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doi:10.22028/D291-33348
Titel: | Discovering Patterns: On the Norms of Mechanistic Inquiry |
VerfasserIn: | Kästner, Lena Haueis, Philipp |
Sprache: | Englisch |
Titel: | Erkenntnis : an international journal of scientific philosophy |
Heft: | 3 |
Startseite: | 1 |
Endseite: | 26 |
Verlag/Plattform: | Springer |
Erscheinungsjahr: | 2019 |
Dokumenttyp: | Journalartikel / Zeitschriftenartikel |
Abstract: | What kinds of norms constrain mechanistic discovery and explanation? In the mechanistic literature, the norms for good explanations are directly derived from answers to the metaphysical question of what explanations are. Prominent mechanistic accounts thus emphasize either ontic (Craver, in: Kaiser, Scholz, Plenge, Hüttemann (eds) Explanation in the special sciences: the case of biology and history, Springer, Dordrecht, pp 27–52, 2014) or epistemic norms (Bechtel in Mental mechanisms: philosophical perspectives on cognitive neuroscience, Routledge, London, 2008). Still, mechanistic philosophers on both sides agree that there is no sharp distinction between the processes of discovery and explanation (Bechtel and Richardson in Discovering complexity. Decomposition and localization as strategies in scientific research, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010; Craver and Darden in In search of mechanisms: discoveries across the life sciences, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2013). Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that ontic and epistemic accounts of explanation will be accompanied by ontic and epistemic accounts of discovery, respectively. As we will show here, however, recent discovery accounts implicitly rely on both ontic and epistemic norms to characterize the discovery process. In this paper, we develop an account that makes explicit that, and how, ontic and epistemic norms work together throughout the discovery process. By describing mechanism discovery as a process of pattern recognition (Haugeland, in: Having thought. Essays in the metaphysics of mind, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, pp 267–290, 1998) we demonstrate that scientists have to develop epistemic activities to distinguish a pattern from its background. Furthermore, they have to determine which epistemic activities successfully describe how the pattern is implemented by identifying the pattern’s components. Our approach reveals that ontic and epistemic norms are equally important in mechanism discovery. |
DOI der Erstveröffentlichung: | 10.1007/s10670-019-00174-7 |
URL der Erstveröffentlichung: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10670-019-00174-7 |
Link zu diesem Datensatz: | hdl:20.500.11880/30697 http://dx.doi.org/10.22028/D291-33348 |
ISSN: | 1572-8420 0165-0106 |
Datum des Eintrags: | 22-Feb-2021 |
Fakultät: | P - Philosophische Fakultät |
Fachrichtung: | P - Philosophie |
Professur: | P - Jun.-Prof. Dr. Lena Kästner |
Sammlung: | SciDok - Der Wissenschaftsserver der Universität des Saarlandes |
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