Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
doi:10.22028/D291-33938
Title: | Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies |
Author(s): | van den Brink, René Dimitrov, Dinko Rusinowska, Agnieszka |
Language: | English |
Title: | Social Choice and Welfare |
Volume: | 56 |
Issue: | 3 |
Pages: | 509–530 |
Publisher/Platform: | Springer Nature |
Year of Publication: | 2020 |
DDC notations: | 330 Economics |
Publikation type: | Journal Article |
Abstract: | We consider plurality voting games being simple games in partition function form such that in every partition there is at least one winning coalition. Such a game is said to be weighted if it is possible to assign weights to the players in such a way that a winning coalition in a partition is always one for which the sum of the weights of its members is maximal over all coalitions in the partition. A plurality game is called decisive if in every partition there is exactly one winning coalition. We show that in general, plurality games need not be weighted, even not when they are decisive. After that, we prove that (i) decisive plurality games with at most four players, (ii) majority games with an arbitrary number of players, and (iii) decisive plurality games that exhibit some kind of symmetry, are weighted. Complete characterizations of the winning coalitions in the corresponding partitions are provided as well. |
DOI of the first publication: | 10.1007/s00355-020-01290-y |
Link to this record: | urn:nbn:de:bsz:291--ds-339386 hdl:20.500.11880/31233 http://dx.doi.org/10.22028/D291-33938 |
ISSN: | 1432-217X 0176-1714 |
Date of registration: | 26-Apr-2021 |
Faculty: | HW - Fakultät für Empirische Humanwissenschaften und Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
Department: | HW - Wirtschaftswissenschaft |
Professorship: | HW - Prof. Dr. Dinko Dimitrov |
Collections: | SciDok - Der Wissenschaftsserver der Universität des Saarlandes |
Files for this record:
File | Description | Size | Format | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Brink2021_Article_WinningCoalitionsInPluralityVo.pdf | 3,34 MB | Adobe PDF | View/Open |
This item is licensed under a Creative Commons License