Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: doi:10.22028/D291-33348
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Title: Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry
Author(s): Kästner, Lena
Haueis, Philipp
Language: English
Title: Erkenntnis : an international journal of scientific philosophy
Issue: 3
Startpage: 1
Endpage: 26
Publisher/Platform: Springer
Year of Publication: 2019
Publikation type: Journal Article
Abstract: What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literature, the norms for good explanations are directly derived from answers to the metaphysical question of what explanations are. Prominent mechanistic accounts thus emphasize either ontic (Craver, in: Kaiser, Scholz, Plenge, Hüttemann (eds) Explanation in the special sciences: the case of biology and history, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 27–52, 2014) or epistemic norms (Bechtel in Mental mechanisms: philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience, Routledge, London, 2008). Still, mechanistic philosophers on both sides agree that there is no sharp distinction between the processes of discovery and explanation (Bechtel and Richardson in Discovering complexity. Decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Craver and Darden in In search of mechanisms: discoveries across the life sciences, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013). Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation will be accompanied by ontic and epistemic accounts of discovery, respectively. As we will show here, however, recent discovery accounts implicitly rely on both ontic and epistemic norms to characterize the discovery process. In this paper, we develop an account that makes explicit that, and how, ontic and epistemic norms work together throughout the discovery process. By describing mechanism discovery as a process of pattern recognition (Haugeland, in: Having thought. Essays in the metaphysics of mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 267–290, 1998) we demonstrate that scientists have to develop epistemic activities to distinguish a pattern from its background. Furthermore, they have to determine which epistemic activities successfully describe how the pattern is implemented by identifying the pattern’s components. Our approach reveals that ontic and epistemic norms are equally important in mechanism discovery.
DOI of the first publication: 10.1007/s10670-019-00174-7
URL of the first publication: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-019-00174-7
Link to this record: hdl:20.500.11880/30697
http://dx.doi.org/10.22028/D291-33348
ISSN: 1572-8420
0165-0106
Date of registration: 22-Feb-2021
Faculty: P - Philosophische Fakultät
Department: P - Philosophie
Professorship: P - Jun.-Prof. Dr. Lena Kästner
Collections:SciDok - Der Wissenschaftsserver der Universität des Saarlandes

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