Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: doi:10.22028/D291-35370
Title: Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters
Author(s): Erdélyi, Gábor
Neveling, Marc
Reger, Christian
Rothe, Jörg
Yang, Yongjie
Zorn, Roman
Language: English
Title: Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Volume: 35
Issue: 2
Publisher/Platform: Springer Nature
Year of Publication: 2021
Free key words: Computational complexity
Electoral control
Plurality with runoff
Veto with runoff
Range voting
Normalized range voting
DDC notations: 330 Economics
Publikation type: Journal Article
Abstract: We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copelandα, maximin, k-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.
DOI of the first publication: 10.1007/s10458-021-09523-9
Link to this record: urn:nbn:de:bsz:291--ds-353703
ISSN: 1573-7454
Date of registration: 2-Feb-2022
Faculty: HW - Fakultät für Empirische Humanwissenschaften und Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Department: HW - Wirtschaftswissenschaft
Professorship: HW - Keiner Professur zugeordnet
Collections:SciDok - Der Wissenschaftsserver der Universität des Saarlandes

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