# A Region in Transition

Politics and Power in the Pacific Island Countries

Edited by

Andreas Holtz

Matthias Kowasch

Oliver Hasenkamp

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Andreas Holtz, Matthias Kowasch, Oliver Hasenkamp (eds)

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Foreword

Dear readers,

the joint history of Germany and the South Pacific dates far back. Romanticized pictures of the "South Sea" played an important role early on, and they still continue to effect us in notions of holiday dreams underneath palm trees. The pictures of white beaches and blue ocean are not false – however, tangible economic interests attracted the first Germans to come to the Pacific at the end of the 19th century, especially the trade with coco products. The next steps then were territorial claims to protect the trade. New Guinea and Samoa were the largest German protectorates and colonial regions in the Pacific.

This is long a thing of the past, but the few decades of colonial presence of the German Empire had manifold impacts on the social history of the islands' populations, which are still visible in the 21st century – in toponyms, in words with German origins, in the basic principles of education or in the continuing social commitment of the churches. Also in the realms of economy and trade there are still significant relations, albeit the emerging Asian states are nowadays unquestionably of more significance for the Pacific Island Countries than the former European colonial powers. New links between Germany and the Pacific nations arise from a similar range of interests in global issues, particularly with regard to the challenges of climate change. Germany welcomes that the intensive endeavors of Pacific Island Countries to pool their interests and voices in regional organizations, e.g. in the "*Pacific Islands Forum*" (PIF), the "*Secretariat of the Pacific Community*" (SPC) and the "*Melanesian Spearhead Group*" (MSG).

During our inaugural visits to the Pacific islands world we were able to experience the economic and political potentials of the young islands countries ourselves. However, the Pacific Islands continues to need strong partners

and external assistance to reach the international standards in the fields of good governance, health, education and sustainable resource exploitation and to overcome the still widespread poverty. The Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations will probably be not attainable without deductions in the South Pacific. Thus it is a matter of course that Germany – also as an important actor within the European Union – remains visible and present in the Pacific in order to contribute to the positive development of the region. In 2012 the Federal Foreign Office sponsored a touring exhibition on the colonial history of Germany in Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Palau. Furthermore Germany supports development projects in the entire Pacific Islands region as the largest donor under the framework of the European Development Fund. The Embassies in Canberra and Wellington finance so-called micro-projects in several islands, which serve as models of sustainable progress on the local level.

This anthology explores the situation in the Pacific Island Countries in a comprehensive way and thereby creates a reference work of special value for everyone who is connected to this fascinating region. We thank the initiators and the authors for this unique compilation!

Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich,
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in New Zealand
Dr. Christoph Müller,
Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Australia

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Introduction

Andreas Holtz/Matthias Kowasch/Oliver Hasenkamp

Around one third of the Earth's surface is covered by the Pacific as the world's largest ocean. The Pacific Ocean is bordered by the booming states of South-East and East Asia, by Latin America and the United States of America as the last remaining superpower. China as a global challenger of American supremacy is preparing to break up existing structures not only in the Pacific. The Pacific island nation Japan is one of the most important economies along with the US, the EU and China. Finally, Russia and the Korean peninsula with its latent crisis are bordering the Pacific Ocean. But this listing hints that when we speak (especially in Europe) of "the" Pacific, we mean the framing periphery, the so-called Pacific Rim States. It is overlooked that the Pacific is not only water but also a political space in the sense of different political units summarized in the term of Pacific Island countries (PICs) that we will deal with in this book.

From the viewpoint of political science, the PICs – not all of them are fully sovereign states in terms of legal sovereignty – are a nearly blank slate. The constitutional constructions are a paradise for jurists and political scientists interested in sovereignty issues. Here we find French overseas territories, US territories and islands under New Zealand sovereignty, a British Overseas Territory, associated states and an Indonesian colony. Besides the 14 (including Australia and New Zealand) independent states, they show various forms of state sovereignty.

The PICs, in addition to the countries of the Lesser Antilles in the Caribian, are the only island countries in the world to form a region and to have

structural similarities, so that they can note a communal nature (Tönnies 2012) and not just common interests (Bull 1985, 2002). Despite these structural similarities as small island states (with the exception of Papua New Guinea), the different islands are very heterogeneous. In Vanuatu alone no less than 110 different languages are spoken by around 200,000 inhabitants. In Papua New Guinea there are even more than 800 languages. Countries like Kiribati have a total land area of around 800 km². At the same time Kiribati islands spread over an area of approximately 3.5 million square kilometers including the exclusive economic zone (EEZ). To refer here to a common state population with similar interests would ignore the complexity of the cultural, political and geographical framework within the country. It is this complexity that prevents conventional approaches to a definition of the Pacific Islands region. If we restrict ourselves to the characteristics of small island states, we have to exclude PNG and the bordering states such as Australia and the US. And even this region would hardly be homogenous given the ethnological division into the sub-regions of Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia. Although terms such as Oceania or the South Pacific include Australia, New Zealand and parts of Indonesia, the question arises whether people from Western Australia define themselves as being a part of the Pacific. And what about the Pacific Island countries north of the equator? So it makes sense to use alternative concepts for the definition of regions.

What is the underlying idea and the motivation behind this book? First, there is a practical motivation, because we all feel connected to the Pacific, do research on Pacific issues and publish scientific papers and books with a focus on the Pacific Islands region. Moreover, we are together organized in the German NGO *Pacific Network*. According to the rules, the network aims to "make known the political, economic, ecological and cultural situation of the Pacific Island countries to a wider audience in Germany. This is primarily

done through publications, lectures and seminars" (http://www.pazifik-netzwerk.org). The network meets once a year in the frame of the general assembly dedicated to a common theme. The meeting in 2014 dealt with "Politics and Power in the Pacific Island States", not least to mitigate the dominance of anthropological work on the Pacific Islands region. The results of this conference has led to this book project. In addition to the participants of the conference, internationally renowned scientists from different disciplines (political science, but also anthropology, law, economics and geography) were asked to contribute. We wanted to open the project to a larger public, which is why we decided to publish in English language and make it available as an open access publication. In this context we would like to thank the University Press of Saarland University for expertise and advice.

Beyond the practical motivation there is a professional motivation. Little research on the Pacific Islands region has been published in Germany dealing with issues of political science, political geography and political anthropology. This may be partly a result of the great distance between Central Europe and the Pacific Islands region. And it is supposed that the region seems to have no practical and theoretical significance for German politics and science. However, this assumption is wrong in many ways. First there are historical relationships between Germany and the Pacific Islands region through the former German colonies (eg Bismark archipelago and Samoa). Secondly, the Pacific is of high political and economic relevance. With China, Japan and the United States the region is bordered by three economic powers, and by the economically emerging countries of Latin America – a fact that an export nation like Germany can not ignore. Politically, the Pacific is the border between East and West. It is probably the line of conflict of the 21st century, although the civil war in Ukraine currently marks a renewal of the Euro-Atlantic conflict line. So, it seems that the 21st century will be a *Pacific*

century, replacing the 20th *American century*. The Pacific may become the region of a new "Great Game" underlined by Hayward-Jones (2013:1) from the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney, who starts her paper with the analysis that "the centre of global economic gravity has moved to the Asia-Pacific" (see also Kowasch and Lindenmann 2014). The Chinese influence in the Pacific is permanently growing, characterized by an expansion of China's sea fleet. Becoming the dominant power in the Pacific, Bejing fills the vacuum left by the Western disinterest (Reilly 2003:63). Nevertheless, the American President Barack Obama highlights the importance of the Pacific for the US: "The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay" (Obama, quoted by Patrick, 2011). His Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) extended the "Great Game" to an Asia-Pacific region from India to the West Coast of the US: "The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of global politics. Stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas, the region spans two oceans - the Pacific and the Indian - that are increasingly linked by shipping and strategy. It boasts almost half the world's population. It includes many of the key engines of the global economy (…). It is home to several of our key allies and important emerging powers like China, India, and Indonesia". So the Pacific is booming!

The question remains unanswered, how the Pacific itself perceives these superlatives. And with the term "Pacific" (not only) Europeans do refer to the periphery, but rather to the Pacific Island countries. We are not denying the importance of the periphical states on the PICs, because their influences can not be overlooked. Yet the periphery seems to overwhelm the core also in the field of research and publications. Anyone who searches political science or political geography papers about the Pacific core region, frequently finds literature on Pacific peripherals.

Whilst there is a large number of journals with the Pacific in their name, in Europe for example the *Journal de la Société des Océanistes* (France) or *Pacific Geographies* (Germany), most of the papers however deal with the periphery. In other European journals, we make the same observation. The *Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs* (Great Britain) and the Polish *Antypody* rarely publish papers concerning politics in the PICs. The theoretical approach to existing problems in the PICs seems to lead a shadowy existence in publications from Europe and even from the Pacific. Most of the journals are also interdisciplinary; none deals only with political science issues.

In the Pacific, including journals from Canada, the US and East Asia, there is a larger offer of journals focussing on the Pacific, eg *The Contemporary Pacific, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Journal of Pacific History, Journal of Pacific Studies, Pacific Affairs, Pacific Focus, Comparative Law Journal of the Pacific, Revue Juridique Polynésienne, Asia Pacific Viewpoint and Pacific Islands Report*. Some of them are clearly differentiated concerning the disciplines, others are interdisciplinary. Nevertheless, most of the articles neglect the PICs. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* even demonstrates this in its name, the former name of the journal was *Pacific Viewpoint*. Moreover, there is still a gap in political science that can hardly be filled by some anthologies (eg vom Busch 1994, Crocombe and Ahmed 1983).

In addition, a theoretical analysis with the phenomenon of the small size of the PICs, with state weakness in several regions and with pronounced asymmetries and disparities in the Pacific Islands region lacks in the context of political science and political geography. Research institutions focussing on other regions are far ahead. The Hamburg *GIGA Institutes of Latin American, African and Asian Studies*, the Latin America program of the prestigious *Berkeley University* and the *Bayreuth International Graduate School for*

African Studies (BIGSAS) are three examples that also provide specific theoretical publications. For the Pacific such institutions are very rare. The research group CREDO *(Centre de Recherche et de Documentation sur l'Océanie)* in Marseille, the Australian SSGM *(State, Society and Governance in Melanesia)* in Canberra *(Australian National University)*, the *East-West-Center* in Hawaii or the *Bergen Pacific Studies Research Group* (Norway) are interdisciplenary orientated or focussed on anthropological topics. The same is true with the *Pacific Studies Association*. Moreover, Germany lacks such research groups or institutions dealing with Pacific Islands issues. With the present book, we want to fill this gap, especially with the focus on the PICs and not on the periphery.

In this context, there is also the question which sometimes ambivalent consequences are arising from small state structures and which are influenced by regional and global (re)organization. Here we are able to identify different levels of analysis, from global structures to regional reflections and local actor analyses. Furthermore, we have to deal with different but not excluding realms like economics, institutions and social structures. These levels and realms are also reflected in the composition of the bookchapters. Theoretically-based contributions by Joanne Wallis and Andreas Holtz (1) form the basis for the description of political structures and their impact on a regional and on a state level of the PICs. Wallis discusses current concepts of regions and proposes a security policy approach that includes the core of the PICs, but also peripheral actors and structures influencing the region. Holtz stresses out that the asymmetries between Australia and the PICs are being interpreted as a material basis for their state identities and their self- and external perceptions which in turn form their interests. After the more theoretical and preparatory contributions of the first book section, the remaining sections investigate regional and local levels in the above mentioned realms. The second

section shows that a political analysis of the PICs can not be done without regarding the peripheral actors. Derek McDougall and Andreas Holtz (2) dedicate their contributions in this book to China and Australia, two states that do not belong to the region in a narrower sense but to its periphery.

A political science analysis must consider various interdependent levels: not only political actions between state and non-state actors, but also political actions within the states. Moreover, it is not sufficient to define states as actors, but also as supranational institutions and economic structures.

Henning Blatt and Oliver Hasenkamp deal with institutional actors. While Blatt analyses the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Hasenkamp chooses a different approach by discussing the influence of the PICs in supranational institutions in the light of their limited political capacities. So the chapter adresses a dimension of power, which goes beyond the mere physical threat potential of (state) actors and deals with soft and smart power responsives (Nye 1990, 2004; Noya 2004) that are more adequate to small states. Hence, the concept of power is more subtle and more dependent on the context here.

After the contributions on regional and international aspects, Peter Lindenmann and Graham Hassall address political home affairs topics. In his article, Lindenmann questions the relationship between national identity, awareness of the Western model of state and state sovereignty. According to Stephen Krasner (1999, 2004, 2005, 2010) he does not see state sovereignty as an entity that exists or does not exist, but that allows intermediate positions with diverse nuances. State sovereignty is always the result of internal recognition of the state by its citizens, which aims at the relationship between state and citizen. From the Western point of view, democracy is considered as the best governance form which raises the question of universality. Therefore, Graham Hassall tries in his article to reflect and explain the state of democracy in the Pacific Island countries.

Policy that deals with power and authority is always put into a context. Classical political approaches are specific on the potential for violence and thus more on the physical power of an actor. In fact, power goes beyond this one-dimensional perspective and involves also economic aspects in terms of imposing interests. For this reason, it is essential to also adress the economic context of the PICs. The contribution of Klaus Schilder deals with global economic structures, which are also reflected in the Pacific Island region and which impact on local economies. However, the question arises who reorganizes local economies, and what the impacts of liberal economic paradigms are.

Even after a reorganization, the economies of the PICs remain limited and weak, which led to the question of whether these states can survive without foreign aid. Another question is how this economic weakness affects the national sovereignty. Geoff Bertram asks of whether small state sovereignty contributes to the wealth of these countries. The concept of state sovereignty must be rethought in light of the structural weakness of the PICs. Eike Blitza presents in his contribution, which concepts and ideas are available for this purpose.

State sovereignty not only depends on material conditions, but also on the acceptance of people towards their state. Such acceptance is based on national identity that appears as an orientation feature in an increasingly confusing world. In this context, Hermann Mückler investigates the role of pre-state regulatory mechanisms in the PICs.

The performance of Pacific economies depends on their wealth of resources. There is a clear distinction between the resource-rich countries of Melanesia and the resource-poor countries of the other Pacific sub-regions. The latter are the so-called MIRAB-economies (Bertram/Watters 1985), which are analysed in the contribution of Tisdell.

In resource-rich countries of the Pacific Islands region, there is a phenomenon that can also be observed in other regions, the so-called resource curse or "durch disesase". The resource thesis links resource wealth to economic crisis and political instability (Auty 1993, Mehlum et al. 2006). In his contribution, Matthias Kowasch investigates the resource curse thesis and reflects the situation of resource-rich Melanesian countries and territories. He makes a comparison study between New Caledonia, Bougainville and West-Papua, whose common point is an independence movement. In New Caledonia, a referendum about political sovereignty will be organized between 2014 and 2018 (Kowasch 2010, 2009).

The political situation in Bougainville, an island that is part of PNG, is in the centre of the chapter written by Volker Böge, who highlights that mining exploitation has not led to economic prosperity and peace. He approaches the topic with a theoretical focus on conflicts (Böge 1998, 2005). The exploitation of the Panguna mine in Bougainville resulted in an ecological desaster, conflicts over compensation payments and finally a civil war for political independence. The civil war is considered as the bloodiest conflict in the Pacific island after the end of World War II. Böge analyses the actual political situation on the island where a referendum about independence should be held between 2015 and 2020.

In addition to the civil war in Bougainville, the violent clashes of different population groups in the Solomon Islands represent another soucre of conflict in the Pacific Islands region. Sinclair Dinnen describes in his chapter the background to the conflict and especially the intervention by the Australian leaded *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI). Since RAMSI was the first military intervention in the Pacific Islands region since 1945, the operation is symbolic for a new era in the Pacific regional policy (Kabutaulaka 2005). Therefore it is advisable to read this chapter together

with the contribution of Henning Blatt and to compare it with the explanations of Manuel Schmitz about East Timor.

Although East Timor does not geographically belong to the Pacific Ocean, the little country can be added both to the group of Small Island states and from the security policy viewpoint to the group of Pacific Island countries. Regional experts such as Ronald May speak of an arc of instability (May 2003), that stretches, according to Brendan Nelson (former Conservative Australian Minister of Defence), from Timor Leste in the West to Fiji in the East (see also McDougall 2009:204). Thus, Manuel Schmitz represents in his chapter the political situation in Timor Leste, which is an independent state since 2002, and describes the background of the Australian intervention. The intervention was justified by a fear of regional destabilization and an assumed lawless space, which could in turn have resulted in refugee flows and terrorism (Fernandes 2005, Kingsbury and Leach 2007). Finally, there are differences of opinion between Australia and East Timor over the maritime border. In these waters there are extensive gas reserves, claimed by both states. In 2006, Australia and East Timor agreed to suspend the border conflict for the next 50 years to exploit the gas reserves in common. Nevertheless, the conflict is an example for the political asymmetry between Australia and its neighbors, rarely for the benefit of the small island states. In addition, the case of East Timor shows that Australia plays the role as a regional power in South-East Asia and the Pacific Islands region, and thus provides an interface between both regions.

The asymmetries between Fiji and Australia are slightly lower. With a population of approx. 904,000, Fiji is actually at the limit to be a small island state whose definition provides up to one million inhabitants (Sutton and Payne 1993). Equipped with a good infrastructure and economically relatively successful, Fiji is an outstanding power within the group of Pacific Island

countries. Fiji is of the few PICs with the capacity to maintain regional and basically global political relationships, highlighted by Steven Ratuva in this book. Despite these favorable conditions, Fiji has extensive domestic problems that destabilize the country. Currently, Fiji is suffering from the effects of the fourth coup in its history. The conflictual situation is partly a result of a deep split in Fiji's ethnic communities of indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians and the serious economic differences between the groups. Therefore, Fiji's "democracy" was described as a facade (Ravuvu 1995) or as Pacific apartheid system (Dasgupta 2000). Manfred Ernst describes the state of the Fijian democracy under military rule on the eve of Fiji's first democratic elections after eight years and discusses how much the life of Fijians is affected by these developments.

There is no doubt that such a book requires the contribution of different people. Thus, we want to take the opportunity to express our deep thanks to all authors for their cooperation and their patience. Without them, this book would not have been possible. We are grateful to the Association of Protestant Churches and Missions for their financial support. We are also thankful to the publishing house, which was always positive despite many delays, and which contributed with expertise to the success of this book. We thank the Pacific Information Centre in Neuendettelsau for support and encouragement. Concerning expert advice, we are particularly grateful to Stewart Firth and Simon Batterbury. In addition, we have to thank Stefanie Ehmke, Rieke Mattiesch and Adrian Fennell as well as Andrew Rennison for translation work and Benjamin Hasenfratz for the editorial work. Finally, our thanks go to our families and friends who have achieved and supported our project over a long period.

Finally, it is almost superfluous to mention that any spelling mistakes are not the responsibility of the authors, but of the editors.

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Frames

Is Oceania a Regional Security Complex?

Joanne Wallis

Abstract: *This chapter considers whether Oceania can be classified as a regional security complex, using Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's regional security complex theory. The central idea of that theory is that security interdependence is regionally patterned and that regions can be identified using the lens of security. While in 2003 Buzan and Wæver concluded that Oceania did not constitute a regional security complex, this chapter argues that developments since that time mean that the region can now be classified in this way. Security challenges have emerged and been securitised, and in order to address them the region has become linked in deep and strong patterns of interaction and interdependence. The transnational nature of many of these challenges mean that it is no longer possible to analyse or resolve the security problems of one Oceanian state in isolation from the remainder of the region.*

Introduction

The region of Oceania, often referred to as the 'South Pacific' or 'Pacific Islands', is most commonly defined in geographic terms as stretching from West Papua in the west to Easter Island in the east. The most important distinguishing feature of the region is the 'smallness' of its states and territories; ranging from Niue with a population of 1.398 people, to Papua New Guinea with a population of approximately 6.5 million. Smallness is said to pose inherent physical, economic, social and political vulnerabilities which make small states 'especially susceptible to harm' (Commonwealth Advisory Group 1997:13; Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank 2000; United Nations 1998). The other important feature is the region's 'islandness'; it consists of 29 island states and territories spread over 30 million km², 98% of which is ocean. Islands are said to experience additional vulnerabilities: remoteness and insularity; small geographic size; and environmental factors (Armstrong/Read 1998; United Nations 2005; Witter et al. 2004).

Oceania is commonly broken up into three broad cultural areas, which although controversial (Thomas 1997), have been generally accepted and adopted within the region. The first is Melanesia, which comprises the arc of islands to the immediate north and east of Australia, starting in the Indonesian province of West Papua, through Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and New Caledonia. In general, Melanesian states have larger populations and land masses, and rich natural resources. Melanesian societies are generally ethnically and linguistically diverse, and tend to be organized around quite egalitarian socio-political structures. The second is Polynesia, which comprises the triangle of states above New Zealand and stretching up to Hawaii. It therefore includes: Samoa, Tonga, Niue, Cook Islands, Tokelau, Wallis & Futuna and French Polynesia. Polynesian islands are small and Polynesian societies tend to be ethnically and linguistically homogenous and

organised around quite hierarchical sociopolitical structures. The third is Micronesia, which comprises the band of islands to the north of Melanesia, starting from Palau in the west, and then moving through Guam, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia to Kiribati in the east. Micronesian islands tend to be very small, homogenous and hierarchical.

This chapter considers whether there is an alternate way to define the region, using Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's regional security complex theory (RSCT). The central idea of RSCT is that "*since most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones, security interdependence is normally patterned into regionally based clusters: security complexes*" (Buzan/Wæver 2003:4). According to RSCT, a region is "*the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other*". Therefore, "*security complexes are regions as seen through the lens of security*" (ibid:43-44). When considering security in Oceania it is useful to use RSCT as it focuses on the security challenges and responses that unite the region, which might help to identify more informative patterns of security interaction and interdependence than geographic or cultural approaches to defining the region.

In their 2003 book, Buzan and Wæver argue that Oceania is an 'unstructured region', and therefore that it does not constitute a regional security complex (RSC). In this chapter I argue that developments since that time mean that Oceania can now be described as a RSC. I begin by describing the main tenets of RSCT. I then use RSCT to analyse events and developments in Oceania in order to argue that a RSC has emerged in the region.

Regional Security Complex Theory

According to RSCT, a RSC is "*a set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from each other*"

(Buzan et al. 1998:201). Desecuritisation occurs when "*actors stop treating each other as security problems and start behaving as friends*" (Buzan/Wæver 2003:56). Securitisation occurs when a security problem is: "*posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, the rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics. The securitising actor therefore claims a right to use extraordinary means or break normal rules, for reasons of security*" (ibid:71)[1].

To identify a RSC it is necessary to study the "security discourses and security practices of actors" (Buzan/Wæver 2003:48). That is, to ask how regional states define security problems and how they interact to respond to these issues. Interaction generates security interdependence, which differentiates a RSC from surrounding security regions. Therefore, RSCT utilises a constructivist approach, which holds that meaning is socially constructed. Consequently, ideational factors such as beliefs, expectations and interpretations are as important as material measures when thinking about a state's priories, behaviour and relationships (Farrell 2002; Onuf 1998; Wendt 1992). A standard RSC will consist of "a pattern of rivalry, balance-of-power, and alliance patterns among the main powers *within* the region" (Buzan/Wæver

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[1] Because Buzan and Wæver are working with assumptions, it also appears possible to explain the process of securitisation using Berger and Luckmann's definition of reification. According to Berger and Luckmann, reification describes the perception of human phenomena as if they were something other than human products, such as existing realities or natural conditions. Reification is therefore the human ability to forget its own creatorship of the human world (Berger/Luckman 1989:89). Within a process of securitisation human assumptions become constructions which are considered and assumed as realities. These assumed realities can be seen as basic motivations for acting. However, it remains unclear whether this acting leads to one or another direction. Therefore, it is also necessary to analyse major influences (see the following article). These might be global turning points and/or interests derived from domestic affairs.

2003:47). Accordingly, RSCs are typically defined by "durable patterns of amity and enmity" (ibid:45). Amity ranges from "genuine friendship to expectations of protection and support", while enmity is a "relationship set by suspicion and fear" (Buzan 1986:189). Great powers can also penetrate a region, and if they come to "dominate a region so heavily that the local pattern of security relations virtually ceases to operate" this may result in "overlay", which hinders the emergence of a RSC (Buzan/Wæver 2003:61).

A RSC does not occur in 'unstructured security regions'. Unstructured regions occur for either or both of two reasons: "*first, where local states have such low capability that their power does not project much, if at all, beyond their own boundaries; and, second, where geographic insulation makes interaction difficult (for example, islands separated by large expanses of ocean)*" (Buzan/Wæver 2003:62). There may also be situations where states in a region have "not yet achieved sufficient cross-linkage" to bind them together in a RSC, which are known as "pre-complexes". There may also be situations where security interdependence is present, but it is too thin and weak to constitute a RSC, known as "proto-complexes" (ibid:4).

Oceania as a RSC

In 1991 Buzan characterised Oceanian states as "very weak powers [that] are separated by vast insulating distances of water" (1991:165), which he said hindered security interaction and interdependence. Buzan argued that the Pacific Islands Forum, the region's primary multilateral political institution, binds Australia, New Zealand and Oceanian states into a "loose security community" (ibid:195). In 2003 Buzan and Wæver argued that Oceania was an unstructured security region, on the basis that the region's states were "too weak as powers to generate security interdependence on a regional level" (2003:64). While they admit that states in Oceania "did develop some loose regional forums", they argue that "distance and water" prevented Oceania

becoming a RSC (2003:136). I argue that developments since they made that assertion mean that Oceania can now be described as a RSC.

Four variables can be used to determine whether a RSC exists in Oceania (Buzan/Wæver 2003). First, there is a boundary which differentiates the Oceania from its neighbours, primarily determined by the membership of the Pacific Islands Forum. Second, there is an anarchic structure, as Oceania is composed of more than two states. Third, polarity is evident, as power is distributed amongst those states. Fourth, there is evidence of the social construction of a RSC, for as discussed below, there are patterns of amity and to a lesser degree, enmity, among Oceanian states.

In order to trace the formation of the Oceania RSC it is necessary to look a "pattern of security connectedness" (Buzan/Wæver 2003:73). The first question is whether issues have been successfully securitised by Oceanian states. If they have been, then the links and interactions between Oceanian states to address these issues much be tracked.

States in Oceania have been increasingly securitised since the late 1990s, facing issues such as civil conflict, coups (or attempted coups), political instability, corruption, population displacement, tension over resource exploitation and distribution, economic underdevelopment, rising crime, natural disasters and climate changes. The primary cause of many of Oceania's security issues is often attributed to the fact that Oceanian states have been characterised as weak both as states (with low levels of political cohesion, particularly in Melanesia) and as powers (as they command small economic, political and military resources, both in absolute terms and relative to non-Oceanian states).

At independence the departing European and Australian colonial powers endowed Oceania with Westphalian-style states. However, particularly in Melanesia, the colonial powers drew their territorial borders arbitrarily and

took little account of existing social and political groupings. This meant that the borders of most Melanesian states were artificial. For example, the Bougainville region was included in Papua New Guinea, even though it is part of the Solomon Islands chain and had many more links to those islands before colonisation (Ghai/Regan 2000). Colonisers also did little to develop a sense of national identity in Melanesian states; few shared one indigenous language, a common culture or a pre-colonial history of unitary rule. As a result, at independence many Melanesians had little sense that they belonged as 'citizens' of their state (Bennett 2002).

Many Oceanian states are also characterised as weak because centralised political institutions have struggled to take hold, again particularly in Melanesia. Prior to European colonial contact Melanesian communities were small; they typically consisted of only a few hundred people, most of whom undertook subsistence horticulture supplemented by fishing, hunting and gathering. Consequently, precontact Melanesian societies were 'stateless', in the sense that they lacked any centralised political or administrative institution equivalent to a government. Sociopolitical leadership status was ascribed in some places, inherited in others, and sometimes acquired through a combination of both. Most commonly, sociopolitical power was held by *big men*, who achieved their status through a combination of competition with others and the cultivation of a personal following through the distribution of wealth, social relationships and the demonstration of skills (such as magic, oratory or bravery) (Kiste 1994; Sahlins 1963). Moreover, for the most part, colonial governments were highly centralised in capitals and other major trading cities, and worked through existing indigenous governance systems. In the lead-up to independence a measure of self-rule was introduced, along with standardised Western models of Westminster-style liberal democratic governance and justice. These new models had very little relevance to most Melanesians,

who continued to live according to local sociopolitical practices in rural areas. This means that the state has 'never existed' for many Oceanians (Kiste 1994; Nelson 2006). For example, there are many areas without any convenient communication system, such as post or telephones (although privately-owned mobile telephone companies are changing this); many people are not connected to a state-supplied electricity system or water service; many children do not have access to secondary schools; and many people do not have access to economic services, such as banks or markets in which to sell their produce. Consequently, non-state actors and entities, including families, clans, tribes or ethnic groups retain social and political authority and engage in economic activity.

The apparent weakness of Oceanian states has contributed to man-made security issues such as conflict and political instability. It has also undermined the region's ability to respond to issues such as natural disasters and climate change. Importantly, most of the region's security issues are internal to its states (although conflict can have cross-border implications, as illustrated by the case of the spill over of conflict in Bougainville into Solomon Islands; see Böge and Dinnen in this volume). As the region's security problems are mostly internal this calls into question the assumption that RSCT should focus on the security concerns of states, given that non-state actors and their systems of security interaction play a significant role in the region. However, given that RSCT focuses on states, I will adopt that focus in this chapter, which will be structured around the interrelated levels of analysis proposed by Buzan and Wæver: the domestic level, particularly "domestically generated vulnerabilities"; the regional level of "state-to-state relations"; and the global level, which covers the region's interaction with neighbouring regions and the role of global powers in the region (2003:51).

The domestic level

Many Oceanian states are characterised as 'weak' when measured against a Westphalian ideal-type, which means that domestic security dynamics are usually dominant. After decolonisation in the late 1960s to early 1980s, instability emerged in the form of unstable political institutions and poor governance, limited economic development, law and order problems and environmental challenges. During this period the most significant security crises were found in Melanesia. In the lead-up to Vanuatu's independence in 1980 pro-French rebels challenged the colonial government, and were only pacified after the newly independent government invited the Papua New Guinea Defence Force to intervene (with Australian support). In 1987 Fiji experienced two coups, when the military removed the elected government and the hereditary monarchy. In 1988 a secessionist and internal conflict ignited in Bougainville. In 1998 societal tensions bubbled over in Solomon Islands between settlers from the island of Malaita and the occupants of the island of Guadalcanal on which the capital, Honiara, is located, culminating in a coup in June 2000.

These events encouraged some commentators to diagnose the *Africanisation* of Oceania (Reilly 2000) or the emergence of an *arc of instability* in the region (Dibb et al. 1999). While these concepts crystallised the challenges facing Oceanian states (Ayson 2007), they were unpopular in the region; Oceanian elites "*hated being lumped together as a single entity: a group of failing countries with a common volatile and insecure identity, limping along together in their collective instability*" (Dobell 2012:33). Scholars argued that the *Africanisation* descriptor narrowly focused on the state's ability to provide public goods, and failed to recognise the importance of political processes and interactions (Fraenkel 2003), and that the so-called *arc of instability*

characterisation was "an overgeneralisation, an oversimplification and even an exaggeration" (Rumley 2006:18; Hegarty 2004).

These characterisations also overlooked the fact that in Oceania's rural, subsistence populations, politics and society is often influenced more by 'traditional' or 'customary' factors than by the assumptions and conventions that undermine the Westphalian state and Westminster political model. In Melanesia's subsistence populations relations between individuals and groups tend to be dominated by reciprocal social obligations, commonly manifested in the ritualized exchange of foods and gifts. Social relations are essentially based on kinship, and rights and obligations flow from membership of an extended family, described as *wantokism*. In Melanesian Pidgin *wantok* literally means 'one who speaks the same language', but it is more generally used to describe "relations of obligation binding relatives, members of the same clan or tribal group, and much looser forms of association" (Dinnen 2001:203). While the *wantok* system and big man leadership model are often characterised as contributing to corruption and cronyism (Fraenkel 2004; Larmour 1997; Moore 2008) they are also a significant provider of social support (White 2007). Indeed, while Oceanian states might not provide significant public goods and services, many are provided by non-state groups such as clans, tribes and churches. As a result, many Oceanians identify "more as members of traditional non-state societal entities (…) than as citizens of the state" (Boege et al. 2008:3). Given the prevailing role of non-state actors, "the 'domestic' *is often as much about the alternative story to the state system* as about what does on *within* particular states" (Buzan/Wæver 2003:224).

Indeed, alternative forms of statehood are emerging in Oceania. These alternative forms have moved beyond trying to (re)build Westminster political institutions to instead working with local socio-political practices and institutions in a process described as "hybridity" (Richmond 2009). Rather than

viewing local practices and institutions as spoilers or hurdles to building liberal democratic institutions, hybridity focuses on their "strength and resilience" (Boege et al. 2009:13-14). From this perspective it proposes a pluralistic approach which acknowledges local agency and power structures and seeks to work with them to achieve mutually agreed outcomes (Richmond 2010).

The regional level

The presence of a RSC depends on significant levels of security interdependence among a group of states, which requires substantial interaction among them. In Oceania regional security interaction has been generated more by weakness than by strength, and there has been relatively little of the enmity that is assumed to emerge when states live under anarchy.[2] Indeed, the most common forms of conflict have been domestic. Moreover the ex-colonial powers, particularly Australia, France and the United States, have retained a strong presence, which has minimised the likelihood of conflict between states. Therefore, until the late 1990s the level of security interaction in Oceania was arguably too low to sustain a RSC.

The situation changed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, when transnational security issues such as drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, illegal migration and HIV/AIDS emerged to challenge the region and its individual states. The threat of terrorism was also mooted (Wainwright 2003), although it was treated with scepticism (Greener-Barcham/Barcham 2006). Natural disasters and the effects of climate change (including rising sea levels) posed increasing challenges, as did the over-exploitation of natural resources, particularly fisheries, forests and minerals. Domestic security issues

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[2]   It is debatable whether the degree of enmity is low because Oceanian states have had insufficient capabilities, and whether they would act more like the competitive, power-maximising states identified by neorealists if they had sufficient capabilities.

created by political instability and conflict also attracted attention at the regional level, as the Bougainville conflict highlighted how conflict in one state could cross borders into another, in this case Solomon Islands. Each of these issues was in turn securitised by the region's states.

In response, the Pacific Islands Forum (see Blatt in this volume), which has a membership comprising all independent states in the region, Australia and New Zealand, strengthened its role. Although the Forum had been created in 1971, it was not until this period that it began to encourage security interaction and interdependence. While the existence of a regional organisation does not necessarily indicate the existence of a RSC, the key was the Forum's move into military-political security. The Forum created a *Regional Security Committee* in 1988 that allows Forum members, representatives of regional law enforcement secretariats, stakeholders and development partners to discuss regional security concerns, securitises issues and promote cooperation to encourage coordinated responses to securitised threats.

The Regional Security Committee's functions have been elaborated by a series of declarations made by Pacific Islands Forum members. The first, the 1992 *Honiara Declaration*, was a response to concerns about the potential impact of transnational crime, and sought to promote law enforcement cooperation across the region. This was followed by the 1997 *Aitutaki Declaration*, which agreed to enhance existing security cooperation and widened the region's security agenda to include threats from natural disasters, environmental damage, economic, social and environmental policies and external threats to state sovereignty. The 2000 *Biketawa Declaration* was the most important development. While it acknowledged the principle of 'noninterference in the domestic affairs of another member state', it asserted the need that in a 'time of crisis or in response to members' request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being

part of the Pacific Islands extended family'. The 2002 *Nasonini Declaration* then committed Forum members to international counter-terrorism measures implemented after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks. The 2004 *Auckland Declaration* further committed Forum leaders to greater regional cooperation on security issues. In 2005 Forum members also agreed to the *Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*, which provides a framework for enhanced regional cooperation, including on security issues. While implementation of the Plan atrophied, the Forum has recently conducted an extensive review in order to generate new momentum for its implementation. Forum members have also signed the 1985 *South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty* and the 1995 *Waigani Convention to Ban the Importation into Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes within the South Pacific Region.*

The *Pacific Islands Forum* also created institutions and mechanisms that encourage regional interaction to address security issues. The *Forum Fisheries Agency* helps Oceanian states sustainably manage their fisheries resources. In 1992 Forum members adopted the *Niue Treaty,* which provides for enhanced cooperation on the monitoring, control and surveillance of fishing. Beyond the Forum, the *Secretariat of the Pacific Community* runs a *Regional Maritime Program*, which assists Oceanian states to implement measures for the safety and security of shipping. The *South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation* plays a role in ensuring the sustainability of non-tuna fisheries in the region. Other regional security agencies that promote regional interaction and interdependence include the *Pacific Islands Law Officers Network*, the *Oceania Customs Organisation*, the Pacific *Immigration Directors' Conference*, the *Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police*, the *South*

Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network and the *Pacific Aviation Security Office*.

Although Australia and New Zealand are members of the *Pacific Islands Forum*, Buzan and Wæver classify them as part of the Southeast Asian RSC (2003:158). Until the late 1990s Australia and New Zealand had been reluctant to become overly involved in addressing Oceania's security issues. Since that time, Australia and New Zealand have increasingly advocated the expansion of the Forum's military-political role, actively securitised issues facing the region and encouraged regional responses to these securitised issues. The change in Australia and New Zealand's approach can be partly attributed to the events of 11 September 2001. In the aftermath of those terrorist attacks, the international community became concerned about the threat posed by weak states, and 'failed' states were identified as a major threat to international order and security (United States 2002). Australia and New Zealand securitised the perceived weakness of Oceanian states, which was seen as making them vulnerable to terrorists or transnational criminal groups (Firth 2005; Henderson 2006; Herr 2004; Shibuya 2005).

The securitisation of state weakness encouraged Australia and New Zealand to embark on an era of *new interventionism* in Oceania, starting with their light-touch intervention in Bougainville in 1997 and then the much heavier-footprint *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI) in 2003 (Dinnen 2004; see also Blatt in this volume). This interventionism was guided by the belief that they needed to restore stability in weak Oceanian states in order to enhance their own security. While Australia and New Zealand already had extensive development assistance programs, the new aspect of their policy was that they adopted a *whole-of-government* approach which involved more government agencies (McLeod/Dinnen 2008). Australia and New Zealand inserted police officers and public servants directly into

Oceanian police forces and government departments to operate as employees of those agencies, rather than as technical advisers or consultants.

The most significant manifestation of this new interventionism and sign of increased security interaction in the region was the RAMSI, which deployed at the invitation of the Solomon Islands government and with the endorsement of the *Pacific Islands Forum* under the *Biketawa Declaration*. The RAMSI initially consisted of over 330 police offers and 1,880 military personnel from Australia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji; although the majority came from Australia. Phase I of the operation was designed to restore law and order, while Phase II was to assist the recovery of the institutions of governance and the economy. In its early stages the RAMSI managed to restore security, implement a gun amnesty, arrest militia leaders and clean-up the police force.

As the RAMSI achieved initial successes, in 2004 the Australian government decided that Nauru was 'on the verve of state failure'. It subsequently entered into an agreement with Nauru, under which it provided a Secretary of Finance and Director of Police, each supported by Australian advisers, to improve financial management and strengthen the professional standards of the *Nauru Police Force*.[3] Australia's operations in Nauru were later strengthened when *Pacific Islands Forum* leaders agreed to support Nauru under the *Biketawa Declaration*. This agreement created the *Pacific Regional Assistance for Nauru* in 2005 as a mechanism for Australia and other countries to operate in Nauru, another indication of security interaction between the region's states.

In 2004 Australia also embarked on the bilateral *Enhanced Cooperation Program* (ECP) in Papua New Guinea. The ECP involved the insertion of 230

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[3]   Agreement between Australia and Nauru concerning additional police and other assistance to Nauru, Melbourne, 10 May 2004.

Australian police advisers into the Papua New Guinea police force and Australian public servants seconded into government agencies. Like the RAMSI, the ECP attracted relatively widespread public support in Papua New Guinea. However, it was resented by certain political leaders and Australia had to withdraw its police in May 2005, after the constitutionality of arrangements that gave Australian police immunity were successfully challenged.

The controversy surrounding the ECP signalled emerging questions about Australia and New Zealand's new interventionism, including whether it was managing to strengthen 'weak' states and achieve sustainable gains (Fry/Kabutaulaka 2008). These questions became louder in April 2006, when rioters destroyed much of the Solomon Islands' capital after the national election and an increased Australian military deployment was required to restore stability. Therefore, it is worth questioning how closely Australia and New Zealand's new interventionism agenda corresponded with the security interests of Oceanian states. As noted, much of Australia and New Zealand's interest in the region was motivated by their securitisation of state weakness. This meant that security considerations were a driving force of their actions and they did not critically analyse what state 'weakness' means in Oceania, and the complex and diverse reasons why Oceanian states might be weak. As they focused on perceived threats such as terrorism and transnational crime, they also risked overlooking more profound domestic human security issues such as personal safety, gender equity, access to education and health care and equitable access to economic opportunities.

In keeping with this approach Australia has also shifted partial responsibility for one of its securitised threats – the arrival of asylum seekers by boat – into Oceania. This shift began in 2001 with the Australian government's *Pacific Solution*. Under this program, asylum seekers who travelled by boat were processed in either Papua New Guinea or Nauru, according to bilateral

agreements with both countries. In order to manage these processing facilities, large numbers of Australian and other expatriate workers were deployed, particularly in Nauru. The consequences of this program were particularly damaging in Nauru, which became increasingly dependent on Australian funding and personnel (Maclellan 2013). While a new Australian government ended the *Pacific Solution* in 2008, that government later re-introduced the program in 2013, this time with the intention of both processing and settling asylum seekers in Papua New Guinea and Nauru. While none have yet been resettled in Papua New Guinea, approximately 100 have been resettled in Nauru, which is already generating challenges as they struggle to integrate into the Nauruan community.

Australia, and to a lesser extent, New Zealand, are also prominent security actors in the region via their extensive defence and policing support. In particular, the *Australian Defence Cooperation Program* supports military forces in Papua New Guinea, Tonga and Fiji (the latter's support has been suspended since the 2006 military coup) and police and other security forces elsewhere in the region. Australia also runs the *Pacific Patrol Boat Program*, under which boats and ongoing assistance are provided to Oceanian states. Australia and New Zealand also convened the inaugural *South Pacific Defence Ministers Meeting* on 1-2 May 2013, to consider opportunities to enhance regional cooperation, which was attended by Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea and Tonga. Australia and New Zealand also have extensive policing deployments, with officers involved in active policing, training, capacity building and the provision of resources. Most notably, the *Australian Federal Police* run the *Pacific Police Development Program*, which provides training, capacity building and leadership at a regional level and bilaterally. Australia also funds the *Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre* in Fiji and bilateral transnational crime teams.

Australia and New Zealand's extensive involvement in Oceania means that they may considered to be either members of the Oceania RSC, to merely penetrate the region, or to constitute an overlay. As they are members of the *Pacific Islands Forum* and have been heavily involved in securitising issues and in responding to security threats in the region, their security interests appear to be sufficiently interrelated and interdependent with Oceanian states to constitute more than mere penetration. It is also difficult to argue that they constitute an overlay, as they are not so dominant that local security relations have ceased to operate, as Oceanian states are increasingly forming alternative regional and sub-regional organisations that are playing a military-political role. Therefore, it appears that Australia and New Zealand are members of the Oceania RSC.

However, this situation may be changing. Outside Australia and New Zealand's reach, Melanesian states have strengthened the role of the *Melanesian Spearhead Group* (MSG). The MSG consists of Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji and the FLNKS (*Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste*, representing the Kanak population of New Caledonia; see Lindenmann in this volume). While the MSG was formed in 1988, it has taken an increasingly activist role. This has been encouraged by Fiji, which has been suspended from the *Pacific Islands Forum* since its military coup in 2006, and facilitated by China, which has funded the MSG Secretariat in Port Vila. The MSG had primarily focused on economic and cultural matters, but has recently expanded to political and security issues. Importantly, the MSG has discussed creating a regional rapid response security force to respond to threats to regional and international borders, as well as to natural disasters and internal conflicts. The MSG has already established a *Humanitarian and Emergency Response Coordination Centre*, focused on coordinating responses to natural and man-made disasters.

In addition, allegedly with funding from China, Russia and some Arab states, in 2010 Fiji held an 'Engaging the Pacific' meeting as a rival to the *Pacific Islands Forum*. In 2013 this meeting evolved into the *Pacific Islands Development Forum* (PIDF), which explicitly excludes Australia, New Zealand and the United States, but which includes civil society and private sector actors. In addition, 30 countries from Europe, Africa, Latin America, North America and Asia attended the meeting as observers. Oceanian leaders have agreed to establish a PIDF Secretariat in Fiji, possibly with Russian, Chinese or Kuwaiti funding (Tarte 2013). Fiji has also encouraged Oceanian states to form an alternative caucus grouping at the United Nations, the 'Pacific Small Island Developing States' group, which has effectively replaced the Forum in this role and minimised Australia and New Zealand's influence.

The global level

The increased willingness of Oceanian states to act outside the *Pacific Islands Forum*, and more broadly outside Australia and New Zealand's spheres of influence, has been encouraged by developments at the global level. Given the smallness of Oceanian states, both as states and as powers, it does not require many resources for external actors to make a significant impact on local security relations. Traditionally, the most significant external powers involved in the region were France, which retains control of New Caledonia, Wallis and French Polynesia, and the United States, which maintains formal associations with Hawaii (which is part of the United States), American Samoa (unicorporated territory) and several Micronesian territories: Guam (organized unincorporated territory) and the Northern Mariana Islands (Commonwealth of the USA); Marshall Islands, Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia have *Compacts of Free Association* with the United States.

France and the United States work with Australia and New Zealand under the *Quadrilateral Defence Cooperation Group* to coordinate air and maritime

surveillance in the region. These states also cooperate via the United States-run Pacific Partnership, which since 2006 has conducted annual humanitarian assistance missions. Australia, New Zealand and France are also party to the 1992 *FRANZ (France, Australia and New Zealand) Agreement*, and to subsequent bilateral agreements, to promote cooperation in their responses to natural disasters and to facilitate defence cooperation in the region.

While France and the United States have penetrated the region, until recently Australia has exercised a degree of primacy, if not hegemony, in Oceania. Global developments are changing this situation. Most significantly, the 'rise' of China (Kang 2007; see also McDougall in this volume) has motivated the United States to 'pivot' or 'rebalance' to the Asia-Pacific (Roundtable 2013). There are claims that the United States is seeking to balance', 'deter' or 'contain' China (Christensen 2011; Friedberg 2011; Xiang 2012), although some commentators identify the potential for the United States to build a 'concert of powers' (White 2012) or achieve 'accommodation' with China (Etzioni 2013).

This changing power dynamic is being played out on a smaller scale in Oceania, where it has been argued that "China's entrance into the region has accelerated the erosion of the United States as a unipolar power", and that consequently that the United States is engaged in 'soft balancing' against China (Lanteigne 2012:23). While China's Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs Cui Tiankai declared in 2012 that China is "*here in this region not to seek any particular influence, still less dominance*" (quoted in Flitton 2012), in 2011 then United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admitted her concern that "*[w]e are in a competition with China (...) China is in there [in Papua New Guinea] every day in every way trying to figure out how it's going to come in behind us, come in under us*" (quoted in Quinn 2011).

Given how marginal Oceania is to the international strategic environment there is only a minimal risk that China and the United States will engage in zero-sum competition for military influence in the region (Dibb 2012). However, the United States has increased its number of high-level visits to Oceania and has engaged more actively in multilateral regional institutions. It has also increased its strategic military deployments, most notably expanding its base in Guam, its *shiprider* program and the *Pacific Partnership*. The United States has also increased its aid, trade and investments and opened the USAID Pacific Island Regional Office in Papua New Guinea and the new regional defence, environmental and labour hub at its embassy in Fiji. The United States has also stepped-up its relationships with its traditional allies in the region, Australia and New Zealand.

While the United States has made large aid and trade pledges to Oceania, whether they are approved by Congress and translated into actual expenditure is not guaranteed, particularly given the United States' budgetary restraints. Indeed, the Congressional Research Service has cautioned that: "*the depth of the Obama Administration's 'rebalancing' toward the Asia-Pacific region (…) may be called into question as time goes on. As yet, it does not appear that the Administration has translated its pronouncements into an across-the-government plan to implement the new elements of the strategy*" (Manyin 2012:10). In this regard, although the United States has increased its military engagements in Micronesia, it has more marginal interests in the rest of Oceania.

Similarly, although there is a body of so-called *China threat* literature which claims that Oceania could provide a testing ground for China's strategic power against the United States (Dobell 2007; Henderson/Reilly 2003; Shie 2010; Windybank 2005), and China has invested in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, and increased its aid, trade and investment in Oceania,

several commentators argue that Oceania is "marginal in China's strategic landscape" (Yang 2009:145; Zhang 2007). More by accident than design, China's influence in the region has been enhanced by the response of Australia, New Zealand and the United States to the 2006 Fiji coup. These powers condemned the coup and adopted sanctions against the Fijian regime, in the expectation that their pressure would encourage a return to democracy. The Fijian regime instead adopted a *Look North* policy and sought closer engagement with China, other East Asian partners and global emerging powers.

Therefore, the United States' increased penetration of Oceania should instead be understood as "*reasserting the status quo rather than issuing a strategic challenge to China*" (Firth 2013:288). Similarly, while China is enhancing its penetration of the region, "*there is not sufficient evidence to suggest that China has a clearly defined and well-coordinated strategy to fill a power vacuum in the Pacific*" (Zhang 2010:50). This suggests that neither state is engaged in a concerted strategy to compete for influence in Oceania.

Other external powers, such as Japan, Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Iran, Cuba, Russia and the United Arab Emirates are also penetrating Oceania as aid donors and diplomatic partners, widening the region's choice of aid partners of regional states. However, there is no suggestion that these states are engaged in deliberate competition for power in Oceania, beyond satisfying their own goals of diplomatic recognition or improved international influence.

It is not necessarily important whether these external powers are actually competing for influence in Oceania. Instead, what is important is how Oceanian states interpret their behaviour, since these interpretations can be enough to influence behaviour. In this regard, Oceanian leaders have encouraged an interpretation that there is emergent competition for influence in the region. Winnie Anna Kiap, Papua New Guinea High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, has observed that external powers are increasingly competing for

influence because "*when a vacuum is left [by the withdrawal of the United States and the United Kingdom], another country moves in to fill it*" (quoted in Tahboub 2013). Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O'Neill has observed that Papua New Guinea will take advantage of the interest that these external powers have in Papua New Guinea and look for economic opportunities in Asia (O'Neill 2012). The Fijian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, Solo Mara, has observed that: "Washington has ramped up its presence and involvement in response to China's increasing abilities and influence", which he interpreted as "Washington's realization that is must be more involved in the South Pacific or risk losing its influence entirely" (Mara 2013). Former Prime Minister of Fiji, Sitiveni Rabuka, has similarly observed that China is 'filling a vacuum' in the region (quoted in Radio New Zealand 2013). However, this perception is not absolute, with Henry Puna, Prime Minister of the Cook Islands, observing that: "*our engagement with major powers should not be viewed as the subject of competition, but as representative of shared goals of mutual benefit and reciprocity*" (Puna 2013).

The interpretation that external powers are competing for influence has opened up global opportunities for Oceanian states, which no longer necessarily need to identify themselves as falling within an uncontested Australia and New Zealand sphere of influence. Instead, Oceanian states may believe that it has more choice as to which external power (or powers) they engage with (Porter/Wesley-Smith 2010). Indeed, Oceanian states may believe that they are able to play competing great powers off against each other, as they might provide a determining factor in a balance of power situation, if enough side with one great power over the other. Oceanian states already appear to be astutely playing-off perceived Chinese and American competition in order to access increased development assistance, concessional loans, military support and international influence. However, in the unlikely event that these great

powers begin to compete for political-military influence in Oceania, this might have security implications for Oceanian states, which could find themselves drawn into a wider global battle for influence.

Conclusion

The chapter has considered whether there is an alternate way to define Oceania, using RSCT. Based on the analysis above, it appears that a RSC has formed in Oceania. Since the late 1990s security challenges have emerged and been securitised. In order to address them the region has become linked in deep and strong patterns of interaction and interdependence. The transnational nature of many of these challenges mean that it is no longer possible to analyse or resolve the security problems of one Oceanian state in isolation from the remainder of the region. The Pacific Islands Forum has played an important role in this process of securitisation, interaction and interdependence, particularly as a result of its 2000 *Biketawa Declaration*, which has been used to justify interventions in Solomon Islands and Nauru. Australia and New Zealand have also played an important role in encouraging the securitisation of threats and in addressing those threats, driven by the characterisation of the region as an *arc of instability*. Therefore, a security orientated definition of the region, which includes members of the Forum, Australia and New Zealand, differs from conventional geographic or ethnological approaches. However, in recognition that the arc of instability characterisation is highly controversial and that Australia and New Zealand's interests do not necessarily always accord with those of Oceanian states, the region is increasingly creating new mechanisms that exclude these powers. The possible emergence of new states in Bougainville and New Caledonia might also change the orientation of the region. Whether these developments affect the Forum's role, and consequently the existence of the Oceanian RSC in its current form, remains to be seen.

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Regional Action in the Face of Global Turning Points and Regional Asymmetries

Theoretical considerations on the regional political and economic transition in Oceania

Andreas Holtz

Abstract: *The following article attempts to theoretically capture a theory for the change of the regional architecture in the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) with the focus on the dimensions security policy and economics. Based on the structural weaknesses of insular small states on the one side and Australia as regional power on the other side of a very pronounced power continuum, the equally distinctive asymmetries between Australia and PIC are being interpreted as a material basis for the state identities and self- and external perception, which in turn form the base for interest-driven action. Yet to analyse the nature of these actions – co-operative/constructive, neutral versus self-serving and conflicting – other variables like global turning points, which influence the action focus of regional policy-makers, need also to be looked at.*

Keywords: Regional order, asymmetries, constructivism, Oceania, Australia, structural change

Introduction

The region of the Pacific insular small states[1], or in short the Island Pacific or Pacific Island Countries (PICs)[2], shows some specific features especially with regards to its small stateness and its island situation. While the term "insular small state" is generally suitable for the states of this region, it is not free from defects. The classification of small stateness for instance is somewhat arbitrary for want of a consistent definition of the word "small". Notwithstanding of this inconsistency, the specialist literature points to a limit of a million inhabitants (Maass 2009:64ff; Sutton/Payne 1993:582). The term "insular" in its basic definition signifies an area surrounded by water while not exhibiting any land borders[3]. In the following, the debate about small

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[1] In this context only states, which are recognized as fully sovereign states should be considered. Other units without full sovereignty will not be taken into account in this contribution (see Blitza in this volume). States with full sovereignty in Island Pacific are Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. These twelve states, characterized by their structural attributes as insular microstates (with the exception of PNG), form the Pacific core.

[2] Within the scope of this contribution the term PICs signifies a political region while Island Pacific means a geographical region *excluding* Australia and New Zealand. Oceania refers the geographical term *including* Australia and New Zealand (to get information about the notion of region in the context of security politics see Wallis in this volume). An economical perspective of region is provided by Goertz and Powers. They argue from a social-constructivist point of view that regions are constructed by regional economic institutions which themselves are already regarded as institutions social constructs (Powers/Goertz 2011:2388). In contrast to other approaches they do not argue exclusively; thus states may be part of more than one region (ibid.:2391), like for example Turkey or Australia. Overall, it turns out that regions become regions simply by denotation. Region therefore fulfill the requirements of reification as an extreme form of objectification defined as the process, by which human activity and society attain the character of objectivity (Berger/Luckmann 2009:94f).

[3] This means that by this definition PNG could not be considered as insular small state because of its number of population and its land border with Indonesia. As integral part of Melanesia, PNG displays cultural commonalities with the other PICs. Therefore PNG is generally viewed as a PIC and not as part of Southeast Asia. Timor Leste (see Schmitz in this volume) presents a similar confusing picture. Although Timor Leste shares a land border with Indonesia, has slightly more than one million inhabitants and is geographically considered as part of Southeast Asia, the state is counted to the group of PICs as reference region because of the Australian influence, its political instability and its structural problems. Together with the Indonesian region of Aceh, Timor Leste marks the Western beginning of the

stateness, state weakness and its functional capacity will briefly be reflected here in order to create a link between real circumstances and the resulting asymmetries and identities, their perception and affordances, eventually proposing an explanation for the change in the region.

PICs as an own state group

The PICs form a conglomerate of states in a sea area, which encompasses about one third of the global surface. The term conglomerate already points to a certain ambivalence as it means both accumulation as well as heterogeneous blend, suggesting resemblances and differences at the same time. The differences within the PICs become especially clear when looking at the tripartite structure of the subregions Melanesia, Polynesia and Micronesia (see chart 1 in the appendix) while the allocation of certain signs from signifier to signifiant respectively classifications of non-Western systems by representatives of Westerners are always to be observed with caution (see in general Chakrabarty 2010:160f).

At the same time the PICs also exhibit the similarities of a state group reflected especially by their insularity as well as by their concept of a small state. These common characteristics make the states of the reference region in the Pacific a *community* of states. To this effect, the PICs could be called a regional community embedded in a global *society*. The basic idea of community points at the structural resemblance of collective parts. Given their core data (see chart 3 in the appendix) and specific mutual challenges, the PIC form a structure i.e. a certain way, of linking up as elements of a system and establishing an order (Lüdtke 2007:639). This concept of structure addresses the nature of the PICs, whereby common characteristics manifest common orientations. Likewise does every state in itself also form a system marked by

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so called *Arc of Instability* (see figure 1 on page 77, see also Dibb et al. 1999:18, May 2003), ending with Tonga in the East (Dobell 2012:33f, Evans 2012:2).

a certain structure. Finally, external norms and structures also have an impact on the Pacific states whilst encompassing their whole outside – the international system of global relations, economic systems or simply ecological incidents to name but a few.

Along with the Lesser Antilles, the PICs are the only states worldwide, which are regionally adjoined at least by maritime borders, and besides their nature as states display some further structural common characteristics. Like Tönnies points out, we here have a communal character of the same nature (Tönnies 2012:231ff; Lichtblau 2012) and not just a state society with common interests (Bull 2002, 1985:31-49)[4]. In spite of these structural similarities as insular small states, there is hardly any region with more heterogeneous units. In Vanuatu alone, 200,000 inhabitants communicate in no less than 110 (in PNG even more than 800) different languages. States like Kiribati dispose of a mere land area of 811 square kilometers, yet the islands of Kiribati stretch on a surface of about 3.5 millions square kilometers of the so-called *exclusive economic zon*e (EEZ). To refer to the PICs as *one* state territory and *one* population would obviously ignore this complexity.

Characteristics of insular small stateness: Structures and small states

One problem when dealing with small states arises when trying to define a universal concept of small stateness (see Dommen 1985:1-15). The basic difficulty is the defintion of the term 'small' or 'smallness'– particularly as the number of states with up to a million inhabitants accredited under international law has been rising steadily up to the millennium[5]. Nevertheless, the

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[4]   In this context Dirk Gerdes (1998:648) speaks about characteristics of homogeneity of a region, which can be described as natural within the meaning of a *conservative-organicistic conception* and/or functional in terms of a *unitary-republican conception*.

[5]   In 1975, 33 states belonged to this group. Until 1980 this number increased to 39. Since 1995 the number has remained stable around 42 of 194 states (= 21.65%) (see www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ retrieved 12 July 2014). Many states are threatened by secessionist aspirations. Geser assumed 70 of these aspirations to the millennium turn (Geser

generally approved and instrumentalised quantitative limit of one million inhabitants shows the arbitrariness of demarcation, particularly since the number of inhabitants is always dynamic and does not reveal a lot about the qualitative abilities of a state.

Looking back in time, the definition of small stateness has displayed a wide scope of interpretations. The spectrum ranges from authors, who consider small stateness as a structural determinant (Buchholz 1984:154-156) to those who dismiss this (Holtz 2008). Small stateness carries both positive as well as negative connotations (Anderson 1999:31). Very small states are usually considered pro-democracy, while this does not seem to be true for larger small states (Anckar 2010:6; see in addition Hassall in this volume). The economic research agrees on the economic vulnerability of small states (see e.g. Briguglio 1995), while the consequences of this within the scope of a small state openness are equally considered as an advantage (Easterly/Kraay 2001:104f; Armstrong/Read 2002:452) as well as a disadvantage (e.g. Srinivasan in 1986)[6]. Clearly the concept of quantity is an obstacle to all definition attempts, consequently, just attributes and characteristics of small states can be determined to serve as a base for analysis[7].

Another method equates small states with weak states, marking them as having certain capacity deficits by definition (see table 1). Here the state efficiency plays an important role (see chart 2 in the appendix). Does a

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2001:98). Referring to the *Unrepresented Nations and People's Organization*, Beary counted in 2008 22 secessionist aspirations. The collapse of a bigger or big state increases the spreading of small states.

[6] According to some authors, structural disadvantages of small stateness can even be compensated (Ray 2003:179).

[7] Exceptions are for example Tom Crowards (2002) and Charles Taylor (1969). Using indicators like the size of a territory, population and GDP for a cluster analysis, Crowards compiles a statistically meaningful classification while Taylor's results show absolute figures. According to Taylor, a state is to be considered as small with a territory size less than 142,822 km², a population less than 2,928,000 people and with a GDP of less than 1,583 Mio. US$. However, Taylor's approach is discrediting itself by using figures of 1969 and therefore only referring to a certain point in time.

(small) state comply with the demands of modern democracy, rule of law and welfare state and at what level does it develop economically and socially?

Table 1: Weak states compared to non weak states (c.f. Handel 1991:52, 53)

	Weak State	Strong State
Population	Very small	Very large
Area	Very small	Very large
Economy	1) GNP small in absolute terms	1) GNP very high in absolute terms
	2) Little or no heavy industry	2) Very large, highly developed heavy industry (including weapons)
	3) High degree of specialization in a barrow range of products	3) Very high degree specialization in large variety of products
	4) Small domestic market, hence high dependency on foreign markets for imports and exports	4) Very large domestic market, hence little dependence on foreign export/import trade
	5) R and D very low in absolute terms	5) R and D very high in absolute terms
	6) High dependendce on foreign capital	6) No dependence on forein capital
Military Power	1) Cannot defend itself against external threats by its own strength; high ot total dependence on external help	1) Can defend itself by its own power against any state or combination of states; very little reliance on external support
	2) Total (or very high) dependence on weapon aquisition in foreign countries	2) Has full array of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems
	3) A high proportion of strength alway mobilized or at its disposal; longer-range war potential very low	3) Domestic production of all weapon systsems. Large standing armies, combined with very high war potential
Inter-national System	1) Limited scope of interests (usually to neighboring and regional areas)	1) Global interests
	2) Litle or no influence on the balance of power (or the nature of the system)	2) Weighs heavily in world balance of power; shapes the nature of the international system
	3) Mainly passive and reactive in foreign policy	3) Pursues a dynamic and active foreign policy
	4) Tends to minimize risks, especially vis-a-vis the powers	4) Tends to maximize gains (rather than minimize risks)
	5) Can be penetrated relatively easy	5) Relatively difficult to penetrate (depends on nature of the internal political system)
	6) Strong support for international law and norms and of international organizations	6) Low regard for international law and organizations; prefers power and summit policies

In this reference frame not all small states are automatically accounted for as weak. Just as 'smallness', the term 'weakness' always needs to be viewed in relative terms – albeit in a reduced manner. What for example are the qualifications for being considered developed or not? This apparent vagueness

makes it important to apply a more operational approach in favour of a qualitative concept rather than a quantitative definition (Hey 2003:3). According to such concept, weakness goes beyond the state efficiency and mere functioning, but rather refers to insufficient capacities and with it the vulnerability of a state. Small and/or weak states are more susceptible to various shocks of any kind, insular small states are even more affected (Easter 1999:408; Briguglio 1995:1622)[8].

Apart from this susceptibility, weakness presents itself above all in comparison to others (Knudsen 1996:5). Only by such comparison does a small state become a small state.

This relative concept is also described by Hans Geser (2001) who classes 'small' as 'immanent' ('substantial'), 'contingent' ('relational') and as 'perceived' ('attributive') smallness (Geser 2001:89ff). This substanial smallness depicts certain features of a state such as its territorial size, population etc., and is thus quantifiable. The relational smallness is more difficult to allocate, as the state needs to be looked at both as a whole and in relations with others. Lastly, the attributive smallness addresses the self-perception of a state (ibid.:90).

The concept of vulnerability and the related efficiency of states also plays a part in the concept of small states by Hein (1985), he thematizes the state ability to support its population. Here, the level of analysis is no longer the state, but the individual citizen. The small stateness is secondary, while its

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[8]   Easter shows that among the 28 most vulnerable states belong 25 to the group of small states. 18 of those 25 states are also island states (Easter 1999:408). Critics like Paul Sutton object that Easter's vulnerability index is one-sided directed on economics and environment: "The Vulnerability Index provides an excellent measure of the economic and environmental vulnerability of all developing countries and underlines the particular vulnerabilities of small states but does not bring out their social, cultural and political vulnerabilities" (Sutton 1999:397). It would be desirable to have a multidimensional vulnerability index underlining possible interdependencies between political, economic, social and cultural consequences of vulnerabilities.

functionality is in the main focus. Although said problems are obviously connected with the smallness of a state, here it remains in the background (ibid.:21). His concept of smallness therefore does not offer a definition, however touches on it through characterizations and descriptions of other definition attempts and analyses.

Keohane's (1969:295-296) systemic analysis of weak states categorizes states as 'great', 'secondary', 'middle' and 'small'. A state is 'great' in terms of a superpower, when it can alter the structure of the international system by itself ('system-determinating'). 'Secondary' refers to a great power, that has no means to alter the structure, but may still influence it ('system-influencing'). The group of 'middle' powers can only influence the system in collaboration with other powers of their categories and can no longer act alone ('system-affecting'). Lastly, weak or 'small' states can not affect the system at all, but rather are themselve being influenced by it ('system-ineffectual'). In his said approach, Keohane negates the perspective of the actors in favour of a system analysis.

The attempt to define small states categorically is bound to fail. The use of respective limits according to the population figure is ultimately arbitrary and lack objectivity. Already Erling Bjøl therefore did not refer to small states, but to 'small state roles', which corresponds to Gesers 'attributive smallness' and allows for an almost constructivist view from today's perspective. He did not define the small state, but allocated certain roles to it corresponding to its abilities (Bjøl 1971:29). Christopher E. Diggines (1985:193) is putting – somewhat biased – a negative spin towards these roles whilst focussing on specific problems a small state could be defined by. A small state is therefore identified by its specific attributes (Liou 2002:1291,1293), well illustrated in dimensions such as economics, politics and society which are broken down in the following table on the next page.

State efficiency and its absence

The small state characteristics more often than not tend towards the capacities of the respective states, in this case of the PICs. From this, conclusions can be drawn with regards to the state efficiency, mainly represented by its ability to state sovereignty (see also Blitza and Lindenmann in this volume). According to the state functions as put together in chart 2 of the appendix, Rokkan (1975:562-600) defines four central dimensions of modern stateness, namely the territorial and constitutional state as well as the democratic nation state and the social interventionist state.

Table 2: General indicators of insular small states

Dimension	Characteristics
Economy	Narrow product pallet
	Open market
	Dependence on imports/exports
	High unemployment rats
	Migration
	Limited resources
	Small domestic markets
	Low economic potential
Foreign Policy	Security interest less pronounced than interest of economic welfare
	Pursuit of further legal provisions to govern international relations
	Rule-Taker
Domestic Policy	Institutional constancy
	Omnipresent government
	Strong personification
Society	Social cohesion
	Tradition & social conservatism
	Social intimacy
	Striving for autonomy

Source: Sutton 1999:397-402, 1987:3-25; Lowenthal 1987:26-49; Payne 1987:50-62; Neumann/Gstöhl 2006:3-36.

Four assets can be extracted from this as base for good governance: Ideally the government should aim at keeping the inner and the outer peace and thus minimize collective risks (security function); the institutionally secured enforcement of legal security (rule law function); the protection of potential

democratic participation (democracy function) and a generally accepted connection of economic efficiency and distribution justice (social function). With the help of these ideals strengths and weaknesses of the respective states become apparent. The respective size of the gap can reveal weak or even functionally inefficient states, which Jackson (1993) describes as *quasi-states*. Other authors speak of states with a restricted statehood. Such a limitation can be seen in those states whose governments have only partial or no control over the internal or foreign use of force – i.e. a legitimate monopoly on the use of force – and only few or no means to enforce political decisions of the central government. In other words: "*Areas with restricted stateness lack at least partially in 'effective territorial sovereignty' as a minimum characteristic feature of modern stateness*" (Risse 2005:6, "*Räumen mit begrenzter Staatlichkeit fehlt es zumindest teilweise an 'effektiver Gebietsherrschaft' als Minimalcharakteristikum moderner Staatlichkeit*"). This is certainly not only true for already desintegrating states stricken by violent conflicts, but also for those, of which restricted statehood is a result of lacking political, administrative and economic capacities (ibda.:7): "*State strength (...) is not measured in military terms. It is, rather, in the capacity of the state to command loyalty – the right to rule – to extract the resources necessary to rule and provide services, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and to operate within the context of a consensus based political community*" (Holsti 1996:82). Obviously there seems to be a correlation between state weakness, state failure or even state decay (Spanger 2002:4). For the post-colonial PICs, the lacking state capacities have negative consequences leading into corruption, violence and crime. It is dangers like these which Canberra perceives as a security threat to Australia (Patience 2005:1f).

In this context, the security function of a state is of prime importance in the political science research. Thereby, security does not just imply the conventional militarily aspect as protection from an external threat, but rather encloses on a much larger scale both also ecological protection as well as the prevention of risks resulting from state weakness and lacking state capacities and thus its deficient functional ability. Along the lines of these areas of state functionality, there are different possibilities of discussion. Here the concept of security can initially be subdivided in state security and human security. Is a state safe from external influences and does it execute an appropriate powerful control? Moreover, can this state ensure the security of its citizens? This last question reveals an inaccurrency in one aspect, which strongly corresponds with the concept of a shared sovereignty (see Blitza in this volume), wherefore this question should again be asked in full: Can *only* an *own state* ensure the security of *its citizens*? In this case the principle of non-intervention under international law would be trifling. Even already possible legitimatable interventions on humanitarian grounds would have to be modified to that effect, that not the intervention as such but its omission needs to be justified (see ICISS 2001; Debiel 2004:61-81). If the functional efficiency of a state is no longer given and if it therefore poses the potential danger of a spreading destabilization in its environment, an intervention seems almost mandatory (Fearon/Laitin 2004:36f).

In summary, the PICs including PNG and Timor Leste factually belong to the group of insular small states characterised by their smallness, a distinctive vulnerability, hardly any own capacities and thus by a general structural weakness. This also applies for PNG, which due to its land border to Indonesia and its own size is not formally considered an insular small state any more. This group defined by vulnerability and weakness refers to one side of a region marked by very distinctive asymmetries. On the other side of this

continuum there is the continental state of Australia, which in all key parameters is head and shoulders above not only each individual single Pacific island state, but also partly above them as a group (see charts 3 and 4 in the appendix)[9]. Australia perceives itself as the solid guarantor for safety and prosperity amidst an unstable and vulnerable region (Rajaram 2003:290-306). In Australia's view this results in "special responsibilities in the region" (Australia 2003:92) and an "*unquestioned, and often unacknowledged belief that Australia has a right, or even a duty, to speak for the inhabitants of the region, to represent them to themselves and to others, to lead, and to manage them*" (Fry 1996:2). The existing asymmetries shape a claim for leadership, best described by Destradi (2010:903-930) as a *leader-initiated* leadership and with intermediate and soft forms of a hegemony. The Australian claim to leadership originates in the power generating asymmetrical interdependence (Nabers 2012:124) between Australia and the PICs as well as the intention to deploy it (Knorr 1975:18,237). These strong asymmetries between the regional leading power Australia[10] and the PICs as its followers determine

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[9]   This asymmetry corresponds with the distinction between vulnerability and sensitivity within the context of interdependent occurrences. An interdependence implies mutual cost impacts. Without these, an interdependence would rather be a connectivity (Keohane/Nye 1985:76). Thus, interdependences occur if a national actor shows a high sensitivity towards external developments. Using this definition of interdependence, a breakdown of relations by one actor would cause higher costs than its maintenance. Under asymmetric conditions the sensitivity tends to be only on the weak pole of above mentioned asymmetry continuum. It may be that this weak pole is vulnerable to shocks while for the strong pole, these register as sensitivity at best.

[10]   According to Nolte (2012:34) a regional leading power is a state, which is providing a combination of power resources, role definitions and external perceptions and therefore fulfilling criterias of requirement, resources, the ability to implement and acceptance. "*Leadership must therefore be described as political activity, which often takes place in institutionalized contexts [Pacific Island Forum] or is aimed at institutionalization [any influence expansion of the PIFs, e.g. Biketawa] in order to stimulate social change [change of regional architecture], is best described as policy-or situation-specific [with regard to policy fields such as security and economic policy], proceeds with limitations on action [exogenous influences], features a normative component [Pacific Plan] and (...) leads to a community building between leaders and followers, or larger social groups [increase cooperation or integration where appropriate]*" (Nabers 2012:130 (bracketed additions by Andreas Holtz); "*Führung*

perceptions, identities and actions. Asymmetries can trigger off actions, still irrespective of direction or shape[11]. Due to reasons of self-protection weakness is motivation enough to act for states with more distinctive capacities. Thus weak states are supported from the outside, e.g. in terms of aid money or even by some military interventions. Since about a decade (2003) the PICs region has experienced this change from cooperation to intervention, while replacing Rumley's below mentioned aid-front (see p. 74) with an intervention front. Especially against the backdrop of said evident asymmetries and the known record of structural weaknesses in the PICs the question comes up, what has caused this change and why at this point in time (see in addition the second article of Holtz in this volume, 109ff)?

Theoretical approaches for the explanation of change

The use of terms like *perception* and *identity* already points to a constructivist approach, which within international relations -unlike other theories- allow for a thematization and explanation of change through implementation of norms, identities and interests. Given the great number of various approaches and applications, it is hardly possible to refer to *a* constructivist approach, which is why these are usually referred to as metatheory or "higher-level

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ist demnach als politische Aktivität zu bezeichnen, die häufig in institutionalisierten Kontexten stattfindet oder auf Institutionalisierung abzielt, damit sozialen Wandel antreibt, als politik- oder situationsspezifisch zu verstehen ist, unter Handlungsbeschränkungen verläuft, eine normative Komponente besitzt und (...) zur Gemeinschaftsbildung zwischen Leader und Follower oder größeren sozialen Gruppen führt".

[11] According to Doris Gerber (2012:88), activity results from reasons. Those reasons are at the same time of internal and external origin as, for example, exogenous affordances are motivating. By doing this, these affordances create interests. However, these interests are leading to real actions by an endogenous interpretation. "Even if one takes an externalist position, according to which the reasons for action are no mental states, but rather external matters belonging to the conditions of the act, even then you have to have some idea of how these supposedly external reasons for the actor are being recognized as his own" (ibid.,"*Selbst wenn man eine externalistische Position vertritt, nach der Handlungsgründe keine geistigen Zustände sind, sondern vielmehr externe Sachverhalte, die zu den Bedingungen der Handlung gehören, auch dann muss man irgendeine Idee davon haben, wie diese angeblich externen Gründe für den Handelnden als seine Gründe anerkannt sein können*").

research perspective" (Krell 2004:369; also Katzenstein et al. 1996:35f). Constructivist approaches above all deal with origins of interests and the significance of interplay between matter[12] and its perception: "*Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interpretation depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world*" (Adler 1997:322). In the focus is thus the being -of either social action or of material circumstances- and its interpretation for the construction of action-guiding assumptions.

The connection of a being with its interpretation refers to the lacking explainability of other approaches, however without blending those out or competing them. Thus neither the power focus nor the (presumed) striving for power is called into doubt by realism and neorealism, nor is the purpose-rational action of liberal approaches ignored. Quite on the contrary it is possible to use various different approaches, without expecting a single one would compete to offer the only possible explanantion (Katzenstein 1996:2). Constructivist explanation approaches are rather considered to be an extension and a co-operative supplement (see, generally, Barkin 2010, Guzzini 2013). If in the following real existing asymmetries, matter in various different shapes and both low capacities and perceptions, acceptances and reifiactions are

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[12] „The concept of matter is one of the central concepts of human thought. Already the ancient philosophers put the matter in the focus of their considerations. Up to the present day the term that, as such, is already an attribution, has lost none of its ambiguity, standing at the same time for a rigid materiality as well as a meaningful metaphor (eg, if a difficult matter is mentioned). Matter is simultaneously passive and active in terms of bio-organic activity. This ambiguous parallelism becomes very apparent in the feminist literature that can be used as an illustration for the below-discussed connection between asymmetry, identity and action: "The body posited as prior to the sign, is always *posited* or *signified* as *prior*. This signification produces as an *effect* of its own procedure the very body that it nevertheless and simultaneously claims to discover as that which *precedes* its own action. If the body signified as prior to signification is an effect of signification, then the mimetic or representational status of language, which claims that signs follow bodies as their necessary mirrors, is not mimetic at all. On the contrary, it is productive, constitutive, one might even argue *performative*, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to any and all signification" (Butler 2013:510, originally 1993:30).

mentioned, this is by no means eclecticism, but a necessary complement: "*The people are living beings whose material needs create a determining factor when forming their interests, but eventually interests are predominantly a result of their ideas, and not their genes; since interests are presumptions of possibilities to satisfy ones needs, and these presumptions are historical and culturally variable*" (Krell 2004:349 with a reference to Wendt 1999/2010:133; "*Die Menschen sind Lebewesen, deren materielle Bedürfnisse einen entscheidenden Faktor bei der Formierung ihrer Interessen bilden, aber letztlich sind ihre Interessen überwiegend ein Ergebnis ihrer Ideen, nicht ihrer Gene; denn Interessen sind Annahmen über Möglichkeiten zur Befriedigung von Bedürfnissen, und diese Annahmen sind historisch und kulturell variabel*").

The connection of a being with its interpretation also refers to the physical connection of matter, here of the small stateness or the state weakness, and a certain and ultimately constructed existence, meaning a certain identity that corresponds to the attributive small stateness of Geser and the small-state roles of Bjøl. Thus Wendt considers (1998:386f) the organizational identity of a state as 'I' resulting in the forming of certain interests according to his self-concept. Though these interests are fundamentally identical, their interpretation and their gratifications differ. This is described by the 'Me', i.e. self-attribution of meanings about me through the eyes of others (ibid.:387). The above quotation of Fry about the virtually natural responsibility of Australia is presumably to be interpreted by the existing asymmetries between Australia and the PICs. According to this theory, the asymmetries in the PICs would be relevant to action. Australia acts the way it does because it supposes this action to be expected owing to its self- and external perception (gen. Wendt 2010:346). Australian security-political interests emerge from this self-confidence and in accordance to a "secure and stable archipelagic screen"

(Ayson 2007:222). Therefore, exogenous influences on the formation of interests are virtually ruled out. The reality looks quite different though: Interests develop with and "within the processes of social interaction" (Godehardt/Lembcke 2010:25; "(…) *in den Prozessen der sozialen Interaktion*"), that is to say they are each individually dependant on endogenous *and* exogenous influences.

Identities do not only shape interests, but also a certain role behaviour reacting to and at the same time creating expectations and ultimately structures (Vertzberger 2010:221f). This process of reification describes the conception of human phenomena, as if they were things, a given irrevocable reality "*as if they were non-human or even superhuman. (…) Reification is the understanding of human products as if they were something different: Natural phenomenas, consequences of cosmic laws or the revelation of a devine will. Reification implies that man is willing to forget his own authorship of the human world*" (Berger/Luckmann 2009:94f; "(…) *das heißt als außer- oder gar übermenschlich. (…) Verdinglichung ist die Auffassung von menschlichen Produkten, als wären sie etwas anderes als menschliche Produkte: Naturgegebenheiten, Folgen kosmischer Gesetze oder Offenbarungen eines göttlichen Willens. Verdinglichung impliziert, dass der Mensch fähig ist, seine eigene Urheberschaft der humanen Welt zu vergessen* (…)"). This is by no means meant as a radical-constructivist refusal to objectively shared realities. An island is and remains a piece of land surrounded by water, and by that stays an objectively shared reality beyond discursive deconstruction. Nevertheless, interpretations about islands belong to the human world described by Berger and Luckmann, whereby insular small stateness is also an objectively shared neutral reality, the interpretations of which can only happen with hindsight and also allows for various alternatives. The process of said reification is like the interpretation of real conditions a process of constant and complicated

learning, whereby identities are created and perpetually dynamically modified[13] (Ulbert 2003:400f). This learning contains the opportunity for a reassessment and thus room for alternatives. The evaluation of certain events – A and B result in C – indicates the "two effects of structure" (Wendt 2010:165). The first effect is of causally determined: C is a result from A and B. In contrast, the second effect is of a constitutive nature: Only as part of C do become A and B the way they perceive themselves. A and B constitutes themselves by action. Thus structures lead to actions, while at the same time only actions create structures.

Applied on the region of the PICs, similar conclusions could be made in view of said existing assymetries with Australia. In virtually all aspects of state functionality and resulting policy areas, Australia is clearly ahead of the PICs, both individually as well as as in comparison between the whole group PICs with the single state Australia (see chart 3 in the appendix). The existing asymmetries form the material basis reflecting an objectively shared reality in relation between Australia and the reference region of the PICs. The reference to these asymmetries is due to their identity-creating effect on the involved actors and their perception. At the same time, the perceived identities do also have an impact on the interpretation of the asymmetries, which are no longer just there, but are rather subject to a certain dynamism. Again, interpretations of these asymmetries rather belong in the human world of Berger and Luckmann[14], which is marked by self- and external perception and the consecutive actions or by identities and interests respectively: Asymmetries "create

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[13] Reese-Schäfer describes identity as "self image of a society, which is generated by discursive processes" (1999:261; "*Selbstbild einer Gemeinschaft, das in diskursiven Prozessen erzeugt wird*").

[14] The term interpretation could also be substituted by the term observation. In this context I like to refer to Heinz von Foerster, whereby "objectivity is the delusion that observations could be made without observers" (von Foerster 1998:154; "*Objektivität sei die Wahnvorstellung, Beobachtungen könnten ohne Beobachter gemacht werden*").

fundamental differences of perspective between the more powerful and the less powerful" (Womack 2004:359). Anecdotal to this, Australia's former foreign minister, Downer, once casually called the PICs "busted arse countries" (Downer, cited from Dobell 2012:2), hinting at possible interpretations of self- and external perception and leaves no doubt about the perceived role on the part of Australia. In the continuum between friend and foe, the perception of at least some of the PICs has got worse, whereby their lacking state efficiency could be considered a security threat and lead to negative sanctions. Within the scope of the Pacific Islands Forum and according to its Biketawa-Declaration from 2000, this is likely to lead to a proactive behaviour including the option of an intervention replacing the former low-key action including supporting aid money.

Why though the change in Australia's perception of the PICs? To answer this question it is beneficial to apply the constructivist approach in favour of the rationalists, which assume that identities and interests are exogenously predetermined and lead to a certain rational benefit calculation. Structures are considered to be existing, explaining the causality of actions, however not yet permitting statements about their constitution. Constructivists in turn aim to highlight the social construct of actors, preferring a holistic perspective, which focusses on both causal as well as on constitutive effects on identities and interests (Wendt 2010:166). With this rational and goal-orientated approach an action can be explained, but not so a change, as the given structures do not account for change. Change is not possible, thus the maxim would be a lack of alternatives.

In the classical theoretical approaches of international relations this lack of alternatives is demonstrated by the (supposed) anarchy of the international system, by which the self-help imperative supposedly only allows for one way of action.

Three cultures of anarchy

The self-concept of a state is based both on matter as well as on the interpretation of matter; material needs or else idealised aims can precede ideas. The self-concept of a state also shapes its identity. Interest is based on identity, action is based on interest. Action is an expression of the incongruity of vision and reality, in the context of this analysis of regional claims and global imperatives. Here the connection between socialising matter (asymmetries) as a constitutive element, ideas as an endogenous element and affordances as an exogenous element in terms of the motivation for an idea or an interest-driven action becomes clear. It is thus "*safe to say that the dimension of socialisation* [here: of Australia and the PICs, remark AH] *need to become the focus of a research programme for political leadership. This dimension is based on anextensive reformulation of interests and identities both on the part of the leader as well as the followers*" (Nabers 2012:129f; *"(...) davon auszugehen, dass die Sozialisationsdimension ins Zentrum eines Forschungsprogramms zur politischen Führung gerückt werden muss. Diese Dimension beruht auf einer komplexen Reformulierung von Interessen und Identitäten sowohl auf der Seite des Leaders als auch des Followers*"). This in turn raises the question what determines the respective action focus– co-operative, neutral or egoistical – and what impact regional and global interactions have.

A situation effected by such interdependencies is determined by the consideration of the actors and their mutual role perception, so that the anarchy of an international system does not necessarily only lead to self-help in a rivaling or even hostile environment (Lake 2009:10). This interpretation of environment results in a certain role concept of friend, rival or enemy (Buzan/Waæver 2010:50), leading to either co-operative (friend), neutral (rival), conflictive or even interventionist (enemy) action. Wendt circumscribes this way of acting as cultures of anarchy in the international system.

In accordance with Martin Wight (1991:7-24) he is describing a structure based on Hobbes (enemy, conflictive-interventionist, compulsive norm abidance), on Locke (rival, neutral-institutionalised, norm abidance out of interest) and lastly on Kant (friend, co-operative, norm abidance out of conviction) (Wendt 2010:247). These structures lead to a certain action and vice versa. This underlines the connection between causal and constitutive effects and demonstrates a potential opportunity for change while ignoring any lack of alternatives.

Regional leading powers like Australia therefore represent states, which connect identities of states that are regionally rather strong and globally rather weak. Structures (in this case global) can therefore be examined once they are reflected in psychic patterns of interaction such as action. The asymmetrical process influences the action (or interaction) through the role learnt by socialisation as well as the therefore mutual role concept of the *weak* and the *strong* and their respective perception. Situations lead to an action, which in itself constitutes the situation through action, therefore causal and constitutive effects are mingled. *Strong* and *weak* do both exist (constitutive element) and are also assessed ('endogenous element'). It is only the culture of the terms *strong* and *weak* that creates the meaning of these words and with it the respective behaviour patterns of *strong* and *weak* culture within the scope of *strong* or *weak* orders (Lebow 2010:558). These behaviour patterns can then appear in three aforesaid dimensions (see in addition also the 'level of construction' of Katzenstein et al. 1996:41). By means of learning and interaction processes these dimensions may alternate or run side by side.

Eventually the question arises whether there is such thing as an 'asymmetric' identity both on the part of the generally rather weak followers as well as on the part of the regional powers usually much better equipped with

comprehensive capacities[15]. The consideration of identity in the formulation of interest is standard both generally (Reese-Schäfer 2000; Welders 1996:275-318) as well as in the context of Australian Foreign regional and security policy (Holland/McDonald 2012:184-206). In relation to Australia, especially cultural influences are taken into account, according to which Australia's identity is based primarily on Western values that are adopted as common and used to justify political action (ibid.:194). Here the view of Western values as exogenously given structures predominates[16], which virtually oblige to a certain action without any alternatives. Pluralistic views, that norms and values are dependent on culture (Wheeler/Dunne 1996:91-107) are rejected here. Just how much the real materialistic basic conditions as regards to the supposed connection between very distinctive asymmetrical circumstances and Australian identity affects the Australian regional policy in the Pacific, is however not addressed. Yet it appears that it is just this awareness as a prerogative of interpretation of its own strenghth when compared to the weak PICs is decisive for Australian action. Particularly the Howard government (1996-2007) claimed the ultimate security-cultural interpretation of debates on Australia's security and identity and thus also determined, "which risks are perceived, what topics have priority and which strategies are deemed appropriate" (Daase 2009:137; "*welche Gefahren wahrgenommen werden,*

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[15] Such an 'asymmetric identity' refers to a material fundament and, thus, to the relation of cultural identity and social reality (Bruendel 2000:12), to the relation of idea and matter respectively. The aim here is, indeed, to explain how identity is produced without neglecting identity's material substrate. Thereby the approach of material structuralism is invalidated which negates a pure idea driven being by preferring a material being as awareness-raising (Welch 2013:71ff). Such a pure materialism, based on material symmetries, would result in the repetition of the same patterns of behavior which, in this context, could only be altered by changing existing asymmetries and their material fundaments.

[16] An example for this is the assumption that human rights were universally valid. The precondition for this assumption would be that Western thoughts were the only possible environment and therefore the only possible outside whilst ignoring the manifoldness of human culture. This exogenous approach would lead again to an assumption of a 'no-alternative' reification.

welche Themen Priorität haben und welche Strategien als angemessen angesehen werden”; see in addition also Westen 2012).

However, this prerogative of interpretation must not be perceived uncritically. While the asymmetries between the PICs and Australia are obvious, their interpretation and articulation remain dynamic. The entirety of this articulatory practise may well be called a discourse (Laclau/Mouffe 1985:105; for the special case of Australia see Holland 2010:643-661). Here, a discourse signifies a “fixation of meaning in a network of difference relations” (Glasze 2008:191; “*Fixierung von Bedeutung in einem Netz von Differenzbeziehungen*”), a “specific system of differences (…) which does not reflect but firstly create a specific sensory world and the ‘order of the things’” (Hebekus/Völker 2012:35; “*spezifisches System von Differenzen (...), das eine spezifische Sinnwelt, eine ‚Ordnung der Dinge‘ nicht abbildet, sondern allererst produziert*”). This describes theorizing that social structures between the PICs and Australia (and vice versa) have either a fixed base and can without alternatives be explained by just one meaning of asymmetry, or else that these meanings are constantly newly assigned, admitting various alternative interpretations of material circumstances (Laclau/Mouffe 1985:112; Spies 2009:49). A combination of both approaches is also possible, which on the one hand consider the external structures of meanings, while on the other also deploys the explanatory capacity in view of existing asymmetries. This contains the possibility of an intellectual self-classification as either a cooperative, interventionist or neutral regional power. This does not mean, “to only describe what one is, but to identify with something while it could well be something other” (Brodocz 2000:38; “*dass man nur bezeichnet, was man ist, sondern dass man sich mit etwas identifiziert, obwohl man sich auch mit etwas anderem identifizieren könnte*”). An evident lack of alternatives is

therefore deciphered as a decision between several alternatives[17]. This raises the tangible question what has led to the paradigm shift in the Australian security and regional policy in the reference region of the PICs, reflected in the change from a co-operative to an interventionist leadership. It is therefore essential to combine system- and action-theoretical approaches (Godehardt/ Lembke 2010:25) in order to come up with arguments for one of the most important questions in the Australian foreign and security policy: "*There is currently one question in Australian foreign and strategic policy that matters more than any other: How does Australia respond to the shifting great power dynamics in our region?*" (Dewar 2011:2; White 2011). This question points to a larger analytical framework: If Australia's security policy in the Pacific as previously researched has been interpreted as a rather pro-active role and was analysed accordingly (Graham in 2008, Peebles in 2005, Powles 2006:43-56, Robertson in 2004, Rumley/Forbes 2006, Rumley 1999), Dewar's quotation shows the very opposite, namely Australia as a power preyed upon by global structures.

Global turning points and regional unrest as affordances

If asymmetries shape the objectively shared reality between the PICs and the regional power Australia, affordances determine their meaning and with it also their interpretation. Affordance means the capacity of an object or indeed a social process to motivate to a certain behaviour. The motivation comprises an offer-orientated character (as sender) and an interpretation-orientated character (as receiver). The ability to interpret results from the actors ability to learn. The nature of interpretation does invariably hold an alternative. The interpretation of an offer thereby depends on the objective, hence the

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[17]   In this context I would like to refer to Butler again (see footnote 12): "[The status of language] is productive, constitutive, one might even argue performative, inasmuch as this signifying act delimits and contours the body that it then claims to find prior to any and all signification" (Butler 2013:510, originally 1993:30).

intention to action, what refer to the connection of exogenous and endogenous elements. This appeals to the person who must deal with a situation. People and their wills are socially conditioned, which particularly demonstrates the close interdependence between agent and structure, meaning that the will or the intention do not stand alone, but are preset by the respective situation.

In this connection not only the real being is to be examined, but also the interests basing on it. These are influenced by the objectively shared reality (here of the asymmetries). The reduction of 'Australia' on the ruling people refers to the individual-psychological bases of politics arising from socialisation and conditioning respectively arising from socialisation and conditioning under the conditions of asymmetries. The interpretation of asymmetries depends on the interpretation of individual situations. External structures in psychology have the character of a situation (Reis/Holmes 2012:64), which in itself is considered within the scope of affordance (Ross/Nisbett 2011:4; Flunder 2006:21-34). Situations therefore only indirectly affect a particular action by means of their interpretations. On a security-political level these assumptions correspond with the concept of *amity* and *enmity* in Buzan and Wæver's *Regional Security Complex Theory* (2003; see also Wallis in this volume), whereby not the threat itself, but more so the perception of it is significant.

In this context we return to the anarchy of international systems, which emerge from non-existent higher institutional regulation mechanisms as an objectively shared reality like, for example, the asymmetries between the PICs and Australia. Indeed, this reality does not only lead to a certain action, on the contrary, the anarchy of the international system contains different levels of meanings depending on the respective constitution of the interpreting actors. Here, any potential action imperatives from exogenous structures

are in the focus, but rather those endogenous elements from the respective actors (Ulbert 2003:401). Thus, the identities of the actors are created not only from matter and structures originating from it (constitutive and exogenous element), but they are also based on ideas, while creating structures in the process (endogenous element).

Therefore, structures do not just exist, but are dynamic: "*The forming of identity is thus a process of social definition on the part of the actors and their collective view on themselves and the world*" (ibid., *emphasis in the original; "Identitätsbildung ist damit ein Prozess* sozialer *Definition der Akteure, der auf den kollektiven Akteursvorstellungen der Handelnden über sich und die Welt basiert*"). Consequently, interests are not just defined by a certain benefit-maximising rational choice, but "*actors (...) (define) their interests (...) in the same process in which they define the respective situation*" (ibid.:402; emphasis in the original; "*Akteure (...) ihre Interessen (...) gleichzeitig in dem Prozess (definieren), in dem sie auch die zugrunde liegende Situation definieren*";, see also Wendt 2010:23ff).

Hypothetically, these interests in the example of Australia as the most important power in Oceania depend on the ambivalent identity as a state both receiving and sending out imperatives[18]. Here the field of controversy between regional planning activity and global imperatives becomes apparent. Australia absorbs the exogenous elements in shape of exogenous affordances and transforms them on a regional level. Interests therefore originate from (global) structures, their transformation or turning points and the resulting

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[18]   The alleged plural used here does not only refer to the identities of involved actors, but indicates also that one actor has more than one identity. Identities are depending on the specific contexts. Identities in our context therefore mean identities accrued from the reference region. Thus, Australia's regional identity is one of a regional leading power while its identity towards the USA as Canberra's main ally is one of a follower. The situation is similar with regard to the identities of the PICs. While they are followers in their relation to Australia and latterly in their relations to China (see McDougall in this volume) the PICs are competitors among themselves.

change of existing norms. They are the result of a structural passive actor's identity which in this case determines Australia's action in the region. We have however seen that this exogenous approach convinces only up to a certain point, because structures and actions arising from identities and interests can be mutually dependant and must not be considered in isolation from each other. The process to the definition of a situation is at the same time the definition of interests.

Here the basic problem is taken up: To what extent are the inside and the outside directional to relevant to action? Ultimately the question is, whether a state alone is responsible for its own action or whether certain imperatives structures are action-guiding (Flunder 2006:33). Wendt (2010:366) claims that actors diachronically create and reproduce identities and narratives about who they are. Only when this has occurred would interests form as a basis for a specific action. From this perspective, the structural influences of external factors as mainly insinuated in sytemic and rationalistic approaches of internationational relations would not be significant. As it would certainly not be helpful to regard both approaches as competitive, a complementary and cooperative point of view is preferred here. Both forces influence decisions. The social conditioning of the leader should also be noted, who can weigh out several options for state action and has multiple options to decide between egoism (conflictive action), cooperation or non-action/ neutrality. Yet external structures are by no means unimportant, because they still have a huge influence on any decision-making in shape of social conditioning. Global turning points like in security and economics (see generally Ferguson et al. 2011; McDougall/Shearman 2006) need to be included in this analysis along with the individual development of the rule-makers who incorporate global turning points or norm changes into their interpretation of said asymmetries as objectively shared realities and by that underlining the interdependence of

the different levels. This refers to the concept of embedding, the concurrent theorisation of regional, global and local paradigms to the explanation of certain behaviour patterns of regional powers (Prys 2012:206). The embedding of regions in a global system unavoidably requires the mentioning of the interdependent relations between region and regional periphery.

Some of the significant variables for change in the Australian Pacific policy is firstly the ever increasing and provacative -to Australias supremacy- presence of China in the region (D'Arcy 2007; see in addition also McDougall in this volume). Turning points in the global structures appear in the shape of the increasing liberalisation of the global economy (Mohamed 2008; Ferguson et al. 2011), the system-change from a bipolar to a multipolar global order and the related regionalisation of the international system after 1989 (Betz 2012:210) as well as a security-political paradigm shift in the face of the international terrorism.

The end of the bipolar structure as of 1989 led to a re-regionalisation, that is to an increased importance of regions and thus of regional powers. Since then regional powers have taken over vital structuralisation duties and by that regional responsibility. Australia also follows this path, claiming an increased global weight as a consequence of its stronger regional position of power. Australia's ambition as middle power (Cotton/Ravenhill 2012) lead to a conflict of capacities, as overall global challenges call for more than middle-sized capacities. In order to to actively partiicipate in at least the most important issues, own forces must be split in a more efficient manner. Australia's commitment in Iraq and Afghanistan and its interests in South-East Asia[19] led to a *general* desengangement on its own backyard while the security-political and economic influence as core areas of the maintaining its interest do selectively

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[19] Australia is, thereby, like for example Turkey, to be considered as a bi-regional power with interests in the Pacific as well as in Southeast Asia.

increase. The reduced Australian commitment on a large scale created gaps, which especially China is only too happy to close. The associated erosion of the regional system calls for further investment in the core areas to avoid destabilizations[20].

Regarding Australia the end of the cold war against the backdrop of an eroding bipolar world order resulted in a system of *Four Fronts*: "*A* cooperative *security front was developed to Australia's north; an* aid *front was in place in Australia's east; an environmental security front has been agreed to Australia's south; and, in 1997, a trade front was constructed to Australia's west*" (Rumley 2006:37; emphases by the author). With this concept Canberra envisaged a safety ring around Australia. In this, the PICs are considered to be Australia's self-appointed natural sphere of influence (Rumley 1999:188), which dates back to the colonial age and also views the island Pacific as an anglo-saxon area of influence[21]. Most noteworthy here were the ideas on co-operative security (in contrast to interventionistist security) and altruistic aid (as opposed to the conditional aid). Yet when the attacks in New York and later on Bali sent shock waves through the security systems, they triggered a shift to non-state-related threat scenarios, unheard of to date. This order was therefore shaken to the core (Rumley 2006:38). Denationalised authority respectively the absence of a state monopoly and the new circumstances called for an appropriate reaction and a review of the concepts of unconditional support and of *co-operative security*. The then applicable maxim of the

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[20] A side effect of this strategy is that global interests can be achieved by regional activities. During the US war against Iraq, Australia was able to be in loyalty to Washington without increasing Australian troops in Iraq unduly. Requests for an increase of Australian contributions could be rejected on the ground that Australia's troops are required in the Pacific to maintain regional order respectively to fight against terrorism in its own backyard (Patience 2005:4).

[21] This „*Australasian Monroe Doctrine*" (Rumley 2012:39) is of British origin and was continued by the then independent Australia. The reason for that doctrine was to keep other European colonial powers, namely Germany and France, out of the region (Holtz 2003:39; v. Krosigk/Jadin 1994:33).

so-called Dibb report (Dibb 1986:60) was dropped first as a proposal for Australias defence policy, whereby Australia was not likely to face threats due to their geographical position.

The security-political turning points origin in the intensifying change of a state to a non-state threat scenario after the terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. If 9/11 marked a global review on security, Australia experienced its very own trauma with the attacks on Bali and Djakarta on 12 October 2002 and 9 September 2004 (Rumley 2006:42) having had a yet bigger impact on the Australian policy and public (Henderson 2006:177). While the primary effect of 9/11 on the PICs is still controversial and no more unambiguously represented, however apparently already existing security-political tendencies were strengthened enormously by the attacks, so here there is a significant consecutive effect (Kaim 2011:3, 5; Butter/Christ/Keller 2011:9; Burke 2008:209). Not only the military potential of a state is in the focus, but also economic, ecological and social threats. Drug and human trafficking, terrorism as well as transnational and national crime are more tangible and much more likely than interstate wars (see in general Balzacq 2011). The threat potential caused by such asymmetrical situations, manifests itself in the so-called *arc of instability* (figure 1, on page 77) and was instrumentalised by the Howard government to justify an interventionist security policy, after the population had by a changed political rhetoric been persuaded of the need for also military interventions (Holland 2010:645)[22]. The

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[22] It would go beyond the scope of this article to shed more light on Australia's domestic affairs which have played their parts in Australia's paradigm shift regarding the Pacific (see in general Burke 2008), although under the aspect of asymmetrical relations between states domestic imperatives should rather be considered on the part of the more powerful states than on the part of weaker states (Womack 2004:360). Basically, it can be briefly said that the political rhetoric in Australia as a part of Australia's security culture has been sharpened supporting thereby an atmosphere of fear (de Castella et al. 2009). The question remains how fear as central human phenomena becomes politically exploited. Here a citation of Australia's former Prime Minister Robert Menzies seems to be appropriate: "(Fear) das also been a

security framework within which Australia officially operates in the Pacific is outlined significantly by the ICISS study of 'Responsibility to Protect' (R2P) (2001) (Makinda 2004:430-436), according to which the individual human security takes precedence over the state. State sovereignty should be defined as being accountable for the protection of citizens (ICISS 2001:74; Werthes 2011:277-290). Where the state does not act or *is not able to act* towards this responsibility, there is an obligation to intervene with the prospect of strengthening or restoration of state sovereignty (ICISS 2001:75).

The second big turning point at global level is the increasing liberalisation of economic systems. After the disaster of the Second World War, the system of Bretton Woods was established to regulate currency systems, and with that represented an institution, which was both to simplify and stabilize

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recognized and potent instrument of domestic policy" (Menzies, cited from Lawrence 2008:18). Corey Robin considers political fear as "*a political tool, an instrument of elite rule or insurgent advance created and sustained by political leaders or activists who stand to gain something from it, either because fear helps them pursue a specific political goal or because it reflects or lends support to their moral and political beliefs – or both*" (Robin 2004:16). In this context it would be a worthwhile challenge for further research to analyze statements of the political representatives (Curran 2006). These statements range from former Australian Prime Minster Howard's "traditional, conservative and individualistic" (Holland/McDonald 2012:194) position of strength to a tendency of a more responsible position of his successor Rudd (Rudd 2006:46-50). Regional disorder and regional insecurity became interpreted as attack to the White Australia policy respectively as attack to Western values in general. The thus resulting pessimistic component in Australia's security perception and security culture indicates to the presuppositions, which lead to a pessimistic perception followed then by a more proactive regional security policy and to an increasing regional engagement up to regional interventions. By doing this Canberra's behavior is ambivalent. On the one hand is Australia's identity as leading regional powers, while the same country on the other hand is guided by a kind of European Angst in an adversely perceived Asian environment (Brailey 2003; Mols 1998:125; Philpott 2001:371-388). Central to such a political analysis is the assumption that national discourses determine national cultures. Hence, angst as a determining factor leads to the above mentioned proactive engagement (Tang 2008:453, gen. Bleiker/Hutchison 2007). Angst does not have to be of existential importance. It is already sufficient that a relative danger does exist. This relative danger can be politically exploited. Especially the Howard government used the Australian angst for a regional clampdown from which is said that there is no other alternative because instability would be connected to the danger of terrorism (Cahill 2004:3). Thus, refugees and asylum seekers are generally placed under suspicion of terrorism what can be considered as "'securitisation' of Australian policy discourse" (Burke 2008:208).

the teamwork of all relevant actors. The oil crisis of the 1970s marked the failure of this rigid system.

Figure 1: Australia's *arc of instability*

The consequently newly established or at least reformed institutions like the *World Trade Organisation* (WTO), the *World Bank* and the *International Monetary Fund* have adapted and liberalised the global markets up to date (Osterhammel/Petersson 2007:86ff; Thirlwall/Pacheco-López 2008 62ff; Chwieroth 2010:138ff; WBGU 2011:107ff). Existing economic and development systems like the one of non-reciprocal commercial relations between the states of the European Community and the group of the Africa-Carribean-Pacific-States (ACP) were replaced by a system of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), consequently reciprocal commercial relations (Schmieg 2008:16, also Meyn 2008:19-40). These EPAs as a result of the biggest global trade and economic negotiations are deemed to be a

motivation to liberalisation also of regional and commercial systems (see in addition Schilder in this volume).

Results: Distinctive hierarchies from asymmetries

The connection of basically anarchic conditions at international level and pronounced asymmetries leads under the premise of an egotistic self-help of the affected states to a hierarchy with conditions of super-and subordination ratios and thus to a stable order. Here leading powers offer a variety of goods such as and above all security and receive the loyalty of their Followers in return. In such a relationship, both sides benefit of hierarchies: "Hierarchy is defined by the extent of the authority exercised by their ruler over the ruled. The greater the number of possible actions by the ruled that the ruler can legitimately regulate, the more hierarchical is the relationship" (Lake 2009:9, 51ff). Within this hierarchy, the classical state duties of the Follower are delegated to a leader rendering the anarchic concept of self-help in the opposition of co-operative help relations more and more unattractive (ibid.:10)[23]. The basis of hierarchy is the presence of authority, thus of a legitimized rule. In this case there is consent between the rule-maker and rule-taker, which can be considered as an identity of leadership[24]. The rule-maker receives his

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[23] Good examples for this assumption can be found within the region of the PICs. Kiribati, Nauru and Tuvalu have accepted the Australian Dollar as their national currency, while the Solomons and PNG were not able to maintain a certain level of security without Australian support (see Dinnen and Böge in this volume). Samoa has delegated its defense policy to New Zealand what is similar to the formally independent states of the former UN Trust Territory of Micronesia (Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall Islands and Palau). Within the framework their *Compact of Free Association* with the USA these states have also delegated their defense policy (see in general Leidhold 1991:143-230). Washington's multifaceted intervention rights in these Micronesian states ensure in the context of a "sovereignty for sale" (Drezner 2002:76) even for the PICs for an unusual high level of financial transfers.

[24] Such an identity of leadership is often based on common interests. In the case of the relations between Australia and the PICs these common interests are based on a political deal. While the PICs in the absence of economical capabilities demanded for economic support, they offered stability and therefore security. This exchange between prosperity and security does not seem to work anymore as Australia prefers to provide security by intervention.

rights to ensure him the leadership position by his follower on a voluntary base[25]. Asymmetries reflecting existing state capacities which make room for pressure are not significant here. The rule-maker is fully recognised as such (ibid.:8) and the hierarchy feeds of it. This authority delegated by members of a group on a leader in the absence of capacities and asymmetries is most striking. Ideally, authority by force is not needed since the followers are already convinced of the authority of their leader, which would be the usual case if the role concept of the actors was that of friends. If in turn actors are classified as being rivals or even enemies, the persuasive power of their arguments might decrease in favour of enforced results. In this case the given capacities and asymmetries do indeed matter. Here, there need to be made a distinction between the internalization of values, norms and positions on the part of the followers on one side and orders on the other (Nabers 2010:69, 2010b:949).

Between these both extremes there is also a potential third way, whereby the mere existence of inherent asymmetries affects the self- and external perception to such an extent that the potential followers seem to have no alternatives than to cooperate with the respective leader. In this case the legitimacy is obtained neither by voluntary recognition nor by compulsion, but by a recognition enforced by the asymmetries as defined by of a normative strength of the factual. A way out of this predicament offers any potential alternative suppliers of state goods. In the PICs such an alternative emerges in the shape of the ever itensifying appearance of China in the region (Hanson 2008; Hanson/Fifita 2011).

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[25]   In this context it is possible to use the term leadership, which is described as "effective and sustainable when foreign elites acknowledge the leader's vision of international order and internalize it as their own" (Nabers 2010:69). Thereby it is distinguished between power and leadership: "Leadership, again in contrast to brute power, is inseparable from the wants and needs of followers, but these wants and needs may be changed through social interaction" (ibid.).

Within this alternative and providing that it settles permanently, changes in the asymmetry complexes between the PICs and Australia would have to be revealed, which according to the aforementioned definition of hierarchy should lead to a reduction of the duties on the part of the leading power[26]. These duties formerly assigned to the original leading power could then and under the premise of cost reduction be delegated to the contender of the regional leading power[27].

In view of the apparent asymmetries between the PICs and Australia, action or the change of actions can be justified by their purpose to protect the existing regional order. External influences pose a threat to this order either existentially by means of security challenges or by a hierarchy-reducing offer of demanded goods by one or several external powers, in this case mostly China and Taiwan. The increasing commitment of both of these Chinese states erodes the existing hierarchy and destabilises the existing regional order. Instead, there is now – from the point of Australia – an impending construction of an alternative hierarchy under Chinese authority establishing a new order. This also refers to the fact that the erosion of existing order does not necessarily imply disorder (for the PICs this opinion is shared by Reilly/Henderson 2003), but simply the setting of an alternative order, whereby

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[26] The measurement of hierarchies within the reference region of the PICs might be possible by a time based comparison which takes account of the corresponding caesura. This comparison should comprise any indicators reflecting dependencies. Already existing methods to measure hierarchies, for example those provided by Douglas Lemke (2002:77), are hardly adequate for the PICs. Lemke's approach argues in a military and technical way. It measures the military and technical relations of states located in area determined by dyad of at least two states competing for leadership. Before China became active in *Oceania*, there was neither competition for regional leadership because of Australia's (military) dominance. Only Fiji and PNG maintain an army without having any transport capabilities for longer distances. For the sake of completeness it shall be mentioned in this context that within the region of *Island Pacific* (see footnote 1) there has been a steady competition between the single PICs, mainly between Fiji and PNG.

[27] Financial support both from China and Taiwan is paid without conditions to the PICs. Traditional donors like Australia however attach conditions like good governance to their assistance.

China's commitment does not necessarily have just negative connotations (Wesley-Smith/Porter 2010; Hanson 2008).

Hierarchies contain the deliberate or structural assignment of duties incumbent upon a leader seen to belegitimate. Inevitably this involves the conveyance of some parts of state sovereignty. Whether this is done under compulsion as we see it in Iraq, or due to historical insights like in the European states towards the European Union or else like in the PICs due to distinctive asymmetries in recognition of their own limited state existence, is not of prime interest when looking at the resulting sovereignty transfer, as the principle of state sourvereignty is now no longer indivisibly. Against the backdrop of distinctive asymmetries a divided state sovereignty is likely, as with Krasner (1999, 2004, 2005) represented in the PICs in various shapes of *quasi-states* (Jackson 1993).

The conditions of a basic anarchy between states does not always result in an intensified and realistic self-help imperative, but also – as with the cultures described by Wendt – in the emergence of different forms like hierarchies, particularly under asymmetrical conditions and frames. This can be explained by the awareness of the respective states (and their leaders) that some duties are better taken care of by other states or institutions due to missing own capacities, or because a certain service comes at too high a price. The inclination to hierarchisise becomes more distinctive, the greater the asymmetries between the involved parties are. Subordinated states recognize the dominant state and position themselves under its protection. This affects their self-perception, their identity and their interests, whereby a distinction between compulsion and voluntariness has to be made (Lake 2009:176). Asymmetries can effect conflict and with it compulsion. Another possible szenario would be that some states follow other states as they are convinced of their

legitimacy to lead. In this case cooperation and subordination are regarded as the cheaper and profitable option than the abstination from it.

In this logic, the behaviour or the alignment of the behaviour of a regional leading power, like here of Australia, would depend on the behaviour of the follower and therefore just be reactive. The behaviour of this power regarding "its" region would then no longer be exogenously determined by turning points but rather originates regional-endogenously in itself, from out the region. In terms of a distinctive asymmetry the collectively shared interpretations lead through the role allocation to the creation of a stable identity, along with a clear understanding of ones own position and some expectations towards other actors. A leading power acts here in anticipation of what its follower would expect it from him, which points to a regional-endogenous action direction. Any informal authority of the leading power can only prevail if there is a congruence of interests between itself and its followers. Only then a legitimacy, which is based on conviction and can renounce compulsion, is granted. This conviction itself is based on the benefit given to the follower by hierarchy and with it by the goods being offered by a regional leading power as a regional factor. The higher the opportunity costs in a state, the more attractive does a hierarchy as system base and as a cooperation mechanism become (Lake 1999:54). Likewise, legitimacy can only be vocalized by the followers, what can also be described as a reverse asymmetrical or reflected power. A power only becomes a leading power through the support of the followers. If the followers in turn stepped out of line, for instance to support another power in shape of a dyade, the system of conviction and legitimacy would no longer work. In that case the leading power would have to intervene to protect the order-generation followship which after all, constitutes the leadership. This is certainly true in view of the interference of China in the PICs region.

A hierarchical order on the basis of asymmetries can lead to a congruence of the self-perception of Australia as a leading power and the expectations of the PICs. This congruence of the socialisation of Australia as a leading power and the PICs as its followers forms the basis for the legitimization as a regional power, because this also corresponds with the interests of leaders and followers (Nabers 2012:129f). This congruence based on the different ends of an asymmetry creates different interests and priorities forming a certain kind of order. As a hypothesis it can be said that interventions always happen at a point in time, when this order is disturbed by interfering external actors posing an alternative to the present system or the change of external – here security and economical – conditions. The intervention of Australia can be interpreted accordingly as a restoration of order. Therefore, the independent variables to explain the change of Australian leadership action in the reference region would be due to the disturbances of the existing order as well as in the existing asymmetry and its ability to react to those. Interventions thus would have the function to preserve existing power relations. Without these disruptions the system would be entirely hierarchical, thus stable and there would be no reason for interventions. Interventions or the threat of interventions in the area of application of the Pacific Island Forum have been envisaged since the Biketawa-Declaration of 2000. Such interventions, which have been implicitly threatened and in case of *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI) [28] have also been carried out, are said to serve the correction of systemic interferences of the regional system Oceania. Asymmetries in this context are said to have the functional character of the system preservation (Anderson 2005:28f).

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[28]   See Dinnen in this volume.

Conclusion

The process of 'identity learning' through asymmetries and the influences of the (global) environment dominate the motivation to respective actions, which only emerge as real action by interpretation. Exogenous and endogenous elements are therefore not to be examined seperately:

Asymmetry $\longrightarrow$ Identity

Affordance $\longrightarrow$ Interest $\longrightarrow$ Action

Assumptions about the properties of others do therefore affect ones own action and only then trigger this particular anarchy which influences the action of states. By this token, anarchy is not *natural*, but a product of cognitive processes as well as of perception and interpretation: "*If they* [the political decision makers, AH] *think that a state is hostile, behaviour that others might see as neutrally or friendly will be ignored, distorted, or seen as attempted duplicity. This cognitive rigidity reinforces the consequences of internationally anarchy*" (Jervis 2010:49). According to Waltz's classic assumption that states would only differ in terms of their capabilities (Waltz 1979:92), anarchy would within the inevitably arising asymmetries in fact lead to hierarchies which theirselves are generating a certain meaning.

Asymmetries especially demonstrate how big the range of hierarchies within a given geographical area is. The regional balancing of power under the conditions of asymmetry is hardly feasable without any outside help. This is the material level, while at the same time there is also an immaterial or else an imagined level of perception. Thus, asymmetries represent the 'What' of the leading power, the measurable data in a mere allocation of ressources, whereas the 'How' marks the area of the affordance, i.e. the interest and the decision. Here, these are primarily those mechanisms affecting interests in

relation to the region and which – hypothetically formulated – emerge from the self-understanding of asymmetric conditions (Lukes 2005 491-493).

The discussion about of identity points to self- and external perceptions on the basis of objectively shared and strikingly distinctive asymmetries between the PICs and Australia. This perception leads to certain inside and outside expectations. Nevertheless, this only explains the action as such and not its consequences, which can be either co-operative, neutral or else conflictive-interventionist. Effectively, identity is only *one* of many different components for interests, action and consequently for a potential change. In order to fix this deficiency, global turning points should also be regarded as changes of global norms and structures as affordances. This is the *second* component for the explanation of change. Ernst von Glasersfeld points out that cognitive beings acquire knowledge earmarked for their own advantage, which is why knowledge can never be objective (von Glasersfeld 1997:187). Piaget (1970:38) describes this behaviour of earmarking as a reaction to disturbances. These endanger the stability of a system, so that their effects on the same must be averted by purposeful activity, which in turn contains the want for stability as some sort of cardinal affordance. This purpose-driven attitude implies at the same time the pursuit for something that is subjectively approved of in the respective context. Negative experiences are not repeated. According to Maturana (1970:39), living systems operate inductively and conservatively, whereby sitations recur and are only repeated once they are considered as being efficient. Australia treated the PICs in a certain manner so long as it would deem it beneficial to itself. External or internal turning points however create disturbances or instabilities which are to be removed by means of a certain purpose-driven action, explaining not only the actions as such but also their purpose. To come back to von Glasersfeld: "*Knowledge exists in the means and ways, which the cognitive subject has developed to*

adjust to the world it experiences" (von Glasersfeld 1997:187; "*Wissen besteht in den Mitteln und Wegen, die das erkennende Subjekt begrifflich entwickelt hat, um sich an die Welt anzupassen, die es erlebt*").

The asymmetries between the PICs and Australia as objectively shared realities give rise for the need for their interpretation. This result could be change, either of a co-operative or interventionist kind or else the neutral zero-option. These three options depend on the change of global norms and subsequently global structures, which in form of affordances influence the interpretation of the asymmetries and themselves decisively. Conversely, the results of that interpretation do (not only) influence global norms and structures individually, their dynamic existence and change respectively. The mechanism constituting the interdependence of identity and structure by way of example of the PICs and Australia in the truest sense of the word, also works "one level up" with regards to global norms as base for global structures, shaping national identities and at the same time laying their own foundation. Therefore, structures are not static, but rather dynamic. Nevertheless, this complex interplay does not only consider the exogenous but also the endogenous elements, which taken together make change explicable. In such a compound of system- and action-theoretical approaches, minimal however recurring changes to a performance or a structuring action as an endogenous element allow for alternatives. By admitting inclusion of potential alternatives in an idea, these are not only thought of but are already put into practice in an initial step.

Appendix:

Chart 1: Pacific Sub-Regions

Chart 2: State Functions at the Interface of States and Their Environment

Capability

DOUBLE COMPACT

International Community

Domestic Leadership

Citizens

GOAL

A State accountable for delivering human security and prosperity to ist citizens and fulfilling ist obligations as a legitimate member of the international community

INTERNAL PROCESSES

FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

1. Legitimate monopoly on the means of violence
2. Administrative Control
3. Management of public finances
4. Investment in human capital
5. Delineation of citizenship rights & duties
6. Provision of infrastructure services
7. Formation of the market
8. Maangement of public assets (land, natural resources, environment, culture)
9. International relations
10. Rule of law

Critical Tasks

RESOURCES
(human, social, physical, natural, international, institutional, security & financial capital)

PROCESSES and ORGANISATION

STAKEHOLDERS

RULES

EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Global Trade System
Global Aid System
Global Security System
Global & Regional Corporations
Global Civil Society Networks
Global Media
Global & Regional Networks of Knowledge
Global & Regional Criminal Economic Networks
Regional Security Trade Aid System

Leadership & management through alignment & sequencing

Source: Ghani et al. 2005:14

Chart 3: Basic Data for the Pacific Island Countries[29]

	Australia	Fiji	Kiribati	Marshall Isl.	Federated States of Micronesia	Nauru	Palau	PNG	Solomon Isl.	Samoa	Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Population in 1,000	22,262	897	103	70	106	9	21	6,500	600	195	106	11	262
Ø Growth ´90-´12 %	1.1	0.6	2.0	0.8	0.0	0.4	-0.2	2.9	2.7	0.6	0.3	1.4	2.5
Migration Rate/1,000	5.83	-6.8	-2.86	-5	-16.3	-14.63	-0.66	0.00	-1.82	-17.3	-16	-6.92	-1.53
Life Ex-pectancy	81.89	71.87	65.11	72.3	72.7	80	72.33	66.66	74.66	72.94	75.6	67.5	72.38
Literacy Rate %	99	93.7	92 (2005)	93.7	92.4 (2009)	97 (2007)	92	62.4	84.1	98.8	99	94 (2007)	83.2
Urbanisation %	89	52.2	48.5	71.8	23 (2010)	100	77	12.5	20.5	19.9	23.4	50.6	24.6
Poverty %	12.8	31	50 (2006)	n.a.	26.7	n.a.	n.a.	37	n.a.	26.9	24	n.a.	n.a.
Governance Indicators: +2.5 = highest, -2.5 = lowest													
Voice and Accounta-bility	+1.50	-0.99	+0.85	+1.18	+1.07	+1.08	+1.19	-0.03	+0.04	+0.47	+0.37	+0.75	+0.57
Political Stability	+1.00	+0.02	+1.33	+0.53	+1.24	+1.03	+1.03	-0.89	+0.34	+0.85	+0.97	+1.33	+0.39
Government Effectiveness	+1.61	-0.71	-0.77	-1.63	-0.74	-0.59	-0.59	-0.74	-0.85	-0.02	-0.37	-0.78	+0.31
Regulatory Quality	+1.77	-0.50	-1.42	-0.95	-0.93	-1.09	-0.91	-0.51	-1.07	-0.33	-0.61	-1.27	+0.23
Rule of Law	+1.75	-0.91	+0.08	+0.13	-0.07	+0.35	+0.84	-0.84	-0.60	+0.65	+0.07	+0.45	+0.21
Control of Corruption	+2.00	-0.49	+0.13	-0.25	-0.30	+0.01	-0.46	-1.12	-0.44	+0.11	-0.29	-0.47	+0.31
Corruption Perceptions Index	7/176	55/159 (2005)	91/178 (2010)	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	150/176	120/182 (´11)	69/182 (2011)	95/182 (2011)	n.a.	77/182 (´11)
Freedom according to Freedom House: 1 = free, 7= not free; free (F) = 1.0 – 2.5; partly free (PF) = 3.0 – 5.0; not free (NF) = 5.5 – 7.0													
Status (total/civil liber-ties/political rights)	F (1/1/1)	PF (5/4/6)	F (1/1/1)	F (1/1/1)	F (1/1/1)	F (1/1/1)	F (1/1/1)	PF (3.5/3/4)	PF (3.5/3/4)	F (2/2/2)	F (2.5/2/3)	F (1/1/1)	F (2/2/2)
HDI (2013); Place/187	0.933; 2	0.724; 88	0.607; 133	n.a.	0.630; 124	n.a.	0.791; 52	0.466; 156	0.530; 143	0.702; 96/187	0.710; 95/187	0.711 n.a.	0.626; 124
GDP Bn. US$/GDP Growth%	1,542/3.6	4.373/2.1	0.636 2.5	0.481 1.9	0.766 1.4	0.060 n.a.	0.221 5.8 (11)	19.41 9.8	1.922 5.5	1.146 1.2	0.801 1.4	0.038 1.2	1.251 2.7
GDP/Head 1000 US $	43.3	4.9	6.1	8.8	7.5	6.3	10.5	2.8	3.4	6.3	7.7	3.4	5.0

Basic Data PICs cont.	Australia	Fiji	Kiribati	Marshall Isl.	Federated States of Micronesia	Nauru	Palau	PNG	Solomon Isl.	Samoa	Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
GDP by sectors %	3.9/ 27.2/ 68.9	12.3/ 19.1/ 68.6	24.3/ 7.9/ 61	14.3/ 13.9/ 71.8	14/ 12/ 74	6.1/ 33/ 60.8	3.2/ 20/ 76.8	28/ 38.6/ 33.4	54.1/ 7.2/ 38.6	9.4/ 26.5/ 64.1	20.9/ 16.6/ 62.5	17/ 27/ 56	20.6/ 11.7/ 67.6
ODA/GDP (2011) %	----------	2.06	26	28.2	40.11	113 (2007)	18.69	4.91	49.57	15.85	21.37	44 (2007)	11.45
Unemploy-ment %	5.2	7 (´11)	6.1 (´05)	36 (´06)	22 (´00)	90 (´04)	4.2 (´00)	1.9 (´08)	39.8 (´05)	1.3 (´11)	13 (´04)	6.5 (´05)	5.5 (´09)
Budget deficit/sur-plus %/GDP	-3.3	-4.2	-29.8	+0.4	+1.5	n.a.	-2.4	-1.5	+5.4	-1.9	0.0	-4.1	-2.8
Currency Rate US$ (01/2014)	1:1.12	1:1.87	1:1.12 (A$)	1:1 (US$)	1:1 (US$)	1:1.12 (A$)	1:1 (US$)	1:2.46	1:7.33	1:2.27	1:1.86	1:1.12 (A$)	1:95.35
Agriculture, agricultural products	Wheat, Barley, Sugar Cane, Fruits, livestock	Sugar Cane, Ba-nana, Coconuts, livestock, Fish	Copra, Taro, Breadfruit, Vege-tables, Fish	Coconuts, Taro, Breadfruit, live-stock	Pepper, Fruits, Vegetables, live-stock, Coconuts,	Coconuts	Coconuts, Copra Fish, Tapioca,	Coffee, Cocoa, Copra, Fruits, Vegetables, Fish	Cocoa, Fruits, Rice, Vegetables, Cocon., Animals	Coconuts, Cocoa, Banana, Taro, Yams, Coffee	Pumkin, Copra, Coconuts, Vanilla, Fish	CoconutsFish	Kopra, Coconuts, Yams, Fruits, Fish, Meat
Industry	Mines, Chemicals, Steel	Tourism, Sugar, Gold, Clothing, Lumber	Handicrafts, Fishing	Copra, Fishing, Tourism	Tourism, Fishing	Phosphate, Offs-hore Banking	Tourism, Clothing	Silver, Gas, Gold, Lumber/Timber, Copper, Oil/Petrol.	Fishing, Gold, Lumber, Timber	Food, tourism, building materials, auto parts	Tourism, Fishing	Tourism, Fishing	Food/Fish, Wood, Meat Canning
Export in Mio. US$ (2012)	257,900	991.6	7.1 (2010)	50.1 (2011)	24.9 (2009)	0.06 (2005)	12.3 (2010)	5,604	226.5 (2010)	11.4 (2011)	8.4	0.6 (2010)	55.9
Export	Coal, Iron Ore, Gold, Meat, Wool, Alumina, Wheat, Transport/Machinery Equip.	Sugar, Garments, Gold, Timber, Fish, Molasses, Coconut Oil	Copra (62%), Coconuts, Seaweed, Fish	Copra Cake, Coconut Oil, Handicrafts, Fish	Fish, Garments, Bananas, Pepper, Sakau, Betel Nuts	Phosphate	Fish, Copra, Clothing	Oil/Liquid Gas, Gold, Cop-per, Logs, Palm Oil, Coffee, Cocoa, Fish	Timber, Fish, Copra, Palm Oil, Cocoa	Fish, Coconut Oil/ Cream, Copra, Taro, Automotive Parts, Beer, Garments	Squash, Fish, Vanilla Beans, Root Crops	Copra, Fish	Copra, Beef, Cocoa, Tim-ber, Kava, Coffee
Export Countries (in %)	PRC: 29.5, J: 19.3, KOR: 8, I: 4.9%	USA: 13.3, A: 12, J: 6.3, WS: 5.8, TON: 5.1%	J. MAL, TW, USA, A	USA, J, A	J, USA	KOR, CAN, UK, G	USA, J, S	A: 30.1, J: 9.9, PRC: 4.8	PRC: 47; A: 16.6	A: 22.6%, AS: 50.4%	KOR: 18%, USA: 16.4%, NZ: 15.1%, FJ: 10%	G: 56%, FJ: 14% (2004)	T: 59.9%, J 20.9%
Import in Mio. US$	263,000	1.938	80.09 (2010)	118.7 (2011)	132.7 (2004)	5.9	113.4 (2011)	4,412	360.3 (2010)	318.7 (2011)	121.9	16.5 (2010)	316.4

Basic Data PIC cont.	Australia	Fiji	Kiribati	Marshall Isl.	Federated States of Micronesia	Nauru	Palau	PNG	Solomon Isl.	Samoa	Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Import	Machinery, Computers, Telecom, Oil/Petroleum	Manuf. Goods, Machiney, Fuel, Food, Chemicals	Fuel, Mashiney, Food	Fuel, Mashiney, Food	Fuel, Mashiney, Food	Fuel, Mashiney, Food	Fuel, Mashiney, Food	Fuel, Mashiney, Food, Chemicals	Fuel, Mashiney, Food, Chemicals	Fuel, Mashiney, Food	Fuel, Mashiney, Food, Chemicals	Fuel, Food, Mashiney	Fuel, Mashiney, Food
Import Countries (in %)	PRC: 18.4, US: 11.7, J: 7.9, S: 6, G: 4.6, T: 4.2,	S: 32.6, A: 15.4, NZ: 14.4, PRC: 10.7	A, FJ, J, NZ, USA, KOR, PRC, T	USA, J, A, NZ, S	USA, A, J (2004)	A, USA, UK (1991)	USA, J, S, KOR (2000)	A: 36.3, S: 13.8, MAL: 8.4, PRC: 7.9, J: 5.8	FJ: 19, NZ: 18.8, S: 18.2, PRC: 15.5, A: 5.8	S 26.6%, A 25.1%, PRC 7%, NZ 4.8%	FJ: 38, NZ: 23.5, USA: 10.1, PRC: 9.9	FJ: 50, J: 18, A: 10 (2004)	PRC: 20, S: 18.5, USA: 14.8, J: 11.4

Legend: A=Australia, AS=American Samoa, CAN=Canada, FJ=Fiji, G=Germany, I=India, J=Japan, KOR=Korea, MAL=Malaysia, NZ=New Zealand, PRC=China, S=Singapore, T=Thailand, TON=Tonga, TW=Taiwan, UK=United Kingdom, USA=USA, WS=Samoa

Chart 4: Asymmetries between Australia and the PICs in some core areas[30]

	Australia	Ø PICs	Ratio AUS-ØPICs	∑PICs	Ratio AUS-∑PICs
Population in 1,000	22,262	740	30:1	8,880	2.5:1
Migration Rate/1,000	5.83	-7.49			
Life Expectancy	81.89	72			
Literacy Rate %	99	90.19			
Poverty %	12.8	32.6			
HDI	0.938	0.664			
GDP BN. US$	1,542	2.59	959:1	31.11	49.6:1
ODA/GNP (2011)	0	31.27			
Export in Mio. US$	257,900	582.74 (incl. PNG) 115.74 (excl. PNG)	442.56:1 (incl. PNG) 2228.27:1 (excl. PNG)	6992.86 (incl. PNG) 1388.86 (excl. PNG)	36.88:1 (incl. PNG) 186.69:1 (excl. PNG)
Import in Mio. US$	263,000	661.22 (incl. PNG) 293.55 (excl. PNG)	397.75:1 (incl. PNG) 895.93:1 (excl. PNG)	7934.59 (incl. PNG) 3522.59 (excl. PNG)	33.15:1 (incl. PNG) 74.66:1 (excl. PNG)
Military Expenditures in Mio. US$	26009.1	81.76 (PNG + FJ)	318.13:1	163.51 (PNG+FJ)	159.01:1

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[30]   Unless indicated otherwise, all data refer to 2012. Sources: CIA World Factbook, World Bank, Transparency International, Freedom House, UNDP and local statistics.

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Actors

Reweighted Islands or Restructuring the Islands? Australia as a Regional Power in Oceania

Andreas Holtz

Abstract: *Regarding the asymmetries between Australia and the Pacific Islands Countries it is obviously not a mistake to consider Australia as a regional power within this region. In this chapter I shall attempt to explain how Australia as a regional power has changed its objectives within the region. I argue that Australia's paradigm shifts in economical and security issues are mainly motivated by global changes. Although Australia is the driver in the region, its global influence is rather limited. Australia seems to be a rule maker and a rule taker at the same time. Therefore Australia translates global imperatives to its regional sphere of influence. I will show that this general direction of Australia's policy has not changed in the last decades, no matter which government ruled the country. Furthermore I will investigate the Chinese imperative as challenge of Australia's leadership in Oceania. This challenge is not only of regional importance as Australia's uses its regional influence to reach a higher level of influence on the global stage. Australia's global middle power ambitions are not to be realised without being a strong leading power in the Pacific. I conclude by attempting to predict the emphases of the Abbott administration's Pacific policy.*

Introduction

There is hardly any other region with more pronounced asymmetries between the regional/region constituting states than Oceania. Comparing Australia as Oceania's leading power with the Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), not only the pure differences in size and population are clearly visible, but also differences in other relative and absolute indicators like political, economic and military capabilities become evident. Traditionally, Canberra's role in this regional game was that of a cooperative and caring hegemon. By the incisive terror attacks of 9/11 a change of programme at the global stage has arisen. Subsequently, Australia has changed its behaviour from cooperation to intervention (Barcham/Greener-Barcham 2006:67-82). Thus Australia has changed from a caring hegemon to an interventionist and order providing power (for further discussion about these specific meanings see Destradi 2008 and Nolte 2006). However, a deeper analysis of Oceania's regionalism over the last quarter century shows a more detailed picture. 9/11 as well as the impact of the so called Bali bombings in 2004 seem to have been turning points in Australia's relations to its Pacific neighbours.

This is surprisingly true and false at the same time. The original turning point as a consequence of the ceding globally influencing Cold War-bipolarity was not apparent at that time. The structure of bipolarity provided an order with clear hierarchies and regional subordinations. After 1989 a new world order emerged providing a system of multipolarity. Thus, the significance of regions increases with growing relative power and influence of regional powers at least in their regions (Hurrel 2007:128). Growing relative power of the then more significant regional powers brings forth also growing responsibilities and duties of the regional powers within their corresponding regions. Regarding this background 9/11 is not a turning point in Australia's Oceania policy or rather its regional security and economic policy, but a

consecutive intensification of an already existing idea about regional order in Oceania (Dinnen 2012:61). Consecutive determinants are influencing results without being the original event leading to a certain result. 9/11 was not the original trigger but a truly important opportunity to realise already existing ideas. However, if only the fact is regarded that Australia uses military force in Oceania to restore law and order in the Solomon Islands or to threaten implicitly to do so in other PICs without being authorized by the UN Security Council, than certainly a paradigm shift from a hands-off to a hands-on approach is obvious (Mc Leod/O'Reilly 2009:215; Dinnen 2008:3)[1].

Australia's ambitions as a leading power are distinct regarding the asymmetric relations between Australia and the weak PICs which are not able to resist such ambitions. The main driver of Australia's role as a regional overlord was Australia's former conservative Prime Minister John Howard who was in power from 1996 to 2007. In December 2007, Howard was replaced by Labor's Kevin Rudd followed by Labor's Julia Gillard in June 2010. Rudd replaced Gillard in June 2013 for a second term. After dissolution of the parliament in September 2013, Rudd was replaced by the conservative Tony Abbott in the same month. The change from Rudd to Gillard and back was more a personal change than a political change. Because of Rudd's devastating results in opinion polls after a long period of popularity and growing

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[1]   A blueprint for this putative paradigm shift is written by the former ASPI-researcher Elsina Wainwright (2003:1): "Now Australia faces a new challenge: how to promote our interests in these island territories as they struggle to achieve viability as independent sovereign states in a tough world. Many of them are, to a greater or lesser degree, failing. In the process they are calling into question the sustainability of the policy approaches we have adopted towards our Pacific Island neighbours since they became independent—policies characterised by generous aid and a hands off approach." Some keywords of this citation are worth to discuss. What kind of interests does a state like Australia has in weak and non-aggressive island states? Who benefits from these interests? A tough world is a perception referring to hard-core realism. Perceptions tend to reveal something about intentions: How is it possible to consider the world as tough? Maybe our world could be also seen as peaceful and friendly. Finally the perception of failing states justifies any intervention. But who has the right to judge about the failure of a state? Where is the border between a failing or even a failed state and a functioning state? ASPI is financed by Australia's Defence Department.

dissatisfaction with his leadership within the Labor Party, its right wing forced him to resign. His successor Julia Gillard had no experience in foreign affairs. Because Rudd's experience as a former diplomat he was asked to serve as a Minister of Foreign Affairs. Therefore it is possible to draw a line between Howard's Pacific policy and Rudd's respectively to compare both approaches.

As a graduate in Chinese language and Chinese history of the Australian National University Rudd joined the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs in 1981. Until 1988 he spent several years as a diplomat in various Australian embassies including Beijing. He soon realized that the Australian-Chinese relationship is an essential component in Australian foreign and economic policy. It seems to be necessary to keep this in mind while analysing Australia's Pacific policy because China is becoming a regional actor of increasing importance in the PICs. Apart from Australia's relations to China, Rudd's Labor government set new standards also in other policy areas. In contrast to his predecessor Rudd showed an astonishing ability for self-criticism when he apologized for injustice against aboriginal Australians (Johnston 2008) or by implementing an effective environmental policy for the first time in Australia's history. In spite of the superficially idealistic or better soft-realistic approach of the Rudd-Gillard government the political reality remained stable. Six years of Labor government had not been enough to change existing structures but enough for the structures to change the government's ideas. In that period of time between 2007 and 2013 the political rhetoric addressed to the PICs became more moderate. However, the content of Australia's Pacific policy remained unchanged. With the change of Australia's government after the last election in June 2013, Labor was defeated by Tony Abbott, Australia's current Prime Minister. While writing this, Abbott has been in power for less than one year. So far it is difficult to provide

solid findings of Tony Abbott's idea about a sustainable Pacific policy, yet it seems highly unlikely that Abbott will change already existing approaches to deal regionally in Oceania. Though it is also obvious that Abbott refuses to follow some paths of the Rudd/Gillard-administration in some realms which are also important to the PICs. While Rudd/Gillard at least tried to prepare the ground for a sustainable environmental policy worthy of the name, Abbott avoids any further efforts on this issue. His new government refused to take part in Warsaw climate change-meeting in 2013 on a ministerial level. Furthermore it also refuses any commitments regarding extra funds to climate change despite a request of Pacific Islands' leaders for additional support of the low-lying atoll island states like Tuvalu or Kiribati. Rather Abbott considers climate change science as "absolute crap", doubting that there are any climate-related changes. Consequentially, Australia has snubbed the United Nations in its attempts to collate a unified international agreement to limit global greenhouse emissions (Sharma 2013). Furthermore, the Abbott government realises now what it had announced as opposition to the former Labor government, namely that Australia is not willing to give a blank cheque to cover loss and damages refering to the climate change. Australia categorically rejects to support a multilateral fund as the Green Capital Fund although the country played a central role in the creation of that fund, its mandate, operations and policies.

The regional reaction to Abbott's closed eyes was clear: "Tony Abbott must listen to the scientists and not play politics with the survival of Australia's friends in the region" (Marshall Islands Minister of Foreign Affairs Tony de Brum cited by Milman 2013). Australia's ecological– as well as its aid pull-out – is absorbed by China that, while Canberra overturned Australia's policy on climate change, announced US$ 1 billion in concessional loans for

the PICs (MacMillan 2013)[2]. Australia's pull-out in questions of climate change is only one example of what happens in the region these days. In general it can be said that a structurally stable region becomes more and more eroded by external influences as well as by Australia's general withdrawal in regional affairs. This seems to be contradictory as Australia increases its efforts in regional security and economic policies. However, there is no true contradiction. Australia's middle power ambitions (Cotton/Ravenhill 2012) run like a thread through Australia's last governments (Howard, Rudd, Gillard, Abbott) and require an increasing level of Australian influence not only in regional but global affairs. Because Australia's capabilities are not unlimited, Canberra has to revise its own priorities. In this context an increasing Australian influence in other regions like Irak, Afghanistan, some African countries or on a general global level means to reduce its activity in the own backyard to save capabilities. Of course, the asymmetries between Australia and the PICs are still impressive but not that stable anymore. Canberra observes this process of regional erosion, which means nothing else than a regional instability. Its reaction is not a generally increasing activity but a higher engagement in core areas of interest like security and economy. This does not avoid erosion but keeps and protects regional hierarchies in these core areas. As a result there is still an erosion which is though not a danger anymore.

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[2]   China offered also ano other billion in commercial loan facility aministered through the Chinese Development bank. China has also promised to support the PICs to enter the big Chinese markets. Therefore Beijing has announced to remove 95% of commodities from Pacific Least Developed Countries (LDCs). These announcements will enhance the diplomatic influence of China in the PICs and therefore will contribute to an erosion of the Australian hierarchy in Oceania which is supposed to lead to a growing regional instability. However, observers do not believe that at least the smaller PICs are not likely to increase their debts by taking on additional loans. Some of the PICs recognise Taiwan rather than China and will probably reject The Chinese offer (Hayward-Jones/Brant 2013).

Australia's Pacific policy consists of various policy fields. The most important ones are certainly Australia's regional economic and security policies. Although these policies are denominated here as Australia's policies, those labellings are not fully correct. '*Australia's*' policies must be seen in combination with global structures and therefore in a global context. It is important, always to notice Australia's policies (as well as the policies of other units) as being connected to their national, regional, inter-regional and global environment. For this reason it is necessary to operate with a multilevel analysis and to consider possible interdependencies.

Australia's Pacific Policy until the Rudd Administration

The Australian led *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI) was in action between 2003 and 2013. Many observers consider this mission as a turning point in Australia's Pacific policy. Following their views that Australia has changed its regional *hands off* approach to a rather sustainable *hands on* approach (Wainwright/Harris 2005:54-61). In fact what is considered as a new interventionism (Fry 2008:72-86) is only the newest example of what could be best described as an intervention history in the Pacific[3]. Besides RAMSI the Australian led intervention in the bloody secession conflict of the resource rich island of Bougainville from Papua New Guinea (PNG) should be mentioned. The Australian led *Peace Monitoring Group* included

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[3]   In the 1950's Australia suggested to assume the British part of the British-French condominium of the New Hebrides. In 1980 Canberra supported the Papua New Guinea Defense Forces to logistically oppress the so called *Santo-Rebellion* on the biggest New Hebrides island of Espiritu Santo (Gubb 1994). During the Vila riots in Vanuatu's capital Port Vila in 1988, Australia's navy was ready to intervene. However the decisive order was never issued. In 1999 Australia's military forces intervened in Timor legalized by the UN Security Council reolution 1264 as part of the multilateral intervention mission INTERFET (see Schmitz in this volume). Beginning in 1998 Australia intervened with other regional forces in the civil war in Bougainville (see Boege in this volume). However, this intervention was invited by both conflicting parties. This unarmed Peace Monitoring Group ended in 2003. However, these former invitations differ from what is described as a *hands on* approach because this new interventionism means armed military interventions without a mandate from the UN Security Council.

some 3,800 Australian troops as well as around 300 civilian personnel (Woodbury 2014:8, see Boege in this volume). One of the main proponents of the Australian led intervention in Bougainville was former Australian minister of foreign affairs Gareth Evans. In this position Evans defended unarmed and peaceful civil interventions (Fry 2004:4, Hanson 2003:259). Later he became one of the authors of the then influential 'Responsibility to Protect'-Report (R2P) issued by the *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS 2001). R2P suggests changing the internationally valid principle of non-intervention into a principle of intervention if a state is obviously not able to protect its citizens. In cases of substantial violations of human rights R2P suggests that the international community has not only the right to intervene but even a duty to assist restructuring law and order to protect human beings. This approach develops a new understanding of security. Security in this sense is distinguished in human security and state security. Older approaches did not distinguish between the two and only accepted the idea of state security. Following such an approach, individual security results from state security and not the other way round.

Although Evans thought about peaceful, unarmed and civil interventions in the Pacific he brought back the idea of interventions on the agenda. The then Prime Minister John Howard expanded Evans' concept in the light of 9/11 and as one of America's closest allies in the war against terrorism. Like the Bush-administration in Washington Howard reserved the right for Australia to fight international terrorism and to protect Australian security interests by preemptive military actions without special consultations or accordance with authorisations from the respective institutions (Baker 2005:225).

Allthough Australia's capabilities are considerably larger than even the sum of the Pacific Islands States capabilities (see the previous article in this volume), Canberra was sought to act legally correct and in accordance with

international law. Historically and in terms of global politics Australia was integrated into the structured global system of bipolarity. Regions were seen as regional appendices of the global structure. Therefore the authority of states with a regional significance was rather limited. Separate activity in their backyard with consultations of the bipolar hegemons was not possible because there was simply not an own backyard. With the end of bipolarity as of 1989 things changed dramatically. After a short period of unipolarity best described as George Bush senior's idea of a new world order, the global political order became restructured into a world of regions. This renaissance of regions was also a renaissance of regional powers. In other words, regional powers like Australia[4] got their own backyard again or sometimes for the first time. From the ashes of a bipolar structure new powers emerged with their responding regions of interest. From this point of view it does not seem a coincidence that shortly after the end of the Cold War the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) adopted the Honiara[5]-Declaration in 1992. The topic of this declaration was to arrange mutual assistance to fight crime. With this convention security was first put on the agenda of the PIF. The idea of mutual assistance to fight crime enabled the PIF member states for the first time in PIF's history to consider domestic affairs of its members. Until 1992 the PIF's intention was only to promote economic and social development. Politics, respectively security, were explicitly not on the agenda of the PIF (Firth 2001:278). In 1997 the PIF adopt the Aitutaki-declaration discussing several mechanisms of intervention. In analogy to the above mentioned idea of Evan Gareth's unarmed and peaceful civil interventions the PIF's notion of intervention was to intervene with the instruments of preventive diplomacy.

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[4] Or the famous BRICS states (Brasil, Russia India, China, South Africa) which have nothing else in common than more or less fast growing economies. The acronym was created by Goldman Sachs chairman Jim O'Neill.

[5] The names of the PIF-declarations result from the respective place of their annual meetings.

Regarding the crises in Fiji and on the Solomons it became obvious that such a kind of soft-interventionalism is not the appropriate instrument to restore law in order. In 2000 the PIF seemed to accept that amendment by adopting the Biketawa declaration. This declaration is often described as a turning point in regional security politics. First of all it was a revolution inside the PIF as the mode of decision-making was changed. Up to 2000 only decisions by consensus were accepted. This rule gave the weak PICs more power to influence decisions. Up from 2000 this mode was changed to a mode with sufficient consensus which practically reflects the reality of assymetries not only on a regional level but also inside the PIF as almost 75% of the PIF budget is financed by Australia and New Zealand (Peebles 2005:60). However, what seems to be even more important in our context is the decision of the PIF to accept further rapid reaction mechanisms without specifiying these further mechanisms. The range of these mechanisms comprises economic sanctions as well as physical interventions (Anderson 2005:28f).

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 shocked the world and also the Islands Forum. Almost one year after these attacks the Forum members met in Suva to adopt the socalled Nasonini declaration. This declaration might be seen as a direct response to the changing global security perception after 9/11. Regarding this change in global security policy the PIF demanded a more active stance in regional security issues. Two years later, in 2004, the Forum adopted its Auckland declaration to promote regional integration and a rearrangement of the Pacific Island Forum including its organisational structure and its original aims. Among these aims were social development and economic prosperity. However, security issues and in general domestic affairs of its member states were explicitly excluded from the Forum's agenda. This changed dramatically as more or less natural appendix to the Biketawa declaration. *Security* as well as *good governance* jumped to the top of the PIF's

agenda and became two its central objectives. What was even more important was the agreement to develop a road map for the island's development that became popular under the name *Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration*. Since then this Pacific Plan has been considered as the blueprint for an increasing level of cooperation and integration between the PICs and the bigger state of New Zealand plus the region's traditional hegemonial power Australia.

By analysing the Pacific Plan the significant interests in Pacific regionalism become apparent. Security refers to the Australians claims to Pacific regionalism. As economically prosperous country, welfare aims have not the highest priority in Australia's Pacific policy. This is not surprising considering the economic asymmetries between Australia and the PICs. To keep it more simple: what could the PIF offer to Australia's economy? This, of course, is completely different from the PICs point of view. This dichotomy provides a perfect platform for a kind of asymmetric regional trade: Australia offers welfare to security while the PICs need welfare to sustain their political and economical stability and to reduce their vulnerability[6]. By avoiding any kind of instability they indirectly produce the regional security which is demanded by Canberra. In this sense Australia's economic capabilities are used as an instrument of Australia's security topics. In view of the relative strengths[7] between the PIF's member states the PIF declarations up from Biketawa have shown its real character: the PIF has changed to a de facto Australian institution to provide political legitimacy to Australian regional actions. It is the multilateral camouflage of unilateral Australian actions in the Pacific. Internationally this regional strategy is secured by the R2P report (see Firth 2001:280).

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[6]   This might be described as a kind of inverted asymmetry.
[7]   Almost 75% of the PIF's annual budgets are paid by New Zealand and Australia.

Therefore the argument of non-intervention, which was one of the leading maxims of the United Nations precept of non-interference, became more and more extenuated. If a state is not able to protect its population in cases of emergency the international community has the right or even a duty to substitute a state and its sovereignty in order to protect its population. In a nutshell, this means that if a state is failing the responsibility to protect, it will be transferred to the international community. Humanitarian interventions are not only considered as a possible alternative but as a duty (ICISS 2001:XI). However, the only regional power which has the capability to intervene is Australia (and to a lesser degree also New Zealand). Australia reserves the right to act and to intervene regionally avoiding the suspicion to act as a neo-colonial power (Field 2003:24-25). Indeed there are some concerns in Australia about this neo-colonial perception. Thus, claiming unilateral regional acting openly is avoided by all means. To unify these extreme and dichotomic poles of intervention and anti-colonialism, Australia uses the PIF to legitimate its actions.

Powerful Markets: Regional Foreign Trade Policy and the EU

In addition to the region's political reconstruction Australia also supports new directions in its economic architecture. Like having regard to the political reconstruction it is apparent that Australia's economic strategy in the region has also changed, firstly, as a result of global economical realignment, and, secondly, after the breakdown of the global system of bipolarity. Until the beginning of the 1990s Australia's regional policy can be best described as defensively altruistic and protective. Since then a process of paradigm shift can be observed here. Australia operates more actively in the region by expanding the globally leading economic approach of neoliberalism to the PICs. One result is that development assistance is tied to good governance and that trade between the islands states and Australia has to be reciprocal. The main

difference between the current regional trade system and its predecessor is that the past system was non-reciprocal while the current one is reciprocal. The old regional trade was determined by the *South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Co-operation Agreement* (SPARTECA) signed on 14 July 1980 in Tarawa/Kiribati. It came into force 1 January 1981. This non-reciprocal trade agreement was concluded between Australia and New Zealand and the majority of the Pacific Islands States[8]. It offered a duty-free and unrestricted access for specified products originating from the PICs to the markets of Australia and New Zealand. In particular it were the textiles, clothing and footwear industries which were the major beneficiaries through the preferential access to the region's major markets.

Retrospectively one can note that SPARTECA was a regional reflection of the global trade agreements between the European Community States and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP). The then European Economic Community entered into a trade and development treaty with the former European colonies by the treaty of Yaoundé in 1963. Yaoundé was an indirect result of the *Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community* (EEC) of Rome signed in 1957 to reduce customs duties to establish a custom unit. It proposed to create a common market of goods, workers, services and capital in Europe. Among the signatories only Luxemburg, Italy and Western Germany were without colonies at that time, while Belgium, the Netherlands and France still pocessed its colonies, mainly in Africa. It was clear that these non-European territories could not be considered as part of the EEC. Therefore the signatories created a special system of trade policies between the EEC and the European colonies respectively the then newly independent states to continue the close trading relationships between the

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[8]   Cook Island, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

European states and their former colonies (Menck 1999:764). In 1973 the
United Kingdom joined the EEC. This meant that British contracts between
the UK and its (former) colonies became part of the negotiations between
Europe and the ACP-states. The treaty of Yaoundé was followed by the first
treaty of Lomé signed in 1975 between the European Community and 71
African, Caribbean and Pacific states. The core of this treaty and its successor
treaties Lomé II-IV was the non-reciprocal trade between Europe and the
ACP states[9], which meant that products of the ACP states were allowed to
access the European market without almost any restrictions[10] under a system
of unilateral trade preferences, while at the same time the ACP states were
allowed to protect their own local markets. Critics like Robert Kappel empha-
size that these treaties should not aim to fight against underdevelopment or to
promote investments in ACP states, but to support Eurpean economic inter-
ests and to control the ACP states politically with regard to the bipolar com-
petition between the capitalist and socialist blocs. Following Kappel, the
Lomé agreements supported a postcolonial conception of cooperation within
a grown system of patronage between Europe and its colonies respectively
Europe and its then former colonies (Kappel 2002:116f). Therefore it is an
important consideration not to foget the bloc confrontation of that time. The
Lomé agreements were also used as an instrument of an anti-communist
Western containment policy. By the end of the socialist bloc in the early
1990's this policy was not longer necessary. Therefore the European Com-
munity was not longer willing to support its expensive policy of the Lomé
agreements. The resolving of the East-West conflict brought a radical break
in global politics and a change in the political significance of the ACP states

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[9]   Another core was the so called STABEX mechanism. The EC guaranteed to compensate
       losses caused by market fluctuations for some mainly agricultural goods (Thibaut/Nohlen
       1994:626). STABEX was financed by the European Development Fund.
[10]   There were some exceptions made for agricultural products.

which has been pushed into an increasingly marginal role. One result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations in 1994 was an erosion of the then existing non-reciprocal trade system that was seen as a contradiction to the just established *World Trade Organisation* (WTO) and its obligations. In this atmosphere of global restructuring it were primarily Germany and the UK who refused compensation payments to the ACP states in order to reduce their losses after the end of the non-reciprocal system. It is not an exaggeration to state that Berlin and London became one of the most important drivers to end the Lomé model in the global North-South policy (Nuscheler 1996:473f)[11].

The successor of the Lomé Agreements was the Agreement of Cotonou which entered into force in 2002. While the Lomé agreements had provided non-reciprocal preferential access for ACP countries into the EU market, this was challenged in the WTO by non-ACP countries such as Australia, and was deemed as WTO incompatible. The ACP countries were given a wavier by the WTO until the end of 2007 to put in place WTO compatible arrangements with the EU. Cotonou included the creation of reciprocal trade agreements between the European Union and regional blocs of ACP states[12] by establishing new systems of cooperation which are now known as the so called European Partnership Agreements (EPAS; see Schilder in this volume). The EPAs are seen as comprehensive trade agreements which are supposed to decrease transactions costs, improve transparency and establish bigger markets as well

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[11]   In 1996 the European Commission issued a Green Paper to analyse the shortcomings of the Lomé agreements naming a limited and non-diversified production base, missing approaches of good governance and the system of preferences within the larger complex of the non-reciprocal trade system.

[12]   This means that there are not any negotiations anymore between Europe on the one side and the group of ACP states on the other side. By negotiating with single blocs of states or even with single states the EU is destroying the united front of the ACP group which is decreasing its corporate bargaining power and is playing the ACP states interests off against one other (Schilder et al 2006:23f).

as a better intergration into the global economy. As a result it is supposed that growth will increase growth which is equated with better conditions for development. Finally, the Cotonou agreement recommended forcing regional integration as this was supposed to increase the bargaining power of the concerned countries and helps them to benefit from economies of scale (Meyn 2008:20-24). In addition to that the EU argued by following the theoretical approaches of functionalism (Haas 2004; Conzelmann 2003:141-169). As it has been experienced by the European Union itself, it was supposed that regional economic intergration would generate spill over effects leading directly to political integration. One might say, that this point of view could be described as eurocentric as the conditions within the single negotiating group are completely different from the conditions of the European process of unification (Meyn 2008:24).

In a nutshell, it can be emphasized that the global economic conditions have changed from non-reciprocal to reciprocal trade. What happens then in the region of the PICs? The Cotonou Agreement became specified in 2004 to be suited and compatible to the local Pacific conditions. Like in the general agreement, the EU also recommends good governance and an increasing integration into the global economy as a problem-solving tool to the PICs (Reichert et al. 2009:10). The former non-reciprocal trade agreements between the EU and the PICs shall be changed into reciprocal trade agreements. Furthermore, since 2008 the ACP states are required to adjust their trade policies to be compatible to WTO obligations. If they refuse to do so the EU will claim the right to impose penal duties which would impede the essential exports of the PICs[13].

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[13] It is not possible to reproduce the general discussion about EPAs in this article. To get some more information see, for example, Schilder in this volume. However, it should be noted here briefly, that EPAs are often seen critically. Critics fear a possible local displacement effect due to European agricultural products (shock of food self-sufficiency) and industrial

Australia's reaction to that global framework in North-South trade agreements provided by the EU was to implement the *Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations* (PACER) in 2002. PACER followed the *Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement* (PICTA) concluded in 2001 (see chart 1).

Chart 1: Trade agreements involving PICs (Source: Braxton 2009:6)

PICTA: Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement
PACER: Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement
SPARTECA: South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement
PATCRA: Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement
MSG: Melanesian Spearhead Group
WTO: World Trade Organisation (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, PNG, Solomons, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu)

PICTA regulates the terms of trade and services as a free trade agreement among the particular Pacific Islands States excluding Australia and New

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products (development shock) and therefore the danger to choke off regional trade (regional shock). Furthermore it is to be expected that exchange rates (foreign trade shock) and national revenues could fall (budget shock). Finally it is assumed that democratic processes could be undermined (shock of democracy and stability) because the EPA negotiations are normally not embedded in national democratic policy processes (Groth 2006:7-9). Some observers go so far as to say that the Pacific becomes recolonized by free trade agreements (Kelsey 2004b).

Zealand. PACER expands this free trade area to Australia and New Zealand. However, PACER is not an internationally binding free trade agreement, but only a compulsory convention that a free trade agreement between the PICTA states and Australia and New Zealand must be concluded if the PICs make similar commitments to other states outside the PIF member countries aspart of an international agreement. Even if that is not the case, PACER envisaged that negotiations among the PACER agreement with the aim to provide a free trade area in Oceania should have been initiated by 2011. Because the PICs are in the negotiating process to conclude an EPA with the EU, the PACER agreement became effective. Two of them, PNG and Fiji have already signed an Interim Partnership Agreement in 2009. Although the EU launched negotiations with Pacifc ACP states in 2004 it became obvious in 2007 that the entire group of these states were not able to conclude a comprehensive EPA with the EU. Therefore, Fiji and PNG initialled an Interim EPA (IEPA) in order to protect their sugar and fish exports respectively[14].

PNG ratified the IEPA in 2011 while Fiji finally refused to ratify. By the conclusion of the IEPA's, and just even by the negotiations about such an agreement, PACER entered into force. In October 2013 the EU suspended its negotiations to a comprehensive EPA with all states of the region except Australia and New Zealand (Cook Islands, East Timor, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu). The comprehensive agreement should have covered trade in goods, trade in services, development co-operation and trade-related issues like food health and safety issues, technical barriers to trade, agriculture, sustainable development and competition.

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[14]   PNG will liberalise 88% of EU imports while Fiji will liberalise 87%. The full EPA is likely to cover the same realms as the IEPA plus development cooperation provisions, a fisheries chapter, social and environmental issues and competition.

The reasons for the failed negotiations between Brussels and the Pacific ACP states are numerous: Vanuatu, for example, requested to obtain special treatment in terms of tariff liberalization due to its unique fiscal circumstances, to obtain market access for its Kava production to the EU, and to eliminate any obligations about tax informations and exchange agreements going beyond OECD's commitments (Islands Business 2013). Even more important, however, were serious divergencies over fisheries management, "*where Pacific countries refused EU requests to bring in changes to Pacific countries' national laws on fisheries management, as well as specific commitments on access to Pacific fisheries resources under the agreement. Instead, the region referred to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission as the competent forum*" (ACP 2013).

The main driver on the side of the PICs was PNG. PNG insisted on its IEPA concluded in 2009 to save its tuna exports to the EU. Fiji initially followed PNG's point of view to save its sugar industry. It seemed that both countries sacrificed regional solidarity to their national interests. PNG assesses that Article 37(4) of the Cotonou Agreement is still in force. This article describes what some observers consider as 'variable geometry' (Tabureguci 2014). This means that a diverse region with different needs like the PICs, should be treated individually. This interpretation consists that PNG's IEPA is not a contradiction to a comprehensive EPA between the EU and the whole group of Pacific ACP states. However, this opinion is not shared by the EU: "*According to the EU a fundamental principle for the EPA was that signatories to the Interim EPA (PNG & Fiji) must be part of the comprehensive EPA. They reiterated that there cannot be two agreements running in parallel, in other words, the Interim EPA and comprehensive EPA it was fundamental that all 14 countries be part of the comprehensive EPA*" (PINA 2013).

Although PNG ought to have known that insisting on its IEPA meant to peril regional solidarity respectively a joint Pacific negotiation group, the country opted out of the shared position within the PICs that negotiations about a regional EPA would be negotiated regionally. Inofficially, "*Brussels had also not made a secret of its insistence that Pacific members of the ACP bloc should opt for an IEPA, not a comprehensive one*" (Pareti 2013). In contrast to PNG Fiji then made a turnaround and refuses to ratify its IEPA preferring instead with the regional position. While PNG is opting out Fiji slips into the role of the regional Pacific leader, emphasizing that "*the region is now faced with three inevitable repercussions that may impede progress. This, he (Shaheen Ali, Fiji's Secretary for Industry and Trade) said, were erosion of export preferences, the elimination of duty free access to the European Union market in 2014 and the removal of sugar production quotas in 2017. 'The value of the Economic Partnership Agreement the Pacific is negotiating with the European Union is declining, even before the agreement is concluded'*" (Lal 2013; see also Stoneman et al. 2010:74). The EU then decided to suspend the negotiations with the PICs in October 2013. Shortly afterwards EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht met the Pacific ACP Fisheries and Trade Ministers in Honiara on 12 December 2013 to resuscitate the negotiations. Despite these attemps Fiji accused the EU to dictate directions of the negotiations (Roquefeuil 2014:25).

This brief summary about the EU-PICs negotiations clearly shows the problems the PICs fear with regard to free trade arrangements. As mentioned earlier Australia considered these global negotiations about WTO-compatible free trade arrangements as a trigger to implement regional agreements like PACER Plus. In the end both argeements show obvious asymmetries between the negotiating groups: PICs vs EU respectively PICs vs. Australia and New Zealand. And indeed the fear of the PICs to be disadvanced due to these

asymmetries appears not to be without reason, although Australia's approach to the PACER Plus negotiations is different to that, taken in traditional free trade agreement negotiations. Officially, Australia's primary objective is to promote the economic development of the PICs through greater regional trade and economic integration. To be integratetd and to be liberalized are the economical cornerstones of the *Pacific Plan* which are in global correspondence to the global paradigm shifts in the EU-ACP negotiations. Critical remarks about potentially negative impacts on the developing countries in general and on the PICs in particular remain unheard. Model calculations for Tonga and Vanuatu clearly show that market liberalisation reduces those countries' revenues most likely by around one third (Nathan Associates 2007).

In July 2013 the trade ministers of the Pacific Forum member states adopted a roadmap for the PACER Plus negotiations. In the current (March 2014) negotiation round trade in services and investments are subjects to discussion. However, what is seen as a setback to the PACER Plus talks is the missing progress over labour mobility and development assistance (Ratuva 2004:4, see in general Ritchie 2009:14-18). These two points are vitally important to the PICs. As typical MIRAB[15] countries (see Bertram and Tisdell in this volume) "*labour mobility would relieve social pressure as a result of growing populations and the lack of employment opportunities. It would also provide a ready source of remittances, which is a key source of foreign exchange for many islands economies of the Pacific*" (Pareti 2013b). Labour mobility would also relieve critical shortages of manpower in some sectors of Australia's and Zew Zealand's economy (Walmsley et al. 2005). Therefore the PICs asked to enhance the seasonal workers programmes as well as to

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[15] The acronym MIRAB stands for **MI**gration, **R**emittances, **A**id and **B**ureaucracy (Bertram/Watters 1985).

seek further inclusions of new sectors like sugarcane, cotton, accommodation and aquaculture (ibid; see also Opeskin/MacDermott 2009).

The negotiations between The EU and the PICs caused some unrest in Canberra being afraid of losing influence in its own backyard. From this point of view the implementation of PACER Plus is an inevitable consequence. Australia was afraid to lose its position as the most important exporter in the region (Kelsey 2004:19f). PACER Plus opens the door to regional trade under liberal WTO-conditions. Critics like the Fijian economist Wadan Narsey note that the main aim of PACER Plus is to secure sales markets mainly for Australia's economy. Others insist that SPARTECA as already existing non-reciprocal trade agreement should be modernized to SPARTECA Plus (Braxton 2009).

Despite regional critics Australia and, to a lesser degree, New Zealand are not willing to reconsider their objectives. It was in particular Australia emphasizing that the one who pays the bills also has the right to decide. Europe's push to restructure its economic relations to the ACP states can be considered as a global break having regional repercussions also in the Pacific. This push was the opening pitch to restructure Australia's backyard. This restructuring still causes increasing dependencies which contribute to consolidate Australia's leading position in the region (Braxton 2009:8).

The *Pacific Plan* as political and economical road map

It was shown that Australia rearranges the region of the PICs economically and politically. The reasons for this rearrangement are turning points in global economy and global politics. An output of the Auckland declaration of the annual Pacific Islands Forum meeting was the agreement about the development of a *Pacific Plan* to support regional integration and development. This *Pacific Plan* was adopted by the 2005 Forum meeting in Port Moresby. The political as well as the economical rearrangement of the Island Pacific region

under the aegis of Australia can be summarized in this *Plan*. This agenda for action is intended as a living document that will evolve with current situations and challenges. The *Plan* consists of four core elements, namely *economic growth*, *sustainable development*, *good governance* and *security* (Forum Secretariat 2005) which is an obvious regional reflection of aims defined by global actors like the WTO or the EU. The two last mentioned elements *good governance* and *security* refer explicitly to the development of the Islands Forum into an effective political institution under the security-oriented auspices of Australia. The goal to achieve good governance in the PICs is not only politically, but also economically motivated. The main source of many of the PICs revenues is Official Development Assistance mainly provided by Australia. It is in Australia's interest that these amounts will be used only for specific purposes. Good governance is widely seen as the main reason for an improper use of ODA and also as a decisive reason for possible state failures within the region of the PICs (Duncan 2004:1).

The *Pacific Plan* is the preliminary result of several decisions including the Biketawa declaration as the most significant one have been made by the *Pacific Islands Forum* since 1992 (Rolfe 2006:86) to rearrange the region's political and economical architecture. Marking the end of the bipolar world this date is not a coincidence. Talking about the *Pacific Plan* as preliminary result it is that RAMSI (see Dinnen in this volume), the *Pacific Regional Assistance for Nauru* (PRAN)[16], PICTA and PACER/PACER Plus have to be

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[16]   At first glance it appears that PRAN was established mainly because of Nauru's disastrous state. Nauru is insolvent. Before Nauru's rich phosphat resources became exploited, the country had had one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. However, bad economical and political management spoiled the state. Nauru's attempt to establish itself as a tax haven lead directly to sanctions imposed by OECD's *Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering*. Because of Nauru's performance in financial matters, the country was added to Washington's list of rogue states. The US suspected Nauru of money laundering, the disposal of offshore banking-licences and passports to foreigners (van Fossen 2003:237-275). In 2004 Nauru's President Harris requested financial assistance in Australia. Nauru and the

also categorized as part of the *Pacific Plan* even though these events had happened before its formal adoption.

The *Plan* is also an expression of a joint responsibility for the region which is realized by the establishment of a multilateral *Pacific Regional Policing Initiative* (PRPI 2006) which is indeed a de facto Australian lead unit (Dobell 2003:16). Such a unit is able to provide the capabilities to further policing tasks like the civil police forces as one important component within the framework of interventions like RAMSI (Hawke 2004:10). The reasons given for such a policing initiative are security interests of mainly Australia. Furthermore Australia is inexpensive able to take account of the self-chosen role as Washington's deputy in the Pacific (Hanson 2003:254). By doing so Canberra operates within the narrow range between humanitarian aid and activities perceived as neocolonialism. The neocolonial perception intensifies itself if a joint Pacific police force lead by the PICs is likely as well as ironically to be declined by Australia because of the loss of national sovereignty (Henderson 2004:21).

The *Plan* includes a number of steps. The first step scheduled between 2006-2008 and encompassed the harmonization of national processes in the

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PNG island of Manus were the main components of Australia's *Pacific Solution* meaning Australia's policy of transporting asylum seekers to detention centres on Pacific island nations, rather than allowing them to land on the Australian mainland. The *Pacific Solution* was implemented between during 2001–2007, and was supported not only by the then conservative government under Premier Howard, but also supported by the Labour opposition. During the election campaign Labour leader Kevin Rudd promised to stop this policy. However one year later, in 2008, Rudd opened a detention camp on Christmas Island. Nauru received more than 100 million Aus$ for the deported asylum seekers. The country feared a gaping hole in its economy after Australia had pledged to end the system (Topsfield 2007). In 2012 Rudd's successor Julia Gillard reopened the camps on Manus and Nauru which were described by Amnesty International as cruel and inhumane (Amnesty International 2012). In July 2013 PNG and Australia signed a Regional Resettlement Agreement including that asylum seekers are to be sent from Christmas Island to Manus or elsewhere in PNG. Canberra also asked the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu to join this agreement (Chand 2013). Canberras payments to Nauru and PNG within the scope of the *Pacific Solution* symbolize how the PICs are involved in Australia's interests (Keith-Reid 2004b:44). To use Satish Chand's words, it is the "Pacific solution to an Australian problem" (Chand 2013).

realms of economy, good governance, security politics etc. (Maiava 2006:9). Most progress could be achieved on the field of economy by implementing PICTA and PACER respectively by the negotiations over PACER Plus. However, some questions remain on how effective economic cooperation between the PICs might be as their economies are mostly not complementary but similarly structured and as the regional trade between the PICs is rather limited (see annex of the previous article). Furthermore it should be asked how the small island economies are able to absorb the absence of tax and customs duties (Thomas 2004:19). Under the mentioned circumstances the implementation of the *Pacific Plan* appears to be mainly motivated by Australian interests.

The next step has a duration of nine years between 2006 and 2015. Until 2015 it is planned to accomplish four main goals resulting in the mentioned core elements *economic growth*, *sustainable development*, *good governance* and *security*. The different objective agreements are marked with numerous subobjectives which are explicitly defined and equipped wth a corresponding strategy. It is conspicuous that most of the subobjectives are derived from the *Plan* and not from real regional stuations or/and problems. Because the *Plan* is not oriented on regional needs but in pursuance of specific and previously defined objectives, it is possible to conclude that the *Plan* interferes with the existing regional order to arange a new one. However, officially, the *Plan* is aimed to cooperative regional management without inroads into national sovereignties (Forum Secretariat 2005:4,6) which seems to be a contradiction to the achievement of the above mentioned core elements of the *Plan*.

To achieve these elements, objectives and subobjectives, it is necessary to establish new institutions and, respectively to expand already existing ones. Regarding the very limited capabilities of most of the PICs the question arises how these new initiatives and institutions can be realized under the formal

condition of equal participation. In most cases there will be no other alternative than filling vacancies with specialists from Australia and New Zealand. This in turn means that the administrative frame to the regional rearrangement is dominated mainly by Australia and, to a lesser degree, by New Zealand. Therefore it is not surprising that the PICs refuse to accept the *Plan*. The implementation of the *Plan* would not be possible without corresponding pressures from mainly Australia. If nobody wants this *Plan*, why does Australia endeavour to implement the *Plan*?

Australia at the crossroads: Terrorism, China and the US

If Australia's place within international relations can be described as a regional power that is, as Nolte (2012:29) emphasizes, in some respects different from the description as a middle power. What both concepts have in common is that regional powers or middle powers are located inbetween local and global level. Casually speaking it is possible to consider these powers as being in a sandwich position between those two levels. Australia is then in an ambivalent situation as guided leader. This seems to be necessary to mention before analyzing Australia's interest in the Pacific.

So far it was shown that economic and security reasons are significant to Australia's approach. Canberra's security policy is heavily influenced by its perception of its environment. An important reason for Australia's actions on the national, regional and global stage is fear because of its geopolitical location as a European island in an alien Asian environment. This picture can also be drawn in other colors like a stable and wealthy Western democracy surrounded by poor and instable Asian anarchy. This perception is also influencing Australian elections. The Australian average voter is considered as *aspirational voter* reflecting a large group of voters. This group is concerned about its future, fearing a possible social decline (Smith et al. 2006:11; Goot/Watson 2007). Conservative rhetoric, an often one-sided media

reporting and the mentioned negative perception of Australia's environment support this tendency. The result is a dichotomic and exclusionary view of the world differing between "them" and "us" which was even exacerbated after the terror attacks in New York 2001 and in Bali one year later (Castella et al. 2009; also Lawrence 2008). The fear of "them" is revealing itself as fear of Islamic terrorism as an activity disturbing order and stability and also as fear about an *asianisation* as a result of an uncontrolled immigration. Although there has not been a sole piece of evidence that that terrorist could choose weak Pacific Islands states as a refuge, like the Taliban did in Afghanistan, this was exactly what was feared. Canberra was convinced that preventive interventions could be a suitable instrument to avoid a Pacific Afghanistan in Australia's backyard as well as uncontrolled and illegal migration from the PICs and mainly from PNG. Thus, it is of importance for any Australian government to show political activism in the fight against terror. Unfortunately, from the government's point of view, some 70% of the Australian's are against the Australian intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. By a rearrangement of Australia's intervention policy in direction of the Pacific as Australia's own backyard, Australia's government manages to balance the Australian citizen's need of security and a relatively inexpensive and innocuous improvement of Australia's position as a responsible middle power on a global level. Furthermore, this change of perspective enables Australia to do its duties as a close ally in America's coalition of the willing, without meeting the demands for an increasing participation in the US conflicts. To keep it short, Australia faces the problem to deal with obvious contradictions (Fry 2004b:7).

The interventionism of the Howard administration rested on the assumption that it might be necessary to stabilize failing states first before ODA is able to work effectively. Some people might interpret this as the main

objective of the Australian interventionism not being to help foreign states but to safeguard and to amortise Australian investments. Here it seems to be necessary to emphasize that until RAMSI in 2003 Australia considered failing states mainly from a development perspective. Until 2003 the humane dimension was an altruistic maxime in Australian policy in the region of the PICs. Then, the Howard administration changed this human dimension into a security dimension (Hawksley 2004:19).

Another important reason for Australia's activity is its self-concept as a middle power on the global level. Australia considers itself as a close ally of the USA, a pioneer for Western values and democracy, as a model state for democratic institutions and as a hegemon in the Pacific. Canberra sees itself as Washington's deputy in the region representing US security interests as Australia's own interests if necessary by interventions (Callick 2003:22). Howard's minister of foreign affairs Alexander Downer thereupon appeased Australia's Southeast Asian neighbours that this interventionist approach was only targeted at the PICs to stabilize the region. Economical reasons, like some might see in Australia's involvements in PNG, the Solomons and Timor Leste (see Schmitz in this volume), are officially of secondary importance (Buchsteiner 2006:5).

China's Interests in Oceania[17], PICs Interests in China and its effects

The region's stability appears to be endangered by Chinese interests in the PICs although the relevance of the PICs is of minor importance to Beijing in comparision with other regions. Chinese official approaches in foreign policy in general were described as an interdependence of a person interacting with other persons. These were emphasizing a cardinal similarity as well as a basic ability to learn (Eun-Jeung 2000:423). China idealizes this liberal approach

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[17]   See also McDougall in this volume.

officially as its foreign and security policies were marked by harmony and peace. Beijing's interpretation of current international relations is marked by its perception of multipolarity as global order. In this percepted multipolar system of global politics, trust is significant to the relations between political units. Therefore China is supporting multilateralism in general while it is refusing hegemonial claims (Chen 2006:325f). However, this is just a nominal condition. China is aware of existing realities referring to the global US supremacy. At second glance China's official multilateral approach therefore appears rather as a wish than reality. Beijing's multilateralism is not altruistic, but rather guided by its own interests. Multilateralism is to be supported as long as China plays a leading part, as long as a multilateral system remains fully controllable. As a result Beijing likes to support mulilateralisms only under its control to achieve a crucial position as global power (Möller 2003:5f).

China stands ready to take a more active role in international relations as its economy became more integrated into global economy (Medeiros/Fravel 2003:22-35). In a more active and globally oriented foreign policy Beijing sees a good opportunity to achieve own interests. Therefore it is necessary to safeguard much-needed raw materials for China's booming economy. Thus leading to China's interests in the Pacific, which are, firstly, to contain American (and therefore Australian) influence in this strategically important region and to expand its own influence, and, secondly, to contain the Taiwanese influence as a result of China's One-China-Policy (Möller 2005:83f) and, thirdly, to get access to raw materials mainly in PNG. These three areas of interest have implications for Australia's position as the traditional leading power in the Pacific. This demonstrates clearly Canberra opportunities and limits at the same time. Australia's opportunities as a supraregional and structure-building power are limited and, despite of being a close ally to the US,

its influence on American politics is just as limited as its influence on China. However, as a partner of both states Australia is able to act as a mediator (Maclellan 2002:51).

Australia's relations to China are ambivalent. On the one hand, China is Australia's most important trading partner – with a share of some 20% it is well ahead of Japan (11.4%) and the US (9%). In 2011 more than 73% of Australia's raw material exports went to China[18] (Australia 2001:2). Between 1999 and 2004 the bilateral trade between both countries has doubled (Möller 2006:3). At the same time Canberra notices China's increasing interets in the region of the PICs which was considered as hazardous by the Howard administration. In contrast to Howard his successor Kevin Rudd tried to cool things down without overlooking the possible negative implications. Therefore it was possible to keep the important role as a mediator between China and the US. As a graduated sinologist und former diplomat in China, Rudd knows political processes of decision-making in Beijing as well as China's economic significance. Rudd tried to get China more involved in multilateral institutions (Hofmeister 2010:74). Thus, Rudd showed not only a better understanding than his conservative precursor, but this also suited China's interests concerning its official multilateral foreign policy approach. However, because of a lack of explicit knowledge of China's strategies in foreign policies the Australian senate warned of possible dangers and risks (Australia 2006:183).

Always hungry for new sources of raw materials, China is not only a remarkable key item in Australia's balance of trade, but economically also very active in the PICs. In almost any major projects, like mining in PNG, China is mostly one the major partners. This means not only a deceasing influence of Australia respectively of Australian companies, but also a danger to the

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[18] This is a strong surge compared to 2001. For example the share of iron ore and concentrates increased from 15.5 % of Australia's raw materials exports in 2001 to 57% in 2011.

political stability of the concerned PICs. Beijing's methods are not always sensitive and have crossed the border of bribery in states usually vulnerable to corruption. The excavation of raw materials is often done by Chinese and not by local workers. Furthermore Chinese companies are mostly disobeying environmental law. The desired effects of employment are therefore not sufficient, pollution and ecological degradation in general is strongly increasing what promotes ecological migration to the aeras of excavation and therefore to an uncontrolled growth of former small villages to bursting towns with negative side effects of alcohol and drug abuse, crimes and prostitution respectively HIV. What seems to be even more important in the PICs is that indigenous landrights are violated. Land is not only a salable and individualized product, but a commonly used part of Pacific life. Land is tradition, culture and food security. In a nutshell, land means life. Indigenous landrights are often incomprehensible to many people outside the Pacific islands. Ecological migration due to pollution means that people migrate to other areas which might be considered as violation of landrights of those area's inhabitants (see for the example of Bougainville Böge in this volume[19]). These quarrelings about the distribution of land destabilize the PICs and are among the main sources of conflicts in these states[20] (LMCN 2008; Wilson 2008; Loode et al. 2008; McIntyre 2008; Holtz 2011).

However, even more important to Australia is China's strategical interests in the region concerning its One China-policy and due to its competion

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[19]   For the Ramu mine as another example see Forell 2009.
[20]   The problem of landrights and its conflict potentials is recognized by Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat maintaining the *Land Management and Conflict Minimisation Project* (LMCM). The LMCM "*is an initiative of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS) that was endorsed by the Forum Regional Security Committee and the Forum Officials Committee in 2006. The project focuses on the interlinkages between land management and conflict minimisation, and approaches land issues in the Pacific from a holistic point of view, combining both economic development and conflict prevention perspectives. The recognition of the centrality of customary land tenure in the lives of the people of the Pacific is the key underlying principle upon which the LMCM project is founded.*"(see Blatt in this volume).

with the USA. Taiwan is politically active in the PICs to gain support for its sovereignty. The Chinese appendix seeks to convince the PICs of recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state and of acting as a mouthpiece of Taiwan in international organizations and institutions like the UN[21]. Taiwan's aspirations to be recognized as an independent state or even as the only legal and democratic China are neither negotiable nor disputable to Beijing. Within this competitive framework both competitors are not prim at the choice of methods. Both countries have enough economic capabilities to 'convince' even the bigger actor in Oceania's small theater. Moreover, however ridiculous it might seem, some Pacific Island Countries leaders as well as leaders from globally more or less unimportant states are flattered to be welcomed in Taipei and Beijing with the same honours as their colleagues from Paris or Canberra (Reilly/Henderson 2003:100).

By far the most important argument for the PICs to maintain good relationships to China is that China in contrast to Western states does not claim for democratic developments within the PICs as a condition to grant development assistance. There is simply no need to bargain the value of good governance and those of development assistance. In total, China offered the PICs some 400 million US$ under the umbrella of the so called *Pacific Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum* as development assistance (Davis 2007). Beijing as well as Taipei simply do not care about corruption or lack in good governance. Australia's or Europe's questions about good governance, democracy etc need must not to be answerd anymore.

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[21]   Currently Taiwan has diplomatic relations with the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Palau, Marshall Islands, Kiribati and Tuvalu plus 15 other states outside the region of the PICs. Tonga was also part of this group until 1998. The Pacific Kingdom decided to change the side recognizing China. In the same year also Marshall Islands decided to recognize Taiwan followed by Palau in 1999. PNG recognized Taiwan also in 1999, what was, however, withdrawn acouple of days later when the then prime minister of PNG, Skate, lost his power. Then, PNG's diplomatic recognition reverted to China (Hegarty 2007:13).

China is happy to fill the gaps caused by Western idealism as these gaps are not that difficult to fill. In comparison to other regions or states, China does not need enormous amounts of money to convince the PICs of following the Chinese way. It is then not really surprising anymore that Fiji's prime minister and former coup leader Bainimarama rather seeks good and close relationships to China than to Australia or other Western states. Also it is not surprising if the in some regards still absolutist governed Kingdom of Tonga likes to be flattered by Chinese diplomats (Nadkarni 2005:6). However, also Taiwan knows how to play the keys of an 'effective payment'. Taiwan does not contradict information published by the Australian journalist Graeme Dobell that only 15% of Taiwan's ODA-budget comes from its official *Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund*. 85% of this amount is administered directly by the department of foreign affairs without providing an account of how and what for this money is used. This non-transparent use of Taiwanese money simply invites to interpret such an abuse of assistance money. One might ask who becomes assisted for what reason by this money (Dobell 2007:11f)?

The increasing competition between Australian supremacy and its Chinese challenger has not only impacts on this Pacific region of states but also on a domestic level within the PICs. A suitable example for this could be most obviously observed the Solomon Islands[22]. One of the causes of the

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[22]   There are also some examples from opther PICs. In 2005 the presidential election campaign at the Marshall Islands also included a parlamentarian poll about whether China or Taiwan should be recognized as the only sovereign Chinese state. Marshall Islands members of parliament were offered between 6,000 US$ and 10,000 US$ for the 'right' poll (www.taipeitimes.com, 08 April2014). In 2000 it was assumed that Taiwan paid 100,000 US$ for Taiwans supporters on the islands. Furthermore, Sung (2000:2) estimated that additional 7 Mio. US$ from inofficial sources were transferred from Taiwan to the Marshall Islands. In Tonga Prince Tupouto'a obtained some 13 Mio. US$ in June 2004 for 'technical cooperation'. The aim of this money was to improve Tonga's telecommunication infrastructure and its electricity grid. The companies oprating in this business areas are both owned by the Tongan royal family (Keith-Reid 2004:26f).

conflict on the Solomons was the highly corrupt local elite profiting from the Chinses-Taiwanese Pacific competition. Money that had been declared as subsidies disappeared in the Solomons' bureaucracy, which caused social unrest.

Members of parliament in the Solomon Islands earn almost 7,000 € a year. Taiwan offered them payments of some 90,000 € in addition to payments to some members of parliaments to buy their votes. Dobell (2011:11ff) mentions sums between 2,700 € and 4,500 € paid to parliamentarians to vote for the pro-Taiwanese candidate Snyder Rini for the office of Solomon Prime Minister during the 2006 elections. After Rini's election on 17 April 2006 anti-Chinese[23] riots broke out in the Solomon Islands capital Honiara. Only ten days later Rini resigned from the office of Prime Minister (D'Arcy 2007:1). The crisis on the Solomon Islands shows even more examples of destabilising effects resulting from Chinese and Taiwanese interferences. During the violent conflict before the RAMSI intervention in the Solomons, Honiara requested the UN twice for assistance in September 2002. One month later the UN sent an observer team to Honiara. The Security Council advocated a coordination framework to implement a peacebuilding office in Honiara to mediate the conflict. In March 2003 Rini's predecessor to the office of prime minister, Allan Kemakeza, supported Taiwan in striving to become a member of the UN. China responded immediately to that support by threatening to use its veto in Security Council with a view to any UN-peacebuilding actions on the Solomon Islands (Ponzio 2005:176; Yang 2011:97; Sheridan 2006:224). The Solomon Islands ought to have known that the recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state and, even more so, the support of Taiwan to become a UN-member would bring about negative sanctions. It

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[23]   Chinese here means ethnical Chinese consisting both, citizens from China and Taiwan.

does not seem to be an unfounded suspicion that Honiara's decision to vote for Taiwan was on behalf of Australia's interest to keep the UN out of the Pacific game so as not to jeopardize Canberra's policy of the free hand in the region of the PICs. Furthermore, this skillful move to play the Taiwan-card enabled Canberra to contain China's influence in this part of the Pacific. This is of strategic interest to Australia as well as to her most important ally the United States.

The US interest in the PICs was not as high as its interest in in other parts of the world. After 1945, Washington used the Pacific Islands as a first line of defence as a lesson learned from the Pacific war. Also, islands like Guam or Okinawa were used as natural aircraft carriers to control East and Southeast Asia. During the period of the Cold War, Washington was one of three supreme powers in the Pacific. While France controlled large parts of Polynesia and New Caledonia and the United Kingdom was the colonial power on some Melanesian Islands like Fiji, the Solomons and earlier also in Papua New Guinea, the US administered large parts of Micronesia by the so called United Nations Trust Territory of Micronesia. This territory was necessary to keep Japan down and the Soviet Union out. By the end of bipolarity in 1989 and the early 1990s, Washington reduced its influence in Micronesia. The New World Order, as declared by George H.W. Bush was the end of history (Fukuyama 1992) for some decision makers. Without any enemies, the strategic significance of Oceania was dispensable. Washington withdrew troops, interests and influence from the region. America's Pacific Century later on constructed by Hillary Clinton (2011) was not on the agenda at the end of the Atlantic age. This gap invited an emgerging power to step in. China expanded its influence in the Pacific Islands region and filled the void (Reilly/Henderson 2003:94-104).

Another example related to the Sino-US-competition was to be observed in Kiribati. In the 1990s, Kiribati had diplomatic relations with China. In 1997, the island country permitted China to build an astronomical observation station, officially to support the Chinese space program. Inofficially, however, it was assumed that the real reason for the station was to collect information about an American missle test range in the neighbouring islands of Kwajalein (Reilly 2002:20). In 2003, Kiribati switched its diplomatic ties from China to Taiwan, and China closed its observation station immediately. Before the changed recognition, some political manoeuvrings between Taiwan, China and the USA became obvious. On 4 July, 2003, Kiribati elected a new government. One of the most important topics during the election campaign was the Chinese missle range. Taiwan sought to take advantage of this situation by supporting the presidential candidates financially. By doing so, Taiwan could be sure to be recognized by the then newly elected government (Pareti 2004:18ff). Inofficially, the US welcomed this step which terminated the Chinese observation activities without American interference. After the recognition of Taiwan and the closure of the Chinese observation station, the relations between Kiribati and the US have improved significantly (Fickling 2003). This example shows that the Chinese Oceania policy is a by-product of its general foreign policy, the main topics of which are the Chinese-American relations. In conclusion, this example illustrates the fact that the Chinese Oceania policy is shaped, among other things, by the global competition between Washington and Beijing.

This also shows that the direction China is taking in Oceania is intended to destabilize the region in order to break into it and benefit from its strategic significance. By now, it is China and no longer Australia that is deploying the highest number of diplomats in Oceania (Dobell 2007), while the numbers of regional US diplomatic posts was continuously reduced (Reilly/Henderson

2003:99) although Washington is by all means aware of China's increasing importance, especially in the Southwest Pacific (D'Arcy 2007:18; CRS 2007). There are fears that the PICs will gain a similar strategic importance like they had during the Second World War. However, this only appears possible in an unlikely worst case scenario. On the other hand it points out that China's Oceania policy cannot be understood without regarding Beijing's relations to the US. Accordingly, it is not surprising that China is significantly modernizing its blue water naval forces including aircraft carriers and submarines (Li et al. 2006:18). Beijing's military planning in the Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean is determined by the so-called offshore defense strategy of the *Second Island Chain* or *String of Pearls*[24] which is similar to the American strategy of the *Strategic Denial* in Micronesia during the Cold War.[25] This *Second Island Chain* includes mainly the Southeast Asian Islands of the Philipines and the Micronesian islands of Guam, the Marianas and Palau but also the Melanesian Islands of PNG and the Solomons (USA 2006:11). Beijing's strategic plannings developed from a *near coast* and *near seas* to a *far seas* approach (Li 2009:144-169). Some are currently even talking about a *Third Islands Chain*, believing that such a strategy would refer to the ability

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[24] The so-called *String of Pearls* refers to the Chinese presence originally beginning at the island of Hainan via the Street of Malacca to the Persian Gulf to protect its sea line of communication at the Indian Ocean and to contain Indian influence. This strategy seems to be expanded also to the Pacific Ocean (Pehrson 2006; Polymeropoulus et al. 2001:13).

[25] Even now this region is of some strategic importance to the American defense forces: "The Freely Associated States (FAS), together with Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands, have been regarded as a security border of the United States, the defense of which is considered to be key to maintaining vital sea lanes. In addition to being home to the Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the FAS are located strategically between Hawaii and Guam. According to some military experts, the FAS provide a vast buffer zone for Guam, which serves as the 'forward military bridgehead' from which to launch U.S. operations along the Asia-Pacific security arc stretching from South Korea and Japan, through Thailand and the Philippines, to Australia. The U.S. military is building up forces on Guam to help maintain deterrence and respond to possible security threats in the Pacific" (Lum/Vaughn 2007:5).

to project power, capable of reaching America's bases in Hawaii (Wallis 2014; Buchanan 2009).

One very important pearl in China's *String of Pearls* is Fiji. The island state has established strong diplomatic and military ties with China after the Western governments of Australia and New Zealand attempted to isolate the Fijian regime after its 2006 coup d'etat. Fiji's interim Premier Bainimarama immediately responded by a *Look North* policy, which aimed at strengthening political and economic ties to countries outside the traditional Western scope, mainly China. Other Pacific states have followed Fiji's lead (Wallis 2014). China's growing military, diplomatic and economic presence in the South-west Pacific is covered by some worrisome rumors about a planned Chinese navy base in Fiji and a growing Chinese fishing fleet, which is suspected of providing cover for Chinese intelligence monitoring (Buchanan 2012).

Since the mid 2000s Australia as well as New Zealand and the US react-ed to this local trend which is part of global trend of the Southern hemisphere countries to bandwagoning Western influence by playing the Chinese card. The US have shifted its strategic priorities from Europe to Asia (although some might say that the Ukraine crisis brings the US back into Europe), mov-ing its navy mainly to the Pacific. Washington has re-opend some of its aid and trade missions in the region and has expanded its security ties with its traditional allies Australia and New Zealand[26]. The strengthening of the old

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[26]   Since New Zealand has banned nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships visiting its ports in 1985, the bilateral security relations between Washington and Wellington have been more or less frosty. Because the US traditionally refuses to say whether its navy ships are nuclear-powered or not, New Zealand has refused entry to its ports to all of them. As a reaction, the US suspended its treaty obligations to New Zealand resulting from the Australia, New Zea-land, United Stets Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty) in 1986 until US Navy ships were re-admitted to New Zealand ports. New Zealand, it was rumored, was considered as a friend, but not as an ally anymore. Some 24 years later, a new defense pact, the Wellington Declara-tion, between the US and New Zealand was signed as a strategic co-operation document to restore relations (Vaughn 2011:1). It commits the two countries to regular foreign ministry, trade and military talks.

trilateral security obligations, a diplomatic reawakening of Western states in the region and the above mentioned EPA agreements between the PICs and the EU, which can be understood as an economical offence, counter-balance Chinese influence in the Pacific and restore a pre-eminent Western orientation in the Pacific Islands States.

This policy of containment as a result of the new significance of the Pacific Islands States became obvious when US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton decided to attend the 43rd Pacific Islands Forum Meeting in the Cook Islands in August of 2012. If one of the most prominent government members of the world's largest economic and military power attends a meeting of weak, small and economically more or less insignificant island states, something important must be going on. The importance of China is also reflected in plans of the Australian military to invade Fiji and to intervene militarily in PNG in cases of an armed conflict (e.g. between the US and China), the outbreak of civil unrest or the breakdown of the order. These plans became public by an article of the Sydney based newspaper *The Australian*, revealing secret chapters of Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper (Cogan 2012). In case of an armed conflict between Beijing and Washington, Australian Defence Forces are not only to protect Australian territory, but also to target the Chinese Navy. Australian submarines would play a crucial role in such a conflict. These submarines are not to be built yet. Although these submarines will be built in Adelaide, "*the design contract will be worth many billions of dollars[27] to the winning country because the designer would also be involved in building them and maintaining them through their life cycle*" (Stewart 2014). So far, German ship builders seem to have the greatest chance to get this lucrative deal.

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[27]   Prasad (2012, also Packham/Vasek 2012) calculates with some 40 billion Aus$ to revamp Canberra's submarine fleet.

As mentioned above, while Australia's economic ties to China are strong, its political ties are still determined by the US-Australian relations. Australia needs markets as well as security, and therefore seeks engagement more than containment or even confrontations while on the other hand Australia "*appeared to be adopting a hedging strategy in relation to China (...). A trilateral security dialogue involving Australia, Japan and the US also suggesting hedging in relations to China (...). Closer security relations between Australia and India could be taken as evidence of the same trend (...)*" (McDougall 2009:143). This was reflected in the three basic pillars of the Rudd and Gillard administrations' foreign policy for Australia: the alliance with United States, Asian engagement and multilateralism (Tow 2008:21). Rudd's multilateral approach in Oceania became obvious when he talked about a new approach to Australia's arc of instability: "*Such an approach would emphasise the 'economic' rather than the 'military'; and 'economic development challenges as a priority', not as 'afterthought'. The approach would be 'proactive' rather than 'reactive'; and 'long term' rather than 'last minute'*" (Fry 2008:9). This appears to be a reasonable approach, but does it reflect political reality and the policy of Australia's new conservative government?

Abbott's Policy in Oceania: Self-Consciousness or High-Handedness?

Just as Rudd was not able to change Australia's foreign policy behavior, Australia's new government, lead by Tony Abbott, will not be able to change it either. As a sensible and non-ideological conservative (Switzer 2014), Abbott is unlikely to bring back Howard's no-nonsense, hands on-approach in Oceania. On the other hand, it is also unlikely that Abbott will act altruistically. Because of its position somewhere in between political allegiance and economic interests, some observers assume that Australia's foreign policy is made of pure pragmatism, which also reflects Abbott's personal attitude: "*Abbott's conservatism has British roots. His influences are figures such as*

Edmund Burke, Roger Scruton, and Michael Oakeshott, who in their different ways championed a pragmatic worldview that is skeptical of political radicalism and foreign adventurism. It's an anti-ideological form of conservatism that has almost no connection with what Americans call 'conservative'" (Roggeveen 2013).

Pure pragmatism seems not enough for many Australians. As Michael Fullilove (2014), director of the Sydney based think tank *Lowy Institute for International Policy* pointed out, Australia is "*not a super heavyweight, but we are certainly not a flyweight. People say we're a middle power. But there's nothing middling about Australia. We are a significant power with regional and global interests. (...) Our great and powerful friends are becoming, in relative terms, less great and powerful. And wealth and power are moving eastwards, towards us. (...) Now the tyranny of distance has been replaced by the predicament of proximity. Our new economic opportunities come with new political risks. We are closer to the world's booming markets—and closer to the world's developing crises. (...) On the one hand, sentiments towards China have warmed six points this year, the equal highest level since 2006. On the other hand, nearly half of Australians think it's likely that China will be a military threat to Australia in the next twenty years, up seven points since last year.*" Furthermore, after praising Abbott's minister for foreign affairs Julie Bishop for her determined policy against Fiji, Fullilove demands a more capable military: "*Australian defense spending is too low given our strategic circumstances. Indeed, our defense spending has scaled down at exactly the moment when other countries in the region are scaling up.*" He also demands for a comprehensive Australian foreign policy which indicates in his eyes a "willingness to see ourselves as actors not commentators and to take aim at the really big issues". Finally he asks whether Australia "*want(s) to be a little nation, with a small population, a restricted*

diplomatic network, a modest defense force, and a cramped vision of our
future? Or do we want to be larger—a big, confident country with an ability
to influence the balance of power in Asia."

While Howard was convinced that the weak PICs should be treated like
rude kids who need a strong hand, Rudd tried to convince by words more than
by actions. The methods were different, but the motivation to increase Aus-
tralian influence, to realize Australian interests and to stabilize the region was
the same. Abbot's pragmatism will likely be somewhere in between, follow-
ing a carrot and stick approach, meaning that friendly rhetoric and multilat-
eral approaches are applied as long as they are useful for Australia. If nobody
is following the carrot, Canberra is willing to use the stick.

Fiji's Interests[28]

This carrot and stick policy implies that the weak PICs have no other option
than to follow Canberra's leadership. Besides using the opportunities result-
ing from their membership in international organisations (see Hasenkamp in
this volume), China makes the difference. Using heavy-weighted China as an
ally, Fiji challenges the Australian supremacy in the region. Globally, Fiji's
reach is not very far. Locally, however, its influence must not be underesti-
mated. Although suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum due to its long-
lasting lack of a democratic government, Fiji is the political and economic
center of the Pacific Islands States, at least if the Pacific is considered without
Australia and New Zealand. It is debatable whether Australia (and to a lesser
degree New Zealand) should be seen as a Pacific power[29]. Many Pacific

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[28]   See Ratuva in this volume.
[29]   The self-perception of the Australians is not necessarily a Pacific one as a minority of the
        Australians is geographically located to the Indian Ocean. They might consider Australia as
        an Asian power. I would like to thank Derek McDougall for pointing this out to me.

Islands States traditionally do not consider Australia one of them[30]. However, "*Australia always wants to be a power perceived as being in the South Pacific as well as being the South Pacific power*" (Dobell 2014). As a hegemon, Australia aims at keeping that status quo, but Fiji, armed with strong self-confidence, a good measure of courage and the willingness to take a risk, wants to challenge this hegemony. Fiji's regional behavior could have come straight from the textbook: As Schweller points out, an "*offensive band-wagoning is done exclusively by lesser aggressors, which I call limited-aims revisionist states. Typically, the lesser aggressor reaches an agreement with the unlimited-aims revisionist leader on spheres of influence, in exchange for which the junior partner supports the revisionist leader in its expansionist aims*" (Schweller 1994:93f). In other words, Fiji is not satiated and therefore a revisionist state: "*a powerful revisionist state or coalition attracts opportunistic revisionist powers*" (ibid). Bainimarama is clever enough to play this game from a powerful position, knowing that China is providing ongoing support due to common interests. China is a revisionist state that is challenging Washington's supremacy on a global level. One step of Beijing's way to global importance is to destabilize the region while simultaneously providing it with aid. China needs unrest in the region to become an irreplaceable helper because such a position is probably the best precondition to become a system determinating[31] state on a regional level. System-determination on a regional level means for Beijing to invigorate itself for global competition. Globally,

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30   When the Pacific Island Forum was founded in 1971, many of the PICs tried to keep Canberra out of the organization. Even then Australia was not considered a Pacific power.

31   A rather old but still highly valuable article by Robert Keohane (1969:295-296) demonstrates how the roles in the political game are clearly apportioned: Great powers are determinating the global system while secondary powers are only influencing this system. Middle powers then are only system-affecting while small states are system-ineffectual. On a regional level the roles and the actors may be changing. The operational framework, however, remains the same. This very short excursus shows that different approaches can be used to explain Australia's regional behavior as alternatives to the current constructivist fashion of explaining international relations.

China is still challenging US supremacy: a system-influencing secondary power challenges a globally system-determining power (Art 2010:359-391). Hence, China as a global challenger needs regional support (and, of course, regional resources), whether it be in Oceania, Africa, Asia or in Latin America. This 'top-down-bandwagoning' is in the interest of Fiji and other (globally) system-ineffectual states. The structure of this behavior is also visibly considering Australia as a global middle-power and a regional giant at the same time. The Australian giant is challenged by the Pacific dwarfs that are striving to evolve into tiny giants, friendly supported by Chinese interests. Canberra reacts by strengthening its relations with Washington to balance out China as a new emerging power in Oceania. China receives political support by a multitude of small, respectively weak, states, not only in Oceania. China then supports these weak states by economically compensating their absolute weaknesses. This enables the small states to challenge regional supremacy, like Fiji does in Oceania. To restore the regional order, Australia needs support from the US. Only regional order and stability allows Australia to use its own forces to engage in other important places with the goal of securing Canberra's middle power fantasies. This briefly describes the relations, dependencies as well as interdependencies between regional and global levels and their actors.

Beijing's involvement in Oceania challenges the Australian-led regional status quo and therefore also weakens Western positions globally. Fiji is a regional beneficiary or junior partner of this strategy and, thus, a revisionist state that is doing what Schweller described as jackal bandwagoning: "*'Jackal' bandwagoning, with a rising expansionist state or a coalition that seeks to overthrow the status quo, decreases system stability*" (ibid). As the excluded country Suva wants to get back what it has lost as a result of Bainimarama's coup: *"(...) international status as a democracy, membership of the Forum,*

full recognition of the prerogatives of the Suva elite that serve the Supremo and a comfortable economic relationship with Australia (...) while pushing on with revisions to the way the Pacific operates. This is the long game in the new dance between Suva and Canberra" (Dobell 2014). Therefore, the Australian-Fijian relations are only superficially characterized by Fiji's non-demodratic domestic affairs. In fact, it is a competition between the traditional hegemon who wants to secure its position and its revisionist challenger who wants to keep Australia (and also New Zealand) out of the region. Fiji's aim is therefore nothing else than an attempt to redefine Oceania's regionalism without the traditional leading powers.

The Abbott administration clearly recognizes this tendency. A redefinition of Pacific regionalism would undermine Australia's middle power ambitions significantly. While Abbotts predecessors regarded Fiji's putsch regime as undemocratic and without any legitimation, Abbott seems to be more pragmatic. His minister for foreign affairs, Julie Bishop, visited Fiji in February 2014 to restore the bilateral relations between Suva and Canberra after seven years of mutual hostility (Callick 2014). After the elections in Fiji, which are announced to be held in September 2014, Australia is offering the end of sanctions, support of Fiji's way back to democracy and to fully restore normal diplomatic relations (Dobell 2014b). All together this means that Bainimarama's Fiji has played its Chinese card effectively and successfully. Now it is possible to enjoy China's *and* Australia's support (Dobell 2014c). However, it must be noted that Fiji is not a beneficiary because of its own efforts but a regional beneficiary due to global competition. Fiji's revisionism is a direct result of changing Global structures as well as Australia's reactions to its challenged regional primacy.

The Fijian example reflects new opportunities for the PICs. Their own weakness is not an absolute disadvantage anymore but rather a more and

more insignificant characteristic. However, this kind of conclusion goes too short. Fiji's assertiveness is a result of the increasing Chinese involvement in Oceania. Therefore, even Fiji as a regional challenger of Australian supremacy is only a small piece on the Chinese strategic chess board. The global paradigm shift in world politics toward the Asian-Pacific countries leads to a focus to the PICs and therefore to states of relatively low international importance. Fiji is obviously able to use this development for its own objectives. Without the big brother in Beijing, however, Australian supremacy cannot be challenged. Canberra's main competitor therefore remains China, and not Fiji. The Sino-Australian relations are highly ambivalent. Australia's most important trade partner is also perceived as its most dangerous security threat – at least within Oceania.

Conclusion

As Hugh White analyzed, China's rise as economic and political power holds some implications. For decades, the US has played an important role in assuring Asia's stability, but recently, Beijing is dramatically challenging this status quo. Washington's reaction is to strengthen its trilateral alignment with Japan and Australia as well as its quadrilateral alignment involving India[32]. This clearly declares Asia and Oceania as significant areas in Global security strategies. Oceania is back on the map. This new old significance of the region encourages the weak PICs to challenge the regional security architecture. Like a wolf in sheep's clothing, small Pacific Islands States like Fiji are acting as camouflage for the Chinese dragon. This deal reweights PICs influence and leads, as a result, to a changing Australian regional policy in Oceania. With the support of their mighty friend China, the PICs revise the status quo by endangering the current stability in the region. In this context, "Canberra

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[32] This quadrilateral alignment is then a virtual counterpart to the above mentioned *String of Pearls*.

and Wellington would become powerful outsiders, not natural insiders" (Dobell 2014). Returning to the question that is raised in the title of this essay, the PICs are reweighted by Chinese interests and therefore part of a process of Australian-led restructuring in the region that aims to balance this reweighting.

This realistic approach is supported by renowned strategic thinkers and Australian policy makers. Reflecting the ambivalence of Australia's relations to China (trade partner and security threat), former Australian Prime Minister Rudd was hoping for China's peaceful rise while preparing for the worst (e.g. by buying new submarines). His academic counterpart Hugh White argued in 2005 that the Chinese challenge of US supremacy in Asia was no longer a theoretical one but had become reality (White 2005:469-480; see also Morini 2012). According to White, Australia should take a more hardline view and therefore has to prepare for a growing Chinese military power challenging U.S. power in East Asia.

This shows clearly that external determinants play an important role (among others) in influencing Australian security interests and, as a result, that its regional policies, too, are driven by external influences. Other external influences are, as shown above, global economic and political restructurings like the liberalization of global economics or the turning point in security politics after 9/11.

On the other hand, we must not neglect the fact that the asymmetries between Australia and the PICs are extremely distinctive. Without disturbances from the outside, Australia is able to play the crucial role in Oceania. Canberra is the traditional hegemon in a regional hierarchy. For the existing ambivalence, this means that Australia is on a regional level structure-determinating and at the same time structure-influenced. Australia is unable to determine global structures while it sets the benchmarks in Oceania. This sandwich

position seems to be characteristic for Canberra's approaches in regional security, trade and economic politics. These characteristics determine Australian governmental actions. There seems to be no alternatives to the *What* in the sense of sustaining regional hierarchies while there are obvious differences about *How* to act. In contrast to Howard's harsh commanding dominance, the Rudd administration followed a direction which can be described as a soft and moderate, or even institutionalized, realism. Abbott, however, obviously stands for unideological pragmatism. The politics remain while their style is changing.

Australia's shaping power in Oceania has a functional component to sustain existing relations while the PICs point of view is more revisionistic. This functional component is defined by Australia's purposefulness which is, for example, the core of Kevin Rudd's speech to the Pacific Islands Forum in Port Moresby 2008. In this speech, later becoming known as the Port Moresby declaration, Rudd announced to extend Australia's development assistance to the PICs. However, this extension was attached to conditions such as measurable success within the target countries (Chand 2008). Australian interests are implicitly included in this success, so that an extended development assistance is transformed to a non-altruistic instrument of Australian politics.

In contrast to the conservative Prime Minister Howard, the Labour Prime Ministers Rudd and Gillard followed more multilateral approaches in Australian foreign policy, which are probably not going to be changed by the pragmatist Abbott. While Rudd served as Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, his decisions were influenced by his religious convictions. Rudd avows himself to Dietrich Bonhoeffer's teaching and its engagement for the weak (Rudd 2006:22-30), which stands in deliberate contrast to the so-called *Brutopia* of the Christian right in the environment of his conservative

predecessor Howard (Rudd 2006b:46-50). Keeping this in mind, it comes as
no surprise that the first Rudd administration closed the Pacific detention
camps in 2008 which were part of the *Pacific Solution*[33] introduced by the
Howard government in September and October 2001. Prime Minister Gillard
re-opened the camps in 2012, which was heavily criticized by the conserva-
tive opposition (Maley/Franklin 2010). The then opposition leader Abbott
attacked Gillard that she wasn't doing anything to protect the lives of people
attempting to reach Australia by boat (Broom 2014) while, according to Wik-
iLeaks, an unnamed key Liberal Party strategist told US diplomats at the
same time that the issue of asylum seekers was "fantastic" for the coalition
and "the more boats that come the better" (Anonymous 2010). This can be
considered an example of opportunism or even hypocrisy, while it is also
possible to view this as the political pragmatism Abbott is well known for. It
is obvious how both sides used the *Pacific Solution* for their purposes. Alt-
hough also a part of its immigration policy, the *Pacific Solution* is clearly also
a brick in Canberra's Pacific policy. The PICs are therefore not only the tar-
get of Australian regional politics in Oceania but, ironically, in this way the
islands are coming back as a thorn in the flesh of Australian domestic politics.

While Hugh White argued in 2005 that the Chinese challenge of US su-
premacy in Asia is no longer a theoretical one but had become reality, the
same link between theory and practice is also obvious in Abbott's policy
approaches. Opposition leader Abbott announced to "stop the boats" (Abbott
2013), while the Prime Minister Abbott allowed removing boats with asylum
seekers to outside Australian territorial waters. These turn-backs mean that
those boats have to remain outside the 24-mile-zone or to return to where they
came from. This harsh command reflects the same pragmatism can be

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[33]   The so called *Pacific Solution* means to expel asylum seekers from the Australian mainland
       to detention camps at Manus Island in PNG and to Nauru.

expected with regard to the *Pacific Solution* in particular and the PICs in general. In conclusion, the above analysis of the situation shows that as long as "Australia's invasion anxiety" (Burke 2008) exists and is (ab)used for political aims, its policies regarding Oceania will not change. This means that Canberra's Pacific policies are also driven by domestic determinants. Both the internal and the external levels, or rather endogenous and exogenous factors, are crucial for Australia as a regional power in Oceania. Thus, Australia's regional behavior cannot simply be explained in the framework of a one-dimensional analysis only. To achieve better research results, it is necessary to use a multilevel approach (see previous article).

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China and Oceania

Derek McDougall

Abstract: *This paper provides a review of China's contemporary involvement in Oceania. There are two main aspects: geopolitical and geoeconomic. From a geopolitical aspect it is clear that at the very least China wants to have the status of the leading power in East Asia, and to be a major influence in the Asia-Pacific more broadly. As an aspiring global power, irrespective of the regional context, China would want to have some influence in Oceania. A more specific reason for China's involvement would be its rivalry with Taiwan, manifested most obviously in competition for diplomatic recognition among the Pacific island states. From a geoeconomic perspective, China is particularly interested in obtaining resources from Australia, although other states such as Papua New Guinea could also be relevant in this respect.*

This paper provides a review of China's contemporary involvement in Oceania. By Oceania I mean Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific island countries (PICs). This region covers a vast area of the Earth's surface, mainly in terms of ocean although Australia as the world's smallest continent is a significant size. The population of the region is about 40 million, with Australia (22 million), Papua New Guinea (6.3 million) and New Zealand (4.3 million) being the most populous countries. Strategically the region is important because of the vastness of the area it covers and its proximity to major power centres in Asia. Economically Australia and Papua New Guinea in particular are important providers of mineral resources and oil and gas; Australia and New Zealand are important agricultural exporters. Australia and New Zealand are primarily countries of European settlement, although the indigenous elements are important in both countries (about 2% indigenous in Australia, about 15% Maori in New Zealand); New Zealand also has about 5% of its population from Polynesia (non-Maori). Australia in particular has become more multicultural, with earlier waves of immigration from continental Europe now being complemented by immigration from various Asian countries, especially China and India.

This context is important in understanding the rationale for China's involvement in Oceania. There has been much focus on the phenomenon of 'rising China' and the prospects for an 'Asian century' in which China features prominently. This helps to explain why China has involved itself in the affairs of Oceania. There are two main aspects: geopolitical and geoeconomic. From a geopolitical aspect it is clear that at the very least China wants to have the status of the leading power in East Asia, and to be a major influence in the Asia-Pacific more broadly. Asia-Pacific here can be taken to refer to East Asia and the Pacific region in general, extending as far east as the Americas; clearly Oceania is relevant in terms of the broader definition. As an

aspiring global power, irrespective of the regional context, China would want to have some influence in Oceania. A more specific reason for China's involvement would be its rivalry with Taiwan, manifested most obviously in competition for diplomatic recognition among the Pacific island states; there could also be some concern about the position of the overseas Chinese community in various states of the region. From a geoeconomic perspective, China is particularly interested in obtaining resources from Australia, although other states such as Papua New Guinea could also be relevant in this respect.

In developing this argument I will discuss the geopolitical and geoeconomic aspects of China's involvement in in relation to Australia and New Zealand, and then the Pacific islands. Having established the nature of China's involvement I will then comment on the implications for other actors in the region, starting off with Australia and New Zealand, and the Pacific islands, and then giving attention to external actors such as the United States, Japan and other Asian states, and the European countries.

Australia and New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand are often grouped together by the outside world. There are certainly many commonalities between the two countries in foreign policy as in other matters but there are also important differences. New Zealand presents itself as a small power and in relative terms is more oriented towards the Pacific islands region than is the case with Australia. Following the dispute over visits by nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered US ships in the 1980s, the emphasis on the security relationship with the US is far less than is the case with Australia. Australia is more self-consciously a 'middle power' and more oriented towards Asia than New Zealand is. Australia is a bigger actor than New Zealand in the Pacific islands region; Australia is more oriented towards Melanesia, New Zealand towards Polynesia.

In terms of the geopolitical perspective Australia is more important to China than is New Zealand. Australia is viewed as the major US ally on the southern flank of the Asia-Pacific but with the potential to be weaned towards more independent policies (just as New Zealand was in the 1980s). Australia's close economic relationship with China (discussed below) might potentially provide some leverage for China in this respect but this situation has not been used to China's advantage in an overt way. In terms of China's goal of winning a preeminent position in East Asia and maximizing its influence in the Asia-Pacific, having support from Australia or at least minimizing opposition would be highly desirable. Australia is also in a position to have some influence on the Asia-Pacific policies of the US, as well as conducting an active diplomacy in relation to major powers within the region such as Japan and Indonesia (and India in terms of the Indo-Pacific perspective). On many of the issues affecting East Asia and the Asia-Pacific Australia is not a major influence in its own right, but it can exert influence in conjunction with other powers. From China's perspective strengthening relations with Australia can be important in minimizing the possibility of an anti-China alignment emerging in the region or even to combat the soft balancing against China that underpins many aspects of diplomacy among the powers most immediately affected by China's rise.

Many of the same points underpin China's geopolitical perspective in relation to New Zealand, but on a smaller scale. New Zealand can have some influence in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, particularly when it works in conjunction with Australia. New Zealand's ties with the US are weaker than Australia-US ties, but there is still some substance in the New Zealand-US relationship. New Zealand's links with the various Asian countries can also be relevant in the broader context of how international issues are dealt with in the region through multilateral diplomacy. China is therefore justified in

giving some attention to building its relations with New Zealand as a means of achieving its geopolitical objectives.

As far as the geoeconomic dimension is concerned Australia is again far more important to China than is New Zealand. Australia is a major supplier of raw materials to China, especially iron ore and coal. China is also an important investor in the resources sector in Australia. These resources are not indispensable as far as China is concerned because there are other suppliers available such as Brazil. However without the resources provided by Australia there would be less competition among China's suppliers. Australia ranked sixth among China's sources of imports in 2012 (Australia 2013). From Australia's perspective China has assumed the position of major destination for exports and major source of imports, amounting to 31.6% of Australian exports and 18.8% of imports in 2012-13 (ibid.).

In New Zealand's case China buys primary products such as dairy, wood, wool, seafood and meat and sells machinery, clothing and furniture. This trade was important to New Zealand, but less so to China. In 2012 China was New Zealand's second most important export destination, and its leading source of imports (13% of exports, 16% of imports) (New Zealand 2013).

The Pacific Islands

Turning to the Pacific islands we have a complex picture, particularly in terms of geopolitics, but geoeconomics also has some relevance.[1] Although the region is small in population its politics are quite complex, with fourteen island countries in the Pacific Islands Forum as well as a number of territories linked to either France (New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Wallis and

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[1]   Two edited books on China and the Pacific islands region are Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter (eds) (2010), *China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?*, New York; Anne Marie-Brady (ed.) (2010), *Looking North, Looking South: China, Taiwan, and the South Pacific*, Singapore. A single author work is Jian Yang (2011), *The Pacific Islands in China's Grand Strategy: Small States, Big Games*, Basingstoke.

Futuna) or the US (American Samoa, Guam, Northern Marianas; the US state of Hawaii is also part of Polynesia).

From a geopolitical perspective China's aim is to achieve and expand its influence in this region; this enhances China's position as an East Asian and Asia-Pacific power and as a global power. There is nothing particularly sinister in this goal; it is a normal part of the behaviour of a great power. China is not aiming to make the Pacific islands region a 'Chinese lake',[2] but it does aspire to be among the most significant powers active in the region. In pursuing its goal China has made use of multilateral diplomacy, its role as a dialogue partner of the Pacific Islands Forum being a good example in this respect. It has focused also on the major Pacific island countries such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji. As the case of post-2006 Fiji makes clear China's diplomacy in the region accepts the governments that emerge irrespective of their democratic credentials.

One particular aspect of China's geopolitical involvement has been its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition by the Pacific island countries. Generally China has been more successful with the larger countries such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji; apart from the two major PICs, the Federated States of Micronesia, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu all recognize the PRC. Taiwan has had more success with some of the smaller countries; the largest state recognizing Taiwan is Solomon Islands, with the others being Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau and Tuvalu (Herr/Bergin 2011:19). In recent years the China-Taiwan conflict has stabilized, reflecting a more discreet approach by the Kuomintang government in Taiwan but perhaps indicative also of China's growing economic and political strength. In the

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[2] Writing in 2013 John Henderson and Benjamin Reilly saw China as having a long-term goal "to ultimately replace the United States as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Ocean" (Henderson/Reilly 2003:95). 'Pacific Ocean' is broader than 'Pacific islands region'. From the perspective of 2013 the argument seems exaggerated.

Pacific islands region this situation has led to a 'truce' in the competition between China and Taiwan for diplomatic recognition by the island countries.

Although not strictly speaking a geopolitical issue the presence of overseas Chinese communities in a number of Pacific island countries is another factor affecting China's involvement in the region. The most significant concentrations of overseas Chinese are in Fiji (estimate of 8,000 to 20,000) and Papua New Guinea (6,000 to 20,000). French Polynesia (14,000), Guam (4,000), Northern Marianas (13,000) and Solomon Islands (1.200 to 3,000) also have significant numbers by regional standards.[3] The overseas Chinese in the Pacific island countries are most commonly involved in business activities. They sometimes attract resentment from the population at large, particularly when an economic downturn is occurring. Anti-Chinese rioting has occurred in recent years in Solomon Islands (2006), Tonga (2006) and Papua New Guinea (2009). While not a major consideration affecting China's role in the Pacific islands region, China would have concerns about any ill treatment of people from China or of Chinese descent.

From a geoeconomic perspective the Pacific islands region is not of major importance to China. Papua New Guinea is of some importance as a supplier of minerals and timber. Papua New Guinea is not indispensable in this respect but it is helpful to China to have a number of suppliers of the minerals it needs for its burgeoning industries. China might figure prominently in the trade figures for other Pacific island countries, but for China itself the region is not a major trade partner.

China's aid relationship with the Pacific island countries is one aspect of China's involvement in the region that warrants comment. China's aid is partly a means of reinforcing its diplomacy in the region but in some cases it

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[3]   The figures are from Yang 2011:112.

provides a means of facilitating access to raw materials for export to China (without amounting to resources diplomacy as such) (Brant 2013:158-177). Allowing for the difficulties of defining 'aid', Philippa Brant concludes that "China's total aid (…) approximates that of other important donors (Japan, NZ, European Commission), but is significantly less than Australia's" (ibid.:167); she refers to one analysis that claimed Papua New Guinea accounted for 58% of China's total aid to the PICs in 2009 (ibid.). As mentioned previously China deals with governments in the region irrespective of their democratic basis. This approach applies also to the aid it provides. Aid is generally offered on a 'no strings' basis, often as grants or concessional loans. There can be some projects that are major in the context of a small Pacific island country and thus have a big political impact, but are not necessarily expensive for a large country such as China. A good example would be the way in which China has provided Samoa with various government buildings, parliamentary offices, court offices and a sports complex as gifts.

Implications of China's involvement in Oceania

Having provided an overview of China's involvement in Oceania, giving attention to both geopolitical and geoeconomic dimensions, I turn next to assess the implications for the various actors in the region, both local and external. I argue that Australia and New Zealand have responded to China's involvement with a combination of accommodation and soft balancing (McDougall 2012:1-17). For the Pacific island countries the more complex international environment signalled by China's expanding role in the region provides more options for their international policies. For the various external actors the Chinese factor has encouraged greater competition in their attempts to win influence in the region, with soft balancing being relevant in some instances such as the US.

Local: Australia and New Zealand

Both Australia and New Zealand have viewed the strengthening of economic ties with China as an important goal. Australia in particular has benefited considerably from the strengthening of these ties. Taking exports and imports together, China accounts for about 25% of Australia's external trade. In New Zealand's case the dependence is less but trade with China is still above 15% of New Zealand's total trade.

While Australia and New Zealand both benefit from the economic relationship with China, at a geopolitical level there has been a concern that China should not become too dominant in the region. Australia in particular has emphasised the importance of the US alliance for Australian security; the subtext is that China is one concern where the US alliance could be relevant. Australian governments have generally acted on the assumption that they can maintain a strong relationship with China while also acting to strengthen the US alliance.[4] Apart from the US alliance Australia has also fostered relationships with major Asian powers such as Japan, Indonesia and India; although in each instance there are factors unique to the particular relationship, there is also an implicit soft balancing occurring in relation to China. This is not intended as a strategy for containing China but is meant to contribute to a complex environment where there are many possible political alignments and no one power is dominant. New Zealand's approach is similar but in a lower key; its relationship with the US is less intense than Australia's and it is more of a minor actor in relation to the major Asian powers.

As far as the Pacific islands are concerned China's involvement in the region makes it more difficult for Australia and New Zealand to dominate the

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[4] Hugh White has argued that inevitable tensions between China and the US will constrain Australia's ability to maintain positive relationships with both powers (White 2010, 2012). For another perspective, see McDougall 2014:319-342.

region than would otherwise be the case. With China as an active actor it is possible for Pacific island countries to strengthen their ties with China as a way of reducing the influence of Australia and New Zealand. As discussed below, this situation has been most evident with post-2006 Fiji, but the option is also available to other Pacific island countries.

Local: Pacific Islands

The general point for the Pacific island countries then is that China's expanding role in the region provides them with more options in terms of their international policies. While China can be an important trading partner and source of aid in a number of instances, more significant is the way in which China's involvement in the region contributes to a more complex international environment. This situation in turn enables Pacific island countries more scope to 'pick and choose', thus enhancing their independence. The best example is post-2006 Fiji where the military government has developed a 'Look North' strategy to enhance its independence and to avoid the consequences of sanctions imposed by Australia, New Zealand and other countries to encourage Fiji to return to democracy. While other countries might follow Fiji's lead should their circumstances be judged to warrant such a course of action, there have been no significant moves in this direction. At the same time the perception that China's involvement provides more scope for independent policies on the part of Pacific island countries might encourage other external actors to take the region more seriously. External actors cannot assume that Pacific island countries are firmly within a Western-led sphere.

With the truce in the China-Taiwan competition in the Pacific islands region, the bidding war that had occurred at times in the past is now over. At the same time it appears that both China and Taiwan are maintaining good levels of aid to the states that accord them diplomatic recognition. Should the

competition resume in the future this would be another aspect of China's role in the region that would again have implications for the local states.

External actors

For the external actors China's enhanced role contributes to the more complex international environment in the region (Firth 2013:286-293), providing more competition for their own efforts. This has been most obvious perhaps in relation to the US but it is also a factor for other external actors.

United States: The change of emphasis in US strategy known as the 'Pacific pivot' began in 2011. The rationale was the need to shift from an undue preoccupation with the Middle East and Southwest Asia to allow for the emerging issues in the Asia-Pacific. While China was a major consideration underlying the new strategy the whole of the Asia-Pacific was affected. In visiting Australia in November 2011 President Barack Obama announced enhanced cooperative efforts with Australia; among other things there would be provision for US Marines to spend time in training and transit in northern Australia. There have also been attempts to improve relations with New Zealand, although these attempts are not necessarily related to the 'Pacific pivot' as such. In relation to the Pacific islands a concern about Fiji's 'Look North' strategy has led to more direct US involvement in Pacific island affairs, with the US no longer prepared to delegate these matters to Australia and New Zealand. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attended the meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum in Rarotonga, Cook Islands in August 2012, the first such attendance by a US Secretary of State.

Japan and other Asian countries: In the past Japan was probably the most significant of the Asian countries involved in Oceania. The political and economic ties with both Australia and New Zealand remain important; Japan, along with South Korea, is the northern bastion of the US alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. 'Soft balancing' against China is relevant to Japan's

relationship with both Australia and New Zealand. In the Pacific islands region China's role is relevant to Sino-Japanese rivalry more broadly. While this rivalry is played out most fully in Northeast Asia, the Pacific islands region is one context where Japan would be wary of China expanding its influence with detrimental consequences for Japan's own role in the region.

Among the other Asian countries Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries have significant political and economic relationships with Australia and New Zealand. In the Pacific islands region Taiwan has been in competition with China in the past. Fishing fleets from Taiwan and South Korea have been relevant to the fisheries issues in the region. Malaysian-based companies have been involved in extracting timber from countries such as Papua New Guinea. Indonesia has been developing a higher profile in the region to counter Melanesian support for West Papuan independence; this issue continues to be important in Indonesian relations with Papua New Guinea. For these various Asian actors increased Chinese involvement is not necessarily directly relevant to their own concerns but simply part of the more complex international environment in the region.

European countries

The United Kingdom, France and the European Union appear most relevant for this topic. The United Kingdom was historically close to Australia and New Zealand, and the political, economic and cultural ties remain important. Britain was also the major colonial power in the South Pacific, but has now largely withdrawn from involvement; Britain regards Australia and New Zealand as having the major post-colonial responsibilities in this region. From the British perspective then, China's role in Oceania is not a major consideration, except insofar as that role has a bearing on the international involvement of Australia and New Zealand; if the Antipodean countries are affected then this in turn could have an impact on the ties these countries have with Britain.

In the case of France there are important political and economic ties with Australia and New Zealand, but more particularly territorial responsibilities in relation to New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futuna. China is part of the more complex international environment in the region, but is generally not a major consideration for France in this part of the world.

The same point could be made about the European Union, with its watching brief for EU issues in relation to Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific islands. As a significant aid donor in the Pacific islands, the EU would be aware that Chinese entry into this field has been a complicating factor for its own endeavours; however there is no evidence of EU hostility to China's role as an aid donor.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that China's involvement in the affairs of Oceania has been motivated by geopolitical and geoeconomic factors relating to its East Asian and Asia-Pacific and global roles. In regional and global terms Australia and New Zealand (to a lesser extent) are the major focus; however China has also assumed an increasingly important role in relation to the Pacific islands. While economic links are important to China, particularly with Australia, China's motivation is mainly to increase its political influence in the region. This is part of its role as a major power. China's expanding role has important implications for both local and external actors in Oceania. The Australian response has been characterized by a combination of accommodation and soft balancing; New Zealand appears to have followed Australian policy in this respect but in a more low key way. For the Pacific islands, most obviously Fiji, China's higher profile in the region has expanded the available diplomatic options. For the external actors China's role has mostly been a matter of making the international environment in Oceania more complex; in

the US case one could argue that the 'Pacific pivot' has been partly influenced by China's greater involvement in Oceania.

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Institutions

The Pacific Islands Forum as a Peace and Security Policy Player in Oceania

Henning Blatt

Abstract: *War and military conflicts amongst states have always been major threats to international security. Nevertheless, other sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields constitute such threats, too. Over the past 40 years, the PIF has evolved into the key promoter of peace and security in Oceania by addressing non-military issues in the region. With the Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation of 1992 and the Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security of 2002, the PIF established a framework to enhance the capacity of member states to counter terrorism and organised crime. The adoption of the Biketawa Declaration in 2000 brought about a new tool to manage internal crises within the Forum states on a regional level, resulting in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands in 2003, the Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru in 2004, and the suspension of the military regime of Fiji from participation in the organisation in 2009. In addition, the PIF is increasingly engaged in drawing world attention to the specific threats that climate change and sea-level rise pose to some of its member states. With these contributions to peace and security in Oceania, the PIF qualifies as a regional arrangement within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.*

Keywords: nuclear tests, terrorism, organised crime, statehood, failed state, climate change, sea-level rise, international security, regionalism

Introduction

The time of the Cold War was influenced by the notion that only interstate conflicts were likely to affect international peace and security. The world community generally assumed a system of individual national interests, potentially leading to entitlement attitudes towards other states, which at worst would escalate into military conflicts. The Pacific area has not seen such classic interstate conflicts in form of a military confrontation since the end of World War II.

However, the perception of peace and security has changed along with the end of the bipolar world order. Particularly the Security Council of the United Nations – according to Article 24 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter the primary organ entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security – is increasingly focusing on issues, which bear no imminent antagonistic moments but are in the interest of all states alike[1]. Following a meeting of the Security Council in 1992, when for the first time in its history heads of state and government had been summoned, its President issued the following statement: "*The members of the Council note that United Nations peace-keeping tasks have increased and broadened considerably in recent years. Election monitoring, human rights verification and the repatriation of refugees have in the settlement of some regional conflicts, at the request or with the agreement of the parties concerned, been integral parts of the Security Council's effort to maintain international peace and security. (...) The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a*

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[1]   Talmon (2005:180) calls these aspects "*general phenomena*", Yamashita (2007:565) "*generalized 'issues'*". See with a focus on the term of international security Häußler (2008:50ff).

whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters" (UN 1992:2f).

Such *matters* may include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, terrorism and organised crime, as well as precarious statehood and even climate change – all of them being policy areas in which the Pacific Islands Forum has been active during its now 40-year history: "*Peace and security in the Pacific, indeed the world, can no longer be seen in the narrow sense of defending a state from external threats of a military nature. It is now understood that they are closely linked with generating conditions that in the words of the Forum Vision 'allow people to lead free and worthwhile lives', and the capacity of states to implement effective, efficient and equitable economic and political governance at all levels*" (Fong Toy 2006:37). The Forum's work in these areas is set out below.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

In the years 1946 to 1996, the USA, the United Kingdom and France detonated a total of 305 nuclear bombs in the Oceanic area[2]. The 1st Forum in 1971 devoted much of its discussion to a previously announced French test series and called on France to cease its nuclear tests. France however refrained from any reaction towards the Forum and carried out the tests regardless, causing heads of state and government to follow-up the matter during their 3rd meeting in September 1972. When France in early 1973 pronounced another test series, Australia and New Zealand took the matter up in two separate lawsuits before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On 22 June 1973 the ICJ ordered the temporarily suspension of the tests to deescalate the dispute. Yet France disregarded this order and ignited numerous other bombs in July and August 1973. The arrival of a new government under Giscard d'Estaing 1974

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[2]   The USA detonated 103, the United Kingdom 9 und France 193 nuclear bombs (Crocombe 2008:555). According to Fischer (2002:230), the total amount of bombs detonated was 250.

was followed by an injunction to end the atmospheric tests and an announcement to continue underground (Firth 1987:102). With that the ICJ considered the dispute settled and closed both proceedings.

At the 6th Forum 1975, New Zealand first put forward the idea of a contractually agreed nuclear-weapon-free zone. Initially, the proposal failed due to Australia's concerns over a negative impact on its relations with the United States (Firth 1987:137). When in the years 1981 and 1982 two more protest resolutions remained without response and there was no prospect to prevail against France on this issue, the 14th Forum 1983 reverted to the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone – notably at the initiative of Australia (SPFS 1983:2; O'Neil 2004:569ff). The following year, heads of state and government decided on the establishment of such a zone and mandated a working group put together by the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (a predecessor of the former South Pacific Forum Secretariat and the present Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat) to draft an international treaty (Ogashiwa 1991:96ff; O'Neil 2004:571ff). The resulting Treaty of Rarotonga[3] was signed by eight Forum members on the occasion of the 16th Forum 1985. The 17th Forum 1986 then approved three protocols in order to extend the effects of the treaty to each of the five nuclear powers USA, Soviet Union, China, United Kingdom and France. In April 1992, France declared a moratorium on its tests and the final halting in February 1996. Only two weeks later France ratified the three protocols of the treaty.

It is sometimes argued that the actual benefits of the Treaty of Rarotonga are only minor, having by no means created a zone that is actually nuclear-free (Firth 1987:138ff). Thus it neither prohibits the passage of nuclear-powered warships and their entry into ports nor the performance of

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[3]   South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, signed in Rarotonga on 6 August 1985 and came into force on 11 December 1986.

manoeuvres and weapons testing. Also Australia is said to have campaigned for the treaty in order to channel and ultimately limit the opposition of the island states against nuclear weapons (Firth 1987:138ff). In any case, the Forum itself considers the Treaty of Rarotonga to being explicitly relevant to peace and security by referring to it as a measure "*of enhancing global and regional peace and security*" (PIFS 2004:31).

This is also in line with the United Nations Security Council's stance on nuclear weapons. In resolution 1540 (2004) (UN 2004), the Council affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and in resolution 1887 (2009) (UN 2009), it regarded the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as being a contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Terrorism and organised crime

Following the Lockerbie air disaster in 1988, the Security Council for the first time classified international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security in resolution 731 (1992) (UN 1992b). In resolution 1373 (2001) (UN 2001), which is connected with the events of 11 September 2001, it emphasized "*the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts*", and called into life the *Counter-Terrorism Committee* in order to monitor the efforts of the states in the fight against terrorism. Only a few weeks later in resolution 1377 (2001) (UN 2001b) it called international terrorism "*one of the most serious threats to international peace and security in the twenty-first century*".

Certainly the meaning of terrorism for the Pacific island states is different from that for the Western industrial countries. While for example Australia – at least in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 – represented a potential target for terrorist attacks and was explicitly named by al-Qaeda, which already had

tried to establish respective human and logistic capacities there (White 2007:176f), there are no such indications with regards to the island states. These states are simply unattractive targets given that terrorist attacks would only have a very limited political impact and would ultimately not be worthwhile[4].

In fact, special security interests of the Pacific states are more affected by organised crime, namely money laundering in some so-called tax havens (Nauru, Cook Islands, Vanuatu), drug trafficking (especially via Palau, Fiji and Papua New Guinea) and illegal arms trade (Boister 2005:39ff; Henshaw 2008:116f). Though these activities in the Pacific may only be minor by global standards (Wesley-Smith 2008:48), they nevertheless present a veritable threat potential for the regional island states. The Forum hereby refers to "*major security vulnerabilities facing the Pacific region*" (PIFS 2004:27), however without specifying the nature of these risks.

The highjack of a New Zealand aircraft caused the Forum leaders to address those issues of regional security for the first time at their 18th meeting 1987. They set up a working group, which later on formed the *Forum Regional Security Committee* (FRSC) and which over the years should emerge as a central body of regional security work. On its suggestion the 23rd Forum 1992 approved the *Honiara Declaration on Law Enforcement Cooperation* (SPFS 1992:48). In it, the Forum leaders identified specific threats to the security of its states and decided on intensified cooperation in this field, such as joint action in relation to the freezing or seizure of funds from or for organised crime, particularly drug trafficking. Already in the following year, they stressed the need for an appropriate legal framework (SPFS 1993:61).

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[4]   Critical towards terrorism fears see Fraenkel (2005:120ff) and Greener-Barcham/Barcham (2006:67ff). According to Herr (2006:117), the Pacific island states would – if at all – only serve as a base for terrorist attacks.

Henceforth, the realisation of this declaration appeared annually on the Forum leaders' agenda. Yet its implementation falls short of the objectives declared (Clements 2008:143), not least because of the limited resources of the Forum island countries.

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the 33rd Forum 2002 adopted the *Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security* (PIFS 2002:14). Herein, the Forum leaders committed themselves to the global efforts in the fight against international terrorism and commissioned the FRSC to monitor the action at national level set by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). As a result, the FRSC supported the island states, in particular when preparing their reports to the *Counter-Terrorism Committee*. In addition, the Nasonini Declaration urged the swift implementation of the Honiara Declaration, however without setting any new standards (Tavares 2010:120).

Despite high ambitions, the results of the Forum's work in the field of terrorism and organised crime are still modest. Ultimately, the Forum in its current form will not be capable to do more than to create and to engage in appropriate channels of communication between the member states (Nabers 2006:74), to create demand analyses (Henshaw 2008:119) and to initiate the establishment of counter-terrorism focal points in national administrations (PIFS 2004:28). Most visible are probably the numerous model laws, most of which were inspired by the FRSC and subsequently developed by the Forum Secretariat (Spillane 2006:201f). These do not only relate to terrorism and organised crime in general, but also in detail to human trafficking, drug trafficking and arms control, as well as extradition of persons and customary regulations. Periodically the Forum calls for the implementation of those model laws. Should a Forum island country detect a respective legislative need, the Forum Secretariat on request provides available human resources to

adapt existing laws (Boxall 2005:173), but here again little process has been made so far.

Precarious statehood

The Forum's former principle of non-intervention in internal affairs of Member states

One of the Forum's key principles since its inception in 1971 is the non-intervention in internal affairs of its members (Richter 2004; Urwin 2005:13). Up until the year 2000, the Forum had not been involved in any internal conflict in Oceania and mostly refrained from adopting any position in this respect. This especially concerns the independance movement on Espiritu Santo (Vanuatu) until its suppression in 1980 (Holtz 2003:72ff), the independance movement on Bougainville (Papua New Guinea) and its evolving civil war up to the cease-fire in 1998 (see Böge in this volume), the Fiji coups of 1987 and 2000 (see Ratuva and Ernst in this volume), and lastly the unrest on Guadalcanal (Solomon Islands) up to the peace treaty in 2000 (siehe Dinnen in this volume).

Biketawa as a realignment

With the overturn of Fiji's Prime Minister and the unrest on the Solomon Islands, the year 2000 became the *annus horribilis* in the region (Urwin 2005:16). Under the impact of these events and at the urging of Australia and New Zealand, the Forum leaders decided at their 31st meeting in October 2000 on new course in the future and approved the *Biketawa Declaration* (PIFS 2000:9). In it they commit themselves to guiding principles such as good governance, human equality and the rule of law, but also to indigenous rights and traditional values. At the same time Biketawa is reserving a procedure applicable in certain conflict situations, triggered either by a state's request for assistance or in a 'time of crisis'. This procedure includes among other the dispatch of a fact-finding mission and the formation of high-level

contact groups. Should the conflict continue in spite of specifically named sanctions, 'targeted measures' come into effect.

Biketawa marks a decisive step towards strengthening the institutional solidarity within the region (Duxbury 2007:188), for the first time formulating the Pacific states' wish to grant the Pacific Islands Forum a greater role in dealing with international security issues (Richter 2004; Tarte/Kabutaulaka 2002:76). At the same time, it exemplifies that under certain conditions the internal affairs of a Forum member may become a matter of the entire Forum (Urwin 2005:17).

Yet the declaration does not specify its basic principles as to the conditions and consequences of their application, but leaves this to the discretion of the Forum leaders. This poses the risk that their decisions under the declaration appear primarily politically motivated, thus rendering these decisions tenuous (Kefu 2005:26f)[5]. Corresponding criticism especially relates to Australia's and New Zealand's de facto dominance and resulting supremacy of interests within the Forum[6]. If however regional measures in line with the Biketawa Declaration are actually taken and thus are perceived as regionally legitimized, the security architecture in the region is unlikely to be harmed (Shibuya 2004:114).

With the Biketawa Declaration the Forum leaders follow to some extent a path, that has already been tread on by the United Nations Security Council on a global level since the end of the Cold War. In resolution 688 (1991) (UN 1991), the Council for the first time recognized human rights violations as a

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[5] This is especially true for a potential suspension of a Forum member, which is nowhere implied in the declaration (see Firth 2008:124).

[6] Firth (2001:280) argues: "Under these circumstances, the future role of the Biketawa mechanism might well be to confer the imprimatur of regional legitimacy on what are essentially bilateral interventions undertaken by Australia and New Zealand, which will claim to be acting on the basis of a mandate given by the Pacific Islands Forum." According to Tavares (2010:126), the Forum's biggest 'achievement' is to have conferred political legitimacy upon the regional implementation of the national interests of its largest members.

threat to international peace and security. Then, with resolution 940 (UN 1994), it passed probably the "*most aggressive resolution ever adopted*" (Levitt 1998:360), for the first time authorising coercive measures to remove a de facto government and restore the democratic process. According to the handling by the Security Council, humanitarian crises, human rights violations and violations of democratic principles are matters potentially threatening international peace and security (Bothe 2007:478ff). The fact that the Security Council hereby more often than not emphasizes, that the individual situation is unique in one way or another, and thus needs an extraordinary reaction, is probably an expression of the fact that such situations are not yet considered a fully accepted legal basis for a forced action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Yamashita 2007:564).

A combination of the above-mentioned problems can be observed in the so-called failed states or failing states. Certainly this term still lacks decisive contours, but the states concerned are attested an inability to settle disputes peacefully, making them appear as a structural threat to world peace (Geiß 2005:306)[7].

Biketawa places itself at the service of the fight of said humanitarian crises, human rights violations and violations of democratic principles. Sometimes it is therefore seen as the political basis for regional coercive measures under Article 53 of the Charter of the United Nations (Graham/Felício 2006: 292). Yet the declaration is by no means of any compulsory nature. It is not a legally binding document. Neither does it obligate to a certain action, nor does it give the Forum or the Forum members any powers (Angelo 2008:68). It is a regional expression of the *Responsibility to Protect* (Clements 2008:

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[7]   Yet in view of their political, economic and geographical marginality it seems rather unlikely that a failure of the Pacific island states would produce similar effects on the international community, as was for example observed in Afghanistan (Herr 2006b:93ff).

142ff), which also only formulates a political conviction, without subjecting any situations of massive human rights violations to legally binding rules – let alone measures deviating from Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter (Payandeh 2010:480ff).

Biketawa I: Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands

Initially it was not foreseeable that Biketawa would ever be used for more than rhetorical purposes (Firth 2005:94, 2008:126). However, it was first applied just three years later in 2003, when the government of the Solomon Islands asked the Forum for help in addressing its continuing security problems. The peace treaty of 2000 failed to stop the ethnic unrest on Guadalcanal. Through the ongoing struggles an unprecedented economic and social decline of the Solomon Islands set in (Fraenkel 2004:120ff). This situation – which made the country in the eyes of some commentators appear as a failed state (Wainwright 2003:6; Kabutaulaka 2005:291ff; Otter 2006:119ff) – made the Prime Minister Allan Kemakeza call Australia and the other Forum members for help in mid-2003. They replied with the *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI) (Fraenkel et al. 2014; see also Dinnen in this volume).

In July 2003 RAMSI was deployed on the Solomon Islands. The mission initially consisted of a total of 2,225 people, distributed on a police force with 335 police officers, a military component of about 1,800 soldiers and a civilian part with 100 employees of various government authorities of the states involved. Its initial success was immense (McDougall 2004:221). As of mid-2004, the focus of the mission shifted to classical state-building tasks (Ponzio 2005:179). The work of RAMSI had so far been based on the three pillars of *Law and Justice*, *Economic Governance and Growth* as well as *Machinery of Government* (Solomon Islands 2009:115ff, 143ff, 153ff). As a result, particularly courts and prisons were reopened or variously supported, the national

finances were completely rearranged and long-term reforms of the political and economic sector were addressed. This change of tasks of RAMSI was also reflected in the personnel composition of the mission. After a gradual reduction of the military part, only about 200 soldiers, but instead 350 police officers and 180 civilians were in service for RAMSI in 2006.

RAMSI began on 24 July 2003 with the arrival of its first contingent in Honiara. At this time, the national legal conditions for the presence of foreign soldiers, police and civilian personnel had only just been created by the Solomon Islands. Just a week before, the parliament of the Solomon Islands had enacted a law (*Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003* of 17 July 2003), which set a general framework for the implementation of support missions of foreign governments. It was not limited to RAMSI and required a regulation of the Governor-General to extend its operative provisions on certain missions – such as RAMSI. In this regulation (*Facilitation of International Assistance Notice 2003* of 23 July 2003), the Governor-General referred to a formal invitation, which had been communicated by Prime Minister Kemakeza to Australia and via the Forum Chair to other Forum members on 4 July 2003. This invitation in turn had been preceded by a written request for Australia's help in the crisis to the Australian Prime Minister John Howard in April 2003, but Howard made a support mission conditional upon the approval of all Forum members to a joint action[8]. On 30 June 2003, the foreign ministers of the Forum members, which had gathered at the *Foreign Affairs Ministers Meeting* (FFAMM) in Sydney, approved the proposed mission and paved the way to the formal invitation on 4 July 2003.

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[8] At the beginning of 2003 Howard had still strictly rejected any Australian intervention in the conflict. About this striking change of direction see McDougall (2005:130). Wainwright (2003b) is frequently quoted as a key publication on this issue. According to Kabutaulaka (2005:287ff), Howard was guided by the idea of a "preemptive strike against terrorists in another country".

On the arrival day of RAMSI in Honiara on 24 July 2003, the Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga signed an international treaty for the mission deployment in the Australian city of Townsville[9]. These seven parties initially participated with a personal contribution to RAMSI, but other Forum members were also involved from day one. In this respect, the RAMSI Treaty is unspecific and in its application not limited to these countries. It expressly gives other states the opportunity to also provide personnel to the mission. On the occasion of the 34th Forum in Auckland in August 2003, the other nine Forum members signed the treaty and sent police, military or civilian forces to the Solomon Islands.

The international legal basis of RAMSI is therefore rooted in the approval of the Solomon Islands to the mission (Wielders 2008:140), as it stipulated in the invitation of 4 July 2003 and the subsequent RAMSI Treaty of 24 July 2003. A few doubtful voices about the viability of this basis argued with reference to the national situation of the Kemakeza government. Allegedly, this government had lost effective control of the country up to 2003 and was thus not in the position to set binding international instruments for the Solomon Islands (e.g. Zwanenburg 2006:505). This assessment has to be legally conceded insofar, as a government in certain situations of internal conflicts over predominance is no longer considered an organ entitled to an external representation of the country (Wippman 1996/97:224ff). Whether such a conflict situation had applied on the Solomon Islands in mid-2003, will not and cannot be discussed here. It should just simply be noted that the corresponding *failed state* labelling had explicitly been questioned on several

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9   Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security, signed in Townsville on 24 July 2003 and came into force on the same day.

occasions[10], that the tensions were limited to the island of Guadalcanal, that Guadalcanal's capital Honiara had largely been under government control since 2000 and that the end of 2002 had marked a significant improvement of the security situation and that of the government in the country (Fraenkel 2004:152). Moreover, the Kemakeza government's action had not been queried by officials; also the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, stressed in August 2003 that the mission was based on an invitation from the Solomon Islands. Hence it is not relevant here whether the mission is legitimized under international law by its regional character or perhaps by its humanitarian character alone and without recourse to this invitation[11].

Given the Forum's approval of the mission according to the Biketawa Declaration as well as the legal nature of RAMSI as a joint action of all Forum members[12] and their subsequent personnel involvement, the regional character of RAMSI was from the beginning beyond question on the part of the Forum (Richter 2004; Peebles 2005:162). On 22 July 2003 it informed the Security Council of the United Nations according to Article 54 of the United Nations Charter about the mission's mandate and about the deployment of personnel due two days later (Ponzio 2005:178; Spillane 2008:74). Correspondingly, the then President of the Security Council described the mission as an "*important regional initiative*" (UN 2003). The Australian House of Representatives across party lines considered RAMSI as embedded in a regional context under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter (Commonwealth of Australia 2003:18205, 18210). However, numerous commentators come to the conclusion that RAMSI was never able to develop its regional

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[10]   Kefu (2005:26) saw the Solomon Islands merely "*close to this scenario*".
[11]   In the same vein is a statement of the then President of the United Nations Security Council, wherein the invitation of the government was not mentioned and instead the "*restoration of normalcy and national harmony*" was emphasized (UN 2003).
[12]   According to Angelo (2007:292), the RAMSI Treaty does not pose a Forum initiative, but does reflect Forum interests.

dimension and that the involvement of other states did only serve the regional legitimacy of a unilateral Australian action[13]. Indeed it is undeniable that the initial regional character of the mission was only slight.

Firstly, this relates to the leadership role of Australia. While the RAMSI Treaty refers to the Forum, the Biketawa Declaration and the FFAMM decision of 30 June 2003 in its preamble, it yet does not assign any functional role to the Forum. At the top of RAMSI is a person designated by the Australian government and the involved police and military forces are managed by their respective most senior Australian officials. Just such a leadership role also applies in quantitative terms with respect to other staff (Ponzio 2005:179). Against the background of the de facto dominance of this country in the region, that fact is yet unsurprising, especially since with the exception of New Zealand, Fiji and Papua New Guinea, no other Forum island country was and still is not capable to perform a major military or police action, but still cannot compensate for the lack of involvement of the Forum in particular.

Secondly, RAMSI's compatibility with the Biketawa Declaration is questionable. The mission was not initiated by the Forum leaders following a Forum leaders special meeting convened by the Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat, as it is required by paragraph 2 (iv) of the declaration, and the elaborated investigation and mediation regime of paragraph 2 (iii) was not

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[13] "While regional legitimacy could be claimed in formal terms, the rushed processes only reinforced the impression that Australia was using the regional assent as a fig-leaf for unilateral action" (Fry 2008:84). See also Moore (2007:143): "Regardless of its Forum origins, RAMSI is open to accusations of neo-colonialism." Similar Crocombe (2008:545) and Farran (2009:267). Foukona (2005) bases this judgement also on the fact that even the contents of the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003 had been formulated by Australia and New Zealand. O'Keefe (2007:145) views the agreement of the Forum island countries to RAMSI as a consequence of their dependence on Australian development aid and therefore negates a legitimating effect. In 2009, a commission of the Solomon Island Parliament dealt in depth with these allegations (Solomon Islands 2009:85ff).

applied[14]. Furthermore RAMSI was in the early years a purely law-and-order mission with the objective of supporting state institutions, so the declaration's requirement to identify and tackle the "*underlying causes of tensions and conflict*" (Wielders 2008:143) has only attracted attention in later years.

As a consequence of these circumstances RAMSI was initially perceived as "*a kind of shadow government*" (Wielders 2008:141) and the Solomon Islands as qualifying for an Australian "*latter-day protectorate*" (Bennett 2005:438). The government of the Solomon Islands came under domestic pressure in this regard. On its request the Forum in 2005 sent an *Eminent Persons Group* to review the work of RAMSI. One of the group's key findings was the need for an emphasis on the regional component, which is why it recommended a greater involvement of the island states concerning the filling of positions within the mission (Eminent Persons Group 2005:91). Given the only moderate implementation of the recommendations, the 37th Forum 2006 decided on the deployment of a task force to conduct a further, more comprehensive assessment of RAMSI (PIFS 2006:21). At the same time, the Forum leaders agreed on the formation of a contact group between the Solomon Islands, RAMSI and the Forum, which started its work in February 2007 as the *Enhanced Consultative Mechanism*.

The report of the task force was to form the basis for an increased involvement of the Forum in RAMSI. It also recognized the lack of communication between RAMSI and the government of the Solomon Islands as a central problem for the implementation of the mission and recommended the formation of a new, three-pronged system of mutual relations of the actors involved. At its suggestion, the *Forum Ministerial Standing Committee*

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[14]   Henderson (2006:178f) notes that in the Biketawa Declaration "consultations – to be worthy of the term, must allow for more than one outcome. This was never the case with Solomon Islands. Australia had made up its mind. Others could join in if they wished, but the Australian intervention would go ahead anyway."

(FMSC) was formed at ministerial level, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the states of the current, past and future Forum Chair and the Solomon Islands, Australia and Papua New Guinea, which meets annually "*to provide oversight and governance to RAMSI*". Below the ministerial level, the *Enhanced Consultative Mechanism* continues to prepare for the meetings of the FMSC. In between these meetings a *triumvirate group* of the Solomon Islands Government Permanent Secretary to RAMSI, the Pacific Islands Forum Representative to Solomon Islands and the Special Coordinator are in contact to regularly update on RAMSI. The first FMSC took place in February 2008. It proposed the development of a framework program for further cooperation between RAMSI and the government of the Solomon Islands, in order to anchor the mission stronger to the interests of the Solomon Islands, to formulate concrete objectives and to specify an appropriate time frame for individual projects. In implementing the resulting *Partnership Framework*, RAMSI transformed into a pure support and development mission for the local police. By mid-2013, the military component pulled out and the civilian projects of the three pillars of *Law and Justice, Economic Governance and Growth* and *Machinery of Government* were transferred into bilateral or multilateral commitments (PIFS 2013:29).

In view of this strengthening of the regional component, the numerous fears on the Solomon Islands side of an Australian domination could be eliminated[15]. Meanwhile, the government of the Solomon Islands closely followed the recommendations of the Forum, such as regarding the establishment of a *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* in April 2009, which was originally

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[15] See e.g. Solomon Times 2010. Another conducive development was the replacement of the RAMSI critical Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare by Derek Sikua in December 2007 and the simultaneous change of the Australian Prime Minister from John Howard to Kevin Rudd. Countless political and diplomatic episodes between the governments Sogavare and Howard had put a severe strain on the mutual relationship and thus on the position of RAMSI before that (Moore 2007:158ff; Hameiri 2009:76ff; Hughes 2007:299ff).

inspired by the *Eminent Persons Group.* At the top of RAMSI next to the Special Coordinator and his representative there is now also a (not provided for by the RAMSI Treaty) Assistant Special Coordinator, appointed by the Pacific Islands Forum (Solomon Islands 2009:24f). With that, the involvement of the Forum had transformed from an initially only supportive role (McDougall 2006:111) to a substantial content control (Solomon Times 2010b). Its influence has eventually not been as marginal as had often been assumed, so that in spite of the factual and also significant legal bond of RAMSI to Australia, yet one can consider RAMSI a regional action of the Forum. However, this influence is limited to the political level.

Biketawa II: Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru

The second application of the Biketawa Declaration – the *Pacific Regional Assistance to Nauru* (PRAN) – took place just a year after the initialization of RAMSI, yet this was of an entirely different nature. Nauru, which once had one of the highest per capita incomes in the world thanks to its phosphate deposits, was after the exhaustion of these deposits faced with an unprecedented economic decline associated with political instability (Ratuva 2005:429). By 2004, Nauru had piled foreign liabilities of about 1 billion Australian dollars and was thus facing a financial collapse (Connell 2006: 47ff; Herr/Potter 2006:199ff; Quanchi 2007:249ff).

In this situation Nauru asked the Forum for help according to the Biketawa Declaration. At the 35th Forum 2004, Forum leaders expressed their common will to assist Nauru in its reform efforts. In August 2005, the Forum sent a senior official of the Samoan Ministry of Finance to Yaren. With this help, Nauru could first develop a *National Sustainable Development Strategy*, which should become the basis for an economic recovery of the country. In 2007, a former Deputy Secretary General of the Forum Secretariat moved to the top of the Nauruan Foreign Ministry. More high-level positions were

staffed with experts from the Pacific region, such as the Minister of Justice and the Resident Magistrate (PIFS 2008:52). A project funded by New Zealand for the first time produced a consolidated version of the entire Nauruan law, which could then be published.

Also in 2007, the Forum explicitly called to mind that significant liabilities of Nauru were barring the way to a long-term recovery of the country, and announced more yet not specifically named support measures under PRAN as well as unilateral actions. The result was, inter alia, a remission of various debts of Nauru in relation to the budget of the Forum Secretariat. At the 40th Forum 2009 Forum leaders assessed a significant recovery of Nauru's financial situation and PRAN was brought to an end after five years (PIFS 2009:57). Up until the 41st Forum 2010 pending projects were transferred into bilateral or multilateral engagements and PRAN was then removed from the agenda of future Forum meetings.

Unlike the case of the Solomon Islands, the Biketawa Declaration was used in 2004 in the context of a conflict prevention (Clements 2008:144), before the financial problems of Nauru could have escalated into violence. By way of the agreed projects Nauru mainly benefited from external capacities in the fields of justice and finance. In retrospect, PRAN represents a bundle of concerted development operations of the Pacific States and the Forum Secretariat[16], with the Forum having served as a coordinator.

Biketawa III: Suspension of Fiji's participation

The suspension of Fiji's participation on 2 May 2009 represents the third and so far last application of the Biketawa Declaration. Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama, Commander of the Fijian army, had for years accused Prime Minister

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[16] The resources required for the implementation of the Forum Secretariat projects were largely provided by Post Forum Dialogue Partners, particularly Japan and India (see e.g. PIFS 2007:23).

Laisenia Qarase to encourage corruption and to pursue a policy of favouring the indigenous majority over the ethnic Indian minority (Ratuva 2007:23; Watson 2005:381ff), when he declared on 5 December 2006 a state of emergency and claimed the rights of the President Josefa Iloilovatu Uluivuda for himself (Fraenkel 2007:420ff). As Acting President he dismissed Qarase, appointed a Caretaker Prime Minister and authorized the government to henceforth legislate without the involvement of another constitutional body. On 4 January 2007, the Caretaker Prime Minister resigned from his office, and on the same day Bainimarama gave his claimed powers back to Iloilo, who in turn appointed him Prime Minister the next day. On 18 January 2007 Iloilo declared all decrees of the military government from 5 December 2006 to 5 January 2007 to be legal and granted all individuals involved in the coup full, unconditional, non-judicial and irrevocable civil immunity in respect of any acts or omissions of the military government. He also dismissed all state employees in management positions.

Former Prime Minister Qarase and others took legal proceedings against this government reshuffle. After initially failing before the High Court, on 9 April 2009 the Court of Appeal declared the coup and hence the current Bainimarama government unconstitutional (Twomey 2009:319ff). At the same time the court recommended to President Iloilo the appointment of a new government in which neither Qarase nor Bainimarama would be involved. The following day, on 10 April 2009, Bainimarama resigned from his post as Prime Minister. This set in motion a series of measures by Iloilo, such as the abolition of the 1997 constitution, his own appointment as President, the declaration of the continued application of all laws (with the exception of the 1997 constitution), the release of all judges of the country, as well as the declaration of a state of emergency and issuance of special powers and restrictions for the maintenance of public order for a period of 30 days. On 12

April 2009 and with effect from the day before, he established a new transitional government under Bainimarama. The state of emergency decree was henceforth extended for 30 more days.

When the military coup was already looming in late November 2006, some leaders in the region, in particular the New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, called for a military intervention on the basis of the Biketawa Declaration. In fact, this possibility was later discussed at some special meetings of the Forum leaders, but ultimately discarded. Instead, the Forum initially reacted with a certain reserve. One of the first official statements was the statement of the Forum leaders, that as of 5 December 2006, the ousted Prime Minister Qarase was no longer in the situation to perform his role as Forum Chair, which he had taken up at the 37th Forum in October 2006 in Nadi (PIFS 2006b).

At the end of January 2007, the Forum sent an *Eminent Persons Group* to Suva to discuss with President Iloilo, the military government under Bainimarama, the deposed Prime Minister Qarase and other political groups possible steps towards overcoming the crisis and the potential role of the Forum. A subsequent extraordinary FFAMM in March 2007, which was also attended by Fiji, evaluated the coup as manifestly illegal and called on the military regime to conduct elections within a maximum of two years. The *Pacific Islands Forum-Fiji Joint Working Group on the situation in Fiji* was deployed to prepare a binding timetable in view of these elections. At the 38th Forum in October 2007, Fiji committed to elections in the first quarter of 2009 (PIFS 2007b:15), but in June 2008, it first announced reservations about the temporal expectation and ended the talks shortly after; the military regime did not take part in the following 39th Forum in August 2008 either. Still, the Forum leaders hung on to the commitment given by Fiji the year before and reaffirmed their expectation that the announced parliamentary elections

would actually take place in the first quarter of 2009. At the same time they reserved for themselves to convene a Special Leaders' Meeting "*to consider special measures in relation to Fiji (consistent with paragraph 2 (iv) of the Biketawa Declaration) and that measures to be considered included the suspension of particular governments from the Forum (…)*" (PIFS 2008b:15). While the *Joint Working Group* later resumed its work – maintaining the 'bridge' with Fiji (Ivarature 2013:189) –, the military government in December 2008 refrained from the original target date for elections.

Hence the Forum convened the previously announced Special Leaders' Meeting in January 2009 in Port Moresby. With a majority of votes, the Forum leaders demanded of Fiji the nomination of an election date by 1 May 2009, the holding of these elections by the end of December 2009, and the demonstration of its commitment to various constitutional standards before 1 May 2009. In case of Fiji not responding to these demands, the imposition of 'targeted measures' under paragraph 2 (iv) of the Biketawa Declaration was announced, namely: "*(i) suspension of participation by the Leader, Ministers and officials of the Fiji Interim Government in all Forum meetings and events; and (ii) ineligibility of the Fiji Interim Government to benefit from Forum regional cooperation initiatives, and new financial and technical assistance, other than assistance toward the restoration of democracy under the framework of the Biketawa Declaration*" (PIFS 2009b).

Shortly after, the Fijian constitutional crisis of April 2009 was at least for the government of the Solomon Islands a reason to recommend to the other Forum members a reconsideration of the decisions of 27 January 2009 (Solomon Times 2009). Shortly before the expiration of the time limit, Bainimarama also pointed out the changed circumstances. The Forum remained, however, unimpressed and announced by the Forum Chair on 2 May 2009 the suspension of Fiji from all Forum events (PIFS 2009c). Immediately after this

announcement, Fiji raised the allegation that Australia and New Zealand had misused their economic weight to influence the other Forum members and thus create a unity towards the suspension, but this was firmly rejected by the Forum.

The 42nd Forum 2011 allowed Fiji to return to specific regional economic talks in order to take account of its significant economic role in the region (PIFS 2011:34). In August 2013, the new Fijian constitution came into force, which the 44th Forum 2013 called an important step towards free and fair elections (PIFS 2013:38). At the same time it affirmed – on condition of the conduct of the elections in accordance with the principles agreed upon in January 2009 – to decide on the full return of Fiji to the Forum process. The 45th Forum 2014 repeated this affirmation immediately before the first parliamentary elections after the coup on 17 September 2014 (PIFS 2014:22). After the elections, which confirmed Bainimarama as Prime Minister, Forum leaders lifted the suspension of Fiji on 22 October 2014 (PIFS 2014b).

Climate change

Climate change issues were put on the agenda of the Forum leaders for the first time at the 19th Forum 1988, when they expressed "*concern about climatic changes in the South Pacific and their potential for serious social and economic disruption in countries of the region*" (SPFS 1988:31). On the follow-up meeting in 1989 they named the sea level rise as the so far most urgent problem and decided that in future "*Forum members should take decisive action to draw world attention to the way the environmental problem affected the South Pacific, and to represent regional views at appropriate international gatherings, possibly including by way of a resolution in the United Nations General Assembly*" (SPFS 1989:20).

Later, the Forum leaders specified this environmental problem as a threat to the physical existence of the island nations and their cultures, identified the

responsibility of developed countries as being the main emitters of green-house gases and set up a corresponding demand for recognition of this re-sponsibility to the *Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on a Frame-work Convention on Climate Change* (SPFS 1991:16). After adoption of the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) in May 1992, the Forum in July 1992 took an unmistakable view on the signifi-cance of climate change for the island states: "*The Forum reaffirmed that global warming and sea level rise are the most serious threats to the Pacific region and the survival of some island states*" (SPFS 1992:7; see also SPFS 1993:29, 1994:19).

The UNFCCC was an expression of an increased awareness on the part of the industrialized countries for their special responsibility in environmental issues; also Australia and New Zealand demonstrated early-stage support of the island states' positions, in particular with regards to the reduction of greenhouse gases. Australia, however, changed this attitude, when shortly after the inception of the UNFCCC it became apparent, that its declarations of intent were not likely to meet the objectives of the convention (Birnie et al. 2009:360) so there would be need for further action. The Australian govern-ment under John Howard was not willing to make corresponding concessions and generally dismissed international environmental agreements. Repeatedly Howard had rated the Australian signature to the UNFCCC as a mistake (Yu/Taplin 2000:113ff).

Thereon, the Forum significantly toned down its extensive demands to the industrialized countries. While the 25th Forum 1994 had reaffirmed the need to elaborate concrete climate protection targets in the form of a protocol, the 26th Forum in following year was already more reserved by merely "*rec-ognising the threat posed to Forum Island Countries*" and welcoming the inclusion of a draft protocol by the *Alliance of Small Island States* (AOSIS)

for consideration of UNFCCC parties (SPFS 1995:24). On the eve of the third UNFCCC conference in December 1997 in Kyoto, the 28th Forum 1997 could only agree on a *Forum Leaders' Retreat Statement on Climate Change*, recognising "*that participants at the Kyoto Conference can be expected to adopt different approaches but all Forum members are unified in their support of the principles set out in this statement*" (SPFS 1997:18). With it, Forum leaders responded to Howard's announcement not to agree to any Forum statement formulating specific targets because of fear of disadvantages to the Australian economy (Edwards 2000:266; Shibuya 2004:110). His persistence on this issue paid off, as the then signed Kyoto Protocol permitted Australia as one of only three parties an increase in greenhouse gas emissions[17]. Yet Australia at first did not ratify the protocol (Elliott 2007:223)[18]. Notwithstanding this attitude of the Howard government, the Forum after that regularly emphasised the importance of the Kyoto Protocol or called for its ratification respectively (see SPFS 1998:35, 1999:21; PIFS 2000:46ff, 2001:31ff, 2002:26). In 2005, the Forum leaders endorsed the *Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change 2006–2015* (PIFS 2005:26), providing for the implementation of national adaptation measures as well as improving the understanding of climate change and raising awareness of related concerns.

The international legal literature these days refer to climate change as the "*most significant environmental challenge of our time*" (Birnie et al. 2009: 335) and partially classifies it as a possible threat to international peace and

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[17]   In the year 2012, the admissable greenhouse gas emissions for Iceland were 110 %, for Australia 108 % and for Norway 101 % of the 1990 levels by Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. For the developed countries in total, a reduction of 5.2 % was targeted (see Davies 1998:453).

[18]   Australia's attitude on climate change did not change until Kevin Rudd became Howard's successor as Prime Minister. On 3 Dezember 2007 – the day he was sworn in – Rudd initiated the national procedures for ratification of the Kyoto Protocol as his first official act and also concluded it (see: http://www.smh.com.au/news/environment/rudd-signs-kyoto-deal/2007/12/03/1196530553203.html).

security (Atapattu 2009:608; Malone 1996:526ff; Talmon 2005:181). By contrast, the United Nations Security Council has not yet issued a corresponding statement. On the initiative of the United Kingdom, the Council however dedicated the whole of its 17 April 2007 session for the very first time to the security policy implications of climate change (Sindico 2007:26ff). Also the worries of the Forum were heard, when a representative of Papua New Guinea issued a statement on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum: "*The dangers that small islands and their populations face are no less serious than those faced by nations and peoples threatened by guns and bombs. The effects on our populations are as likely to cause massive dislocations of people as past and present wars. The impacts on social cohesion and identity are as likely to cause resentment, hatred and alienation as any current refugee crisis*" (UN 2007:28). Further indications for the classification of climate change as a security-related phenomenon can be found in resolution 63/32 of the General Assembly of the United Nations (UN 2009b), in which it recognized the special challenges posed by climate change, especially for island states.

The 39th Forum 2008, with the *Niue Declaration on Climate Change* (PIFS 2008b:14), reaffirmed all previous positions on the threat to the island states and committed its members to use all international fora to continue to advocate and support the recognition of the social, economic and security aspects of climate change as well as its potential impact on national and international security. Accordingly, in May 2009 Nauru presented a draft resolution (UN 2009c) on behalf of the Pacific island states to the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was unanimously adopted the following month as resolution 63/281 (UN 2009d). In it the General Assembly showed deep concern on the impact of climate change and the potential security threats. As a result, the UN Secretary-General was instructed to draw up a report on the possible security implications of climate change. This report

was compiled in September 2009 and marked the sea-level rise as "*perhaps the ultimate security threat" for small island states, particularly those in the Pacific*" (UN 2009e:71).

At the 40th Forum in August 2009, the Forum leaders directed a *Pacific Leaders Call for Action on Climate Change* (PIFS 2009:4) to the UNFCCC parties and formulated a number of concrete goals approvable at their conference in Copenhagen in December 2009; two months later a common negotiating strategy was agreed on. After the outcome of the conference was perceived as a failure, the 41st Forum 2010 decided to continue its corresponding efforts at the follow-up conference in Cancun, Mexico in November/December 2010. Yet a breakthrough – as expected – did not happen here either. The 44th Forum 2013 adopted the *Majuro Declaration for Climate Leadership* (PIFS 2013:17), in which it described climate change as the greatest threat to the existence, safety and welfare of the people in the Pacific and as one of the biggest global challenges. The declaration is a letter of intent to reduce greenhouse gas emissions; aiming to create the political will for an international legally binding climate agreement by 2015.

Due to the scientifically sound expectations of a complete flooding of individual Forum island country territories – as well as the associated physical elimination of their existence[19] and refugee movements (Atapattu 2009:610ff; Oliver 2009:211ff)[20] –, the direct link between climate change and the security interests of the states becomes evident, therefore its treatment relates to the maintenance of international peace and security.

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[19] Yet it is also argued that the complete loss of territory does not necessarily result in the disappearance of the respective legal entity (Yamamoto/Esteban 2010:6ff). Regarding the implications on maritime borders see Schofield (2009:405ff).

[20] Tuvalu had twice already and eventually in vain asked Australia for the admission of its nationals in the event of its submergance (Banham 2006).

The Forum as a regional organization under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations

According to Article 24 paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council of the United Nations is primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security[21]. The General Assembly may also deal with all matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, Article 11 of the Charter. Regional arrangements make a complementary and quasi-inductive contribution to this under Chapter VIII of the Charter (Abass 2004:40, 59f). They are dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, Article 52 paragraph 1, whereby they are by no means inferior to global affairs with regards to their structure and quality; they just operate on a regional-decentralised and not on a global-centralised level.

The aforementioned issues with which the Pacific Islands Forum is concerned, are therefore not only within the area of competence of the United Nations under Article 1 paragraph 1 of the Charter, but at the same time within the basic scope of Chapter VIII, so regional arrangements can also deal with them[22]. And dealing with them serves the maintenance of international peace and security, just as it has been approved for the prevention of international conflicts since the inception of the United Nations. With that the Forum

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[21]   In the international legal literature, the question of whether the United Nations Security Council is at least *ultima ratio* the proper forum to address climate change appropriately, has not yet been finally answered; affirmative are Malone (1996:530ff), Oliver (2009:221), Scott (2008:506ff), Wæver (2007:110). More about the different points of view see Sindico (2007:32f). According to Häußler (2008:58), the notion of 'international security' as a legal term and as a concept legitimising intervention, remains linked to direct threats of physical violence.

[22]   This result is ultimately identical with the inclusion of *situations* in the area of competence of regional arrangements under Article 34 of the Charter of the United Nations, as *situations* are not necessarily characterized by conflicts of interest between states either (Kühne 1998:59f).

is making its own contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Accordingly, the United Nations General Assembly state its relation to the Pacific Islands Forum in the preambles of its resolutions 56/41 of 7 December 2001 and 57/37 of 21 November 2002 as follows: "*Recalling that one of the purposes of the United Nations is to achieve international cooperation in addressing international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, Bearing in mind that one of the purposes of the Pacific Islands Forum, established in 1971, is to promote regional cooperation among its members through trade, investment, economic development and political and international affairs, Welcoming the ongoing efforts towards closer cooperation between the United Nations and the Pacific Islands Forum, Bearing in mind the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations on the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action and other activities consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations (…)*" (UN 2002 and UN 2003b).

In resolution 59/20 of 8 November 2004, the General Assembly revealed, what specific activities of the Forum it had based its classification on: "*Welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum to promote, primarily through the Regional Security Committee, law enforcement cooperation, the rule of law and regional peace and security, including combating all types of terrorism, in implementing the core United Nations treaties on anti-terrorism, anti-money-laundering, transnational crime and the financing of terrorism; (…). Welcomes the significant efforts of the Pacific Islands Forum in enhancing peace and security in the region, including through the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (…)*" (UN 2005).

Certainly, in resolutions 56/41 and 57/37 the linguistic reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter is only weak – that chapter is merely 'borne in mind'. In addition, the resolutions of the General Assembly lack the legally binding force of those of the Security Council. However, the Forum is hereby brought into a qualified proximity to Chapter VIII; the relevant classification by the United Nations is pending[23]. In a joint press release of 7 September 2011, the Forum leaders and the United Nations Secretary-General state: "*PIF Leaders and the Secretary-General: (...) Acknowledged the UN's key role in the maintenance of international peace and security and the PIF's leading contribution to addressing regional peace and security challenges. They noted the value of enhanced cooperation and experience-sharing between the two Organizations on conflict prevention, peace-making, mediation, peace-keeping and peace-building, building on positive experiences in Bougainville and Solomon Islands*" (PIFS 2011b).

Conclusion

By now, the Pacific Islands Forum has established itself as an independent regulatory actor at the regional level. In the preamble to the new Forum agreement of 2005[24], Forum leaders ensured their confidence, that "*the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity*", thus situating the Forum's work explicitly in the field of peace and security policy. Similar objectives can already be found, e.g., in

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[23] According to Clements (2008:143), the Forum is "informally regarded under UN Charter provision VIII as a regional organisation". Angelo (2008:69): "If weak arrangements and agencies can qualify, then it may be possible to consider the Biketawa Declaration and the Forum Leaders' Meeting as satisfying the criteria of the UN Charter's Chapter VIII." Graham/Felício (2006:295) regard resolution 57/37 as unequivocally recognizing the Forum as a Chapter VIII arrangement.

[24] Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum, signed in Port Moresby on 27 October 2005, not yet entered into force. In recent years, the Forum has repeatedly urged a swift ratification of the agreement by the Forum members (PIFS 2011:47, 2012:68). However, in view of the political situation in Fiji an entry into force of the agreement in the near future seems rather unlikely.

the Aitutaki Declaration of 1997 (SPFS 1997:22), the Biketawa Declaration of 2000 (PIFS 2000:9), the Nasonini Declaration of 2002 (PIFS 2002:14) and the *Pacific Plan* of 2005 (PIFS 2005:3)[25]. Advancing these objectives to a legal commitment by enshrining them in the Forum's founding treaty indicates the Forum leaders' intention to continue if not intensify the Forum's peace and security work in the future.

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[25]   At an extraordinary meeting in May 2014, Forum leaders endorsed the re-casting of the Pacific Plan as the Framework for Pacific Regionalism (PIFS 2014c). This Framework for Pacific Regionalism was then approved by the 45th Forum 2014 (PIFS 2014:3).

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The Pacific Island Countries and International Organizations: Issues, Power and Strategies

Oliver Hasenkamp

Abstract: *For a long time, the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) received little attention in international politics. Yet, they constitute an important voting bloc that is of relevance for international organizationssuch as the United Nations. There are indications that some of the Pacific islands get increasingly active in international organizations, are recognized by a growing number of extra-regional states as potential coalition-partners and start to challenge traditional preceptions, according to which they can exert hardly any influence. Especially Fiji is strategically portraying itself as an important global actor, which is underlined by the country's activities in Peacekeeping and its chairmanship of the eminent G77 in 2013. This article provides an overview about the membership of the Pacific Island Countries in international organizations, especially the United Nations, and their relationship and contributions to these organizations. The article will further elaborate on the issues most actively addressed by the Pacific Island Countries in international organizations, their coalition-building with and dependency on other actors, and point to the application of strategies that help small states to exercise some influence in international politics.*

Introduction

Political scientists argue for a long time that international organizations are of particular relevance to smaller states, because of the common formal equality of states within international organizations, the potential security of membership and the capacity of organizations to restrain 'Great Powers' (Rothstein 1968:39 et seq.; Keohane 1969:294). Raimo Väyrynen even stated that "international institutions are the best friends of small states" (Väyrynen 1997:42). Membership in international organizations provides small states "with ready access to the services of the United Nations and its specialized agencies" and "offers small states a much more cost-effective method of maintaining extensive relations with the outside world than bilateral diplomacy" (Harden 1985:16). Yet, the Pacific Island Countries (PICs) are widely ignored in the study of international diplomacy and international organizations. However, they do not only constitute a significant voting bloc in many international organizations, but also increased their activities in international diplomacy in the past few years. Some indicators for the rising activities and visibility of the PICs in international organizations may be Ban Ki-moons first ever visit of a United Nations (UN) Secretary General to the Pacific in 2011, Fiji's chairmanship of the eminent G77 in 2013, and the opening of Kiribati's first permanent mission to the UN in 2013. More recently, the UN General Assembly has declared 2014 the International Year of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and in September 2014 the Third International Conference on Small Island Developing States took place place in Samoa, accompanied by Ban Ki-moon's second visit to the region in only three years. Both events did not only attach greater attention to small island states and the Pacific in particular, but also shed light on their specific challenges and their opportunities to influence international politics. While there are in fact many examples for the wide-held view that small states only have limited influence

in international institutions and are reliant on larger actors, reality shows that the performance of the PICs in international politics is far more diverse than a limited view of the states as only small, weak and dependent actors suggests (see Holtz in this volume). In the last years, especially Fiji has boosted not only its own reputation in international diplomacy by a very active foreign policy (see Ratuva and Mückler in this volume), but also provoked its Pacific Islands neighbours to reshape their activity and policies in international organizations.

This article wants to provide an overview about the relationship between the PICs and their activities and policies in international organizations to shape global politics. It will especially focus on the UN and on its General Assembly, the organization's core decision-making body that comprises all members of the organization and provides them with formally equal rights.

The Pacific Island Countries & International Organizations

There is a wide variety of different international organizations that fulfil various tasks. Only the UN system comprises a large number of specialized and associated organizations and programmes. They can help small states to overcome some of the disadvantages of their smallness, while at the same time, membership in international organizations and especially active participation requires resources, which often are available to small states only to a limited degree. Robert Rothstein states that international organizations by their "mere existence" can "provide inexperienced Small Powers" with the possibility of developing "some diplomatic sophistication" by widening the "political perspective" (Rothstein 1968:40). Some international organizations deliver services to their members such as providing expertise on a specific issue or development assistance. Others are decision-making bodies or lobbying groups that exert influence within other international institutions.

Table 1:Year of independence and admission to the United Nations

	Independence	Admission
Fiji	1970	1970
Federated States of Micronesia	1986	1991
Kiribati	1979	1999
Marshall Islands	1986	1991
Nauru	1968	1999
Palau	1994	1994
Papua New Guinea	1975	1975
Samoa	1962	1976
Solomon Islands	1978	1978
Timor-Leste	2002	2002
Tonga	1970 (never fully dependent)	1999
Tuvalu	1978	2000
Vanuatu	1980	1981

Keeping in mind that most PICs acquired political independence comparatively late, it comes to no surprise that they still constitute a relatively young group of states in the pivotal international organizations that were founded in the aftermath of the 2nd World War. Even though membership in international organizations such as the UN "is seen by many as an expression of their international legitimacy"[1] (Harden 1985:16), some of the smaller PICs (and Samoa) waited years until they joined international organizations, most importantly for financial reasons. Next to Australia, New Zealand and Timor-Leste, which increasingly interacts with the Pacific Islands Region, but basically is considered as an Asian country, twelve PICs are members of the UN, namely Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. As the only Pacific Islands representative

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[1]   One may argue that for many (especially smaller) PICs membership in the regional Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) rather than UN membership was considered as the final confirmation of political independence.

in the organization until 1975, Fiji regarded itself as a 'spokesman' of the entire region and was, to a certain extent, "regarded as such by the outside world" (Fry 1980:12). Even though this sparked some suspicion in neighbouring countries, Fiji plays a leading role for the PICs at the UN until today. Like all countries, the PSIDS are represented at the headquarters of the UN in New York by permanent diplomatic missions, which compared to those of larger countries are staffed with only few diplomats (see Table 2). Kiribati only opened a permanent representation to the UN in mid-2013 after it was the only UN member state without a permanent representation in New York since its admittance in 1999 (Islands Business 2013).

Table 2: Number of diplomats at Permanent Missions to the UN (New York)[2]

Australia	30
Fiji	**4**
Federated States of Micronesia	**3**
Germany	78
Kiribati	**2**
Marshall Islands	**1**
Nauru	**4**
New Zealand	13
Palau	**3**
Papua New Guinea	**4**
Samoa	**3**
Solomon Islands	**3**
Timor-Leste	**2**
Tonga	**3**
Tuvalu	**2**
Vanuatu	**3**

Within the system of the UN the PICs are considered as so-called *Pacific Small Island Developing States* (PSIDS). The name is also used by the Pacific countries as the name of an informal lobbying group of their permanent

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[2]   As of March 2014; Based on data of the UN's Protocol and Liaison Service (UN 2014).

representations to the UN since 2007. This group is not meant to be a regional decision-making body, but a platform for working level cooperation, in order to pool resources, to speak with one common voice and issue joint statements in international organizations.[3] Sometimes also the Cook-Islands and Niue, which as associated states enjoy full sovereignty in regional Pacific affairs, including membership in der Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), are considered as members of the PSIDS group. They are represented within the UN by New Zealand, but are sovereign members of other international organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Consequently, they squeeze the costs of UN membership, but invest their limited resources in prioritized areas such as climate change.

Due to their limited financial capacities the PSIDS only contribute insignificantly to the annual budget of the UN (see Table 3). With the exception of Fiji there are also only few PSIDS nationals working at the UN secretariat (see Table 4).

The Asia-Pacific Regional Group at the United Nations

Most international organizations consider the PSIDS to be Asian countries. Hence, they are members of some Asian organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Within the UN system the five regional groups of African States, Latin American & Caribbean States, Western European & Other States[4], Eastern European States and Asian-Pacific states are of particular relevance when it comes to equitable geographical distribution and matter in terms of the election to bodies within the UN system, e.g. the Security Council.

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[3]   Unlike the *South Pacific Missions in New York*, the predecessor of today's PSIDS group, the PSIDS do not comprise Australia and New Zealand.

[4]   Australia and New Zealand as well as Canada are considered as *Others*.

Table 3: Assessed Contributions of PSIDS and Selected Countries to UN Budget (in percentage)[5]

Country	2010 - 2012 scale	2013 – 2015 scale	2013 – 2015 GNI Share
Australia	1.993	2.074	1.678
Fiji	**0.004**	**0.003**	**0.005**
Germany	8.018	7.141	5.776
Kiribati	**0.001**	**0.001**	**>0.000**
Marshall Islands	**0.001**	**0.001**	**>0.000**
Federated States of Micronesia	**0.001**	**0.001**	**0.001**
Nauru	**0.001**	**0.001**	**>0.000**
New Zealand	0.273	0.253	0.204
Palau	**0.001**	**0.001**	**>0.000**
Papua New Guinea	**0.002**	**0.004**	**0.012**
Russia	1.602	2.438	2.241
Samoa	**0.001**	**0.001**	**0.001**
Solomon Islands	**0.001**	**0.001**	**0.001**
Timor-Leste	**0.001**	**0.002**	**0.004**
Tonga	**0.001**	**0.001**	**0.001**
Tuvalu	**0.001**	**0.001**	**>0.000**
USA	22.000	22.000	24.304
Vanuatu	**0.001**	**0.001**	**0.001**

With the exception of Kiribati, which formally belongs to no regional group yet, the PSIDS are members of the Asia-Pacific Group. In 2011 they success-fully campaigned within the Asian regional group to change its official name to 'Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Island Developing States' in order to increase their visibility and accommodate the fact that the PSIDS constitute over a fifth of the group's membership (Herr/Bergin 2011:22).

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[5]   Based on the Report of the Committee on Contributions of the UN General Assembly (A/67/11). GNI refers to *Gross National Income*; for further information please consult the original document (UN 2012a:46 et seq.).

Table 4: Distribution of Staff of PSIDS and Selected Countries' Nationality at
the UN Headquarters (2013)[6]

Country	Total	Percentage of all staff
Australia	290	0.70
Fiji	**106**	**0.26**
Germany	513	1.24
Kiribati	**None**	
Marshall Islands	**None**	
FSM	1	>0.00
Nauru	**None**	
New Zealand	119	0.29
Palau	**None**	
PNG	**11**	**0.03**
Russia	569	1.38
Samoa	**11**	**0.03**
Solomon Islands	**2**	**>0.00**
Timor-Leste	**23**	**0.06**
Tonga	**3**	**0.01**
Tuvalu	**None**	
USA	2.865	6.51
Vanuatu	**2**	**>0.00**

Fiji's ambassador to the UN, Peter Thompson, regarded this move to be in-
dicative that the PSIDS are "*wanting to play their full part and assume their
rights and responsibilities*" (Radio New Zealand International 2011). The
renaming is mainly symbolic, but it may help the PSIDS to legitimize their
claims for stronger representation in international organizations.

The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

All PSIDS, including the Cook Islands and Niue, are members of the Alliance
of Small Island States (AOSIS), an international lobby-group that consists of
37 islands countries and like-minded coastal states. AOSIS, which regards

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[6]   Based on the Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Composition of the Secretariat
        2013 (A/68/356). The numbers only comprise staff at the secretariat and no soldiers de-
        ployed to UN Peacekeeping Missions. However, most Fijians working for the UN are in the
        secretariat's Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN 2013).

itself as the "negotiating voice for small island developing States (SIDS) within the United Nations system" (AOSIS 2014), was founded in 1990 with the explicit aim "to bring the issue of climate change to the international agenda" by speaking with a "unified voice" (Shibuya 2003:146). It hardly addresses any issues not related to climate change or environmental protection, though (Barnett/Campbell 2010:101f). The alliance is often regarded as a *moral voice* or an *international conscience* of climate change diplomacy (Barnett/Campbell 2010:101; Shibuya 2003:147). AOSIS represents a visible force in international climate change conferences and it has been argued that it was at least successful in affecting the negotiation process, shaping "the negotiations to a remarkable degree, much more so than the a priori power distribution would predict" (Betzold 2010:131, 143).

The G77 and Fiji's Chairmanship in 2013

One international alliance that recently came in the focus of the PSIDS is the Group of 77 (G77), which was founded in 1964 and consists of currently 133 developing nations. G77 is the most important international forum for economic development policy and attempts to counter-balance the major industrial countries. However, the very diverse membership that includes islands countries as well as oil-producing Arab states "make common policy positions difficult to forge" and frequently results in conflicts of interests within the group, especially concerning climate change (Karns/Mingst 2010:106, 107; see also Barnett/Campbell 2010:101). G77 seemed to be of little relevance to the Pacific until 2013, when Fiji took over the chairmanship of the organization. It was the first time that a PSIDS led such a significant international negotiation bloc, which comprises about two thirds of the UN members. After Fiji's chairmanship that convinced the Solomon-Islands and Kiribati to join the alliance, all PSIDS expect Palau and Tuvalu are members. This is especially remarkable, because the G77 is closely aligned with China

and some PSIDS (especially those that joined recently) are recognizing Taiwan. Palau was member of G77 from 2002 to 2004, but left the alliance disillusioned by heavily diverging opinions about climate change (Barnett/Campbell 2010:101). Fiji's chairmanship in 2013 resulted in Fiji's politicians and diplomats delivering many statements at the UN and other international fora on behalf of the group, which significantly increased the country's visibility in international politics. It hosted several international meetings and workshops, e.g. on the controversial issue of climate change, for G77 members both in Fiji and New York. Fiji was not always enthusiastically about the G77, though. In 1989 Fiji's Permanent Mission to the UN noted in its annual report that "it appears more appropriate for us [Fiji] to be part of the Group but not to be among its spokesmen", because of the group's "often anti-western" stance, "the extreme positions which have been pushed" and its often confrontational style of diplomacy (Fiji Mission 1989:160f)[7]. Fiji's commitment to G77 needs to be viewed in the context of its *Looking North Policy*, which attempts to reduce dependency on traditional allies like Australia and to strengthen ties with Asian countries like China. The magazine *Islands Business* stated correspondently: "*Fiji's appointment is an endorsement of the country's rising importance as perceived in international circles despite its ongoing political problems that have resulted in many international organizations like the Commonwealth and regional ones like the Pacific Islands Forum suspending its membership. This indeed sets the cat among the pigeons and regional and global hawks are unlikely to find this new endorsement palatable*" (Taga 2013:9).

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[7]   When reference is given to a PSIDS' 'Mission', this refers to the respective country's permanent mission to the UN.

Regional Organizations in International Politics

Next to the alliances on international level, also regional organizations from the Pacific are concerned with international politics. The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF; see Blatt in this volume), the most important regional decision-making body in Oceania, decides on many issues that are related to international organizations at its annual high-level meetings. For instance, endorsement and support was given to Australia's successful candidature for the UN Security Council for the term 2013-2014 and for New Zealand's candidature for 2015-2016. The PIF's secretariat holds observer status at the UN since 2004. While the PIF gained some prominence internationally – e.g. reflected by Ban Ki-moon's participation in the 2011 anniversary Forum meeting, but also by other recent high-level visits – the institution seems to have lost relevance to the PSIDS themselves. Especially after Fiji's suspension from the PIF in 2009, the number of joint PIF statements in international forums has declined significantly and the PSIDS look for forms of cooperation without Australia and New Zealand. Richard Herr and Anthony Bergin write from an Australian perspective that especially the recent rise of the informal PSIDS lobby group demonstrated Australia's "alienation from the FICs [Forum Islands Countries]", because "*[t]he increased prominence of PSIDS derives from the FICs' preference for a form of engagement that excludes Australia and New Zealand, which would be included in any discussion under the PIF banner*" (Herr/Bergin 2011:22, 23).

Prior to the 2014 election in Fiji there was some hope that the relations between Fiji on the one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other hand were to improve. The two larger states for instance lowered some of their sanctions, including travel bans for Fijian politicians, in the run-up to the elections. However, even though the PIF has lifted Fiji's suspension after the election in the country, the Fijian government refused to actively participate

in the organization again until reforms to limit Australian and New Zealand influence were implemented. Hence, there are currently no signs for a renaissance of the PIF in regard to the PICs international political activities. It rather seems that Fiji continues to prefer new channels of cooperation over the established structures of the PIF. This is most likely motivated by the presumption that Fiji can play a more dominant role in regional settings that exclude Australia and New Zealand and that it can better exploit own benefits from flexible international alliances. In fact, it is unlikely that Fiji will allow its traditional partners to take away its strengthened engagement at the international level that comes closely related to cooperation with many non-traditional partners, especially China (see McDougall in this volume).

Other Groups

Many PSIDS are members in other international organizations, like the Commonwealth of Nations or the World Bank, and in lobby groups, like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which largely overlaps with G77. The individual added value of membership in many different alliances to PSIDS is not always obvious, though. The often overlapping responsibilities and sometimes even contradicting positions of some alliances suggest that greater focus on a smaller number of alliances could lead to greater coherence and the spending of fewer resources in the PSIDS' foreign policies.

Prioritization

Due to their limited financial and material capacities, it is even more important for smaller than for larger states to set priorities in their international activities and to define prioritized policy fields. This can result in a focus on specific international organizations, as it becomes most evident in the case of the Cook Islands and Niue, which are members of a few specialized international institutions and regimes only. However, especially the issues that are of greatest relevance to the Pacific island states are decisive for their activities in

international organizations. With the exception of Fiji, which tries to address as many issues as possible to underline the country's desired image of being an influential global actor, the strategy of prioritizations is definitely applied by all PICs to varying degrees. Especially the smallest countries concentrate most resources on the issue of climate change, the generation of financial support and sustainable development. Table 5 on the following page shows some other important issues that were addressed by the PSIDS at the annual General Debates of the UN General Assembly from 2008 to 2013. The General Debate provides all UN member states with the opportunity to speak on those issues most relevant to them. It is also the occasion, when the states are usually not represented by diplomats, but by Heads of State or Government.

Climate Change

Climate change as the single most important issue is on the top of the PSIDS' agenda in nearly all international organizations. From the their point of view climate change is closely related to many other relevant issues, ranging from sustainable development to human rights and international security. Even though climate change is addressed most explicitly by the annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the PSIDS regard climate change as a cross-cutting issue and believe that it should be addressed by all 'relevant organs of the United Nations', including the General Assembly and the Security Council (Kiribati Government 2012:4). They argue that "*[t]he security implications of climate change pose a direct and very real threat to our sovereignty, survival and fundamental freedoms assured by the Charter of the United Nations*" (UN 2009:8). Hence they for example very actively participated as observers in a Security Council debate on climate change, which was initiated by Germany during its presidency over the Council in 2011, but produced no result beyond a presidential statement. Still the German initiative was strongly

embraced by many PSIDS, which was reflected in an increasing number of calls for a permanent German seat on the Security Council (e.g. Nauru Mission 2011:3). It is regarded as one of the major successes of the PSIDS grouping that the General Assembly after lengthy debate passed a PSIDS' resolution (A/RES/63/281) on 'Climate change and its possible security implication' in 2009 by consensus which became the first international document explicitly linking climate change and security (UN 2009).

Table 5: Issues Addressed by PSIDS at the UN, 2008 – 2013

	2013	2012	2011	2010	2009	2008
Climate Change	All PSIDS	All PSIDS	All PSIDS	All PSIDS	All PSIDS	All PSIDS
MDGs & SDGs	FJ, FSM, KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, PNG, SI, TON, TV, VAN	FJ, KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, PNG, SI, TON, TV, VAN	FJ, KIR, NAU, PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU	FJ, FSM, KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL. PNG, SI, TON, TV, VU	FSM, KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU	KIR, RMI, NAU. PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU
Fishing & Ocean Preversation	FJ, FSM, KIR, NAU, RMI, PAL, SI, TV	FJ, FSM, KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU	FJ, FSM, RMI, NAU, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, FJ	FJ, FSM, KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, SI, TV	FSM, KIR, PAL, SI, TON	FSM, PAL, KIR, SI
Decolonization	FJ, SI, VU	FJ, SI, TV, VU	FJ, SI, VU	F, VU	-	VU
Nuclear Testing	RMI, PNG, WS	RMI; PNG	RMI, PAL, PNG, VU	RMI, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, VU	WMI, PNG, WS, VU	-
Peacekeeping	FJ, PNG, WS	FJ, PAL, PNG, WS, SI	FJ, PNG, WS, SI, VU	FJ, PAL, WS, VU	FJ, PAL, PNG, WS	FJ, RMI, WS, VU
Terrorism	-	FSM, WS	FJ, WS, TV, VU	FJ, PNG, WS, VU	FJ, RMI	RMI, SI
Inclusion of Taiwan in UN System	KIR, RMI, PAL, SI, TV	KIR, RMI, PAL, SI, TV	KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, SI, TV	KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, SI, TV	KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, SI, TV	KIR, RMI, NAU, PAL, SI, TV
Reform of the UN	KIR, NAU, PAL, WS, SI	FSM, KIR, NAU, PNG, WS, SI, TV	RMI, NAU, PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU	FSM, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU	FSM, NAU, PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV, VU	FJ, FSM, RMI, NAU, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, TON, TV
Non-com-municable Dise-ases	FSM, PAL, PNG, TON	FSM	FJ, FSM, PNG, WS, SI, TON, VU	NAU, TON	-	-
Food Security	FSM, RMI, NAU, TON	FSM, NAU, PAL	KIR, PAL, WS, SI, VN	FSM, NAU, VU	FSM, KIR, NAU, WS, TV	FSM, NAU, WS, SI, TON, TV
Human Rights, Empowerment of Women	PAL, PNG, SI, TON, TV, VU	FJ, RMI, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, VU	FJ, FSM, PAL, PNG, WS, SI, VU	PAL, PNG, SI, TON, TV, VU	FJ, PAL, PNG, SI, TON, VU	FJ, PNG
FJ = Fiji, FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, KIR = Kiribati, RMI = Marshall islands, NAU = Nauru, PAL = Palau, PNG = Papua New Guinea, WS = Samoa, SI = Solomon Islands, TON = Tonga, TV = Tuvalu, VU = Vanuatu; MDGs = Millenium Development Goals, SDGs = Sustainable Development Goals						

Development & Sustainability

Next to climate change development policy, which is very often linked to the concept of sustainability, ranks high on the PSIDS' international agenda. Concerning development policy, the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the drafting of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the generation of financial support as well as fisheries and the exploitation and protection of maritime resources play an important role for the PSIDS. Especially the smallest PSIDS are frequently calling for the establishment of specific support measures for island countries within the UN system (e.g. Tuvalu Mission 2012:3; Nauru Mission 2012:5) and are smartly looking for ways to generate additional funds. This for instance includes membership in the UN's group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), which grants easier access to development assistance. Currently Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu belong to the LDCs, with some of the states, however, facing graduation from the category for several years. Samoa graduated in January 2014, after the UN General Assembly postponed the country's graduation that was originally scheduled for 2010 subsequent to a devastating tsunami in 2009 (Committee for Development Policy 2012:19; UN 2010). Tuvalu and Vanuatu were recommended for graduation in 2012, but struggle with this decision and Tuvalu regarded this recommendation as a "grave and untimely mistake" considering the special vulnerabilities of SIDS (UNOHRLLS 2012).[8]

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[8]   The Committee on Development Policy, a subsidiary body of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), reviews the eligibility of countries to be listed as LDCs according to three criteria every three years and recommends graduation to the ECOSOC; graduation finally comes into effect by a respective resolution of the General Assembly. Kiribati was also eligible for graduation in 2012, but has not been recommended for graduation yet, as it, unlike Tuvalu and Vanuatu, did not meet the graduation criteria in the previous review periods; Kiribati will be "considered for graduation at the next triennial review, in 2015" (Committee for Development Policy 2008, 2012).

Niche Policies: The case of Palau's Shark Protection Diplomacy

Theory argues that smaller states can establish themselves as champions in small policy niches (Henrikson 2005a:67 et seq.). One of the most demonstrative examples, related to maritime sustainability, is Palau's pioneering effort to drive forward the protection of sharks via international organizations. The World Future Council, which awarded Palau the Future Policy Award in 2014 for "outstanding maritime policy", argued that "Palau continues with its ambition to be a leader in shark conservation, by pushing for international regulation banning shark finning and trade of shark products" and serving as an example for other countries (World Future Council 2012:7 et seq.). Some other Pacific countries like the Federated States of Micronesia already joined Palau in establishing Shark Protection Zones and using international institutions like the UN General Assembly to call for international regulations in this so far a scantly filled niche (e.g. Palau Mission 2012:2; Radio New Zealand 2012).

Decolonization

The existence of non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Islands region leads most PSIDS to be vocal advocates of decolonization, fuelled by the fact that most PSIDS acquired independence comparatively late (Levine 2012:439). Several PSIDS are active members of the UN General Assembly's *Special Committee on Decolonization*, which annually sends an observer mission to New Caledonia in collaboration with the PIF and the sub-regional *Melanesian Spearhead Group* (MSG) (de Decker 2007:122). At the international level the case of New Caledonia has lost controversy since the territory was re-listed on the UN's list of non-self-governing territories in 1986, a step pushed by Fiji and other PSIDS (Fiji Mission 1989:156 et seq.). French Polynesia was re-listed in May 2013 after the General Assembly adopted a resolution (A/RES/67/265) sponsored by Nauru, Tuvalu and the Solomon Islands

and co-sponsored by further PSIDS. Even though the resolution was formally accepted by consensus, it provides an example for PSIDS resisting the opposition of powerful states, because France issued a letter of protest to its allies and boycotted the meeting. Germany, Great Britain, the United States of America (USA) and the Netherlands "disassociated themselves" through their statements from the consensus vote (Radio New Zealand International 2013a; Maclellan 2013).

Generally Vanuatu is known to be the strongest advocate for decolonization, being also the only PSIDS addressing the Indonesian-occupied West Papua at the UN (de Decker 2007:115; Hassall 2007:239; Mückler 2010:167). Especially in 2013 Vanuatu vocally urged the international community to take action to guarantee the rights of the people of West Papua, which according to Vanuatu's former Prime Minister Moana Carcasses Kalosil is neglected and ignored by the UN and even most of its Pacific neighbours (Vanuatu Mission 2013:4,5). This is about to change significantly, as there is currently going on a heated debate in the Pacific about a potential admission of West Papua to the sub-regional *Melanesian Spearhead Group* (MSG). The initiative has sparked broad public solidarity demonstrations in many Pacific countries, but also motivated Indonesia to start diplomatic efforts to frustrate a potential West-Papuan membership in the MSG that would provide a platform for greater international attention.

Nuclear Testing

The consequences of nuclear testing still pose the "first foreign policy issue" for the Marshall Islands, for which this issue is not only a "historical legacy", but "a contemporary reality for our local communities" (Marshall Islands Mission 2012:2). The country uses international fora to voice harsh criticism towards the USA and also the international community over this issue. The Marshall Islands as well as other PSIDS have sued the USA, France and other

nuclear powers in several legal procedures at the International Court of Justice (Radio New Zealand International 2014; Luck/Doyle 2004:100). The criticism of the Marshall Islands or e.g. Palau's clear anti-nuclear stance since independence[9] however manifest an antagonism in the policy of the three COFA countries that maintain *Compacts of Free Association* (COFAs) with the USA, namely the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau. In fact, they are the only PSIDS that have not signed the Treaty of Rarotonga that established a *South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone* and usually vote closely aligned with the USA (see below).

International Security Policy, the United Nations Security Council and Peacekeeping

Apart from Timor-Leste, there have been no major traditional security issues from the Pacific that were widely discussed in international organizations so far (see Schmitz in this volume). International security issues are most prominently discussed by the UN Security Council, the only international decision-making body that can make legally binding decisions and impose sanctions or military interventions to implement them. The Council briefly considered the political situations in Fiji after the coup d'états and unrests in 1987, 2000 and 2006 as well as the conflicts in the Solomon Islands, but agreed on no resolutions. The *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI, see Dinnen in this volume) was mandated by the PIF, but lacks a mandate by the Security Council, because no draft resolution was introduced to the body in fear of a Chinese veto in face of the Solomon Island's recognition of Taiwan (McDougall 2004:214). So far no PSIDS have been members in the Security

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[9]   After Palau was granted self-government, it decided to include a ban of any nuclear weapons, technologies or waste from its territory and waters in its constitution. The Palauan nuclear ban was a main reason for the late obtainment of full independence, as the people of Palau in six separate referenda refused the US-designed Compact of Free Association granting the USA the right to use Palau for nuclear related military activities (Hassall 2009:171, 172).

Council, which consists of 5 permanent members – the USA, China, Russia, Great Britain and France – and another ten members that are elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly according to geographical distribution (Africa: 3, Asia-Pacific: 2, Eastern Europe: 1, Latin American & Caribbean: 2, Western Europe: 1 + Western Europe or 'Other': 1). Papua New Guinea campaigned for a Security Council seat in 1975 and Fiji in 1970, 1971 and in 2011, when it officially still was listed on the ballot, but already withdrew its candidature in support of Pakistan prior to the election. In all cases, the two countries received only one single vote in favour (Security Council Report 2011:1, 2012:18, 31).

International security policy still matters for some PSIDS particularly in terms of international Peacekeeping Missions (see Table 6). Especially Fiji has a very long record of participation in many UN Peacekeeping Missions, which not only provides financial benefits to the country, but also shapes the its international reputation (Firth/Fraenkel, 2009:119, 120). In 2013 Fiji agreed to send more than 500 soldiers to the Golan Heights (while withdrawing some from less perilous missions) to replace European forces, which have been withdrawn due to the ascending risk created by the Syrian civil war (Fiji Sun 2013; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2014a). In April 2014 Fiji ranked 32 of all peacekeeping contributors, which is according to the country's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, "far beyond what is expected of a country of our size and level of development" (Fiji Mission 2012:3). It seems that participation in peacekeeping missions has become a deliberate strategy for Fiji to portray itself as a "good global citizen" that is prepared to carry global responsibilities and thus has a legitimate right to claim greater involvement in international politics.

Table 6: Contributions to UN Peacekeeping Missions (April 2014)[10]

Rank	Country	Contribution (Military & Police)
1	India	8132
32	**Fiji**	**768**
48	Germany	268
60	USA	140
64	Russia	112
81	Australia	49
91	**Samoa**	**16**
94	New Zealand	12
101	**Vanuatu**	**5**
110	**Palau**	**2**
107	**Timor-Leste**	**3**
118	**PNG**	**1**

Voting Behaviour

Most international institutions like the UN General Assembly base on the principle 'one state, one vote' and provide the PSIDS with formally equal voting power compared to larger states. The General Assembly takes most votes in consensus and only records the individual voting conduct of its member states in controversial votes. Table 8 shows some examples for PSIDS voting in controversial General Assembly votes. Looking at the voting behaviour of the PSIDS at the UN reveals that some of the Pacific states are amongst those countries most often being absent in General Assembly votes (see Table 7 on next page). This was especially true for Kiribati before it opened a permanent representation to the UN in 2013. The State Department of the United States of America annually issues an analysis of the voting behaviour of individual UN member states at the UN General Assembly, which provides not only information on the affinity of the PSIDS to the USA, but also on their general voting patterns. The voting behaviour of the PSIDS in international organizations and conferences show that the PSIDS relatively often do not vote as a unified bloc on issues that are not prioritized by them.

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[10]   As of April 2014; based on UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations 2014b.

This constitutes an obstacle to even more consistency and influence of the PSIDS and like-minded states. It also implies that they seldom vote in line with one single alliance of like-minded states such as AOSIS, but rather switch between different available alliances.

Table 7: Absences of PSIDS in Recorded General Assembly Votes, 2010-13[11]

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013
Total Rec. Votes	71	85	78	84
Fiji	2	0	1	1
FSM	15	19	21	17
Kiribati	67	81	77	8
Marshall Is.	5	11	18	10
Nauru	46	63	60	29
Palau	6	8	10	6
PNG	4	6	2	0
Samoa	3	7	0	1
Solomon Is.	0	3	1	1
Tonga	5	8	6	12
Tuvalu	3	25	8	8
Vanuatu	23	16	6	58

The COFA countries & the United States of America

On many issues that are not of high priority to PSIDS, their voting behaviour to varying degrees seems to be often even more influenced by larger actors than by membership in alliances of like-minded states. This is most striking for the three COFA countries, which in 2013 voted in 98.4% (Palau), 99.6% (FSM) and 93.6% (Marshall Islands) respectively in line with the USA (Table 9).

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[11] Since the data used is provided by the USA State Department (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014) the table as well as following numbers on recorded votes for data reasons only include those recorded votes in which the USA did not abstain.

Table 8: Voting by PSIDS on Selected Resolutions of the UN

Resolution (Symbol)	Fiji	FS Micronesia	Kiribati	Marshall Is.	Nauru	Palau	PNG	Samoa	Solomon Is.	Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Arms Trade Treaty A (A/RES/67/234A)	+	0	0	0	0	+	+	+	+	+	0	0
Arms Trade Treaty B (A/RES/67/234B)	/	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0
Status of Palestine in the United Nations (A/RES/67/19)	/	-	0	-	-	-	/	/	+	/	+	/
Sovereignty of Palestinian People (A/RES/67/229)	+	-	0	-	-	-	+	+	+	/	+	/
International Migration & Development (A/RES/67/158)	+	+	0	0	0	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Human Rights in Iran (A/RES/68/184)	/	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Moratorium on Death Penalty (A/RES/67/176)	/	+	0	+	+	+	/	+	/	-	+	+
Impact of Globalization on Human Rights (A/RES/68/168)	+	-	-	-	+	-	+	+	+	+	+	+
Refuges in Abkhazia & South Ossetia (A/RES/68/274)	/	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Economic & other activities affecting peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories (A/RES/68/88)	+	+	+	+	0	+	+	+	+	+	+	+

Table 8, cont.											
Resolution (Symbol)	Fiji	FS Micronesia	Kiribati	Marshall Is.	Nauru	Palau	PNG	Samoa	Solomon Is.	Tonga	Tuvalu	Vanuatu
Necessity of Ending US sanctions against Cuba (A/RES/68/8)	+	/	+	/	+	/	+	+	+	+	+	+
Human Rights in Syria (A/RES/68/182)	/	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
+ = in favour; - = against; / = abstention; 0 =absent												

This makes them over the last years next to Israel and Canada the closest allies of the USA at the General Assembly, which gets even more obvious in those votes considered to be most important by the USA, in which all three COFA countries like Israel had 100% coincidence with the USA since 2011 (US State Department 2012, 2013, 2014). The COFA countries and Nauru amount for more than half of all states that opposed a widely-discussed resolution on the status of Palestine (A/RES/67/19) in line with the USA and Israel in 2012. All other PSIDS with the exception of the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu abstained or were absent, whereas the large majority of the 193 UN members (138) voted in favour (Australia and Germany also abstained, New Zealand voted in favour). At the same time, it cannot be generalized that the COFA countries vote with the USA in virtually every vote, especially when issues directly affecting the states or moral questions (e.g. death penalty) are concerned. They for example jointly did not vote with the USA against a moratorium on death penalty in 2012 (A/RES/67/176) or on the annual resolutions on activities affecting peoples of the Non-Self-Governing Territories (e.g. A/RES/68/88).

Table 9: Voting Coincidence with the United States of America[12]

Year	2012		2013	
	Consensus + Recorded Votes	Recorded Votes Only	Consensus + Recorded Votes	Recorded Votes Only
Australia	92.6	71.0	95.1	80.9
Fiji	83.5	38.5	83.5	40.0
FSM	97.8	92.2	99.6	98.4
Germany	89.4	60.0	92.2	70.0
Kiribati	66.9	0.0	89.5	60.6
Marshall Is.	95.3	83.0	93.6	77.5
Nauru	90.5	68.8	92.1	72.0
New Zealand	90.1	55.2	90.4	63.9
Palau	99.1	96.7	98.4	94.4
PNG	87.1	47.4	87.7	52.2
Samoa	85.1	43.8	87.6	52.2
Solomon Is.	81.7	37.8	83.2	42.7
Tonga	87.9	50.9	89.6	57.9
Tuvalu	80.2	33.8	84.8	48.0
Vanuatu	84.2	40.0	83.8	18.8

Japan & the International Whaling Commission

Unlike the relationship between the COFA countries and the USA, which is (with a few exceptions) nearly comprehensive, most other influencing actors only shape PSIDS' voting behaviour on specific issues. A popular example are Japan's efforts to use development aid to 'convince' the PSIDS members of the *International Whaling Commission* (IWC), namely Kiribati, the Marshall-Islands, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, to regularly vote in line with Japan for the lifting of the commercial whaling ban (Baldacchino 2009:35). This is particularly delicate as these voting practices seem to

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[12]   Based on USA State Department 2013, 2014. In 2012 Kiribati participated in only 1 record-ed vote, in which it voted opposite to the USA. Also the comparatively low coincidence of Vanuatu with the USA in 2013 comes partly due to a large number of absences (see Table 7).

be contradictory to their claims for protection of oceans and marine eco-systems.

The Diplomatic Rivalry between China and Taiwan

As many observers have examined, the Pacific Islands region is one of the main locations for diplomatic rivalry and competition over diplomatic recognition between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan) (Shie 2010:47 et seq.; see McDougall in this volume). Even though it has been argued that recognition of one of the Chinese states has been subject to frequent switching (Shie 2010:148 et seq.; Hassall 2007:225, 240, 241), the number of PSIDS recognizing Taiwan, namely the Marshall-Islands, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Solomon-Islands and Tuvalu, has remained stable over the past years. The pro-Taiwan PSIDS regularly and prominently call for Taiwan's international recognition and membership in international organizations. However, they never directly criticize China, but rather try to come to terms with both actors (see Brady/Henderson 2010:194). Those states recognizing Taiwan sometimes suffer from negative impacts of Chinese influence, though. Not only lacks RAMSI, as lined out above, an international mandate, but as a permanent Security Council member China was also able to delay the vote about the applications of Nauru and Tuvalu to the UN. It however decided not to veto it, probably to not risk the support of other PSIDS and to avoid giving Taiwan an occasion to stirring up resentments against China (Shie 2010:149; Henderson 2001:151). Next to issues directly affecting the potential UN membership of Taiwan, the diplomatic rivalry seems hardly to affect PSIDS voting behaviour. On human rights issues the majority of the PSIDS, including those states aligned with Beijing, is regularly voting opposite to China. At the same time pro-Taiwan states entered the pro-China G77, which in the long-term may strengthen China's influence in the Pacific. China is of greatest value for Fiji, as cooperation with China is a pivotal element in Fiji's

strategy of disassociation with its traditional partners that goes hand in hand with its efforts to increase its global presence.

Diversification of International Cooperation

Using the UN as a platform to initiate and further relationships with various different actors, the PSIDS have diversified their international relationships particularly over the last years. Most of these collaborations are informal, flexible and focused only on a few issues, but generate new strategic options for the PSIDS. One excellent example is the collaboration with Arab League countries that has been introduced by Fiji and the United Arab Emirates, which has hosted several PSIDS meetings (Herr/Bergin 2011:21). However, the effects on PSIDS' voting, especially concerning Israel, seem to be limited so far. In 2014, also Turkey hosted a PSIDS meeting (Hurriyet 2014). Fiji has recently intensified its relations with some G77 members that have an arguable international reputation, including Iran and North Korea (Herr/Bergin 2011:21; Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). A longer history in contrast has the cooperation of many PSIDS with Cuba (e.g. Crocombe 2008:608; Herr/Bergin 2011:21). The Solomon Islands and Vanuatu are regularly joining "the international community in calling for the immediate lifting of the US economic and trade embargo against Cuba" (Solomon Islands Mission 2012:7), which was regarded as "long overdue" and, as the Prime Minister of Vanuatu, Sato Kilman Livtuvanu, stated, even "inhumane" (Vanuatu Mission 2011:10). Cuba hence provides another case of PICs opposition against larger countries such as the USA on some issues.

Confusion over Abkhazia & South Ossetia

Especially on issues that are far away from the PSIDS and of hardly any direct relevance to them, there sometimes seems to be no concerted region-wide policy and occasionally even a lack of national policy coordination. This becomes evident in the confusion over PSIDS' policies on the breakaway

regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which formally belong to Georgia, but, supported by Russia, claim independence (Herr/Bergin 2011:21). Particularly Nauru surprised the international community by recognizing the two territories, urging "a rapid and peaceful settlement to the situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia" (Nauru Mission 2012:5) and voting in line with Russia and a small number of other states against a resolution on refugees and internally displaced persons in these regions in subsequent years (e.g. A/RES/68/274). According to reports, also Tuvalu and Vanuatu recognized Abkhazia in 2011, but never voted in line with Russia on the respective resolutions, but with Georgia and most other PSIDS instead. Several statements by Vanuatu confirming or denying the establishment of relations respectively suggest that the country was unable to cope with the issue. In 2013 it finally admitted confusions and misunderstandings concerning Abkhazia and stressed that there were no formal ties, but Vanuatu by now even had plans to establish relations with Georgia instead (Radio New Zealand International 2013b; Herr/Bergin 2011:21). The Solomon Islands in contrast established diplomatic ties with Georgia in its 2011, explicitly welcoming aid contributions by that country (Solomon Islands 2011:3), but was among the few states voting in line with Russia opposing the annual resolution in 2011 and only abstaining in 2012, before finally voting in favour in 2013.

Prioritization, Coalition-building & Capacity-building strategies

The above-mentioned case provides an example for the absence of strategic behavior due to limited relevance to PSIDS. However, generally the PSIDS like many small states are neat users of strategies that help them to overcome some of the weaknesses of smallness and to influence negotiation processes and outcomes in international diplomacy. The most important strategies that have already been addressed above are the prioritization of the relevant policy fields in order to use the limited resources most meaningful and the pooling

of resources with other states by the formation of alliances with like-minded or dominant states. As aforementioned, the coordination of policies within the distinct PSIDS group and with like-minded states sometimes could be more focused to further reinforce the influence of the PSIDS on issues not directly affecting them. Next to cooperating with other nations small states can also increase their expertise and influence by using capacity-building strategies, which for example include the cooperation with institutional actors like secretariats or non-governmental organizations (Panke 2012a:315 et seq.; Deitelhoff/Walbott 2012:349 et seq.). Institutional cooperation has been boosted by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, whose visit to the Pacific in 2011 was described by the former Palauan President Johnson Toribiong as "a testament to the fact that the countries in our region, even the smallest and most vulnerable among us, have something important to contribute to our world" (Palau Mission 2011:6). Subsequent to the visit, Ban established annual high-level meetings with Pacific leaders and started to regularly issue joint statements with them (e.g. UN 2012b). Especially during the annual climate change conferences the PSIDS closely cooperate with NGOs, which not only provide additional resources, but also help them in raising public awareness and creating a positive image of the states (Panke 2012b:390).

Also the chairmanship over organizations or certain bodies "may increases visibility and multiplies the opportunities to launch arguments and frame debates" by "[s]etting the agenda, organizing meetings or distributing position papers and reports (Panke 2012b:396). Fiji's G77 chairmanship can be considered as a milestone in in this regard. Furthermore, Nauru currently acts as AOSIS chair, while Vanuatu, Samoa and Tuvalu were holding the position in the past. Having been absent from many important posts within the UN itself, the number of PSIDS serving e.g. as Vice-Presidents of the UN General Assembly has also slightly increased in recent years, most recognizably

revealed by the activities of Fiji's Ambassador to the UN Peter Thompson and the Palauan Ambassador Stuart Beck, who presided over the final vote on the important Arms Trade Treaty that was concluded in 2013.

Soft Power, Moral Argumentation, Institutionalization & Confrontation

According to constructivists the perception of a country, e.g. as a 'good' member of the international community, matters, because they view the international system not only as governed by physical power, but also by norms, beliefs and perceptions. The PSIDS actively use 'soft power'[13] like moral arguments to manage and shape the perceptions of others about the own state or a certain issue. While Fiji is very eager to be regarded as an influencing actor, underlined by frequent references to its peace-building commitment and supported by China, many other PSIDS still manifest the perception of them as being small for strategic reasons, including the generation of financial support (Browning 2006:273; Baldacchino 2009:31). This for instance becomes evident in the struggles of some PSIDS to preserve LDC status. All PSIDS, however, aptly use "discursive power resources" (Deitelhoff/Wallbott 2012:346) like moral arguments and metaphors to generate sympathy for their issues. It is remarkable to note that many PSIDS also employ 'religious arguments' and frequently refer to the Holy Bible in their statements in international organizations (e.g. Vanuatu Mission 2008:10; Marshall Islands Mission 2008:4).

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[13]   The concept of 'soft power' has been especially developed by Joseph Nye. It is based on the notion that a state cannot only "obtain the outcomes it wants" by using hard power resources such as military force or economic pressure, but also "because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it". A state thus can create influence via its culture, its political values and its foreign policy that may are regarded as endowed with legitimacy and moral authority. According to Nye, "[t]his soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them" by "set[ting] the agenda and attract[ing] others in world politics" instead of forcing "them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions" (Nye 2004:5).

It is argued that small states are particularly supportive of international law, because they lack capabilities and 'hard power' resources for power driven politics in an anarchic international environment that is not governed by institutional rules and norms (Rothstein 1968). The PSIDS regularly express their great support towards the UN, are reluctant to reforms of those organizations operating on the 'one state, one vote' principle and comparatively often consult the International Court of Justice. However, they are party of only comparatively few international treaties, especially in the field of human rights protection (Baird 2008:190 et seq.). This signifies that prioritization as a strategy seems to be of greater importance to the PSIDS than is their support for codification and institutionalization.

Even though the PSIDS generally tend to avoid embarrassing other actors especially when no distinct PSIDS interests are concerned, they sometimes strategically resort to confrontation and protest as means of diplomacy. Most popular is the case of Tuvalu's boycott of a session of the Conference of the Parties, which at least created significant attention and "was able to provoke a suspension of the meeting, seriously affecting the dynamics of the negotiation process" (Deitelhoff/Wallbott 2012:357).

Conclusions

It can be concluded that after being only that the PSIDS have become increasingly active members in international organizations and especially in the last years they have significantly boosted their participation in international diplomacy. Of course the PSIDS still do not constitute the most important or most powerful group within international organizations. But they are also not just powerless actors without any relevance to international decision-making. They claim their responsibilities and make clear that they no longer want to be ignored in international diplomacy. The PSIDS often remain neutral or conform with dominant actors on those issues of limited relevance to them,

especially in order to strategically safeguard financial support. But they also firmly represent their interests and do not obviate confrontation with powerful actors when it comes to prioritized issues. International organizations as well as different international actors attach rising attention to the PSIDS, which at the same time increase their foreign policy activities in international organizations. Particularly Fiji has pursuit a very active and sometimes aggressive international diplomacy that also affects Fiji's Pacific islands neighbors (see Ratuva in this volume). Chairing the G77 was convenient to Fiji's policy of increasing its visibility and activity at the global level, to its disengagement with Australia and New Zealand and its attempts to virtually demonstrate the independence of traditional partners by looking for new ways of cooperation. There are, obviously, still dependencies and external influences that strongly direct the behaviour of many PSIDS in international organizations. However, they increasingly diversify and become more flexible, increasing the choices of PSIDS and making them less dependent on only a few powerful actors. There have been many dynamics in the international diplomacy of the PSIDS in recent years, including the establishment of new diplomatic links, the admission to new organizations and lobby-groups, stronger cooperation on PSIDS level and many symbolic gestures that point to their rising prominence in international organizations. According to Christopher Browning, being regarded as "'small' is not an objective given, but a matter of negotiations" and of the behaviour of smaller states (Browning 2006:681). As the example of Fiji shows, smaller states do not need to stick to small state identity and suppliant behaviour towards larger states, but can reshape their image, if they decide to put some resources in their international activities and are ready to take some risks.

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Appendix:

Membership of PICs in international Organisations (obs. = observer)

	Melanesian Spearhead Group	SPC	PIF	Asia-Pacific Regional Group	G77	AOSIS	PSIDS
Australia		■	■	■			
Am. Samoa		■	obs.			obs.	
Cook I.		■	■	■		■	
Fiji	■	■	■	■	■	■	
French Polynesia			Associate member				
Guam		■	obs.			obs.	
Kiribati		■	■	■	■	■	■
Marshall I.		■	■	■	■	■	■
Micronesia		■	■	■	■	■	■
Nauru		■	■	■	■	■	■
New Caledonia	(FLNKS)	■	Associate member	■			
New Zealand		■	■	■			
Niue		■	■			■	
Norfolk							
Northern Mariana Islands		■	obs.				
Palau		■	■	■		■	■
PNG	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Pitcairn		■					
Samoa		■	■	■	■	■	■
Solomon I.	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Timor Leste			obs.	■	■	■	
Tokelau		■	Associate member				
Tonga		■	■	■	■	■	■
Tuvalu		■	■	■		■	■
Vanuatu	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Wallis and Futuna		■	obs.				

Structures

Shared Sovereignty in the South Pacific Region?

Eike Blitza[*]

Abstract: *Understanding sovereignty as the exclusive authority of a State within a given territory, the use of the term "shared sovereignty" may raise doubts due to its apparent contradictory nature. Sovereignty however is not a static but an evolutionary concept, leading to the consequence that today sovereignty should be viewed as having a relative rather than absolute nature. Relative in this regard means that the State is no longer exclusively competent to regulate certain matters, but must interact with other States or international organizations. This is where the term "shared sovereignty" comes into play, as it refers to instances in which sovereign States willingly transfer power to other States or international organizations. The concept of shared sovereignty is descriptive in nature and aims at providing a better understanding of the factual situation at hand, it is – as the following paper argues – not necessarily reflective of the legal situation.*

Keywords: Sovereignty, Shared Sovereignty, Pacific Island Forum, RAMSI, Associated States

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Introduction

Any assessment of the nature of sovereignty in international law must acknowledge that it is a difficult concept to grasp (Steinberger 2000:500ff; Giegerich 2011:603). Such difficulty can only be exacerbated in the attempt to make sense of 'shared sovereignty', as it appears a logical contradiction[1] to what one ordinarily associates with sovereignty: the exclusive authority of a State within a given territory (Besson 2012:366-391).

This definition of sovereignty is, however, insufficient, as it is not nuanced enough and neglects the fact that sovereignty is an evolutionary concept and thus subject to constant change (Schrijver 2000:65,70,98; Breuer 2013:747). In 1576, Jean Bodin refused to understand sovereignty in absolute terms, but saw it rather as something of a relative nature.[2] Accordingly, it can be seen that even at this early juncture the absolute nature of sovereignty was perceived by some as conceivably including the notion of shared authority.

However, in view of the prominence of the definition of sovereignty as exclusive authority over a defined territory, it is understandable that the concept of shared sovereignty is found by some to be astonishing or incomprehensible. The following paper therefore aims, taking the Pacific Islands States (PICs) as an example, to address this conceptual ambiguity by assessing its scope of application, as well as any inherent limitations in the use of the phrase 'shared sovereignty'.

An illustration focusing on PICs seems appropriate not only in view of the historic development of this area,[3] but also due to the fact that plans to

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[1]   Compare for this train of thought also Kahl 2000:436 and Schliesky 2004:530.
[2]   *Jean Bodin*, Les six Livres de la Republique (1981), I 8, III 4. Although it should be noted that this early understanding of the relative nature of sovereignty was influenced by considerations related to natural and divine law.
[3]   The New Hebrides (Vanuatu) were governed as a condominium by Britain and France, a form of administration under which sovereignty is only reserved with respect to nationals but not to the territory. See for further information Morrison 2013 and Kohen 2000:35, 41 et seq.

enhance integration[4] in the region have been repeatedly, and perhaps in an ill-considered manner, linked with the catchword 'shared sovereignty'.

Moreover, due to the fact that the term has also been used recently to describe situations of intensified development aid and support, and post-conflict constellations (Krasner 2004:1075; Daase 2011:493-522), one might well ask if the *Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands* (RAMSI) could be qualified as an instance of shared sovereignty.[5] In addition to the objective mentioned, the following text therefore aims to add to the terminological clarity of the concept.

Sovereignty – a concept open for development

Given the significance of State sovereignty in international law, it appears to be rather odd that the term is criticized for being so difficult to grasp and that it has been described as "the most glittering and controversial notion in the history, doctrine and practice of international law" (Steinberger 2000:500). Having said that, it seems to be exactly this formlessness – or put differently: its flexibility or openness - which ensures its persistence and rebuts its numerous but ultimately premature dirges (Oeter 2002:259, 275).

This becomes apparent if one considers that attempts to deny its relevance have mainly been based on a rigid understanding of sovereignty. For example, the attempt to apply a sociological understanding of sovereignty which defines it as the possibility of unlimited exercise of State authority renders it rather unsurprising that sovereignty in this form is nonexistent (Hillgruber 2002:1072f). It is obvious that such a conclusion is inadequate given how multifaceted the concept of sovereignty is. Moreover, even an understanding of sovereignty which builds on the supremacy and unlimited

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4   An example of such integrated efforts can be seen in the 2003 call for "pooled regional governance" by the former Australian Prime Minister John Howard which has been implemented in the 2005 Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration.

5   See *infra*, C.2.

authority of the State seems disputable. Both etymological and historical approaches clarify that sovereignty cannot be equated with "*Bindungslosigkeit*" or absolute freedom (Breuer 2013:747f) but is of a comparative nature, as it requires supremacy within a certain group, while not precluding the existence of higher authority outside that group (Dicke 1978:54f; Hillgruber 2002:1075).

Leaving aside the 19th century misconception of absolute sovereignty (ibid.), this phenomenon can be found in the consensus-based legal order of international law.[6] Our modern consensus-based system requires a relative understanding of sovereignty, as it is true that "[i]n a society composed of sovereign states, the law that regulates their relations is above them" (Kohen 2000:36).

When States transfer power to an international or supranational organisation, or if they oblige themselves to refrain from certain acts, this can be described as abstaining from the exercise of sovereignty in a certain field. It should not, however, be equated with its loss. This point is emphasised by Kohen when he points out: "What is repeatedly called the relinquishment or 'abandonment' of sovereignty should rather be perceived as an exercise of it: states are free to limit their jurisdiction, and to transfer part – even substantial parts – of their powers to other institutions."[7]

This quotation poses the question as to whether the transfer of authority has any substantive limitations: Is there a core of rights which cannot be transferred as to do so would risk 'losing sovereignty'?

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[6]   Independence "is really no more than the normal condition of states according to international law; it may also be described as <u>sovereignty (suprema potestas)</u>, or <u>external sovereignty</u>, by which is meant that the state has over it no other authority than that of international law", Permanent Court of Justice, Customs Régime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion, 5 September 1931, Series A/B, No. 41, 57 (dissent Anzilotti).

[7]   Kohen 2000:36, Permanent Court of Justice, SS Wimbledon, PCIJ Series A, No. 1, 25: "*the right of entering in international engagements is an attribute of state sovereignty*".

Building on this question, Seidel assumes a 'drain' of sovereignty, if essential rights which form the core of a State's independence, e.g. those related to the budget, are transferred without the power receiving entity being equally democratically legitimized (Seidel 2013:900; Herdegen 2008:220 MN 5).

In contrast, Hillgruber (2002:1076) does not focus on the existence of certain substantial powers (and whether they are still held by the State in question), but rather considers the 'Kompetenzkompetenz', i.e. the potential omnicompetence, to be decisive. This conclusion is convincing as sovereignty as such is not the subject of transfer, but rights that are theoretically retrievable are being temporarily transferred (Giegerich 2011:610). A State which has transferred authority does not forfeit its ability to act – even in the field of law in which it has transferred power - but merely risks breaching its obligations by nevertheless acting in this given field. A different conclusion can only be drawn in cases where a sovereign decides to transfer its sovereignty in order to become part of another State. In that case, it becomes part of a federation/federal State, a situation which is firmly associated with the abandonment of sovereignty.[8]

General international law does not make the surrender of sovereignty an easy undertaking, and this can be traced back to its wish to guarantee stability. National constitutions might, however, set stricter requirements when it comes to the transfer of power to another international legal subject. For example, the German Basic Law[9] contains a provision, Art. 79 (3), which renders certain powers resistant to any transfer – even in the case of constitutional amendments (Dreier 2006:1795, 1803)[10].

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[8]   For discussion of the distribution of sovereignty in federal States, see *infra*, C.1.
[9]   Basic Constutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949, BGBl. 1.
[10] See also BVerfGE 123, 267, 357.

The Notion of Shared Sovereignty

Previous considerations of this topic suggest that there is nothing like 'shared sovereignty', as a State, in transferring power, merely obliges itself not to exercise its sovereignty in certain given fields. Only in cases in which a people decide to become part of another State could one say that sovereignty itself (and not specific rights in a given field) is the subject of transfer. Thus, if only rights are subject to transfer in such situations, why is it that the term 'shared sovereignty' is nonetheless so often used to describe them?

Shared Sovereignty as a means to describe multi-layered political systems

An initial approach in explaining the concept of shared sovereignty may be found in considerations regarding relations between a federal State and its members. In view of the member States' participation in authority on the federal level and the fact that the federal State does not possess any authority independent from that of its member States, it has been assumed that in federal States sovereignty is being shared (Giegerich 2011:604f).

However, this understanding is problematic, a fact which becomes clear when considering a historical example concerning a dispute between a federal government and one of its member States. In 1828, the parliament of South Carolina rejected the implementation of federal tax law by unilaterally claiming the right to annul it. In so doing, it provoked the threat of military intervention by the then President, Andrew Jackson (see for further information Grimm 2009:54ff). Although this conflict was eventually resolved by peaceful means, it demonstrates the potential tensions which might arise due to a lack of clarity in the distribution of sovereignty. Furthermore, in Germany in course of the foundation of the Second Reich in 1871, the allocation of sovereignty became a contentious matter. Georg Waitz was of the view that the sharing of sovereignty between the federal State and its members was indeed possible, and, whilst this thesis was widely approved – particularly because it

allowed for the foundation of the empire without limiting the princes' power in a revolutionary manner – it was heavily criticized after the foundation of the Reich. For example, Paul Laband was of the view that sovereignty is of an absolute character and does not allow for enhancement or reduction. He believed that there can be no halved, shared, reduced, dependent or relative sovereignty, but merely sovereignty or the lack thereof (Laband 1901:68). This position became the established position, so that generally, in the case of federal States, sovereignty rests with the federation and not with the member States.[11]

In recent times, the idea of shared sovereignty is enjoying a renaissance of sorts, as it is being used to explain the allocation of authority in multi-layered political unions. Kahl considers such a model of a sovereignty division to be helpful, particularly for its ability to acknowledge the variety of centralized, layered actors that are equipped with authority in the broader sense (Kahl 2000:434). Pernice (2006:438, MN 22) agrees, arguing that in multi-layered systems, sovereignty can neither be considered to be merely with the transferring States nor with the power receiving entity. Randelzhofer (2004:157) and di Fabio[12] are of quite the opposite view, with the latter particularly emphasizing that, even in multi-layer political systems, the issue is not about sharing of sovereignty but rather a question of shared responsibility (di Fabio 2001:92). In light of the controversy surrounding the legal status of the concept of shared sovereignty, it seems preferable to understand it foremost as something descriptive, as a model to describe far-reaching transfers of power in multi-layer systems, a term which aims to describe a factual situation but not necessarily a legal one.

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[11]   In Switzerland, however the situation differs: the cantons are sovereign in so far as their sovereignty is not limited by the federal constitution (Grimm 2009:59).

[12]   Udo di Fabio 1998:124: "Im Staatenverbund ist souverän, wer das Recht des Austritts besitzt. Und das besitzen immer noch die Mitgliedstaaten".

Shared Sovereignty as a means of describing the distribution of powers in post-conflict (or alike) situations?

As mentioned previously, the ambiguity surrounding the concept of shared sovereignty does not merely follow from its lack of precision, but is also due to the fact that the term is used to refer to quite different scenarios. For example, Krasner proposed the use of the term to explain the distribution of powers in certain post-conflict situations. Proceeding from a three part understanding of sovereignty (Krasner 2004:1077)[13], i.e. international legal sovereignty (recognition of independent territorial entities with the freedom to decide independently on entering into international agreements), Westphalian sovereignty (the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory) and domestic sovereignty (supreme authority to regulate all matters within a given territory), Krasner (2004:1091) describes shared sovereignty as the use of international legal sovereignty at the expense of Westphalian sovereignty for the benefit of domestic sovereignty.

The scope of application of shared sovereignty as proposed by Krasner mainly applies to post-conflict (or alike) situations in which States are in need of foreign development aid and support in excess of what went before. If the assisting States take over authority in fields which are commonly considered to be part of the *domaine réservé*, or a right of veto is granted to them in particular sensitive areas, e.g. in important financial questions[14], States – in Krasner's opinion – then lack an important element of what amounts to sovereignty: Westphalian sovereignty, as other States are exercising elements of

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[13]   In an earlier paper he identified four different meanings in the usage of the term sovereignty. In addition to the three outlined above he also made reference to "*interdependence sovereignty*" and described it as the "ability of states to control movement across their borders" (Krasner 2001:17, 19).

[14]   For a recent example of a counter-signature obligation of the foreign expert group in Liberia, see Daase 2011:502.

it on their behalf. This, in turn, is held to justify referring to such post-conflict situations as ones of shared sovereignty.

However, this seems questionable if one considers that even in post-conflict missions – when based either on an explicit invitation, or relying on a contractual authorization in a founding treaty of an international organization[15] – the State concerned is agreeing to the help of other States, which otherwise would be contrary to the prohibition on intervention enshrined in the UN Charter.[16] Thus, the State is not giving up sovereignty but quite the contrary: in making such an agreement, it is actually exercising it.

Preliminary conclusion

In summary, it can be concluded that 'shared sovereignty' is better understood as a factual rather than a legal concept; describing the status quo, it aims to explain how sovereignty is exercised. On this understanding, the remainder of this chapter will assess if shared sovereignty may be used to refer to the distribution of power with regard to PICs.

Oceania: a region of shared sovereignty?

Shared Sovereignty as a consequence of enhanced integration?

The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) (see Blatt in this volume) is the institutional framework in the PICs integration process. The PIF came into being following a summit of the heads of State of Nauru, Samoa, Tongo, Fiji, the Cook Islands, Australia and New Zealand in 1971, in Wellington. Noteworthy is the fact that the PIF was not established by an international treaty but, as described by Shennia Spillane (2008:72f), "evolved in the 'Pacific way', from a decision to talk".

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[15]   See e.g., Art. 4 Constitutive Act of the African Union, 26 May 2001, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/23.15.
[16]   Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, UNTS 892, 119.

Accordingly, the PIF, or the South Pacific Forum as it was called until 1999, was a forum used to discuss, prepare and implement steps towards integration, rather than a legal subject equipped with competences deriving from powers transferred by the PICs. The reason for not providing the PIF with legal personality appears to stem from a deliberate decision of the heads of State, as they considered that the ability to enact binding decisions may have proved to be detrimental to the forum's work (Blatt 2011:25).

This holds true, as the PIF – despite its missing institutionalization – has produced a remarkable output. In 1972, the foundation of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-Operation was agreed on. Based on a founding treaty signed in 1973,[17] the Bureau for Economic Co-operation formed the institutional framework for trade negotiations between the PIF members (ibid:5). Moreover, the Pacific Forum Line, a regional shipping agency, commonly owned by the twelve participating States, was established to ensure a reliable link between them. The Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) was also established.

The FFA, similar to the Bureau for Economic Co-operation, was based on an international agreement and established as an international organization with its own – though very limited – competences, transferred to it by the founding States (Sutherland 1986:15-28). In essence, the FFA may be – in line with the intention of its members – described as a 'service agency' ("forum leaders generally expressed the view that the role of the agency should be confined to providing advice to forum governments"[18]). The FFA does not

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[17] Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation, 17 April 1973.
[18] Forum Document SPF(78)REP, 24.

have extensive rights in the field of fisheries and accordingly only marginally affects the sovereign rights of its members.[19]

Recently, the PIF Secretariat, the successor organization to the Bureau for Economic Co-operation, was founded and has led to an increase of cooperation in the PICs area. Explicitly equipped with legal personality, it was established to address a variety of new areas. Pursuant to Art. III of the Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, it is tasked "*to facilitate, develop and maintain co-operation and consultation between member governments on economic development, trade, transport, tourism, energy, telecommunications, legal, political, security and such other matters as the Forum may direct*"[20]. Despite this long list of assignments, the actual competences transferred to the Secretariat remain limited. So far, it only possesses independent competence in view of its depositary function[21] and is considered to be "competent authority" in the field of development aid (Blatt 2011:46, 52).

In view of the above considerations, it is clear that intergovernmental co-operation in the Oceania region does not fit the traditional description of shared sovereignty. It is not a political multi-layer system like the European Union, for example, in which it might be appropriate to speak of a situation of shared sovereignty in order to better grasp the factual situation. Even recent integration efforts, including the 2005 Pacific Plan and aim to base the work of the organization on four pillars (economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security, Graham 2008:19, 36), do not show such

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[19] See Sutherland 1986:18: "member States are obliged to inform the FFA in view certain measures taken in the field of fishery"; 23-24: "common register for fishing vessels".

[20] Art. III Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 30.10.2000, online: www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/about-us/agreement-establishing-forum-secretariat.html.

[21] For information on what sort of obligations are generally considered to be of a depositary nature, see UN OLA, Summary of Practice of Secretary General as Depositary of Multilateral Treaties, UN Doc. ST/LEG/7/Rev.1 (1999).

kind of enhanced integration which – even from a mere descriptive perspective – justify the label shared sovereignty.

Shared sovereignty as a consequence of intervention by invitation

As previously outlined, the concept of shared sovereignty is not only used as a descriptive means to explain the distribution of power in multi-layer political systems, but also is referred to in relation to post-conflict (or alike) situations. Taking Krasner's model of shared sovereignty as a basis, the following aims to assess whether the RAMSI intervention may be understood as an instance of shared sovereignty.

In light of civil unrest and increasing violence on the Solomon Islands leading to an overextension of local security forces (see Dinnen in this volume), in spring 2003 the Solomon government saw itself forced to ask the other PIF member states to help to restore law and order. The institutional basis for the RAMSI intervention was laid out in the Biketawa declaration.[22] Following negotiations, an agreement[23] was drawn up providing for the support of the Solomon security forces. Pursuant to Art. 2 of this *Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement*, the supporting States were authorized "*[to] deploy a Visiting Contingent of police forces, armed forces and other personnel to Solomon Islands to assist in the provision of security and safety to persons and property; maintain supplies and services essential to the life of the Solomon Islands community; prevent and suppress violence, intimidation and crime; support and develop Solomon Islands institutions; and generally to assist in the maintenance of law and order in Solomon Islands.*"

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[22]   Pacific Islands Forum, Biketawa Declaration, 28.10.2000, online at (retrieved 18.02.2014): http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/attachments/documents/Biketawa%20Declaratio n,%2028%20October%2020002.pdf.

[23]   Agreement between Solomon Islands, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa And Tonga Concerning the Operations and Status of the Police and Armed Forces and Other Personnel Deployed to Solomon Islands to Assist in the Restoration of Law and Order and Security [2003] PITSE 12 (Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement, online: http://www3.paclii.org/pits/en/treaty_database/2003/12.html (18 February 2014)).

If one subsumes these facts under Krasner's conception of shared sovereignty, then there are good reasons to speak of a situation of shared sovereignty. Foreign personnel were authorized to perform the sorts of functions usually exclusively carried out by sovereign States. This point is emphasised where the functions to be performed concerned sensitive matters that are commonly accepted to be part of a State's *domaine réservé*. This finding is supported if one considers the competences of the supporting forces deriving from the definition of the term 'assistance' in the Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement.

According to Art. 5 *Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement*, members of the *Participating Police Forces* (PPF) are in general only subordinated to the commands of the PPF[24] and are only obliged to respect their respective national laws.[25] Furthermore, they enjoy immunity in cases of statutory violations.[26] Based on Krasner's idea of shared sovereignty, this indeed appears to justify the description of a 'shared sovereignty' between the requesting and the supporting States. It is to be emphasized, however, that the model does not describe the legal situation but merely functions as a descriptive simplification of the situation at hand. By inviting foreign forces to aid them, the Solomon Islands exercised their sovereignty and neither shared nor forfeited it in any way.

Free Association as an instance of shared sovereignty?

Finally, the question of distribution of sovereignty with regard to associated States must be assessed, at which point it should be emphasized that a detailed discussion of this matter cannot be provided here, as it would go far

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[24]   Unless they are official members of the Solomon Islands Police Forces. In such cases they are subordinated to the command of the Police Commissioner after consultation with the head of the PPF.

[25]   Art. 5 (6) Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement.

[26]   Art. 10 (2) Solomon Islands Assistance Agreement.

beyond the scope of the current paper. The reason for providing an overview of sovereignty in relation to associated States is the ambiguity that exists surrounding their nature, especially in view of the distribution of sovereignty. Moreover, they are of particular relevance in a study that assesses sovereignty in the Pacific region due to the fact that five States[27] in that area are associated States.

Free association has been described as "a form of self-government developed in United Nations practice under which the associated entity has a special status short of independence, with certain functions (including international representation and defense) carried out by another State" (Crawford 2006:625). This is in line with a systematic interpretation of General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV), as 'free association' is mentioned – alongside emerging as a sovereign independent State and integration with an independent State – as a separate option for entities to realize their right to self-determination.

As an associated entity does not possess all competences usually possessed by sovereign States, it may well be asked if sovereignty in these instances is indeed shared with another State.

In contrast to the potential scenarios of shared sovereignty laid out before, the situation with regard to associated States differs, as they were never independent States with 'Kompetenzkompetenz' which then decided to transfer certain rights, but were as such only able to regulate certain aspects of what amounts to 'full' sovereignty. It has sometimes been argued that associated States do not possess legal personality, as they have no say with regards to their own foreign affairs and defense (Broderick 1968:368, 402). However, it might be appropriate here to recall the judgment of the International Court

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[27]   The Cook Islands and Niue are associated with New Zealand and the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau with the United States.

of Justice in the *Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco*, in which it held that a State remains sovereign despite having contractually obliged itself not to exercise certain rights, even if it amounts to "all of [its] international relations" (ICJ 1952:176, 188). Despite the differences, as e.g. the judgment was related to a protectorate and not an associated State, it may be concluded that a State, even after transferring such important competences as national defense or foreign affairs to another State, does not lose its legal personality but remains 'sovereign'. Thus, there are good reasons not to simply reject that an associated State may be sovereign. Rather, its status depends on the specific conditions laid down in the agreement which forms the basis for association but equally importantly its implementation (Crawford 2006:632). Instances in which the association was agreed to by the people concerned, and they are provided with substantial powers of self-governance without the possibility of interference by the State they are associated with, as well as a unilateral right to terminate the status of association, can all be seen as evidence for the proposition that associated States possess "substantial international personality […] in approximate to statehood" (ibid.:632-633).[28]

Similar to the conclusions reached with regards to the scenarios assessed above, referring to associated States as instances of "shared sovereignty" may be appropriate to better understand the factual situation, but does not necessarily reflect the legal situation.

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[28]   Due to political developments the Cook Islands may, e.g., "*for most purposes [...] be considered as independent*" (Crawford 2006:630). See also the Joint Centenary Declaration of 11 June 2001, in which the prime ministers of the Cook Islands and New Zealand jointly declared: "*In the conduct of its foreign affairs, the Cook Islands interact with the international community as a sovereign and independent State.*"

Conclusion

An essential criterion in regional integration processes is the transfer of rights to an international organization that is itself equipped with legal personality. However, this process does not, in contrast to what has been frequently stated[29], amount to a sharing of sovereignty. Rather, it is the (temporary) abstention from the exercise of the particular elements of sovereignty required to exercise the rights that have been transferred.[30] The renunciation of sovereignty as a logical prerequisite of an upwards distribution of sovereignty may only be assumed if a sovereign State decides to become a member State of a federation. Accordingly, statements connecting the transfer of some single sovereign rights with the term shared sovereignty are merely of a descriptive nature and, while they may hold some political force, do not affect the legal status of sovereign nations.

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[29]   Cf. only Graham 2008:27: "Regional integration, by its nature, requires some surrendering or sharing of national sovereignty".

[30]   Similarly European Court of Justice (1964), Case 6/64, Costa/E.N.E.L. ECR, 585, 593.

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Conflict Transformation, Sovereignty and State Building in New Caledonia

Peter Lindenmann

Abstract: *In New Caledonia, a former French colony in the South Pacific, the question of independence has created political strife and a situation of conflict in the 1980ies. The French authorities acted a series of statutes trying to define the difficult situation of a dependent territory 20,000 kilometres away from its European mother country in order to find an issue. Key to finding a political solution was the economic settlement on how to share the rich natural resources. The Noumea treaty that finally was signed between pro-independence parties, loyalists and the central state in 1998 has paved the road for an evolving emancipation of New Caledonia. Irreversible transfers of competences; joined by the training of adequate administrative personnel and the granting of the necessary funding have been among the means agreed to by the parties of the treaty to build up New Caledonian statehood. As the end of the treaty period draws near the New Caledonians are still divided about the question of independence and while the referendum that must be held during the legislation ending in 2018 looms, they must find a way to a shared and inclusive future. For this new ways to think about sovereignty, markers of political identity and citizenship are necessary.*

Keywords: decolonization, overseas territory, statebuilding, conflict transformation, statehood, non-self governing territories, fragility, economic development, independence, power sharing, sovereignty, identity markers

Figure 1: New Caledonia

Introduction

The French overseas territory of New Caledonia, situated in the South Pacific, some 2000 kilometres east of Australia is an often cited example for an alternative version of decolonisation and successful conflict transformation. In some versions of the story, New Caledonia is the luminous example proving the claim that a successful way out fragility and violent conflict is possible for former colonial territories. In other versions New Caledonia is the prime example for the on-going persistence of colonialism, one of the very few non-self governed territories still under the yoke of a European metropolitan power some 20,000 kilometres distant.

   Both versions neglect the agency of the local people, who have struggled with their situation as colonial subjects, transported convicts, deported rebels, internal migrants, invaders, contract workers, officials, officers and opportunity seekers ever since France took possession of the remote island group

161 years ago. Beside the Kanak, the original inhabitants of New Caledonia, the island population consists of the descendants of free settlers, transported convicts, deported rebels from Algeria and contract workers from former French and Dutch colonies in South East Asia. Furthermore there are migrant workers from other former and actual French possessions in the Pacific, some also present since several generations. Finally a large part of the current population consists of migrants from metropolitan France who came to New Caledonia in the last decades as teachers, public servants, military personnel and pensioners or for the nickel industry and stayed on. Local people largely undertake the lobbying for independence as well as for continuing a close relationship with France. While up to the 1990s the officials of the French state had a clear stance for New Caledonia to remain French, nowadays they are more ambivalent. This became clear when President Chirac forced the issue of freezing of the electorate for local elections only weeks before passing the presidency to his successor Nicolas Sarkozy (Chappell 2008:461). And even President Sarkozy, while visiting New Caledonia in 2011, stated that while he himself would favour New Caledonia to remain French, the decision for one of the possible options would belong to the local population eligible to vote in the final referendum (Chappell 2012:394).

The New Caledonian population on the other side is still much divided on the issue of independence. While a majority of the Kanak would probably vote for independence, a majority of the other population groups is likely to prefer a continuation of some kind of relationship with France. Because the non-kanak represent the majority of the inhabitants (around 60%), they are likely to tilt the balance against independence (Chappell 2011:476). On this condition all parameters of the coming referendum are highly controversial. This starts with the registration of voters, but also the timing of the vote, the exact formulation of the question to be asked as well as the choices offered to

voters. All these factors might be decisive for the outcome, are closely scruti-
nized by the different groups and are widely discussed among the local popu-
lation.

Some time ago two 'easy' solutions where proposed, the one to have a
"*referendum coupere*'", a quick nasty vote on a brutally formulated question
to ensure a "no to independence" from the majority of voters (Chappell
2009:354). The other option would have been again to push the referendum
forward a few years and prolong the period of transition for another decade
(Chappell 2009:354). Actually, however it looks like the referendum is to
take place as planned (Le Monde 26.7.2013). New Caledonians will be able
to vote on the future status of their island group somewhere in between 2014
and 2018.

In the meantime, New Caledonia while constitutionally still being a part
of France has been swept up in the commodity driven Asia-pacific economic
sphere. Most recent New Caledonian GDP per capita data shows it on pair
with the declining motherland and ahead of advanced neighbouring countries
such as New Zealand and Australia. These rapid changes in the economic
system have also to be taken into consideration while discussing political
issues (see Kowasch in this volume).

Conflict transformation

New Caledonia was torn apart by a violent conflict, verging on a situation of
civil war from about 1981 (murder of Pierre Declerq) to 1989 (assassination
of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwene Yeiwene) (Kurtovitch/Regnault
2002:166-168). New Caledonia had been a laboratory of status for overseas
territories since the end of WW II (15 statuses in 32 years; Angleviel 2006:
220). A succession of socialist, Gaullist and UDF[1] (centrist) administrations

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[1]   UDF: Union pour la Démocratie Française, French centrist party founded by former French
       president Valérie Giscard-D'Estaing.

had struggled with the problem of how to hold on to overseas territories in a world where colonialism was to be a thing of the past. When the struggle for independence turned violent in the 1980s, François Mitterrand, the first socialist President of the fifth Republic was just about to replace Valérie Giscard-d'Estaing as head of state. While still in opposition the socialist party had been in favour of New Caledonian independence (Garde 2001:12). But once in power their stance became more ambigous and a first try for a peace agreement at Nainville les Roches in 1983 (*statut Lemoine*) did not work out (ibid.). A second try, the *statut Fabius-Pisani* in 1985 was not implemented as the socialist government was overturned in 1986 (Leblic 2003:304). The incumbent Gaullist government headed by Jacques Chirac tried its hand twice in the short period from 1986-1988 (statut Pons I et II) but also to no avail (Garde 2001:14-16). The insurrectional situation turned for the worse during the presidential election of 1988 when Jacques Chirac, the acting prime minister, tried to wrestle the presidency from François Mitterrand. In between the two turns of the election a hostage situation on Ouvea Island became the last colonial massacre by the joint efforts of the French police and military. 19 young Kanak activists were killed, some during the liberation of the hostages and some under dubious conditions (Leblic 2003:305; Michalski 2004:15). The shockwaves created by this event enabled the newly elected socialist government to negotiate a new peace agreement in the aftermath. In May 1988 delegations of the loyalist RPCR[2] and the pro-independence FLNKS[3] where summoned to Paris where Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the charismatic leader of the independence movement and Jacques Lafleur, the founder of the main loyalist party and mining billionaire shook hands and signed together with prime-minister Michel Rocard the Matignon treaty (Leblic 2003:305). The

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[2]   RPCR: Rassemblement pour la Calédonie dans la république.
[3]   FLNKS: Front de libération nationale kanak et socialiste.

primary achievement of the Matignon treaty of 1988 was to put a stop on the violent and insurrectional situation in the country. It was decided to suspend answering the question on eventual independence for ten years and to dedicate these years to accelerated economic development, especially in the disadvantaged regions. Even the assassination of Jean-Marie Tjibaou and Yeiwéné Yeiwéné by a disappointed pro-independence hardliner on Ouvéa Island a year later was not able to derail the peace process (Angleviel 2006:225).

The first treaty also provided a set of new, made to measure, institutions and offices for a large part of the political cadres of both of the main political factions. The country was divided into provinces and these provinces received large competences. Their prerogatives comprised primary level health services, social services, land administration and urbanization, parts of the road network, agricultural extension services, economic development and tourism (Devaux 1997:869). Furthermore they even received so-called common law competences, meaning that all competences that were not regulated elsewhere were attributed automatically to the provinces (Pontier 2000:262). The provinces where designed in a way that pro-independence parties would probably control the northern and the island provinces, while the southern province including the capital Noumea would serve as a powerbase for the loyalists (Angleviel 2006:221). Furthermore a complex array of economic measures was put in place in order to further an equilibration in favour of the less developed Northern and Island provinces. These dispositions managed to move the struggle from the streets and villages of New Caledonia into the arena of the provincial and territorial councils.

Economic settlement

An important element of the settlement of the New Caledonian conflict was the insight that economic issues had to be addressed urgently, preferable even

before the definitive political agreement. Already in 1990 a former white-owned "little"[4] mining company, the *Société Minière du Pacifique Sud* (SMSP) was bought by the newly created Northern Province ruled by pro-independence parties (Carnuccini/Guillaud 1997:94). All of the three provinces created so-called mixed-economy societies, owned by them and a few selected shareholders and investing in various ways to further economic development (Kowasch 2010:177). The provinces thus became major economic actors in their own right, owning casinos, hotels, airlines, ferries, fishing vessel, but also aqua farms, a soap factory and a vanilla drying unit.

The FLNKS blocked discussions on a definitive peace agreement in 1996 until their conditions with regard to future economic development had been met. In the New Caledonian context this meant the future of Nickel mining. *ERAMET/SLN* and the French state agreed in 1997 to transfer mining rights of the Koniambo massive to the SMSP mining company. The SLN would receive the already operational SMSP mine at Poum in exchange. The so-called '*préalable minier*' was then lifted and the way to a definitive peace settlement, the Nouméa treaty of 1998, cleared (Garde 2001:158). The deal included a paragraph stating that the Koniambo massive would fall back to its original owner (*Eramet/SLN*) if the SMSP had not made a substantial commitment to the development of the resource within 10 years. André Dang, SMSP's general manager was able to strike a deal with the Canadian miner Falconbridge, since 2006 part of Glencore/Xstrata. SMSP would retain a 51% share in the Koniambo-project for contributing the resource and mining titles while Falconbridge got 49% and was to invest several billion dollars in order to build a new smelter in the north of New Caledonia (Kowasch 2010:91).

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[4]   Beside the giant Société Le Nickel with its smelter in Doniambo, right beside Nouméa's city centre, there always existed 'les petits miniers', small companies mining nickel ore in remote sites and selling the produce to SLN or exporting ore directly to smelters abroad.

The so-called 'Usine du Nord' started production in 2013 (LNC 12.4.2013). Meanwhile the village of Koné, formerly a rural backwater on the west coast that became the capital of the Northern Province in 1989, has grown into an economic beehive with the advent of the new nickel smelter built in nearby Vavouto.

No security sector reform

At the end of the conflict independence fighters as well as security forces were granted amnesty (Leblic 2003:305). The loosely structured armed groups on the pro-independence side all but disappeared. There was no disarmament, the (few) weapons literally disappeared into the nature and where never recovered. The French police and army remained as the only armed actor. There was however no reform of state security forces, only the numbers of army personnel present on the island declined slowly over the years after the Matignon treaty and the security measures became less strict as the level of threat as perceived by the French authorities declined.

According to French law the security sector is the reserved prerogative of the central state (Ventre 2002:31). As New Caledonia is still under French sovereignty, the security sector has never been reformed post conflict. Until New Caledonia will be independent the French authorities will continue to assume the responsibility for the police and the armed forces alone. New Caledonia is the primary staging point for the prepositioned French projection forces in the Asia-Pacific area (defence.gouv.fr). Military elements stationed in New Caledonia have been deployed in disaster relief to various Pacific Islands as well as for peace-enforcement to East Timor (troupesdemarine.org). Police functions in rural New Caledonia are still assumed by the French *Gendarmerie nati*onale, metropolitan officers are rotated on a four-year basis to the island. Only Nouméa, the capital, is in 'zone police' and hosts a contingent of *Police nationale*, also constituted mainly by French

officers. Only some of the gendarmerie and police personnel are hired locally. They either belong to the local cadre and cannot raise above a certain level in their career or the join the general force and will then serve all over France and its overseas possessions. New Caledonia is currently totalling about 3,000 French security personnel but reinforcements are ferried in and out as needed (nouvelle-caledonie.gouv.fr).

At the provincial as well as on the territorial level local authorities are trying to use niches such as environmental regulations, customary law, repossession and maritime security to implement embryos of local security forces controlling these sectors. The New Caledonian governments thus has installed a 'customary police' (pidp.org) and deployed a fishery patrol vessel (affmar.gouv.nc). The government of the Southern Province also deploys patrol boats in coastal waters and an environmental police controlling hunting regulations (province-sud.nc). Some municipalities, such as Nouméa, Bourail and most recently Canala employ municipal police agents, but under French law the '*Police municipal*' has very limited prerogatives (Ventre 2002:39f)[5]. Actually the also municipal fire brigades are much more effective as a security force for local needs From 1 January 2014 the competence for civil security has been transferred to New Caledonia. Disaster relief, the fight against bushfires and disease prevention will from now on be coordinated by the government of New Caledonia, not the High Commissioner anymore (nouvellecaledonie.la1ere.fr).

A second treaty

At the end of the Matignon treaty's ten-year period politicians from both side of the conflict refrained from holding the promised referendum and sought

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[5]   In France the Municipal Police is only competent to ensure the respect of the orders given by the mayor and the surveillance of public spaces. Law enforcement, judicial investigations and response to distress calls are reserved to the Police Nationale within city limits (only Nouméa) and the Gendarmerie in rural areas (noumea.nc)

another issue. They were wary that the outcome of this vote, likely to be in favour of continuing the relationship with France, would not resolve the issue and probably lead to further violence by the disappointed pro-independence fighters (Garde 2001:154-156). With the exception of Tjibaou and Yeiwéné largely the same cast as ten years earlier found a willing partner in the new socialist French government under Lionel Jospin that had come to power after an advanced election in 1997. Instead of the vote on independence, a second treaty, called the Nouméa treaty was signed in May 1998 (Leblic 2003:309). At the same time a the referendum was postponed for another fifteen to twenty years another promise of the Matignon treaty was held, as prime minister Jospin opened the new Tjibaou Cultural Centre in Nouméa (ibid.). The new treaty extended the period of transition for another twenty years. Only during the mandate of the local parliament elected in 2014 the first of three possible referendums on the question of self determination will be held (Garde 2001:91). But the new treaty also introduced some new elements. For the first time since the loi cadre of 1956 New Caledonia would have its own government headed by a President and not the High Commissioner. The New Caledonian parliament, the Congrès, would be joined by a second chamber of a sort. The already existant consultative customary council was to be upgraded to Sénat coutumier, with prerogatives to be consulted in all matters of kanak affairs and a competence to make propositions for laws (Garde 2001:236-238). In the time running up to the coming referendum essentially all non-regal competences were to be transferred to New Caledonia.

Transfer of competences

In order to bring government closer to the people and to prepare the New Caledonian authorities for greater autonomy and eventually independence, the Nouméa treaty prepared a schedule for the transfer of all non-regal competences to New Caledonia. Because of bad experiences with competences

reclaimed by the central state, especially during the gaullist era in the 60s and early 70s, as well during cohabitation between 1986 and 1988, the pro-independence coalition FLNKS demanded that all competences transferred would be so irrevocably (Page 2000:277). This guarantee was a condition that had to be negotiated during the series of talks preceding the conclusion of the treaty. The Noumea treaty thus states, that the transfer of the new competences would be irreversible (Pontier 2000:258).

New Caledonia has never been an incorporated part of France. This means that already as a colony and later as an overseas territory, New Caledonia always had been administered as a separate entity. All laws decided by the French parliament had to be extended by another act of parliament in order to be applicable in New Caledonia (Devaux 1997:117). This did not happen in all cases; sometimes on purpose and sometimes the territory was simply forgotten. As all colonies, New Caledonia always had a separate budget. Since 1900 the local assembly had a say in the matter of tax collection (Garde 2001:7). Taxes collected in New Caledonia had to cover local expenses; in the time up to the 1960ies the French state was very reluctant to provide monetary support to this very distant colony (ibid.). With the *Loi cadre* of 1956 New Caledonia had received additional competences and although some of them had been recalled by the '*Jacquinot*' (1963) and '*Billotte*' (1969) laws, the territory retained for example its own domain of public lands, its own social security system, a public works department and a separate land administration (Devaux 1997:26).

Immediately after the Nouméa treaty, further competences started to be transferred: Primary education, the ownership and the administration of the littoral, as well as natural resources with the exception of those necessary for nuclear power generation went to the provinces, whereas postal services and telecommunications high sea fisheries and the exclusive economic zone,

customs and the import of tobacco were attributed to the territory (trans-fertsdecompetences.gouv.nc). Other competences, such as police and security in maritime and air transport, the land reform agency ADRAF and the cultural agency ADCK were transferred at a later stage (ibid.). On 1 January 2014 civil security was transferred to the local government. Of the competences that could possibly be transferred the central state still retains secondary (to be transferred 2014) and tertiary education, control of local territorial entities (municipalities and provinces), civil law and administration of public funds.

Power sharing

The Noumea Treaty of 1998 contains an important element of power sharing. Between France and New Caledonia this includes the transfer of competences mentioned before. Within New Caledonia, power is shared between the Ka-nak who detain the original sovereignty and the other communities of the local population. Within the political sphere, power is shared between the different political blocs. Political parties have to surpass a limit of 5% of inscribed voters to be represented in parliament (Garde 2001:220). If they gain 5 seats or more, they can form a group and can then claim a seat in the local government. The seats in government are shared in proportion to the seats of the parliamentary groups. The government hands responsibility for sectors to individual members, but it is collectively responsible for decisions. All parties that have a group in parliament are thus represented in government (Garde 2001:245). The New Caledonian government is thus, very unlike the metropolitan French government, a permanent coalition were all citizens are represented. Early during the period of application of the Nouméa treaty, there where just two blocs, a minority pro-independence and a majority loyalist. Both blocs where represented in government but loyalists dominated the proceedings and controlled all important positions. Since the elections of 2004 however, when the loyalist faction started to split up into several

components, the setting has become much more complicated. The actual government comprises members of no less than seven parties, the UC[6], Palika[7] and Parti travailliste[8] on the pro-independence side and the Rassemblement UMP[9], Avenir ensemble[10], Calédonie Ensemble[11] and the MPC on the loyalist side. Furthermore the blocks are not as fix as they were and various parties have sided with others across the original division along the question of eventual independence, UC/Parti travailliste with RUMP and PALIKA with Calédonie ensemble (Chappell 2011:482). This has opened positions for pro-independence leaders; Rock Wamytan of the FLNKS was in this way elected to the presidency of the local parliament.

The power sharing agreement does however not extend to the lower level; these provisions do not apply to provinces and municipalities. In these institutions a mode of "the winner takes it all" still prevails. The winning party of an election still tend to retain a policy of excluding the minority party from the administration of the political entity. In 2011 however the power sharing agreement embodied within the government of New Caledonia collapsed over the issue of identity markers. Calédonie ensemble, one of the

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[6] Union Calédonienne: Oldest New Caledonian Party, member of the FLNKS, founded in the 1950s along the motto 'two colors – one people' (Angleviel 2006:33), originally autonomist but declared itself pro-independence in 1977 (Mrgudovic 2011:4). Controls the island province.

[7] Parti de libération kanak: Hard-line pro-independence party founded in the 1970s with a socialist agenda. Controls the Northern Province.

[8] Parti travailliste: Left-wing party that emerged out of the union movement.

[9] Rassemblement-UMP: New name of the former RPCR.

[10] Avenir ensemble: founded by dissidents of RPCR in 2004. AE managed to wrestle the Southern Province and the Government of New Caledonia from the RPCR in that year's election.

[11] Calédonie ensemble: The former president of the Southern Province and the Government of New Caledonia Philippe Gomés left AE in 2008 and founded his own party. Since the parlamentary elections of 2012 CE holds both seats of deputies from New Caledonia to the French parliament.
MPC: Latest addition to the plethora of local parties, Sonia Backes and Gaël Yanno created the Mouvement populaire calédonien in April 2013, after they split from the Rassemblement-UMP.

loyalist parties, used an instrument originally put in place to protect minority interest and pushed their members to resign repeatedly from their positions,

Figure 2: Political Parties in the New Caledonian Parliament

Party	Bloc of Parties	Congress	Government
Avenir Ensemble	Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France	2	1
Rassemblement-UMP	Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France	11	1
Calédonie Ensemble	Calédonie Ensemble	12	2
Union Calédonienne	Front Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS)	12	1
Parti travailliste		4	0
LMD	Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France	2	
UNI-Palika	UNI (Union nationale pour l'indépendance)	6	1
LKS		1	
Dynamik unitaire sud	FLNKS	1	
MPC		2	1
RDO			
MODEM	Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France	1	
Non-inscrits (not registered)		1	
UDC	Engagement pour une Calédonie dans la France	1	

thus forcing the demission of the entire government each time. The declared aim was to provoke advanced territorial elections with the issue of the two flags looming in the background (Mrgudovic 2011:13). Finally the local parliament had to ask the French national assembly to amend the organic law regulating the implementation of the Nouméa treaty in order to limit use of this strategy to once every 18 month to ensure some kind of continuity in government and to prevent it become hostage to party interest (Chappell 2012:392).

A recent paper of the committee instated to analyse the political future of the territory thus utters some doubts if the government in this form will be able to master the competences to be transferred in the future (Courtial et al. 2013:60).

The price to pay

Conflict transformation, however, came at a price. France invested huge sums in economic development and social welfare schemes in New Caledonia. Financial transfers from France to the island group were at 0.5 billion Euros annually in 1990 (TEC 2006) and have risen to 1.5 billion Euros in 2011 (not including the cost of security, pensions of French personnel and tax benefits) (TEC 2012:82). Furthermore France had to cede on quite a few of the core issues of French Republicanism, not the least equality. New Caledonians remain French citizens, French citizens who come to New Caledonia, however, are deprived of voting rights in local affairs, the body of electors for the local parliament has been 'frozen' to those present before 1998 and their descendants. In the case of the coming referendum on self-determination, the electorate is even limited to those present in 1988 and their descendants (Gohin 2000:390). The Kanak, the original inhabitants of these islands retain their separate civil law status (Demmer/Salomon 2013:63,64) and maintain system of chiefs and high-chiefs that has roots in tradition as well as in colonial policy. The new institutional framework included the creation of customary spheres created on mostly linguistically bases the where given a local customary council. Each customary sphere furthermore delegates two senators to the Customary Senate that enjoys some of the privileges of a second chamber of parliament[12] while being limited to the male composite of the Kanak part of the population.

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[12]   The customary senate must be consulted on all decisions with regard to kanak identity. It can also submit proposals on matters of kanak identity (Garde 2001:237,238).

Foreign relations

Part of the transfer of competences was also, that New Caledonia could become member in a regional organization in its own name, could conclude regional treaties and agreements on its own and even build up its own foreign affairs department.

New Caledonia is thus a full member of the South Pacific Community (SPC) and has become an associated member of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2006. Full membership in the Forum is under evaluation, but it is not France who is slowing the process but rather the other island states that are reluctant to accept a member that is not fully independent (Ministère des Outre-mers 2013:7). The case of the *Melanesian Spearhead Group* (MSG) is special, in the case of that regional organization the FLNKS is a member and represents New Caledonia. But the New Caledonian government is working toward a transfer of membership from the pro-independence movement to the territorial government (Chappell 2011:481).

The competence for external trade was among the first competences transferred to New Caledonia after conclusion of the Nouméa treaty in January 2000 (gouv.nc). In 2004 only an embryo of foreign affairs existed, a single counsellor preoccupied mainly by questions of trade policy. Today however, international relations have become an important portfolio within the local administration. New Caledonia has signed a convention with France in 2012 that defines the modalities of the stationing of representatives of the government of New Caledonia within French embassies and consular agencies in the region. A first 'delegate of New Caledonia' has taken up his position in the French embassy in New Zealand in 2012 and four other postings will be purveyed soon, in Australia, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea and Fiji (Ministère des Outre-mers 2013:9).

Identity markers

The issue of the so-called identity markers that could be adopted by New Caledonia as a concession of the Nouméa treaty proved to be thorny. Only the first three of them were relatively easy to agree on. A hymn, and a motto were chosen and the newly designed banking notes have recently been introduced (LNC 22.1.2014). Although the new hymn is far from a popular tune and most people would probably not be able to recite a single line, these topics where not utterly controversial. The name of the country and the flag however were a different matter. The issue of the flag is still unresolved sixteen years after signing the Nouméa treaty. While French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna and other French overseas territories have their own flags, some of them since quite a long time, there is still no agreement about the flag of New Caledonia. For the pro-independence parties, the issue was clear. They had created a flag for the future independent kanak state in the 1980ies already, the so-called '*drapeau kanaky*'. This flag was widely used during the fight for independence and the northern province as well as all municipalities headed by pro-independence mayors, used to deploy this flag beside their official buildings (Mclellan 2010:17). In 2011 the Pacific Games, a major sport event were to take place in New Caledonia. The unresolved issue of the flag became embarrassing as it was deemed inappropriate to welcome the fellow pacific islanders under the French republics tricolore (Mclellan 2010:17). Thus it was decided in Paris by then Prime Minister François Fillon to hoist the two flags, the tricolore and the drapeau kanaky side by side for the time being. Fillon, when visiting New Caledonia in 2010 assisted the hoisting of the drapeau kanaky in the precinct of the residence of the French High Commissioner in Nouméa (Mrgudovic 2011:12). For the pro-independence kanak, this looked very much like victory, that was exactly what they had fought for so long, seeing their flag flying in the garden of the governors mansion. The only

important question to remain was, according to them, when the other flag still flying beside theirs, would be taken down and put on a ship home. For the time being, that was exactly what shared sovereignty looked like, the two flags flying side by side (LNC 7.8.2010).

The loyalist's foot soldiers on the other side were fuming. But as the idea had originated with Pierre Frogier, a leading loyalist (Mrgudovic 2011:12), they could however not be too outspoken against it. The question gained momentum during July and August 2010 when first the southern province and then the New Caledonian government also hoisted the drapeau kanaky on their buildings in central Nouméa. At last also the municipalities had to conform to the new code and after a few suburbs had caved in, the flag of the independence movement was hoisted on Nouméa town hall. The mayor, a loyalist stalwart, refused to assist the ceremony and forced his deputy to conduct it. The municipality of Ouvéa island, a pro-independence fief, followed suit by declaring that out of solidarity they would hoist the French tricolore on their 'mairie' (town hall) for the first time in thirty years (LNC 28.7.2010). Only three loyalist municipalities in southern province remained steadfast and refused to fly the 'drapeau kanaky'. These west coast communities, Bourail, Moindou and La Foa argued that the Nouméa treaty called for a 'common flag' and as for them the 'drapeau kanaky' was a partisan flag connected with memories of civic unrest, violence and open defiance of republicanism it was unacceptable. The issue, apparently too connected with that of sovereignty and independence has so far eluded any resolution.

An important reason, why identity markers are difficult to agree on is the lack of a 'national' identity. Although a "New Caledonian-citizenship has been created by the Nouméa treaty" (Garde 2001:281), its definition is still incomplete. For the time, being a New Caledonian would comprise the right to vote in local (provincial) elections as well a preference for local people to

be considered in hiring. The differences however are also huge and continuously used to create divergence. The Kanak, due to the struggle against colonisation and for independence, are remarkably unified. There are disputes and disagreements, but across religions, languages and lifestyles there is some agreements what being Kanak means and that common traits are more important than differences. This is however not true for the other ethnic groups living in New Caledonia. The certainly is a Kanak nationalism and on the loyalist side especially the party Calédonie ensemble is trying to promote a Caledonian (settler?) nationalism, but loyalists are still too torn apart by allegiances toward France and New Caledonia that are not reconcilable in the end (see Carteron 2008).

Sovereignty

Another important trade-off was the notion off indivisible national sovereignty, very dear to the French conception of statehood. In classic French thinking, sovereignty was either absolute or not at all. Thus while the preamble of the French constitution of 1958 stated a right for 'free-determination' for overseas territories (TOM) (Mrgudovic 2012:87) and one African colony (Guinea-Conakry) attained independence by voting no on the referendum (Devaux 1997:19), all others, including New Caledonia had voted yes and thereby confirmed their status as a TOM an at the same time forfeiting sovereignty. There was no in-between. This perception had somewhat changed by the end of the 1990s as European integration progressed. In order to justify the forfeit of some elements of sovereignty to the common administration in Brussels (e.g. introduction of the Euro), constitutional jurists began to admit that sovereignty could also resume itself to a collection of competences (Haquet 2000:142).

It was within these wider discussions that issues for New Caledonia compatible with the French constitution where discussed at the end of the

application period of the Matignon treaties. As the new treaty should provide for and for and guarantee the best conditions to organise a referendum on self-determination (with the possibility of independence) between 2014 and 2018 (Mrgudovic 2012:91), the new dispositive had to come up with some creative solutions that finally made necessary changes to the French constitution. In the preparation for the constitutional amendments made necessary by the Nouméa treaty in 1998 the notion of undivided sovereignty had to be abandoned in order to proceed in a meaningful way (Haquet 2000:142). From then on, sovereignty became a divisible power to be shared by France and New Caledonia at least for the period of transition (Haquet 2000:145,147). Based on the acceptance that Kanak sovereignty preceded French sovereignty in New Caledonia sovereignty would be shared during the period of application of said treaty. However, France would share sovereignty in New Caledonia not only with the Kanak but also with the "other communities" (Mokkadem 2013:3). For the constitutional jurist Haquet, the guarantees of the Nouméa treaty were equivalent of a process of relinquishing sovereignty and have required the French constitutional bodies (Congrès and Conseil constitutionnel) to accept some remarkable exceptions to elementary principles of the French constitution (Haquet 2000:148). But in order for sovereignty to retain any value in today's world, it was considered necessary to perceive it from nowadays as the common wielding of competences by the central state and the emancipating territory (Haquet 2000:143).

An important part of the principle of shared sovereignty was thus the new repartition of competences (Page 2000:275). But this shared community manifests itself also in several other instances, among them the possibility of New Caledonia to adopt its own 'identity markers' (Mrgudovic 2012:98).

The fact that the New Caledonian parliament gained a normative power and is entitled to vote local laws within the bounds of its competences is also

perceived as marker of a shared sovereignty by some observers. Haquet (2000:148) insists that such an arrangement is only permissible within a federal conception of statehood and not compatible with the unitarian conception of France prevalent before 1998.

Conclusion

New Caledonia has not yet achieved full sovereignty from an international point of view. Its repeated applications for full member status in the Pacific Island Forum have thus been downturned again and again (see Chappell 2011:481, 2012:395). From the French perspective New Caledonia is a territorial entity of the Republic sui generis, with a unique status. However with this it does not stand alone, it was first in line, but because of reforms ongoing since 1998, there seem currently to exist as many different status as overseas territories under French sovereignty (Mrgudovic 2012:95)

It is important to state that not all the possibilities opened up by the Nouméa treaty have been exploited (c.f. Mrgudovic 2011:9). On the eve of a decision about the future status of the territory, the current arrangement of a large autonomy has not been pushed to its legal limit. Because of disagreement, infighting, jealousy and conservative opposition to change, the political actors in New Caledonia let some options of the shared sovereignty agreement pass by. Some of the planned transfers of competences have still not taken place. The personnel employed by the French state in New Caledonia has only diminished for about 300 personnel between 2005 and 2010 and has been on the rise in recent years. There is still no agreement on the flag and the name of the country.

On the other hand, and this is also important, New Caledonia has been put on its own trajectory with the Nouméa treaty and has constantly evolved in this direction. France has so far held true to its word and has encouraged and facilitated the territory's way towards emancipation. For a democratic

country with parliamentary elections every four years and presidential elections every five years, sticking to a (costly) policy for more than 16 years is a remarkable feat. Parliamentary majorities have changed twice in the meantime and it is the third president in power since the treaty has been signed. Inegality is however still rampant (Courtial 2013:11) and the economic equilibration between the different parts of the country is difficult to achieve.

For the future, the recent report of the parliamentary commission delegated to New Caledonia to investigate the possibilities draws four different scenarii. The first would be the classical independence similar to other former colonies (Courtial et al. 2013:22). In this case all ties to France would have to be cut and the new state would establish its own ties. New Caledonians would lose French citizenship and access to the metropolitan education system, the transfer of funds would stop and New Caledonia would have to create its own police corps. It would become a small pacific island state.

The second scenario depicts an 'independence-association' although the authors prefer the notion 'partnership' (Courtial et al. 2013:36). Some ties with France would be maintained, especially in the sectors of foreign affairs, defence, currency, etc. while New Caledonia would still become an independent country with the possibility to join regional organisation (Pacific Islands Forum) as well as the UN. A similar model was already proposed by the Pisani project in 1983 (Kurtovitch/Regnault 2002:167). However it is unclear under which circumstances New Caledonia would be perceived as independent by the UN and other Pacific Island states. The status of the Cook Islands is often cited as an example (Courtial et al. 2013:59).

A third variant would be an extended autonomy for New Caledonia, all non-regal competences transferred to the territory and only a part of foreign affairs, defence, justice and monetary policy remaining under French control (Courtial et al. 2013:50). This extended autonomy would however on the one

side not satisfy the demands of the pro-independence parties and on the other hand also engender a perpetuation of the financial transfers from France to New Caledonia while France would cede almost all control about how these moneys are to be used.

The last variant envisaged by the French commission was the maintaining of the status quo beyond the current treaty period (Courtial et al. 2013:61). Many current politicians in New Caledonia could probably live with such a scenario. But as several dispositions of the Nouméa treaty are strictly transitory in nature and where designed for furthering the emancipation of New Caledonia, it would difficult to maintain these within the framework of French constitutionality. Especially the dispositions concerning citizenship and voting rights where only considered acceptable because they were limited in time and were supposed to be replaced by the more equal definitive internal organisation of the new state being created (Courtial et al. 2013:55). Immigrants from France who have arrived after 1998 will have been deprived of voting rights in local affairs for up to twenty years by the end of the treaty period. While it is not imaginable to keep them disenfranchised for eternity, admitting them at once would marginalise the Kanak as well as the pro-independence vote.

Which of the four scenarios will come true is still unclear. But it is evident that ordinary solutions will never fit New Caledonia and that similar to the Matignon and the Nouméa treaty also the definitive solutions will have to be tailored to fit (Courtial et al. 2013:10). Or as Chappell (2011:41) puts it: "*Double legitimacy plus common destiny may yet produce dignity for all.*"

The next steps with regard to New Caledonian sovereignty are approaching fast: local elections were held in May 2014. The new local parliament will have to decide on the conditions with the first referendum to take place between 2014 and November 2018 (Courtial et al. 2013:82; Le Monde 26.7.13).

In the case that the New Caledonian population rejects the proposition of the referendum, a second and even a third vote could be demanded by a third of the members of the local parliament. The question of the future status of New Caledonia and the conclusion of the saga of the longest ever procedure of decolonisation is thus still some time away.

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Democracy in the Pacific: Tensions between "System and Life-world"

Graham Hassall[1]

Abstract: *This chapter draws on Habermas' concept of system and life-world (Habermas 1984) to understand the tensions in Pacific Island societies between culture and contemporary systems of constitutional democracy that have arisen as a consequence of the manner in which they were "introduced" and "received". It explores the view that the "systems" in place in Pacific states draw too little on the life-worlds of Pacific peoples, and are consequently unable to cope with the many conflicts manifest in these societies in recent decades. New approaches to public and political discourse and decision making will have to be crafted if more divisive confrontations are to be avoided.*

Keywords: System and Lifeworld, Democracy, Pacific Islands

This chapter draws on Habermas' concept of system and life-world (Habermas 1984) to understand the tensions in Pacific Island societies between culture and contemporary systems of constitutional democracy that have arisen as a consequence of the manner in which they were 'introduced' and 'received'. Habermas employs the terms 'system' and 'lifeworld' to describe the interrelated spheres within which human beings interact individually and collectively to achieve their strategic and collective interests through shared language and reasoning. By 'life-world' Habermas means the "intuitively present", the "unquestionable" or "unproblematic character" of everyday life, which has this quality when all actors within it are embedded in shared understandings that render explanations superfluous (ibid.:128f). By 'system' he means the rationalization or "structural differentiation" that brings order to events but consequently limits pure freedom to some extent or other. A society may value health care, for instance, but its decision to allow into formal schooling only those children who have been immunized, brings order and control to a realm of action formerly unrestrained: each such new imposition of a rule by the 'system' – no matter how solidly reasoned as being in the public interest – reduces the scope of the autonomous 'taken for granted' life-world.

Existing scholarship on democracy in the Pacific explores a similar notion, but without reference to Habermas' eloquent diagnostic frame (Habermas 1989). In describing the transfer of the Westminster form of constitutional democracy to the Pacific Islands as a "foreign flower" (Larmour 2005), for instance, Larmour suggests that 'systems' in Pacific context have emerged less from shared reasoning within the life-world, than they have been imposed from somewhere outside or beyond it. Rather than system encroaching on the life-world, as in Habermas' original formulation, the Pacific 'life-world(s)' (communal, local, and linguistically complete) had their 'systems'

displaced through colonial intervention and the influences of later modernity (individual, national, linguistically diverse). Indeed, Dinnen (2001) suggests that in the Pacific context, the impact has been so great as to "invert" the relation between 'system' and 'life-world'. Political and administrative systems, far from growing *out of / in relation to* Pacific lifeworlds, dominate them to the extent that they mediate the experience of everyday life.

This chapter therefore explores the view that the 'systems' in place in Pacific states – particularly those pertaining to the allocation and use of democratic power and authority – draw too little on the life-worlds of Pacific peoples, and are consequently unable to cope with the many conflicts manifest in these societies in recent decades. New approaches to public and political discourse and decision making will have to be crafted if more divisive confrontations are to be avoided.

In global context, conflict in the Pacific has not reached levels of significant concern[2]. Furthermore, since neither communism nor socialism took hold in the Pacific, the problems of democracy are not the same as those facing the 'new' and 'restored' democracies as discussed by Kanninen and Potomaki (Kanninen/Potomaki 2005). Nonetheless, political conflict in the region has cost lives, disrupted economies, and retarded human and social development, all of which have provoked debate concerning the suitability of modes of democracy in operation and the extent to which these have been accepted by Pacific peoples. There is much, indeed, given this formulation, to explore about the condition of democracy in Pacific Island countries, and

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[2]   The World Public Sector report for 2010 (UN 2010): *Reconstructing Public Administration after Conflict: Challenges, Practices and Lessons Learned*, figure on 'violent conflicts of high intensity in 2007' (p. 4) includes no Pacific states.

about the prospects that introduced systems have to assist these societies work
through their conflicts and realize their aspirations[3].

There are some twenty independent and dependent states[4] in the Pacific
Islands region, and a sizeable literature on conflict and post-conflict Pacific
Island states has focused on the origins/causes of conflict, methods/prospects
for resolution, and programs for post-conflict rehabilitation, and naturally
considers the roles of history, culture, politics, law, economics, and environ-
ment as factors triggering conflict, or responding to it[5]. Although commonly
identified with the three broad cultural groupings of Melanesia, Polynesia,
and Micronesia, a broader survey than the current chapter would include
conflict over political status experienced in the French Territories (New Cale-
donia and French Polynesia) and the Strategic Trust territories in the North
Pacific (Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of the Marshall
Islands). It would note, too, intra-island conflicts in the Marquesas, Wallis
and Futuna, Tuvalu, and Kiribati.

The islands of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Tonga
share some common characteristics, and the next section of this chapter ex-
amines their recent experience with democracy, conflict, system and life-
world[6]. In an earlier period, each of these four countries experienced coloni-
zation or the spectre of it: Fiji's chiefs ceded the islands to Great Britain
(1876); Solomon Islands was annexed by Britain as a protectorate (1893);

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[3] Reilly has asserted that the Pacific's troubles herald the "Africanization" of the Pacific
     (Reilly 2000) – a charge rebutted by Fraenkel (2004).
[4] The Pacific Islands region includes some twelve 'independent states' as well as a number of
     additional states and territories with either voluntary or involuntary dependency on another
     political authority. The Pacific Islands Forum comprises 14 Island state members (plus Aus-
     tralia and New Zealand). The South Pacific Community, in contrast, includes 22 member
     'countries'.
[5] An overview of Peace and conflict in the Pacific region is provided in Henderson/Watson
     (2005); see also Brown (2007).
[6] Vanuatu is not considered in this chapter, as it has been written about elsewhere: see Hassall
     (2007).

Papua New Guinea experienced Australian and German colonial occupation and subsequently trusteeship status under the League of Nations (to 1946) and then the United Nations (1946-1975); whilst Tonga warded off British or German annexation through promulgation in 1875 of a Constitutional Monarchy and in 1900 acquiescing to British protectorate status. Sovereign independence came to these countries in 1970 (Fiji and Tonga); 1975 (Papua New Guinea) and 1978 (Solomon Islands).

All four countries are archipelagos, requiring intricate geo-governance of small islands with varying degrees of linguistic and ethnic diversity: the significant variations of the Melanesian peoples of Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands; the blended Melanesian and Polynesian traditions of Fiji; and the less ethnically diverse but more socially stratified Polynesian and chiefly culture of Tonga.

Each of the four states has experienced significant division in recent times. Fiji has experienced four coups, the first two in 1987 seeking to further entrench the interests of the Fijian community at the cost of the interests of Indo-Fijians whose forebears were brought to work the cane-fields during the colonial era, and the most recent in 2006 purportedly to *end* such Fijian ethnic nationalism (see Ratuva and Ernst in this volume). Papua New Guinea has faced a number of separatist and secessionist movements, the most destructive being a civil war on Bougainville (see Böge in this volume) that concluded with constitutional change but no resolution of fundamental grievances, but others also, fuelled by grievances and claims in Papua, Manus, New Britain, and various highlands provinces. Solomon Islands experienced the virtual collapse of civilian government in 1998-2000 when the people of Guadalcanal vented long-standing frustrations focused on migrants from outer islands, notably Malaita (see Dinnen in this volume). Lastly, Tonga's seat of government in Nuku'alofa was razed in 2006 by rioting pro-democracy protesters

angered by parliament's failure to approve constitutional changes before concluding that year's final session.

These commonalities of unrest aside, the four states differ in significant ways. Most notably, the mode of hereditary chiefly authority in the Polynesian societies of Fiji and Tonga creates a markedly different context for democratic processes and for the resolution of conflict than those of Melanesian Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands – where continuing (patriarchal) "big-man" cultures have impact not only on democratic politics and conflict resolution but also on issues of gender. The recent experience of democracy in each of these countries will now be examined in brief.

Fiji

This chapter need not rehearse the story of Fiji-Indo-Fijian rivalry in the lead-up to and following independence[7]. Suffice say both the independence constitution of 1970 and the constitution as revised in 1990 entrenched Fijian interests in both houses of parliament and other constitutional offices and institutions as well as through perpetual ownership of land. Of immediate relevance is the apparent failure of these arrangements to satisfy all classes of Fijian society, such that the dissent that fuelled a civilian coup of 2000 and the military coup of 2006 grew *within* the ranks of Fijians, who were willing to back radical elements in their quest for what they regarded as social and economic justice (Hassall 2009:73-93). Grievances concerned access to land and rents more than they concerned political and civil rights -since all Fijian

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[7] Both prior to and following independence the main political contest in Fiji appeared to concern the rights of the ethnic Fijians, as owners of the land original inhabitants of the Fijian archipelago, and the immigrant Indians, who had entered the colony as indentured labourers but who had emerged within several decades as the drivers of commerce and as a population equal in number to the indigenous community. Although a political understanding always existed between leaders of the two communities that the Indians accepted political subjugation in exchange for economic dominance, the perceived emergence of 'Indian-dominated' governments in 1987 and 2000 were used effectively by Fijian nationalists to re-assert Fijian hegemony. The literature is immense, but an excellent overview of the constitutional arrangements is provided by Ghai/Cottrell (2007:639-669)

land is owned communally and has for the most part been exploited by tenant farmers under contracts mediated on behalf of landowners by the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB – renamed after 2006 the i-Taukei Land Trust Board) in a manner that increasing numbers of ordinary Fijians resented. In brief, the Board persisted with a patronising approach to land-owners: instructing them who to lease their land to, for how long, and for which purposes; determining the profit allocations due to both the land-owning groups and the tenants; distributing proceeds through each clan's chief in accordance with a formula dating to the 1940s; and apparently keeping considerable profit for its own use[8]. Thus whilst the Indo-Fijian farmer was often made the target of resentment, other targets also emerged.

Rapid urbanization has brought approximately 50% of Fijians out of their villages into urban and peri-urban areas, where many prefer life as unemployed or under-employed squatters (an even greater proportion of all Indo-Fijians are urban-dwellers, some in the upper and middle classes, but all too many in settlements). Failure by successive democratically elected governments to address complex matters of land ownership and use, to establish minimum wage rates, or to develop urban infrastructure; the multiplying number of scandals involving abuse of public money; allegations of electoral fraud; allocation of contracts and projects to favoured partners and provincial councils; and political in-fighting at the expense of parliamentary performance – appear to have dented the average Fijian's commitment to parliamentary democracy (scheduled for restoration by the military regime in 2014).

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[8]   The board is required to collect rent and distribute them to landowning units according to a formula: NLTB 25%; Head of vanua (Turaga ni Taukei) 3.75%; Head of yavusa (Turaga ni Qali) 7.5%; Head of mataqali (Turaga ni Mataqali) 11.25%; and Members of mataqali 52.5%.

The Indo-Fijian community, for its part, voted with its feet and emigrated in ever-larger numbers to Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and elsewhere, thus ever-reducing the threat (real or imagined) to Fijian sovereignty. In 2006 the Fijian military, sensing a crisis of confidence in Fiji's democratic system and opposed to the Qarase government's overtly pro-Fijian policies and draft legislation (and driven additionally by factors not addressed here), usurped power on the pretext of protecting the integrity of the nation and with a view to engineering change to the social, political and economic order. In the face of political opposition from within the country, the Pacific Islands Forum, and particular sections of the international community, the 'interim government' mapped out a new political order for 'post-ethnic' Fiji through a combined strategy of suppression of all sentiment of opposition and orchestrated public dialogue with cooperative individuals and organizations. Opposing views put by NGOs, human rights advocates, the media, prominent chiefs, the Methodist Church, academia, and the legal community, were suppressed through public emergency regulations backed up as necessary by physical and verbal intimidation. Public servants and politicians were silenced in part through the establishment of an 'Independent Commission Against Corruption' which commenced a review of citizens' grievances against the public sector, as well as through appointment of a 'Public Accounts Committee' to review reports from the Office of the Auditor General which a lackadaisical parliament had failed to read.

Public servants were tasked to write a 'state of the nation' report for tabling before a regime-appointed National Council for Building a Better Fiji, which produced in December 2008 a 'People's Charter for Change, Peace and Progress'[9]. A 2008 legal challenge in the High Court by ousted Prime

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[9]   See http://www.fijipeoplescharter.com.fj/finalcharter.pdf

Minister Laisenia Qarase, originally dismissed but upheld by the Court of Appeal's judgement of April 2009, resulted in immediate abrogation of the 1990 constitution and reversion to rule by military decree[10]. Bainimarama allowed a 'President's Political Dialogue Forum' with ousted political party leaders to proceed in March 2009 before announcing the suspension of further talks in favour of a dialogue process excluding all former members of parliament and a 'roadmap' that would see a new constitution written in 2012 and general elections held in 2014.

In 2012 a Constitutional Commission chaired by Professor Yash Ghai completed its work and submitted a draft constitution to the administration, which promptly dismissed the Commission, rejected its draft, cancelled a scheduled constituent assembly, and promulgated its preferred version.

Despite the regime's appeal to the international community to understand the Fijian context and the need for change, no solution to the decline of the sugar industry and therefore the economy as a whole, and human rights abuses have persisted. Furthermore, Fiji's situation has split the unity of the Pacific states and slowed the evolution of Pacific regionalism.

Solomon Islands

Solomon Islands' independence in 1978 was accompanied by a threat from its Western Division to 'break away' (Larmour 1982; Premdas et al. 1984). The critical issue then, as later, was a concern in remote provinces at being left out of development planning and flow of resources. The parliament struggled for two decades to find an acceptable balance between national and provincial powers, and the people of Guadalcanal province (site of the nation's capital city Honiara), became increasingly vocal about the impact of migration and other developments on their land. What followed was a complete breakdown

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[10]   Decrees are online at http://www.fiji.gov.fj

of the national government's authority, violent confrontation between militant groups from Guadalcanal and Malaita, a regional quasi-military intervention and establishment of a 'parallel machinery of government', restoration of rule of law, and a drawn-out constitutional exercise yet to provide the country with an enduring constitutional solution.

The country has deliberated the merits of switching to a federal model since independence. Whereas the Mamaloni review of 1987 did not result in any change (Solomon Islands 1987), the review exercise started by the Kemakeza government in 2002 and which continued through the Sogavare and Sikua governments produced a draft federal constitution, fully deliberated on in 2007-08 by a 32-member Constitutional Congress – but which again resulted in no change, having been halted toward the end of 2009 through lack of operational funds and due to the onset of preparations for parliamentary elections in 2010.

In the absence of effective constitutional review, the heads of the Solomon Islands' nine provinces recommended in 1999 that the national constitution and the *Provincial Government Act 1996* be reviewed. The Malaita and Guadalcanal Provincial Governments had threatened secession at the time of its passage, and in 1997 the Guadalcanal government had made a successful legal challenge. It now sought compensation for the national government's use of land in and near Honiara but tensions between landowners and settlers from outer islands became violent, and in June 1999 the government invoked a state of emergency[11]. At the height of the anarchy the courts continued to operate, although members of the judiciary were intimidated and in some cases physically attacked (ICJ 2002:328-335). The treasury was plundered.

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[11] The military activities of the Isatabu Freedom Fighters (IFF) resulted in the departure of at least 10,000 Malaitans – although they also disrupted the economic and political stability of the entire country.

Numerous atrocities were committed. Although Commonwealth special en-
voy to Solomon Islands, former Prime Minister of Fiji Sitiveni Rabuka, nego-
tiated a peace accord, violence continued and the factors underlying the con-
flict remained unaddressed. On 5 June 2000 members of the Malaita Eagle
Force, along with a faction of police officers, detained Prime Minister
Ulufa'alu and demanded his resignation, which was submitted on 13 June.
Twenty-three days later a new government was formed under Prime Minister
Manasseh Sogavare.

The 15 October 2000 'Townsville Peace Agreement' (TPA) brokered
with Australian assistance addressed issues of amnesties, weapons disposals,
compensation, constitutional amendment, economic development, reconcilia-
tion, peace monitoring; and implementation[12]. More than one decade on,
however, there remains a widespread perception amongst Solomon Islanders
that the Peace Agreement was far from comprehensive and that much remains
to be done to ensure justice is administered to those involved in unlawful
activities during 1999-2003 (i.e. activities not covered by the amnesty provi-
sions of the TPA). Following restoration of rule of law, successive govern-
ments focused on national reconciliation at both grass-roots and elite levels,
on compensation rituals and payments, on constitutional reform, on improv-
ing the institutions of government, and reinvigorating the economy and civil
society[13]. Under the watchful eye of the *Regional Assistance Mission to Sol-
omon Islands* (RAMSI), the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, and such

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[12]   It should be noted that ousted Prime Minister Bart Ulufa'alu promoted a different view of the
       conflict, acknowledging the deep-felt frustrations on Guadalcanal, but regarded these as the
       channel used by his political opponents to remove him from power in an operation that esca-
       lated out of their control. Good summaries of the conflict to 2001 are presented by Böge
       (2001) and Hegarty (2001). In 2004 the UNDP commissioned a "peace and conflict devel-
       opment analysis" for Solomon Islands United Nations Development Programme (2004):
       'Solomon Islands Peace and Conflict Development Analysis: Emerging Priorities in
       Preventing Future Violent Conflict'. Other studies focus on the economic impacts of the con-
       flict (Friesen 2002).
[13]   Comparative lessons on intervention are discussed by Chopra/Hohe 2004:289-305.

international agencies as UNDP and IMF, government revenues increased, parliamentary performance strengthened, and accountability increased. Following close consideration of international experience, the government established in 2009 a *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* to assist the country's population deal with the traumas inflicted on it during the period of ethnic conflict. The Commission's 2012 report was not made public until its chair, frustrated at such lack of transparency, unofficially released in 2013.

Papua New Guinea

Of the four countries under consideration in this chapter, Papua New Guinea is the most violent, volatile …and democratic. It is also distinguished from its neighbours by the extent of its natural resources – gold, copper, zinc, oil, timber, fisheries, and most recently, natural gas. Prior to the imposition of state law, individual communities bore responsibility for enforcement of their interests and rights and many continue to do so regardless of legality. Volatility and violence are thus endemic to the young nation's numerous life-worlds, and a constant occurrence, whether in the activities of 'raskol gangs' in urban areas and settlements, or in the 'tribal-fights' that continue in highlands provinces (Rumsey 2009:1-14).

Papua New Guinea's volatility includes struggle between central and provincial leaders for control of the state power and resources, as expressed in constant legislative change, legal challenge, and constitutional debate. Struggle over the status of Bougainville, where the large Panguna open-cut copper mine is located, is a case in point. In 1976, one year after independence, Bougainville's threat to secede from the young nation resulted in a constitutional amendment that introduced a system of provincial government. Over the ensuing two decades, however, provincial leaders and some land-owning groups continued to nurse grievances about self-determination, revenue sharing, and environmental degradation.

Conflict erupted in November 1988, the PNGDF landed on the island in March 1989 and the central government declared a state of emergency in June[14]. Some thirty written agreements were signed by the warring parties between 1989 and 2001 in an effort to end the conflict[15]. Finally, in the *Bougainville Peace Agreement* the parties agreed to peace terms: (1) a high level of autonomy for Bougainville; (2) the holding of a referendum on independence; (3) constitutional changes required to recognize these decisions and arrangements; (4) weapons disposal; (5) security personnel dispersal; and (6) arrangements for peace monitoring.

A Constitutional Commission worked 2002-04 (Carl/Garasu 2002) to draft a constitution for the Autonomous Province of Bougainville (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004), and changes to the Constitution of Papua New Guinea were agreed to by the National Parliament in December 2004, in time for elections on Bougainville the following year[16]. The resulting Bougainville constitution allocates three parliamentary seats for women (one each for north, south and central Bougainville) – a figure significantly lower than the ten originally proposed – but an allocation that nonetheless recognizes the significant role women played in the peace process as a whole. The constitution also provides three seats for ex-combatants – a provision that expires at such time as a vote on independence takes place.

A comparative note can be made about similarities in the circumstances of Bougainville and Solomon Islands – two Pacific contexts in which

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[14] A state of emergency was declared in North Solomons Province on 26 June 1989, and recommended a continuation of the state of emergency: National Parliament, Statement No. 2 of the Permanent Parliamentary Committee on National Emergency relating to the declaration of a state of emergency on Monday, 26 June 1989 in the Bougainville Province, 1989.

[15] The handling of the Bougainville crisis by the Chan and Wingti governments is assessed by May 1997. A good overview of the period 1997 to 2002 is in Regan 2002:114-129.

[16] In writing this section the author is grateful to the following informants for interviews on Buka in 2005: Joseph Watawi, Nick Peniah, Buka (7 April); Joel Banam, the late Sir James Fraser, Peter Sohia, Chris Siriosi, interviewed in Buka (8 April).

constitutional exercises have followed violent conflict. Whereas in the case of Bougainville, the *Bougainville Peace Agreement* became embedded in Papua New Law and provided a legal framework for the establishment of the Constitution of the Autonomous Province of Bougainville, the *peace agreements* that concluded conflict in Solomon Islands did not create law, and on-going efforts toward reconciliation appear to be parallel to, rather than part of, constitutional reform.

At the same time that a particular solution was being sought for Bougainville, sweeping reforms were also being made to the structure of provincial and local-level governments in the rest of the country. A *National Executive Council* (NEC) 2007 taskforce on *Government and administration* outlined three options for reform at sub-national level: (1) retain the existing three-tiered legislative system and making only incremental change; (2) change to a two-tiered legislative system that includes a Provincial Governor but removed from the National Parliament; and (3) change to a two-tiered legislative system that retains provincial electorates, removes the provincial members from the existing parliament and creates a senate comprising male and female representatives from each province (Hollaway 2008) – with a modified option two prevailing.

Papua New Guinea's electoral system and parliamentary practice have also undergone reform. There are now 111 Members of Parliament, including 91 in open constituencies and 20 whose occupancy of *regional* seats renders them simultaneously members of the national parliament and Governors of their province. In the lead up to independence, the formation of political parties was encouraged as a means of activating democratic culture in the political institutions of the new state. Yet despite considerable efforts at *political engineering*, parties are more often associated with the business aspirations and interests of political personalities and regional groupings than with the

concerns of *political publics*. Very few women have been elected as Members of Parliament, and UNIFEM's 2009 advocacy for *temporary special measures* to provide dedicated seats for women provoked considerable public and parliamentary debate but failed to achieve the necessary legislative change.

The parliament is based on Westminster but its proceedings are much influenced by the volatility of the nation's politics and political parties. Many governments have been removed by votes of no confidence, which have demonstrated the fragility of party loyalties and hindered the executive's desire to call sessions. Laws were passed limiting use of a no-confidence vote to after the first 18 months of a new parliament and no later than 12 months prior to the next national election, locking members of parliament into their membership of one or other political party, and placing sanctions on resignation from a party or voting across party lines in an effort to keep MPs loyal to party in matters of budget approval, confidence, and election of the Prime Minister. However whilst this law was credited with providing political stability it also received considerable scrutiny (Kalinoe 2009:160-168) and was challenged in Supreme Court reference No 11 of 2008.

In a judgement of July 2010 the Court struck down ten of the Organic Law's major provisions, which in effect restored to the individual MP freedom in matters of thought, expression, and association. The impact of this decision was felt immediately, with three members of Cabinet, including the Deputy Prime Minister, defecting to the opposition and instigating a confidence motion which, although put on the floor of parliament on 21 July, was thwarted when the speaker abruptly adjourned parliament until 16 November, leaving incomplete such important matters as installation of a new head of state and considerable uncertainty about the adequacy of parliamentary

procedures[17]. To a certain degree, government business continued in the midst of this political jousting. The Government launched the *PNG Development Strategy Plan 2010-2030* which set 20-year targets for economic growth, job creation, crime reduction, land development, and tax revenue.

Most significantly, a concerted effort was made to develop the plan internally, without reliance on international agencies or experts, so as to signal the maturation of Papua New Guinea's development planning capabilities. However, the government's attention was once again diverted, by a recommendation made by the Ombudsman Commission to the Public Prosecutor in late 2010 that Prime Minister Michael Somare faces a Leadership Tribunal for failure over many years to lodge statements of income as constitutionally required. The Public Prosecutor's decision that the Tribunal proceed caused the Prime Minister to temporarily step down and stimulated public discussion of rumoured and proven instances of favouritism and corruption to increase[18]. At a time when a Liquid Natural Gas project implemented by ExxonMobil has commenced pumping billions of kina into government revenues, Papua New Guinea remains *off track* in efforts to meet its Millennium Development Goals commitments (Banks 2008:23-34).

Tonga

Events have been equally eventful in Tonga. A pro-democracy movement emerged in the 1980s seeking change to political arrangements established in the Tongan constitution of 1875. King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV reigned from 1965 until his death in September 2006 and the process of constitutional change was no doubt made easier by the clear statements of Tonga's new

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[17]   On 10 December the Supreme Court ruled the Governor General's election invalid and called on Parliament to meet within 40 days to elect a head of state by constitutionally correct procedures.

[18]   At the time of writing a Leadership Tribunal has been appointed but is yet to meet, and the Public Prosecutor responsible for authorising the referral removed from Office.

king, Siaosi Tupou V, approving a shift toward more democratic rule. In 2006 a *National Committee of the Kingdom of Tonga on Political Reform* reported to parliament its findings on consultation with Tongans domestically and abroad but the parliament failed to endorse proposed changes before rising in late November - a decision that provoked unrest and resulted in the capital of Nuku'alofa being razed in four hours of mayhem. Despite the loss of life, buildings, and reputation as a peaceful tourist destination, Tonga's evolution toward more democratic government continued on the slow and deliberative path that had been agreed by all parties in broad. In 2008 a *Constitutional and Electoral Commission* was established and in 2009 a five-person *Political Reform Commission* was appointed by the Privy Council which by year's end had made 82 recommendations for change. Most significant among these were that the King and Privy Council would no longer be part of the Executive Government; that the King would no longer have power to appoint the Prime Minister or ministers to office; and that the King could only appoint the Prime Minister on the advice of the Legislative Assembly.

The Parliament agreed to the Commission's major changes which included removal of multi-member seats and of seats appointed by the monarch, an increase in the number of people's representatives from nine to seventeen, and continuation of the election of nine noble representatives. Although the *Friendly Islands Democracy Party* (FIDP) won 12 of the 17 popularly elected seats in the November 2010 under the revised voting system,[19] this was two short of a majority in the 26-member parliament, and since all five 'independents' sided with the nobles, Lord Tu'ivakano was elected Prime Minister. When Tu'ivakano awarded just two of the government's eleven ministries to

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[19]   Constitutional and Electoral Reform in 2010 increased the number of popularly elected members of parliament from 9 to 17, whilst the number of nobles elected by their peers remained at 9.

the democratic party, and appointed two ministers from outside parliament[20], FIDP leader Akilisi Pohiva, who had been appointed health minister, resigned in protest, leaving in cabinet just one member of the party, Isileli Pulu (as Minister for Tourism). The democratic system has been reformed, the people have voted at general elections (albeit with a minority of seats reserved for the aristocracy) – and the nobles have retained their hold on government.

   Parallel to this transformation of political process has been legal process to deliver justice in the aftermath of the nation's works man-made disaster. On 5 August 2009 a ferry named *Princess Ashika* sank in Tongan waters with the loss of 74 lives, all women and children. In the face of public outcry, an embattled Tongan government had little choice but to establish a commission of inquiry into the tragedy. The commission's report, tabled with the king and parliament on 31 March 2010 and freely available on the internet before its formal release to the Tongan public, found *Princess Ashika* to be a "scandalous maritime disaster" that was avoidable because the ship was "unquestionably unseaworthy and in an appalling condition" and should never have been allowed to sail. It further found that the chief executive of the shipping company had no experience with maritime safety but did have a vested interest in the SCP acquiring another vessel and recommended that he face manslaughter charges. Although the executive argued that he was acting under political pressure from the Sevele government, no politicians were charged (although Lord Dalgety avoided indictments on a technicality, when the court ruled that the instruments had not been properly signed and dated by the prosecutor).

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[20]   Dr Ana Taufe'ulungaki, former academic and member of the *Political Reform Commission*, was appointed Minister of Education, Women's Affairs and Culture; and William Clive Edwards, who had served in a number of previous cabinets, was appointed Minister for Public Enterprises and Revenue Collection.

The *Princess Ashika'*s purchase, sinking, inquiry, and public response[21], pro-
vide an instructive entry-point to consideration of democracy not only in
Tonga but in nearby Pacific Island countries. It coincided with the concluding
phases of a 20 year struggle for constitutional change, involving the delibera-
tion of a constitutional review panel on proposals for Tonga's future political
arrangements. It symbolizes the complacency about public interest that can
accompany entrenchment in power. The boat was not seaworthy and should
not have been purchased let alone used: these facts eluded a system in which
few levels of accountability or due diligence were observed. For several dec-
ades an elite group of nobles and the monarchy resisted the demands of a pro-
democracy grouping that seeks their curtailment if not complete abandon-
ment. The constitutional reforms and the abrupt public management lessons
provided by the *Ashika* sinking will presumably have some impact on how
Tonga's leaders plan for its future[22].

Democracy, Constitutionalism and Deliberative Democracy

The first section of this paper reviewed some recent issues facing four Pacific
island countries. It now turns to consideration of how their democratic and
constitutional foundations were established, together with observations on
prospects for change.

Democracy exists when a society freely constitutes itself, not merely in
accordance with a set of rules, but with intent to converse with itself and
others on issues that matter collectively, and in a manner that results in learn-
ing and some sense of forward progress. This conception of democracy thus
has formative, discursive and purposeful aspects, and may be constituted at

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[21] Expatriate Tongans in New Zealand stated they are ready to 'bear arms' to fight for the
      establishment of democracy in Tonga (TVNZ 2010).
[22] Letter to the editor, Matangi Tonga: "*Tonga is getting to be the capital of corrupted officials
      that never learn. From selling of Tongan passports, Tongan Jester disappears with Tonga's
      Million Dollar Investments, Civil Servant strikes, Burning of Nuku'alofa and now the MV
      Ashika. What is next?*"

various geo-political levels: from local, through to provincial, national, regional, and global. Steiner et al have drawn on Habermas to explain *"(…) deliberative politics means that the actions of the participating actors are not coordinated via egocentric calculations of success, but through acts of common understanding and agreement. Actors pursue their individual goals with the expectation that they are able to share the definition of the situation and thus can coordinate their actions. This process may need much time, and ideally deliberation should have no fixed end point but should be allowed to continue for as long as it takes to find agreement. Furthermore, when agreement is found it has to be considered as fallible and can therefore always be put in question by new and better arguments"* (Steiner et al. 2004:27) [23] [24].

In considering the development of democracy in the Pacific Islands, especially as this relates to constitutionalism and the prospects of deliberative democracy, significant issues include the key role of constitutional dialogue in the resolution of conflict and the strengthening of democratic culture, the significance of electoral processes in determining voter preferences; the need for caution in positioning political parties as aggregators of voter preferences; the importance of parliaments as the home of democratic discourse; and the significance of continuing development assistance to both civil society and government entities.

It was noted at the outset that most systems of democracy were introduced to the Pacific Islands at the time of independence, on the basis of minimal public discussion amongst either society at large or its intelligentsia. The origins of some constraints were historically determined. Traditionally,

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[23]   Habermas (1996) would call these the 'illocutionary obligations' of communicative freedom.
[24]   Habermas has proposed that discourse that establishes 'general validity' must fulfil three conditions: 1) Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse; 2) everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever; 3) everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs, no speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2) (Weinshall 2003:28).

villages were constituted to meet the needs of communities as a whole; the interests of individuals were constrained by the interests of the collective (Narokobi 1980). The social and political constitution was focused on relatively small-scale communities. The sphere of political authority corresponded with the sphere of the moral universe. The shift away from small scale, local communities, toward larger political, social and economic formations occurred through compulsion rather than consent – but ironically, as Larmour points out, with a touch of reluctance on the part of the colonizers: "*The colonial process of transfer was not a simple one of imposition. Writing about British policy for decolonization, Lee found 'little genuine enthusiasm for exporting 'the Westminster model' to countries which lacked the presence of British settlers.'*"[25] British colonies tended to be governed by a flexible version of royal prerogative. 'Westminster' took place far away. The system of government that was imposed by colonial rule was that of the District Commissioner, and later, the functional department. Legislatures were established, with narrow franchises, but a defining feature of 'Westminster' – an executive chosen from the legislature – was an imposition of decolonization rather than colonization. Some of the pressure for it came from the international community into which the former colony emerged" (Larmour 2001:3; see also Larmour 2002:39-54).

In the case of Pacific Islands' jurisdictions, a majority of the constitutional exercises have sought devolution and better regulation of politics, while others were related to self-determination, conflict prevention, and post-conflict peace-building. But, for all the references to "we the people" in Pacific Islands' constitutions, there are but a few jurisdictions in the region in which constitutional change occurs through popular vote. Whilst much has

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[25]   Lee (1967:1) quoted in Larmour (2001:3).

been made, for instance, of the extensive public consultations held by the Constitutional Drafting Committee in Papua New Guinea, chaired by John Momis in preparation for independence, the proposals of that Committee were considered not by "the people" but by the members of the 1972 House of Assembly, which sat for three weeks as a Constituent Assembly.

No subsequent constitutional exercise in Papua New Guinea has had such a wide audience. The Constitutional Development Committee's reform agenda in the mid-1990s, which resulted in passage of the *Organic Law on Provincial and Local Level Government*, whilst aimed at establishing more efficient and effective government at provincial and local levels, was at the same time an effective move by national-level politicians to crush their political opponents at the two lower levels (current feeling is that local level government has been insufficiently cultivated, and that the influence of national MPs over executive branches of government, and into lower levels of government, is too great).

Constraints on 'constitutive dialogue' in Pacific states in the colonial and post-colonial periods have created serious limitations in their epistemological foundations, their ideological inventiveness, their legitimacy and their effectiveness. Such constraints, in other words, have yielded significant barriers to state functioning, and to the possibilities of full participation by citizens. Ghai argues of the Solomon Islands constitution that despite consultation with the people and active involvement of their leaders, the constitution cannot be said to be rooted in indigenous concepts of power, authority and decision-making. Some politicians were given a chance to consider alternatives to Westminster, but generally chose against it.

Ghai describes how, as consultant to the *Constitutional Planning Committee* (CPC) in Papua New Guinea, he canvassed alternatives to 'Westminster'. Although he found some support for a presidential system the CPC saw

a parliamentary executive as more participatory and under the control of the elected legislature. The alternatives, he said, were also abstract, and difficult to imagine (Larmour 2002). In the Cook Islands, Ghai suggested to a 1998 review the use of a "government by committee" in order to "significantly reduce the role of parties, and to provide for the role of all MPs in policymaking and administration" (Cook Islands 1998:102f).

Another example of reluctance to consider 'alternatives to Westminster' is provided by Fijian leader Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, who in his memoir *The Pacific Way* refers to his attempt, in the lead up to general elections in Fiji in 1982, to establish a "government of national unity":

"To me, with the two main parties fairly well balanced and on reasonable terms (which were likely to degenerate in the heat of the election atmosphere), it seemed an opportune time to promote once more my continuing dream of a government of national unity. I first floated this alternative to the Westminster system in December 1969, during the preparatory talks for the 1970 Constitutional Conference, and I had found that the membership system worked along those lines, though it did not fully recognize it at that the time.

I proposed it to a meeting of the Alliance Council at Sabeto in 1980, only to find that it was strongly opposed by some of my colleagues. I was disappointed, for they were people who were happy to use my name, and indeed my presence at their meetings, but they were unwilling to support this initiative. Were some of them fearful they would lose their ministerial positions? Perhaps that was the reason, for a unity government would certainly have had that effect" (Mara 1997).

Post-independence exercises in constitutional revision have generally followed this pattern, whether due to considerations of cost or the limits of

expertise[26]. The costs of effective public awareness campaigns – on any topic – are high. In such contexts, broad understanding of national affairs rests with the urban, educated elites, and the challenges of civic education are more commonly taken up by NGOs than by the state. This is problematic for any call for greater recognition of the constitutive role of 'the people'. But if it is argued that constitutions are too complex to lay before 'the people' for decision, how is it that these same people are entrusted with electing representatives to oversee government on their behalf?

The extent to which constitutional exercises genuinely involve 'the people' depends on whether republican or monarchical system was adopted at independence. In general, therefore, Micronesian constitutions allow for periodic peoples' constituent assemblies, and change through an act of popular will. For the remainder, final say rests with elected representatives and the Crown. The review of Fiji's 1997 Constitution is a case in point. The review was conducted by a three-person panel, whose recommendations were modified by committees of the Fiji parliament (Reeves et al. 1996). Prasad observed (presciently in 1996) that the report was to be presented to the Prime Minister and via him to the Parliament: "*A parliamentary subcommittee comprising ten representatives each from the Fijian and other groups in parliament will then be charged with working out a consensus for consideration by the whole parliament. It in effect means that the CRC report will form the basis for a race-based political bargaining; albeit by elected representatives of the different racial communities. There are no further requirements for public consultation during this phase, nor indeed is there any prior role set for the CRC itself. (...) One remarkable absence has also to be noted about*

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[26]   The example to be used here is the current constitutional exercise in Solomon Islands, which has spanned several years but has studiously avoided free choice of constitution by all citizens.

the official review process. There are no procedures or requirements for consultation with civic organizations that have some direct stake in the constitution review process or the people more generally after the report of the CRC is submitted to the President and eventually the Parliament. Racially elected MP's are assumed to have the mandate and authority to debate and agree on a future constitutional settlement for all of Fiji" (Prasad 1996:17,18).

As it turned out, Fiji's parliamentary committees (there were three that examined the constitutional proposals) reversed some of the Reeves' Report's main recommendations. Whereas more 'open seats' and fewer 'communal seats' were recommended, for example, the parliament established the reverse. Regarding the situation in Tonga, Powles observed in 2006: "*The constitutional debate has been one-sided. Government has declined to consider any of the suggestions put forward over the years. Why this is so cannot be said with* certainty*: it might be the self-interested conservatism of an anachronistic elite reluctant to hasten its own demise; it might be a matter of protocol, the reformists having gone about their task in ways that offended the aristocratic sense of propriety and respect; it might also be a matter of personalities, of individuals having taken such offence at the style of others that they refuse to listen to the message*" (Powles 2007:136).

These examples point to a fundamental weakness in the spirit of constitutionalism in the region – in strategic terms, the will of the people counts for less than the calculations of their representatives, who hold public office on their behalf. There is little of what Katz calls "constitutional respect" (Katz 2002:302) – and this has resulted from the realities of civil society formation in the island states, where approximately half of the population in each island group is rural-based, and where there are still high rates of illiteracy.

Constitutional exercises focused on devolution and better regulation of politics have taken place in, amongst other Pacific jurisdictions, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu,[27] Tuvalu (Tuvalu 2000, 2004), Tokelau[28] and Niue[29]. There are also important but little known campaigns for constitutional change such as that conducted for a half century by the *Fai Chuuk* in the Federated States of Micronesia (Hezel 2004). However, despite the extent of constitutional review activity in the Pacific, there are very few purpose-build institutions in the region devoted to this important activity. In Papua New Guinea, the *Constitutional Development Commission* established in 1997 (and amalgamated with the law reform Commission in 2004) is possibly the lone exemplar. The *Constitutional Reform Unit* in Solomon Islands emerged from the Department of Provincial Government, but has always been closely associated with the Office of the Prime Minister (Solomon Islands 2005; Woods 2005).

The role of Constitutional dialogue in peace-building

Constitutional review exercises in Pacific Island countries have been subject to considerable communicative constraints from the pre-independence period up till recent times. Constraints took such forms as limited time frames for public education, public consultation, delegation deliberation, and final decision. They also took the form of limits on material resources required to facilitate consultation, and narrow decision-making bodies. These limitations aside, constitutional review in Papua New Guinea, New Caledonia, and Solomon Islands (Solomon Islands 2005) has had a conflict-resolving role[30]. The Constitutional exercise in Nauru came in response to a unique form of state-

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[27]   Official Reports of Review Exercises have not been released.
[28]   Tokelauans failed at votes on self-determination in 2006 and again in 2007 to obtain 2/3 majority consent for self-determination.
[29]   Niuean Prime minister Sani Lakatani in March 1999 announced a possible referendum to make changes to the Constitution.
[30]   In the wake of ethnic violence concerning principally Malaitans and the people of Gaudalcanal (Nanau 2002:17-20).

building to follow a financial as much as political crisis (Nauru 2007; Le Roy 2006; Balm/Le Roy 2006). Constitutional review in Fiji is motivated by the need for conflict-prevention, and much remains to be considered concerning prospects for success in that venture (Ghai/Cottrell 2007). The issue of constitutional reform in Tonga has been a focus of conflict, whichever way the politics in that country are interpreted (Powles 2006).

Bougainville

Bougainville's constitutional exercise was more complex and comprehensive than any other in the Pacific Islands in the post-independence period. The context was an inclusive civil war that commenced in 1989, was quelled by a truce and ceasefire in 1997-98, and concluded by the *Bougainville Peace Agreement* of 2001 – which provided for "arrangements for an autonomous Bougainville Government operating under a home-grown Bougainville Constitution (…)"[31].

The constitution was to be made in three stages: formation of a representative Constitutional Commission; adoption of the Constitution by a Constituent Assembly; and endorsement by the National Government (Bougainville 2001). This Bougainville-wide exercise, however, was not to be regarded as a Papua New Guinea-wide constitutional reform exercise (Ghai/Regan 2002:12-16). The Bougainville Interim Provincial Government commenced discussions about the establishment of a Commission in June 2002, its 24 members "*'broadly representative of the people of Bougainville' but also kept small enough to ensure that it could operate effectively*" (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004:65) were agreed on 10 September, and a first round of public consultations commenced before the end of that month. The late Sir James Frazer was engaged as constitutional drafter, and the first draft

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[31]   Clause 1.

was ready by the end of December the third and final draft was completed in July 2004.

Much can be learnt from the peace processes and subsequent constitutional exercise conducted by the Autonomous Province of Bougainville: whereas the process may have appeared overly long and drawn out, it was of sufficient duration and depth to engage a significant portion of the population (Regan 2002:114-129). Whatever weaknesses emerge in the new arrangements, they are more adequately 'owned' by the provincial population than are constitutional arrangements elsewhere in the region.

Fiji

Fiji, for example, has implemented a number of constitution writing exercises (leading to the 1990 and 1997 constitutions; Reeves et al. 1996) but, the efforts of an expert commission 1995-97 ultimately failed to deliver a robust constitutional framework. For a fourth time, in December 2006, the country experienced a military coup. During 2007-8 a regime-appointed 'National Council for Building a Better Fiji' elaborated the directions for establishing equality of all Fijians (the principal point being abolition of race-based constituencies and establishment of a common roll) but not altering the basis of land ownership. Major issues in Fiji have been, and remain, the constitutional status of land, and traditional leaders. Control over land has been at the heart of the conflict in Fiji, and the search for effective land policy is on-going (Boydell 2000; Citizens' Constitutional Forum 2002). In April 2009, after an unfavourable court decision, the regime abrogated the constitution, and dismissed the judiciary. It then established a constitutional review commission, headed by Professor Yash Ghai, whilst simultaneously continuing to enforce a series of decrees limiting media freedom and the association of people in public spaces (Bhim 2013).

The regime had indicated that the CRC's draft would be put to an appointed Constituent Assembly, which would make final decisions on the new constitution. Such a pathway was not followed, however, as the regime disowned the draft, cancelled plans for a Constituent Assembly, and tasked the office of the Attorney General to provide a charter that it found more appealing. This made public in August, and promulgated in September 2013. Despite public discussion about Fiji's constitutional future since 2006 and even before, the 2013 Constitution immediately drew criticism from within and outside the country. Fijian Chiefs lamented that it failed to entrench land rights, and Amnesty International criticised its limited protection of human rights.

Parliaments, Political Parties, and Elections

The notion of 'representative democracy' associated with the Westminster parliamentary tradition is premised on notions of the individual citizen as actor, as voter, and as potential democratic leader. Locke, for instance, speaks of natural duty to obey the state: individuals delegate sovereignty to the state to rule on their behalf, to protect their rights, and to bring social order. In this view the individual has consciousness to obey the laws of a society that exists 'outside' or beyond it. Individuals, personhood, are independent and self-contained persons. The citizen of the liberal democratic society is a rational independent self-contained individual with interests and a conscience, and there is an assumption that if individual behaviour is regulated then Society is ordered.

But traditional Pacific societies didn't separate the individual from society in this way (see Mückler in this volume). They were constituted communally – in contrast with the received/imposed constitutions which the individual person as the constitutive unit. This is why Habermas' articulation of 'system' and 'life-world' holds promise as an analytic tool in Pacific Islands' context. Persons were viewed as social beings for whom duty was not

imposed through conscience nor by the imposition of legal rules but through socially defined, approved, and enforced sanction generated through the 'organic solidarity' of continuing kinship and ethnic ties. The Pacific is a region in which the 'division of labour' experienced by European societies is incomplete and where 'lifeworlds' remain strong[32].

Strathern reports that in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea, for instance, the person is not an isolated individual but a person in relation to others (Strathern 1985), and Lawrence has pointed out that where morality is not constructed universally, but has a restricted social range, social ties are weak beyond those between members of kin groups (Lawrence 1969). If the purpose of government is viewed as bringing 'asocial' individuals into relation, this does not apply to many parts of the Pacific, as people already have relations, and governments in fact seek to sever these relations in order to rebuild social relations according to a different set of norms.

Clearly, notions of democracy have transformed within the Western tradition, in terms of suffrage, and in terms of legal and constitutional form. Innovations are similarly required in the Pacific context. Key questions include the possibilities for expanding the scope of constitutive communities to be more inclusive of heterogeneity; of somehow 'freezing' in place the characteristics of 'benevolent' use of chiefly powers while avoiding despotism and arbitrary rule, and of deepening the 'public sphere' in order to deepen capacity for reflection on the 'public interest' (Habermas 1984). An example of re-moulding legal institutions in light of cultural norms comes from Bougainville, where the Bougainville Constitutional Commission set out clearly in its 2004 report the attitudes toward political parties held by a broad cross-section of Bougainvillean society:

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[32]   In this respect it appears appropriate to refer to Ferdinand Tönnies and his differentiation between Gemeinschaft (community) and Gesellschaft (society) (see Tönnies 2001).

"*1. People do not want political parties because:*

They will cause division in Bougainville

- *that division will come from different people and groups in Bougainville supporting different parties*
- *we need to maintain the unity developed during the peace process*
- *the activities of political parties in PNG work against the interests of the people – we do not want that in Bougainville*
- *political parties do not operate on the basis of principle or policy. All they are seeking is power. They are not looking after the people.*

2. political parties can come later:

- *after the systems of government are tried and tested*
- *after the referendum*

3. What's wrong with Melanesian consensus? Political Parties are not consistent with consensus politics because they highlight division not unity. They are by their nature looking for an opportunity to criticise their opponents not at how they can work together to find consensus" (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004:226).

Other projects in Pacific context have sought to re-introduce traditional norms of discourse (Efi et al. 2007). Halapua implemented a 'talanoa' process to re-engage contending political actors in Fiji and Tonga (Pacific Islands Development Program 2001; Halapua n.d.; see also Ernst in this volume). The Talanoa approach has been described as 'less formalised' and possibly more 'intuitive' than formal mediation. When Fijian Prime Minister Qarase announced that a Talanoa Session had led to agreement on the Parliamentary Sugar Select Committee and on other important issues concerning the sugar industry reforms, ANU academic Professor Brij Lal questioned the suitability of costly, private sessions, between public leaders, as compared to having them discuss the same matters publicly, in the context of parliament. These

were, indeed, discussions about the constitution more than constitutional dialogue. Five Talanoa sessions were between November 2000 and June 2002. The outcome of Talanoa IV was agreement on the need to examine four areas: building trust and reducing suspicion and fear among leaders and communities; fostering wide acceptance of the rule of law; ensuring all communities feel secure in Fiji as their home; and examining the constitution. Although little subsequent progress was made with this process (and although Halepua re-engaged some of the main parties during a visit to Suva in June 2008), the Talanoa sessions explore a form of multi-party dialogue that seeks communicative action. This 'Pacific' approach to dialogue requires more analysis, particularly in regard to a quest for alternative approaches to democratic dialogue. In the context of the Federated States of Micronesia, a member of the legislature has explained:

Traditionally and by nature, Micronesians prefer not to resolve issues in such a way as to produce gloating winners and disgruntled losers. This does not mean that we never have strong disagreements – we do. It does not mean that we won't work hard to convince others to see things our way – we also do that. Nor does it mean that members will never use the supermajority voting rules as a means thwart the will of the majority – that happens, too. But we approach disagreements with the understanding that we must continue to live and work closely together for years to come. Recognition of the benefits of consensus has a moderating influence on both the proponents of legislation and those who may be in opposition (Sipenuk 2005). This MP goes on to say: Parties are not necessary to the vitality of the political process. Unquestionably, the political process thrives on the tension between competing ideas and derives much of its energy from policy disagreements between elected officials. We find, though, that these forces can and inevitably do exist even in the absence of political parties. In any group of politicians – or any group of

people for that matter – some are more likely to favor stability and security, others are more likely to seek change and reform. Geographic, economic and cultural differences will also cause them to see policy questions differently. Virtually without fail, ideas that merit examination and testing will find their proponents and opponents. Parties do not seem essential to the formation of leadership or healthy dialogue around individual issues.

The question as to what role political parties play in the political systems of Pacific Island countries has thus generated a range of views. A *developmental* approach presumes that representative democracy requires parties and that where these do not currently exist, or are not fully functioning, they will mature in the course of time. It could be asked, on the other hand, whether alternative forms of interest articulation may better suit Pacific contexts.

Most political parties active in Pacific Island states are fluid, populist, legally unrestrained, clientalistic, policy-poor and administratively bare (Duncan/Hassall 2010:265-276). Whereas a few parties have developed from a clear ideological stance, Ratuva and others have pointed to the distinctly non-ideological impetus to party formation (Rich 2006). Much of the concern about the operation of party systems in Pacific Island context concerns the *fluidity* of political parties, and the movement of MPs between them. Such *floor-crossing* tactics have had considerable impact on the formation and exercise of legislative and executive power. The most direct impact of party fluidity is executive instability, which is manifest in no-confidence votes, shifts of allegiance, pre-occupation by successive heads of government with maintaining loyalties, and the performance of legislatures (numbers of sitting days, performance of parliamentary committees, progress with passage of legislative programs etc.) (Hassall 2012:213-237). Responses to these problems have focused on reforms to mandate stability: party registration, discouragement of independent MPs, restraints on party-hopping, automatic

triggering of dissolution through no-confidence votes, power of constituencies to exercise recall, and enlargement of cabinet size to accommodate more sectional interests.

Of all the Pacific countries, only Papua New Guinea has enacted legislation regulating the conduct of political parties, and much of that legislation was struck down by the courts in a ruling of 2010 as described above. The 2003 *Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and Candidates* required political parties to have a minimum of 500 subscribed members and to hold incorporation under the Associations Incorporation Act 1966 if it sought to field candidates in general elections. By 2007, 34 political parties had obtained the necessary registration with the Integrity of *Political Parties and Candidates Commission*, although the information was only as accurate as assured by each party, and was not validated by the Commission prior to its acceptance. Consequently, phone numbers, names of officials, and records of party donations, are unreliable. As with party loyalties in Solomon Islands, membership was much influenced by *wantokism*,[33] with active party supporters mostly comprising relatives of candidates.

In the case of Solomon Islands, 12 of 17 'parties' active as at 2009 had legal personality under the *Charitable Trust Act* of 1964. The five without such registration include the *Solomon Islands Party for Rural Advancement*, which claims a membership of between 7000 – 8000 but which like the *National Party*, the *People's Alliance Party*, the *Solomon Islands Liberal Party*, and the *Solomon Islands Democratic Party*, maintains no official records of party membership or meetings. Of the 17 parties the *Solomon Islands Social*

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[33] 'wantok' is a *tok pisin* term from the English words 'one-talk' i.e., a common language group. The 'wantok system' refers to systematically giving preferential treatment to one's own kin-group over all other groups. Rather than being seen as a form of corruption, it is viewed subjectively as ethically correct; however, it is in marked contrast to systems of ethics that call for equal treatment of all, irrespective of place of origin. It is, in other words, a relational/situated view of ethics rather than a universal one.

Credit party led by Manasseh Sogovare was alone in claiming to maintain official record of some 10,000 members. The *National Party*, with a support base of approximately 500 holds an annual convention in addition to a monthly executive meeting, raises funds through fundraising activities and sponsorship from business interests including logging countries, but is under no legal obligation to report the size or origins of donations.

Because parliamentary discourse is controlled by the strategic interests of political parties and these strategic interests determine the rate at which parliamentary business is processed, Pacific Parliaments are not the bastions of democracy they were established to be. A partial assessment shows that the average number of sitting days per annum in Pacific Parliaments in recent years ranges from 21 to 51, although actual reasons for the low number of sitting days can only be surmised at present, for want of detailed research on the matter (ibid.).

Whereas formal systems of democracy such as elections, parliaments, and representative government have been introduced to the four countries under consideration, there is still a prevalent view of democracy as something foreign, that leaders do not represent the people, and that the laws they pass do not necessarily seek to promote the public interest. Leaders are commonly viewed as the source of conflicts rather than as the source of solutions to them. Perceived inadequacies of formal systems of government in the Contemporary Pacific have resulted from limitations in 'constitutive dialogue' at epistemic and ideological levels in the colonial and post-colonial era. Problems manifest in citizens' behaviour in the Pacific, whether in voting and leadership selection or in shaping civil society, have often been attributed to the novelty of the introduced system rather than to epistemological issues of constitutive consent and engagement. There is concern about apathetic civil culture, the non-creation of conditions conducive to deliberative practice, and

the need to link together civil society, tradition and governance in some form of reflexive political praxis. Concerted efforts being made at regional level, at least, though such coordinating instruments as the *Pacific Plan* (see Holtz in this volume), to consolidate democratic norms, institutions, processes, in ways that respect the diversity of the Pacific and complement continuing *traditional* institutions.

Conclusion

This paper has suggested that Habermas' distinction between *system* and *life-world* is useful in interpreting prospects for successful application of demo-cratic values and processes to conflict resolution in Pacific Island countries. If democracy is to become a more effective tool with which Pacific societies address the issues that most divide them, they must first determine the modes of democracy they prefer, and the values of democracy they hold most dear. Whereas constitutional and electoral reform, parliamentary strengthening, and capacity building for media and civil society are all valuable policy responses to post-conflict reconstruction agendas, I argue that in keeping with Haber-mas' insights concerning the value of communicative action, the success of any and all such policy responses is dependent on the extent to which they reflect discourse in the *life-world*. Ironically, the introduction of *democratic practices*, if perceived as originating from beyond the community's *lived-experience*, may be treated as unreasonable impositions regardless of the intrinsic value they offer. Thus human rights regimes, constitutionalism and the rule of law, public sector reforms, and the discourse of civil society – all offered as solutions to tyranny, disorder, insularism and nepotism – are *un-reasonably* rejected rather than embraced as a pathway to economic and so-cial development. The solution to this seeming *unreasonableness* – one which is not impossible but which calls for greater effort - is for Pacific societies to deepen and broaden their engagement with resolution of the contradictions

they face, at the same time that they engage with regional and international partners eager to propose solutions that have been considered useful elsewhere.

For Habermas, the quality of democracy is determined by the procedural fairness by which the rules were created, any by the quality of deliberation that such rules subsequently generated (see generally Habermas 1996). Habermas' 'Discourse Principle' posits: "*Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse*" (ibid.:26). By this standard, "*(I)t is only their claim to general validity that gives an interest, a volition, or a norm the dignity of moral authority*" (ibid.). Political *realists* may find such standards for democratic discourse far too idealistic. Indeed, even those who propose them do not suggest they are easily attainable, if at all. However, if the elaboration of theoretical standards for full deliberation can improve actual practice to even a small degree, the effort will be worthwhile[34]. Such an approach may be embedded in traditional forms of dialogue in some parts of the Pacific.

Whereas constitutional and electoral reform, parliamentary strengthening, and capacity building for media and civil society are all valuable policy responses to post-conflict reconstruction agendas, this paper suggests that in keeping with Habermas' insights concerning the value of communicative action, the success of any and all such policy responses is dependent on the extent to which they are understood by discourse in the *life-world* (i.e.: in the subjective values, norms, and traditions, of the society in question).

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[34] Following Habermas, the authors suggest six conditions necessary for any form of public consultation: 1: Participation; 2: truthfulness; 3: logical justification; 4: expressed in terms of the common good; 5: willingness to listen to the arguments of others and treat them with respect; 6: willingness of all participants to yield to the force of the better argument (Steiner et al. 2004).

Contemporary democratic systems and values weave an unsteady path in Pacific societies between individual and collective worldviews and interests, with the rights, interests, and indeed responsibilities, of individuals, frequently deferring to the continuing rights, interests, and responsibilities of the ethnic/linguistic/lineage group of which that individual continues to be a member. The modern state introduced rule of law to remove arbitrary use of power – a value diametrically opposed to the highly contextualised application of law that has applied in the Pacific. In extending its sphere of authority to all individuals, the rule of law breaks the special ties that otherwise existed between individuals. It removed an elasticity that the rule of law classified as *arbitrariness*. The rule of law handles heterogeneity in a way that custom cannot (Hassall 2000). Rule of law is viewed as separate from society, and it separates. It is *law that rules*, rather than the ruler using law. Whereas the authority of law is absolute and universal, the authority of custom is relative, contextual and contained in bounded communities.

Few Pacific constitutions reached the goal of *autochthony* in either a legal or philosophic sense; most were highly directed by colonial experience, and colonial powers. Crucially, at the time of independence, constitutional discourse was generally constrained in terms of duration and reach, such that constitutional frameworks which purport to provide the *social contract* for the new sovereign Pacific Island nations were in actuality assented to by the few rather than the many, and as a consequence have struggled to gain full popular recognition. There have been calls for *home-grown* constitutionalism in the Pacific (Malifa 1988) but not much further work has been undertaken. By simply *transferring* in the Westminster system the Pacific states missed an opportunity to establish truly home-grown, culturally grounded systems.

Although the Pacific states have very few mutual legally binding obligations, and pressures are currently being experienced over such matters as

regional trade agreements, and ownership of deep-sea natural resources, 'multi-level' governance (Bache/Flinders 2004), and supra-national arrangements are being developed to improve governance at the regional level. Protocols for conflict resolution are set out in the Biketawa Declaration and for improved governance in the *Pacific Plan*, which seeks to strengthen shared institutional arrangements. References to future *deeper integration* open possibilities ranging from enhanced cooperation to some form of political union, with the EU, African Union, East African Community, and other regional inter-governmental bodies including ASEAN as reference points (Longo 2006; Graham 2008).

Development assistance will continue to play a crucial role in strengthening democratic capacities in both civil society and the institutions of state. This assistance occurs in numerous spheres: parliamentary strengthening; leadership development; access to information and rights to information; expansion of digital capacity; support for judicial independence and the rule of law; human rights education and advocacy; capacity building in the public sector; education for the security sector; strengthening of accountability institutions and mechanisms. Support in all these fields is required at local level as well as national, and indeed at regional level.

Deliberative democracy can strive toward finding public interest, and transformation of interests comes through deliberation. At the current time much expectation is being placed on civil society actors, particularly NGOs, to establish the dialogic spaces and capacities through which the public interest might be articulated. State agencies, particularly parliaments and their committees, also have role to play in this. Cultivation of civil society is an essential component in the strengthening of democratic capacity, but the challenge lies in doing so without creating dependency on international financing or intellectual preferences. In addition to taking part in global issues, civil

society must emerge from domestic felt needs and dispositions if it is to adequately respond to the requirements of time and place.

The introduction of a system of democracy can be regarded as imposition of a system on the life-world. But whereas in Habermas' normative theory each life-world generates systems on the basis of its shared and agreed values and aspirations, systems in the Pacific Islands – particularly those pertaining to politics, administration, and economic activity – were introduced under conditions of colonial role.

Most fundamentally, therefore, Pacific societies must review some fundamental questions which ask whether the systems of democracy received at independence are sufficient for their future constitutional evolution. If not, what more appropriate system would give greater expression to the life-world? Human rights regimes, constitutionalism and the rule of law, public sector reforms, and the discourse of civil society – all offered as solutions to tyranny, disorder, insularism and nepotism – are 'unreasonably' rejected rather than embraced as a pathway to economic and social development. The solution to this seeming *unreasonableness* – one which is not impossible but which calls for greater effort – is for Pacific societies to deepen and broaden their engagement with resolution of the contradictions they face, at the same time that they engage with regional and international partners eager to propose solutions that have been considered useful elsewhere. There is need to encourage a flourishing of the *public sphere* in Pacific societies, in the village *fono*, the market place, community halls, and religious communities, and through the mass media.

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Self-confidence and a New Self-understanding as Opportunities and Challenges for the Future Development of Pacific Island Countries

Hermann Mückler

Abstract: *This article focuses on concepts of self-understanding and traditional modes of orientation of the Pacific Islanders in a fast changing world. Some Pacific Island populations face the increased problem of predicted and already visible loss of land. The traditional role of the sea as a territory itself is sketched for its use to create a new understanding about the land-sea relationship and its impact on statehood. It peaks in the question 'Tu valu or not Tu valu?' Also the significance of 'kastom' and 'wantok' are highlighted regarding their capacity as concepts to create identity and provide orientation in a challenging globalized world.*

Keywords: tradition, revival of tradition, identity, the sea, loss of land, climate change, kastom, wantok

During the annual conference of the New Zealand Studies Association (NZSA) at the Norwegian Maritime Museum and the Kon-Tiki Museum in Oslo in June 2014, the keynote speaker, New Zealand anthropologist Dame Ann Salmond, addressed old and new meanings of the sea as space and place of orientation and identification for the Pacific islanders. She mentioned this in the light of the changing ecological and climatic conditions in Oceania, which increasingly lead to uninhabitable island. Thus, the future of Pacific Islanders will be characterized by unprecedented and existential challenges, and survival strategies need to be found for coping with these challenges in an environment under threat. The loss of land in the form of island territory will have serious consequences for the understanding and the localization of the islanders themselves with it and in it. Salmond said that a 'loss of territory' might not necessarily be accompanied by a 'loss of identity'. Rather, it is important to define the identity creating spatial frameworks in new ways. One option could be, that Pacific Islanders build on forms of traditional self-understanding and focus on perspectives that were decisive for the Pacific Islanders for centuries and which might today await their reactivation or re-discovery.

"Why can not the sea be a territory?" asked Salmond, facing the imminent loss of islands due to rising sea levels (Salmond 2014). The fact that in the current international legal understanding the loss of land directly leads to a loss of sovereignty, and the question of whether there can exist, for example, a nation of Kiribati even when there is in fact no longer the territory of this state existing, provides challenges for the relevant discussions in international politics, the Law of the Sea institutions and of international law. The imminent emergence of the term 'climate refugees' or 'environmental refugees', a term that is not recognized so far by the international bodies (although one precedent recently occurred in New Zealand, where a family of

Tuvalu successfully sought asylum on grounds of environmental causes) will dominate future negotiations about strategies and practical policy for dealing with such cases. It culminated in the pithy slogan 'To valu or not Tu valu, that is the Question' regarding the future Tuvalu has to face. The visibility of the issue begins to slowly open up to a broader audience; but discussions about the handling and possible adaptations of regulatory mechanisms are still held mainly behind closed doors. The question is, whether the internationally recognized and through colonialism spread western-occidental concept of a 'mare nullius', which means the general availability and usability of the sea for everybody (excluding those regulations which relate to the direct and indirect coastal area, the so-called foreshore and the seabed), is conflicting and opposing with traditional understandings of the role, function and importance of the sea for the Pacific islanders. In other words: for the inhabitants of Oceania, the sea has always been much more than just a hurdle that had to be overcome in order to get from island to island.

In Europe, the over the centuries slowly growing understanding and importance of the sea, preceded by many a continental oriented centuries in European history, has determined the legal concepts for dealing with this element, which after all, covers by far the greatest part of the globe. The ownership and control of land, therefore, had priority for a long time and was dominant in order to justify claims of power, even when Europe reached for the overseas territories and gained the sea as a transportation route of growing importance. Finally, in the context of geopolitical conceptions, the role of the sea was defined in a way that favoured European needs and ignored other potentially existing concepts. For instance, 'classic' geopolitical experts like Alfred Theyer Mahan - who found recognition in the geopolitical analyses of the 19th century focusing on US-American interests – showed interest in the sea, but for the sake of creating concepts providing free and unlimited access

to land territory, which means controlling the sea in order to control land. Based on the understanding of the importance of land, the Western definition of statehood, originally developed by George Jelinek and his three-element theory as constituent feature, was based on territory, a (state) people, and a state authority. Although this was later enriched with several other elements, an essential basic feature is still recognized: the fact that there must be a land on which a state manifests itself (see Crawford 2007; Katz 2010). If this condition is not applicable, there cannot be any statehood, and therefore no 'citizens'; statelessness would result.

However, if one is open-minded for a different understanding as a basis for interpreting the role and importance of the sea, including traditional relationships with the Pacific Ocean which have grown over centuries, the situation could be different. The Pacific Islanders (and I here leave aside the highlanders of Papua New Guinea) have had and partly still have an understanding which gives much greater notion to the sea as a central element of identity. This means the sea is an integral part of an environmentally based self-understanding and therefore an inherent part of the orientation and movement in space. The Islands of Oceania were not just isolated, as they are often portrayed in the Western worlds 'island jokes', viewed as an endpoint for dropout fantasies and as inescapable whereabouts for castaways. Rather, they were network nodes in a dense network of trade, barter, tribute, marriage and religious relations. The islands embodied, figuratively speaking, oases and bases, and the sea provided the roads on which the inhabitants of Oceania were able to move between the different network nodes – their places of interest. All this was accompanied by a very sophisticated, specialized and customized technology. The possibilities and opportunities for getting and remaining in contact by using the sea as a road were used intensively, as it is evident if we look at the complex maritime technology as well as the precise

knowledge of oceanic navigation of the Pacific islanders. Hegemonic aspirations, claims to power and mutual boundaries marked the political sphere in Oceania in the pre-colonial era. In the centre of Oceania, for example, between the island groups of Fiji, Samoa and Tonga – and thus over relatively large distances – rivalries and struggles took place over centuries that led to Tonga's temporary rule over Samoa and the eastern part of Fiji. Trade relations evolved over centuries and dissolved a locally limited availability of resources through exchange and distribution over large distances. Trade goods such as pottery products, hardwood, textiles and shells, to merely name a few, were traded from Melanesia and West-Polynesia (Vanuatu, Fiji, Samoa) to Central- and East-Polynesia (Marquesas and Tuamotus). An entire historical epoch marked by a specific and identifiable style of clay pottery, the so-called Lapita-period, was spread from Melanesia via the triangle Fiji, Samoa, Tonga to the Central-Polynesian islands and beyond; this period and its main barter goods figure as a typical and easily comprehensible example of the range and therefore the mobility of the Pacific residents over long distances (see Mückler 2009:31ff).

Let us create a vision: Following such historical facts dealing with the ocean in the framework of international and constitutional law, law of the sea negotiations could be different – and lead to different conclusions and results, if one starts from the existing concepts. Thus it could be that statehood manifests even without the presence of "land". With a historically verifiable close relationship and intensive use of the sea as a habitat for mobility and residence of marine-oriented peoples, the sea – the ocean as such – could be interpreted as a habitat for Pacific Islanders. It could be defined as 'their' territory and specific rights of sovereignty could be derived which then must be respected internationally. "We have to reimagine the nature of the state" proclaimed Roy Smith, an expert on International Development of the British

Trent University, in his keynote speech at the conference in Oslo (Smith 2014). And Ann Salmond added on the following day that "*we have to re-evaluate and redefine the law of the sea, (...) revision of the framework is only possible in a pan-oceanic way, it should recast our imagination of the sea*" (Salmond 2014). In this sense 'reimagination of the State' is equivalent to Benedict Andersons concept of 'Imagined Communities' (Anderson 1991). Since the modern nation-state can be seen as such an imagined community, a re-evaluation and an appreciation of the marine space – in an admittedly un-realistic equality between land and sea as territory – lead to a reassessment of the fate of the thus affected island populations. In this case, however, relevant initiatives of existing and over a long period of time established historical modes of (self-)understanding of Pacific Islands populations as well as tradi-tional relationships between man and the sea have to be made more visible and transparent. Here, the re-reflection on their own cultural traditions might not have only a folkloric function, but can create a basis for tangible existence and ultimately securing changes in international Law of the Sea. Salmond rightly observes that these things can only be achieved in close cooperation of all Pacific Island nations and peoples and she is aware of the expected re-sistance of many continentally oriented nations. Nevertheless, a unified action of the Pacific island countries and a reasonable reflection about their own cultural traditions that grant the sea a central position in the thinking and actions of people, could initiate a global shift in thinking about the relation-ship between man and the sea. This would mean a splitting up of those regu-lations that have been adopted in 1982 by signing the Law of the Sea Conven-tion, which provided the most comprehensive global determination of rights and opportunities with respect to the use of the oceans. By some commenta-tors the re-evaluation of the 'mare nullius' concept is placed in a row with the 'Mabo case', that legendary legal dispute in Australia, which led to a

reassessment of the colonial understanding of a 'terra nullius' and the Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait islanders ownership of land based on proven traditional use (see Gray 1997; Mulrennan/Scott 2000; Balint 2005; Perera 2009).

The background of an increased devotion to this issue is not only due to the time pressure, fed by the increasing timeliness and thereby increasing urgency to act, but also the fact that the United Nations declared in 2014 the 'International Year of Small Island Developing States' to stimulate raising awareness about the concerns of the fragile and sometimes threatened islands and island states. The so-called Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have in the advocacy of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) an ad hoc lobby and negotiating voice, which helps the small island states and low-lying coastal countries in the international arena, particularly at the United Nations and its sub-organizations. The strategies to raise awareness for the concerns of island nations, thereby differ significantly (see Hasenkamp in this volume). In relation to sea level rise and its causes, individual island states are blaming developed countries for not acting properly and demand a commitment for the island states and their problems. There are discussions going on about ways to absorb already visible effects of the creeping disaster and about strategies to deal with future developments. Two storylines can be distinguished concerning the central Pacific: the Government of Tuvalu currently favours a policy of downsizing and partial trivialization of climate-related and oceanographic evidence that points to a change, and calls for an involvement of the 'rich' industrialized countries in the search for solutions regarding the challenges ahead, while the government of Kiribati has a politician in the person of the president Anote Tong, now acting on his third term, who announced on international stage: "*Let me make the point that whatever is agreed within the United States today, with China, it will not have a bearing on our future,*

because already, it's too late for us. And so we are that canary. But hopefully, that experience will send a very strong message that we might be on the front line today, but others will be on the front line next – and the next and the next" (Tong 2014). Tong relies on an intensive examination of the impending problems in his own country. He discusses options and possibilities, how the island population of Kiribati could deal with the challenges. This includes the idea of relocation of parts or the entire population from the exterior to the central islands and from the islands to continental countries of the Pacific Rim – provided the latter agree to mass immigration from i-Kiribati, as the local people call themselves. Tuvalu in turn still hopes that less drastic measures might be needed and hopes to benefit from support of the large CO^2-polluters, the industrialized countries. Evidently the two pursued strategies are mitigation on one side versus adaptation and handling on the other.

Many issues are raised and discussed for the first time. What does it mean for such affected countries in terms of international law, if a mainstay of what international law represents – namely the territory – disappears? Will these countries cease to exist? What will happen especially to the EEZs, the exclusive economic zones of the island states, when the islands have vanished? These are measured exactly in a 200 nautical mile radius around the islands, and are important because of their fish stocks and the proven or suspected seabed mineral resources. If they disappear, are these areas then going to become international waters? Which conflicts over the control and distribution of that booty will emerge and by which powers? Even if a long-term total depopulation of the region will not take place, the future of the affected islands seems to be largely determined by the major external powers operating in the region.

The writer, anthropologist and artist Epeli Hau'ofa, born in Papua New Guinea who lived in Fiji until his death in 2009, had stressed regional identity

creating similarities between the island nations in his programmatic essay '*Our Sea of Islands*' (Hau'ofa 1993). In his opinion, the special geographical and topographical conditions faced by all islanders play a crucial role. He stressed the sea as a unifying element just as the common formative experience of outside influence like colonialism, the Christian mission and hegemonic claims of outside powers who imposed various limitations to the islanders sovereignty. Hau'ofa's article has been published in response to doubts about the existence of a regional identity. It was not about a nonreflective return to passed on and/or lost traditions, but rather he looked ahead. Hau'ofa called upon – in the metaphorical and real sense – the ability to overcome barriers, and to use the freedom to counteract interpretations that had been imposed from the outside on the societies of Oceania, and get rid of them. Every individual person should demonstrate its personal responsibility and initiative for action, so Hau'ofa, and not rely on politicians and government institutions. To deal with some necessary changes maybe only general directional changes, new strategies and completely different approaches can open new doors that have yet to be found. Hau'ofa explains that to meet the challenges of the future also means to incorporate new aspects in a way that they fuse with approved programs, and something new is created from it. The Solomon Islands lawyer Transform Aqorau also argued for this direction and appealed to his compatriots to recognize the potentials of the future. "*As we stand at the beginning of the 21st century, we have an opportunity to do things differently, to learn from the mistakes of the past, and to chart a course for a bright and hopeful future*" (Aqorau 2006:239). Another question is whether one can apply the term 'revival of tradition' considering the example outlined above about an altered understanding of the element of the sea and thereby potentially seeing it as a model for a new pacific self-understanding. The term 'revival of tradition' has been used in the past fifteen years as a collective

term for all custom-based concepts and for building on traditional responses to grievances against and shortcomings of public systems in the Pacific island countries in general, but especially in Melanesia. The fact is that in recent decades the reference to real and fictional traditions has experienced a renaissance, that has grown steadily since independence and which has increased with the time since the discharge from the colonial yoke.

The relatively short period of transition from foreign rule to sovereignty in many parts of Oceania in the decades from the 1960s to the 1980s must be viewed in the context of chronologically preceding and subsequent developments. The euphoria and the expectations at the time of change in the newly independent island states have been great. This was particularly the case in those countries which had a solid base of resources and hence could hope for a steady income cash flow for investment in infrastructure. This was the case, for example, in Papua New Guinea, and gave rise to high expectations in the years before and after 1975. "*There was a political consensus in the clear demarcation from the colonial modernization through the takeover of the state apparatus and the economy by locals and the reduction of foreign dependence. Central monetary and fiscal policy measures were taken such as the establishment of the Kina, the national currency that was stable in its performance for a period of two decades. The National Development Strategy, published in 1976, envisaged a development process that should avoid major social disparities and maintain the hitherto largely intact social fabric*" (Seib 2007:2). The agriculture of Papua New Guinea then was assigned developmental priority. A few large mining projects of transnational corporations should serve to finance the efforts. Increasing environmental issues with these mines, and also the inefficiency of public institutions, economic stagnation and a high level of violence within the society, prevented a successful 'take off'-phase of this rich island state per se. The same situation occurred in

the Solomon Islands and in Vanuatu, the former New Hebrides. They were all confronted with the fundamental challenge of ethnic, linguistic and religious heterogeneity – summarized as cultural diversity – and the lack of awareness about togetherness in a nation-state that had no historical precursors from pre-colonial times. This required exertion to guarantee economic social peace and prosperity. The identification with the new, young nation state, which consists usually of many former autonomously organized islands and island groups, was and is for the people, especially the larger Melanesian countries, a hurdle and the source of many conflicts of interests and distribution. A variety of particularisms are the result of the historically grown and not yet overcome fragmentation of states. Disappointment and a lack of faith into the problem-solving capacities of national governments and bureaucracies replaced the euphoria of the early years. The particular interests of the politicians resulted in the majority of countries, especially in Melanesia, in escalating corruption, nepotism, collusion and nepotism.

The difficulties of island nations to create a national identity in broad sectors of the population and thus identification with the respective nation-states, led at the latest at the end of the 1980s to disillusion and a search for a way out. These also included the return to traditional forms of political representation, but also the promotion of regional cooperation to establish identity through the articulation of regional similarities on the inside and the development of visibility on the international stage to the outside. Challenges, identity crises and a redefinition of the self-understanding of the islanders are the defining elements, which are now of relevance in the Pacific island nations. All peoples of Oceania are gradually affected by these aspects although possibly in different ways.

Presumably, the question of identity is in the rapidly changing world of the 21st century – besides environmental problems – the biggest challenge for

the designing capacities of the islanders. Migration from the home islands, and the long-term and often permanent change of residence to Pacific Rim territories in the course of labour migration change the bindings of the former islanders to their original home. Such reduced populations will – on some of the more remote islands – fall back into isolation due to unprofitable transport and travel routes; therefore especially on some Polynesian and Micronesian islands a permanent settlement or a resettlement is up for discussion. It can be predicted that at the end of the 21st century, more islands, particularly in Micronesia and Polynesia, will be inhabited than now. The peripheral location and the involvement of the islands in the globally neoliberal organized market with simultaneous existence of immutable adverse factors such as too long transport routes to potential markets, reduce optimistic forecasts drastically. In fact, all small states could not survive without foreign help. This finding, reflected in the acronym MIRAB (see Tisdell and Bertram in this volume) – migration, remittances, aid and bureaucracy –, shows the fundamental dilemma of the island states of Oceania: by themselves and insisting on self-sufficiency the island states cannot survive. The vital linkages of labour migration, money remittances and long-term international development aid mean in turn external influence and a partial give-up of self-determination. By tendency, the external influence will not be reduced, but is going to shift. China's involvement in the islands will increase in those places, where Australian and New Zealand or generally Western investment and development aid was linked to democratic political demands of 'good governance' and where the island states do not want to bow to such restrictions that are perceived as patronizing.

The best example regarding this aspect is the island nation of Fiji, which was since 2006 isolated by Australia and New Zealand and treated as a pariah country. Fijis transitional Prime Minister Commodore Voreque Bainimarama

has emancipated most clearly in the years 2006-2014 from Australian and New Zealand interference in Fijian affairs. The conditions of dependence changed after Bainimarama's seizure of power that was a result of a coup in 2006 and wiped away a corrupt, racist and unconstitutionally acting government. Australia and New Zealand immediately imposed massive sanctions against Fiji and pursued a strategy of isolation of the island nation (about recent political developments in Fiji see Schieder 2012). Australia tried to force Bainimarama to return as soon as possible to a democratic western style political system through the announcement of elections, but with regard to the specific situation in Fiji the Fijian politician refused to do so. He pointed out that he first had to solve the basic structural problems of the country before working out a new constitution, which could act as a basis for general elections that he scheduled for September 2014. At the beginning the economic situation in Fiji deteriorated dramatically, because Australian tourists, which are an important source of revenue for Fiji, and Australian investment came to a halt. In spite of this and contrary to the opinions of many political observers, Bainimarama succeeded in providing inward stability, easing the fragile ethnic situation between Fijians of indigenous Melanesian-Polynesian ancestry and Indo-Fijians of Indian descent, and – if only with limited success – he even succeeded in his fight against corruption and mismanagement. The military always has been and still has a strong position in Fiji and soldiers find high recognition in the population, especially on the side of the indigenous Fijians. The return to local traditions, a 'revival of traditions', was visible in two directions: on the one hand, the soldiers of the Fijian army were regarded as a direct extension of the historical role of the Fijians, and considered as skilful and admired warriors, to draw a direct continuity line from famous 'old times' to a present that generates proudness On the other hand, institutionalized traditions have been overturned and discredited as 'invented

traditions', such as the existence of a Great Council of Chiefs, an assembly of the chiefs, which – implemented by the British colonial power as an instrument of colonial 'indirect rule' – was deemed unnecessary by the transitional government. It is beyond doubt that all this served to maintain Bainimarama's power, and it emphasizes that when analysing traditions one must pay attention on which groups with what sort of intentions claim interpretational sovereignty over certain traditional practices in order to pursue their own interests; in other words: an instrumentalization of tradition in the sense of traditionalist practices (Mückler 2012:141ff).

Within a few years, Bainimarama had been able to increase Fiji's prestige at the international level through active participation in several international organizations. He even obtained the chair in some institutions and committed himself to the Pacific micro-states, instead of only acting on a regional level. Due to the suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), Fiji no longer saw itself bound to the agreements made in that institution. In 2010, Fiji caused a stir with the 'Engaging the Pacific'-Meeting (and two more meetings of this kind followed since) and received benevolent consent by the other Pacific island countries. Some of them interpreted these events as counter-events to the Australian-dominated PIF annual meetings. After the Fijian elections in September 2014 and by now acknowledging Bainimarama as a democratically legitimated prime minister, Fiji was invited to rejoin the PIF. But Bainimarama refused by criticising Australia's and New Zealand's substantial influence in this institution. Fiji only will agree to rejoin the institution if Australia and New Zealand leave the PIF. Although this is very unlikely to happen, it shows the new self-confidence that Fiji exercises. In 2011, Fiji succeeded to host the annual meeting of the inter-regional governmental organization *Melanesian Spearhead Group* in the Fijian capital Suva, where many Melanesian island States expressed their deep sympathy for Fiji. The

Polynesian counterpart which was founded in 2011, the *Polynesian Leaders Group*, then invited Fiji in the same year to become a member and thus also supported the Fijian interests. All these activities were not pronounced but indirectly directed against Australia's attitude on Fiji.

The merger of the Pacific island countries at the United Nations to the group of Pacific Small Islands Developing States (PSIDS), which replaced the previous informal agreements on the level of the PIF, was finally a visible sign that Fiji as the most influential islands country in the region is still willing to go ahead for the benefit of all other Pacific island States; Fiji successfully did and does follow this strategy. Within the regional groups at the United Nations Fiji inspired and successfully implemented that the regional group, which also subsumes all the small island countries, has been renamed from 'Asia Group" into "Asia and the Pacific Group of Small Islands Developing States' (short: 'Asia-Pacific Group'). It is obvious that such actions cause the goodwill of the neighbours. Fiji's candidacy for the UN Security Council in 2011 was finally 'the icing on the cake'. It is unusual that a small country of this size requests to be included in the Security Council of the United Nations – as Oliver Hasenkamp noted and critically questioned in an excellent analysis about Fijian policy (see Hasenkamp 2012:5-10). Even if later, Fiji tactically withdrew its realistically hopeless candidate status, this step caused a stir not only regionally and internationally, but also made clear that Fiji's new self-confidence could be a model for actions of other small states, not least in the Pacific. The latest coup was that since the beginning of October 2012, Fiji – based on its nomination by the Asia-Pacific Group of the United Nations – led the board of the influential 'Group of 77', consisting of 77 developing countries plus China. Thus Fiji left behind any form of isolation imposed by Australia and New Zealand. Although some persons rightly criticize the foreign policy executed by Bainimarama for a diversion from

domestic politics and accuse him of megalomania, the tactic worked: Fiji broke out of the prescribed solitary confinement primarily imposed by Australia and New Zealand and is now more active and visible than ever before (see Hasenkamp 2012; see also Hasenkamp and Ratuva in this volume). Fiji frankly questioned (and questions) Australia's hegemonic role in the region, which is observed by other micro and small Pacific Islands states with malicious joy. Many Pacific Island countries, with Papua New Guinea leading the way, explicitly appreciated Fijis approach. Sir Michael Somare, prime minister of Papua New Guinea until 2012, expressed several times his sympathy for Fiji and his critique of Australia in various regional media.

The opening of several new embassies in Fiji shows that the island nation moves forward. Rather, Australia manoeuvred itself with its policy towards Fiji into a regional political impasse, and therefore has been even reprimanded by the United States. The Americans pursue a different strategy and inaugurated in 2012 their biggest new embassy in Oceania in Fiji's capital Suva. The new US-ambassador to Fiji immediately paid a visit to Fiji's prime minister Bainimarama after his arrival in Suva in 2011; a step which the Australian and New Zealand ambassadors had avoided since 2006 (Mückler 2013:105-107). The Fijian government knew how to call China into the play as new donor and therefore fuelled Australian fears of increasing Asian and especially Chinese influence in the Pacific Island region. Thus, Fiji acts vicariously as a representative of a growing Chinese influence in the region, which is accepted by the island states and observed with suspicion by the traditional partners such as Australia, New Zealand, the European Union and the United States. Fiji's action proves that small island states have space to move and that they can pursue unusual and unorthodox ways, which can cause regional power shifts and ultimately can eventually lead to geopolitical consequences.

In Fiji's wake, the self-confidence of other island states was rising against external influences, and own strengths grew in the context of self-discovery.

The future of the Pacific Islands societies probably will be a sensitive symbiosis of Western and proven traditional ideas. Not everything that is old automatically has to be good; not every tradition or traditional practise actually is one and for some people, the question arises whether and how it should be continued or adapted in order to meet the present needs of the populations. It might be noted that the instrumentalization of tradition in the sense of traditionalism with the lack of independent control mechanisms may also be counterproductive for the successful development of the island states. Usurped interpretations must be scrutinized self-critically by the affected members of the respective societies. In Melanesian societies, the term 'kastom' played and plays a decisive role. The two Australian anthropologists Robert Tonkinson and Roger Keesing already dealt in the early 1980s with 'kastom' and its relevant use (Keesing/Tonkinson 1982). Since then, the concept of 'kastom' has been used to describe cultural self-representations of the inhabitants of Oceania by themselves at all levels of society. It serves the residents as an identifier for various forms of self-representation against a foreign group. With this form of self-representation mainly Melanesians affirm their own distinct identity or, conversely, they try – for example in the context of the inclusion of Christianity – to distance themselves from it (Jebens 2007:144-145). The anthropologist Holger Jebens has examined the meaning of 'kastom' in the context of anthropological external- and self-perception and outlined the relevant research on and about 'kastom' – a word derived from the Melanesian pidgin word for 'custom'. This includes in a narrow sense the works of Lamont Lindstrom and Geoffrey White (1994), in which traditional Melanesian concepts of culture and the corresponding 'cultural policies' are discussed. In this instance, it makes a difference whether the

resulting patterns of interpretation come from 'above', for instance from a ruling elite or leaders who claim these competences for themselves, or from the 'bottom' of individuals or groups in the context of self-assertion, the need for manifestation and/or as a strategy of differentiation.

Especially in the Melanesian island states, the attachment to the own local group is still much closer than to the state and its institutions; the latter are often perceived as relatively abstract, distant and complex. Since the range of the modern state is limited in most island nations and its services, especially in peripheral areas, are therefore insufficient, the reputation and the loyalty of the citizens and local leaders to the state is usually lower than against the obligations to the own group. An example from Papua New Guinea may illustrate this. The so-called 'wantok'-system, a concept of social reciprocity and loyalty, shows this clearly. The Tok Pisin term 'wantok' ('one talk') signifies a person who 'speaks' the same ethnicity, values, norms and language, and a similar socialized person as a brother or a sister is thus emotionally close. The people I share a language with, I am obliged to help. They are close to me and for this very reason they accept social obligation for me. The 'wantok' system can thus be seen as a Melanesian social security insurance as it implies reciprocity, and therefore creates a social network for an individual which gives him security, but is also demanding. A Papuan is doing really well if his tribe, clan or extended family – the 'wantok' – feels well. Such an 'embedded' Papuan must do everything to maintain the harmony among all the 'wantoks'. In the traditional context, this system so far has worked well, but in a modern world it collides with other obligations and liabilities to which people are increasingly subjected. So-called 'wantoks' can come into serious and to them almost insoluble conflicts of conscience, as an example illustrates: A Papuan, employed in a store as a shopkeeper might not be able to sell the products to a customer who is at the same time a 'wantok' to him.

On the one hand, the request of the 'wantok' to give him the products without payment and on the other hand, the need as a shopkeeper to ask to pay the bill can cause significant troubles for the person being torn between the modern concept of market-,oriented sanctity of contracts and his duties as a 'wantok'. Modern contracts, market-based trust policies in terms of contract compliance, accounting rules and governmental laws lose their prime importance or do not develop any meaning at all and might be in such cases of lower priority. This dichotomy creates fundamental problems, wherever a modern world relies on the compliance of a contract.

Therefore, today 'wantok' is decreasingly interpreted by outsiders with its positive connotation as a social bond structure, but increasingly with its negative effect as an obstacle that penetrates all levels of society within the meaning of favouritism, which culminates in the political level as nepotism. As an example can be mentioned the practice of awarding government office jobs and other advantages in the public sector to 'wantoks'. Here, the key aspect is status, not achievement. For this reason, the people's confidence in their representatives and generally in the democratic system in Papua New Guinea is low (see Gelu 2003). The political-bureaucratic sphere in Papua New Guinea is interwoven with lifeworld practices that are based on the power of social interrelationships. The dominant meaning of 'wantok' could be reduced only if there were social safety nets that can unfold similar logistical functions. Since this will not be the case in the foreseeable future, the 'wantok' system will continue to have its significance and function – and thus remain important for the indigenous population. If one asks locals, they see this concept quite positive and as an essential system that is integrative and functional in its use as a cushion and as a distribution system in a society that otherwise hardly receives state-imposed social security measurements. This has been confirmed by Anastasia Sai from the Department of Papua New

Guinea Studies and International Relations of the Divine Word University in Madang, who spoke about these aspects in 2014 at the University of Vienna (Sai 2014). The conclusion is that the traditional concepts that are known and proven, must continue to exist, as there is no alternative in sight.

Therefore, seen from an outside position, the value and importance of traditions and traditional practices for the future development in the Pacific island states is, considered ambivalent. Those who arrogate interpretation in this regard – at all political levels – in fact reinterpret: they select, systematize and create ideological systems in which heterogeneous cultural traditions are transformed, in the ideal case to form a homogeneous national ideology. The purpose of these practices is part of a process of identity-finding, envisaged to create a national solidarity. Therefore, continuity is used to draw legitimacy from the past for the present. These are processes that are still far from coming to a final end. The previously mentioned discussion about the traditional importance of the sea for the inhabitants of Oceania shows that observance of traditional self-understanding can also have an avant-garde aspect. Here, a re-evaluation and modification of traditional ways of Pacific Islanders could be an inspiration for an altered view at a global level.

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Markets

Sovereignty and Material Welfare in Small Island Jurisdictions

Geoff Bertram

Abstract: *Across the world's small island economies, sovereign independent political status is negatively associated with present-day per capita income. Does this reflect a causal link whereby political sovereignty has held development back since decolonisation, or does it indicate the persistence of pre-decolonisation differentials? If the latter, is there any reason why poorer colonies might have tended to end up independent while richer ones tended to remain non-sovereign? These issues are explored in this paper by inspecting time-series data on income, life expectancy, and imports for small islands that identified by the UN General Assembly in the 1940s as candidates for decolonisation. Data at this stage of the research programme are still very incomplete and the results are inconclusive, but suggest three hypotheses for future work. First, sovereign and non-sovereign island economies appear to have had the same growth rates of income since 1970. Second, there may have been a period up to 2000 when non-sovereigns outperformed sovereigns, followed by a period in which the pattern was reversed. Third, longer-run data back to the 1940s seems to indicate persistent differentials of income and imports but convergence of life expectancy (and potentially, therefore, other social and health indicators). No generalised development-related reasons to change the political status quo have been identified at this stage of what is an ongoing research programme, leaving political status a matter to be determined by the non-economic specifics of particular cases.*

Introduction

Small islands have special interest for social scientists because of the way they throw up surprises that remind us of the limitations of common assumptions and theories. My own initial encounter with small-island reality was in 1979 in Tuvalu, then a newly-independent country of 8,000 people, with effectively no export earnings other than philatelic revenue from the sale of stamps issued by the new government to collectors around the world. Before arriving there I was inclined to think of both the enterprise of sovereign independence, and the prospect of achieving any standard of living above the subsistence provided by local village agriculture and fishing, as 'unsustainable' – a favourite economists' term for things that seem to defy gravity but nonetheless manage to continue.

Within an hour of stepping off the plane I had abandoned those preconceptions and had begun to appreciate how a very small - but ethnically and culturally close-knit – community could achieve things that much larger countries around the developing world were struggling to manage. With a seat in the UN General Assembly, and a diplomatic presence that was obvious to anyone watching the 2009 world climate-change summit in Copenhagen, Tuvalu confounds conventional wisdom in both its politics and its economy. Three pillars of development 'conventional wisdom' have come under threat from the empirical record in small island economies. The three are:

- The view that developmental success in a small open economy (that is, an economy that is exposed to global markets) requires strong export performance to sustain material standards of living

- The presumption that there are crucial economies of scope and scale in economic development (implying that very small economic units are at a developmental disadvantage)

- The proposition that sovereign independent statehood is positively related to the achievement of gains in material welfare for the population

In research over the past three decades I and a number of other scholars around the world have worked our way down that list, using data on a widening set of small islands. At each stage the key insights have come from confronting conventional wisdom with the empirical evidence, and finding the former wanting. Export-led growth is not necessary for achieving prosperity; smallness is not inherently a drag on prosperity; and sovereign independence, which potentially limits development options and imposes large cost burdens not faced by sub-national island jurisdictions, is not associated with any clear economic advantage – rather the opposite. This paper summarises these research findings before reporting some new data on the relationship between decolonisation and material welfare.

Growth need not be export led

The first pillar to fall was the supposed importance of exporting success. The MIRAB model[1] (Bertram and Watters 1985; Bertram 1986, 1993, 1998) was developed to explain the obvious dominance of *import*-led development across much of the small-island Pacific, with balance-of-payments figures showing very large trade deficits which persisted for decades without triggering signs of economic stress such as rising indebtedness. In an earlier publication I demonstrated the goods and services balances of seventeen Pacific economies over the period 1975-2004 (see Bertram 2013:329; Figure 27.1).

In MIRAB economies, the imports that sustain islanders' standards of living are financed from a combination of migrant remittances and official aid transfers. Since the original MIRAB work was published, two other general

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[1]   The initials stand for **MI**gration, **R**emittances, **A**id and **B**ureaucracy (see also Tisdell in this volume).

small-island development strategies have been recognised as enabling trade
deficits to be sustainably financed. One of these is tourism, whose rapid rise
in both tropical and cold-water island destinations has been documented and
analysed by Baldacchino (2006), McElroy (2006), McElroy and Parry (2010),
McElroy and Hamma (2010), and Milne (1992). The other is the exploitation
of niches of jurisdictional opportunity in a globalising world – what Baldac-
chino (2004) has labelled the 'PROFIT' strategy based on "the resourceful-
ness of jurisdiction" (Baldacchino/Milne 2000) – involving a wide range of
leading sectors: offshore financial centres and tax havens (Shaxson 2011),
rentals from foreign-controlled fishery and mineral activities in expanded
exclusive economic zones, provision of strategic geopolitical services includ-
ing military bases and weapons testing (see Poirine 1995; Drezner 2001;
Baldacchino 2006b). The resulting three-way classification of development
paths into MIRAB, SITE and PROFIT models, with export-led growth mere-
ly a subset of the PROFIT group, is summarised in Bertram (2006) and Bal-
dacchino and Bertram (2009, from which figure 1 has been reproduced). A
more detailed classification by Bertram and Poirine (2007: Table 8 and Figure
12, 353-364) identified nine developmental paths across 80 small island
economies, with export-led growth being only one of the nine.

Smallness is not a handicap

There is a strong school of thought that regards small countries as inherently
vulnerable simply on account of their size (Briguglio 1995; Streeten 1993)
but this "vulnerability paradigm" does not perform well empirically (Baldac-
chino/Bertram 2009:146-148). *Vulnerability* as measured by its proponents
has turned out to be positively, not negatively, related to income per capita
(Armstrong et al 1998; Easterly/Kraay 2002; Sampson 2005). Small islands,
rather, seem characterised by *strategic flexibility*, with non-sovereign island
jurisdictions leading the way (Baldacchino/Bertram 2009).

Figure 1: A three-fold taxonomy of small-island economies

MIRAB:	MIRAB/SITE:	SITE:
Cape Verde Comoros Dominica Haiti Kiribati Marshall Islands Mayotte Micronesia Montserrat Samoa Sao Tome & Prinicipe St Pierre et Miquelon Tokelau Tonga Tuvalu Wallis & Futuna	French Polynesia, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Palau, Pitcairn, Reunion	Bali, Bonaire, Canary Islands, Cook Islands, Curacao, Guam, Hawaii, St Maarten, Turks & Caicos

MIRABs   SITEs   PROFITs

SITE/PROFIT:

Anguilla
Antigua & Barbados
Aruba
Bahamas
Barbados
Bermuda
British Virgin Islands
Cayman Islands
Cyprus
Fiji,
Grenada
Maledives
Malta
Marianas
Seychelles
St Kitts & Nevis
St Lucia
St Vincent & Grena-
dines
US Virgin Islands
Vanuatu

MIRAB/ PROFIT:

Greenland, Nauru, New Caledonia, Solomon Islands, St Helena

PROFIT:

America Samoa, Bahrain, Falklands, Faroes, Guernsey, Iceland, Isle of Man, Jersey, Mauritius

Source: Baldacchino and Bertram (2009:152, figure 1)

Work by numerous researchers since 1990 has focused on the relatively strong development performance of very small, often island, economies relative to larger entities – a finding that throws doubt on the extent to which diseconomies of scale and scope necessarily constrain material welfare. Table 1 on next page shows the top fifteen economies in the world on the basis of Gross National Income (GNI) per capita in 2007, according to the World Bank's development indicators. The list includes five very small countries (less than 100,000 population), and three island economies, two of them very

Table 1: World Bank Development Indicators Top Fifteen

	GNI per capita	Population
Monaco	161,470	35,013
Bermuda	117,640	64,888
Liechtenstein	111,790	35,308
Luxembourg	79,670	479,993
Norway	76,950	4,709,153
Qatar	63,440	1,152,459
Switzerland	59,040	7,551,117
Iceland	58,780	311,566
Denmark	54,700	5,461,438
Ireland	49,150	4,356,931
Sweden	48,900	9,148,092
United States	48,640	301,231,207
Isle of Man	48,550	81,812
San Marino	46,880	30,377
Netherlands	46,310	16,381,696

Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries?page=1&display=default and http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?page=1 (23 January 2014).

small ones. The World Development Indicators lack data on many of the smallest island economies of which several (such as Aruba, Sint Maarten, Cayman Islands, US Virgin Islands) belong among the world's highest-income economies. In short, at the very small end of the size spectrum we encounter the world's richest economies in terms of GNI per capita. As Easterly and Kraay conclude (2002:2015), "*if we control for the location by continent of all countries, whether they are oil producers, and whether they belong to the OECD, then small states are actually significantly richer than other states*". Diseconomies of scale and scope due to small size have not proved crippling.

Sovereign independence has not been a developmental advantage

A by-product of the statistical work on size and income was the explanatory power of political status in relation to modern income levels. Many small island jurisdictions are sub-national jurisdictions within larger metropolitan economies, rather than sovereign independent nation states. Intuitively it seems quite probable that in very small units, there would be diseconomies of scope and scale in running a full-service government, and that this might be expected to be a drag on economic performance. In other words, non-sovereign jurisdictions are able to 'travel light' in terms of the resources that have to be allocated to operating the public sector. This intuition runs counter to the strong belief among world opinion leaders in the second half of the twentieth century that liberation of a people from 'colonial rule' should un-leash creative and productive potential, and enable a greater share of the eco-nomic surplus to be retained to finance development. Given that some trade-offs can be expected, the issue is ultimately an empirical one.

Strong statistical evidence that, among small economies at least, non-sovereign status is <u>positively</u> related to the level of per capita GDP, was found by Armstrong et al. (1998), Armstrong and Read (2000, 2002), Bertram (2004), McElroy and Pearce (2006), McElroy and Parry (2012) and Sampson (2005:7). Sampson found, however, no significant effect of sovereignty status on the growth rate, and a negative effect on growth of being a small state after controlling for sovereignty. Higher incomes today, in other words, may be explained by past, not current, economic prosperity. If so, it may be that dur-ing the decolonisation era there was a tendency for poorer colonies to become independent and for richer ones to remain non-sovereign; if that were to be the case, then causality could run from relative wealth to political status, not from political status to relative wealth. This question is central to the present paper.

Bertram (1986) reviewed the various options for decolonisation - sovereign independence, integration with another state, self-government in free association, and possible unspecified other options – and argued that sovereign independence was likely to be an inferior option for very small islands. In later statistical work on small islands Bertram (2004) estimated that integrated political status added between $5,600 and $7,500 in US dollars to per capita income, relative to sovereign independence. He concluded that sovereignty operates as a tax on material welfare, and hypothesised that non-sovereign political status confers advantages in political-economy terms because by being integrated with a larger, usually richer, economy, a small island community can secure more favourable treatment in terms of financial aid, migration access, other market access, and ability to leverage off some functions of large-country government services such as education and health.

Poirine (1999) demonstrated that in the 1990s not only did island economies in general receive more aid per capita than larger, non-island countries, but that non-sovereign islands secured 36 times more bilateral aid than comparable sovereign independent island states.

All of these studies essentially used modern-day cross-section comparisons of income levels across countries, with regression analysis based on panel data, to draw the conclusion that non-sovereignty seemed to pay off. What was lacking in that first generation of research was engagement with the long-run historical determinants of modern political and economic outcomes. As the wider development literature is giving increasing attention to economic history and especially to the long-run impacts of colonialism and biogeography on the modern world, it is time to gather more historical material together.

A 2009 statistical exercise by Feyer and Sacerdote investigated the long-term effects of colonialism across a sample of 81 islands. Most of their paper

was concerned with finding an instrumental variable for date of colonisation, which they hypothesised was an important determinant of modern income levels (they used wind direction because most European colonisation of small islands took place in the age of sailing ships, which meant that the geographical intensity of search and discovery was influenced by prevailing winds). But their data set showed a pattern that ran against the conventional wisdom on decolonisation: the number of centuries an island economy had been a colony was positively, not negatively, related to modern per capita income (Feyrer/Sacerdote 2009: Figure 1, 251). They commented (ibid.:248) that "*there is a robust positive relationship between colonial tenure and modern outcomes. The obvious question is why? More intensive involvement with Europeans or longer colonial rule might have left islands with a more stable or better structured government. This theory is most associated with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson… Unfortunately, it is not easy to identify which governmental institutions are the most critical, and measuring institutional quality is extremely difficult. Furthermore, even if we had a modern index of say, expropriation risk or corruption for these islands, one might worry that good modern institutions were caused by high incomes rather than the other way around. We offer two partial (and admittedly imperfect) solutions to this conundrum.*"

The answers tested were who was the coloniser, and when did colonisation occur? Along the way, their econometric work included the end date of colonialism in each case as well as the initial date, which meant that they had a set of cases in their sample (the modern non-sovereigns) with no end date. Their regression that included this information threw up the finding that "*(b)eing a colony at the end of the twentieth century remains very positively associated with income [even though] [c]onditional on making it to the end of*

the century as a colony, years as a colony in the twentieth century are nega-
tively associated with income" (ibid.).

Decolonisation options

By "remaining a colony", Feyrer and Sacerdote (2009) meant being subordi-
nated to a larger metropolitan power. But this misconstrues the issue. Decolo-
nisation does not necessarily have to consist of moving to a sovereign inde-
pendent nation state, and sub-national status is not synonymous with colonial
status. On the contrary, small islands have been the laboratory for exploring
various ways of exiting from the colonial era, and sub-national status in the
early twenty-first century is fully compatible with the genuine exercise of
autonomous local agency in economic and social development, as Godfrey
Baldacchino and I have been arguing (Baldacchino/Bertram 2009). The con-
fusion of sub-national jurisdictions with 'colonies' may be understandable
given the pro-independence rhetoric of the United Nations Committee on
Decolonisation over the past half-century, but misses the point that the test of
decolonisation laid down by UN Resolution 1514 (December 1960) was not
sovereign independence but simply "a full measure of self-government",
which could be consistent with "integration with an independent State" or
"free association with an independent state", as viable post-colonial alterna-
tives to sovereign independence. The real issue is the extent of local autono-
my, agency and initiative. Decolonisation in a sub-national context is a
change in degree rather than in kind on these dimensions.

Decolonisation was one of the great historical transformations of the mid-
twentieth century in Asia and Africa, but it is often overlooked that in the
Americas there was a similar political upheaval in the years 1775 to 1825, as
a colonial order established on the North and South American continents by
Britain, Spain, Portugal and France was supplanted by a swarm of new sover-
eign nation states. The dominant process then, as in twentieth century

decolonisation, was the installation of sovereign national governments in place of the colonial administrators among the large nations of the two continents. But foreshadowing twentieth-century experience, the sovereign-independence model ran aground in the small islands of the Caribbean. There is a striking contrast between the continental American drive to sovereign national independence and the survival of colonial rule in the islands of the Caribbean.

Only in relatively-large Haiti did an independent nation state emerge, following a slave revolt (related to the Revolution in the metropolitan power, France) that displaced the previous ruling groups. In much of the Caribbean the continuation of colonial rule was favoured by the ruling slave-owning elites, reinforced by the superior military power the colonial powers could wield against small territories. No genuinely indigenous population or culture had survived from pre-colonial times to provide a basis for self-conscious national identity, and the transition out of slavery helped to defuse political activism amongst the black populations.

Effectively, the social contract that developed was one in which the elites controlling the Caribbean islands threw in their lot with the metropolitan colonial powers as a matter of straightforward self-interest. Over time the range of groups that benefited from holding onto the colonial relationship encompassed a growing proportion of the islander population, especially in the British, French and Dutch Caribbean. Eventually this provided the basis for the great post-World War II burst of West Indian migration to Britain: between 1948 and 1970 about half a million people moved, out of a population in the British West Indies of 3-4 million – about 15% out-migration. When decolonisation finally got underway in the Caribbean in the 1950s and 1960s, a substantial number of the island territories turned down the option of sovereign nationhood and opted instead for sub-national status. Bermuda,

Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Netherland Antilles including Aruba, joined Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands (see below) as post-colonial sub-national jurisdictions in the region.

Meantime Spanish colonial rule in the Caribbean had been broken not by popular resistance but by the USA in its 1898 war with Spain, the outcome of which was one nation state (Cuba) and one sub-national jurisdiction (Puerto Rico) which has remained non-sovereign since and has become increasingly closely linked into the US economy. The USA subsequently moved on to buy the US Virgin Islands from Denmark in 1917; these are still an 'unincorporated organized territory' of the USA. Table 2 lists the inhabited island territories that have sub-national status within the USA[2]. None of these think of themselves as 'colonies' any longer (if they ever did).

Table 2: Inhabited US Island Territories

	Since	Other history
US State		
Hawai'i	1959	Annexed by US 1898
Commonwealths of the United States		
Puerto Rico	1952	US colony 1898-1952
Northern Mariana Islands	1978	UN Trust Territory 1946-78
Unincorporated organized territories		
Guam	1898	Conquered from Spain
US Virgin Islands	1917	Purchased from Denmark
Unincorporated unorganized territory		
Guantanamo Bay	1903	

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territories_of_the_United_States (19 March 2014).

As the worldwide era of decolonisation got underway after the end of Second World War, it became conventional wisdom that the correct path for former

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2   Detailed definitions of the different jurisdictional arrangements are online available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Territories_of_the_United_States.

colonies to follow was the same as that of the continental American colonies before them, leading to the establishment of sovereign nation states on the Westphalian model. In the metropolitan countries themselves, governments accepted this as inevitable and encouraged the United Nations to evolve into a major driving force for decolonisation, with newly independent states in Africa and Asia gaining General Assembly seats and pushing with increasing determination for the elimination of all remaining 'colonies'.

Two fundamental issues were apparent from the outset of this process. One was the difficulty of matching the concept of 'nation' (a matter of cultural and ethnic identity and self-identification) with the concept of 'state' (a matter of political control over a defined territory and the ability to act in a sovereign fashion in asserting that control in a global community of nations). Many post-colonial states, especially in Africa, were patchworks of tribal identities and ancient loyalties that did not fit the colonial borders imposed in the nineteenth century. Others, such as India and Pakistan, were deliberately constructed to separate conflicting religious domains, but struggled to encapsulate this in the form of territorial borders. The attempt by the British in the Caribbean to usher a large group of colonies through to independence under the title of 'West Indies Federation' (1958-1962) failed because of the obvious diversity of the communities involved and the strength of popular resistance to being thus shoehorned into a new nation state big enough to fit metropolitan aspirations.

The second fundamental issue for decolonisation was the general situation of small island territories around the world, where the economic basis for full sovereign statehood seemed shaky and where the tide of decolonisation ideology often ran out of momentum, given the absence or weakness of popular anti-colonial movements. It is true that in some small islands the local elite saw benefit to themselves in establishing and staffing a sovereign national

government, and therefore acted as a local vested interest group supporting a full-sovereignty decolonisation bargain with the colonial power; examples were Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, in the Caribbean; Iceland (1944) in the North Atlantic; Malta (1964) and Cyprus (1960) in the Mediterranean; Nauru (1968), Vanuatu (1980) and Western Samoa (1962) in the Pacific.

Other small islands were effectively dropped overboard by the colonial power and left to fend for themselves, with varying degrees of ongoing support from the metropole. In the Pacific the outstanding cases were the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (1978-79) (now Kiribati and Tuvalu) and the Solomon Islands (1976); in the Indian Ocean Mauritius (1968) and the Seychelles (1976); in the Caribbean the Windward Islands (Grenada (1974), St Vincent (1979), Dominica (1978), Antigua (1981), St Kitts and Nevis (1983), and St Lucia (1979).

This left many small island territories where local enthusiasm for full sovereign statehood was muted or absent, support for continuing integration with the colonial power was strong, and the decolonisation process was diverted into other channels. One of those channels was the concept of 'associated statehood' championed by New Zealand at the United Nations in the 1960s to cater for the unwillingness of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau to move to full independence. Self-government in free association was applied in the Cook Islands (1965) and Niue (1974), by the British briefly in the Windward Islands after the collapse of the West Indies Federation, and by the United States in its Pacific Island Trust Territories.

Another outcome envisaged in the UN decolonisation documents was political integration with the metropole. This was applied most systematically by France (see table 3), which removed its island colonies from United Nations decolonisation oversight in 1947 and subsequently made them into Departements d'Outre-Mer and Territoires d'Outre-Mer (DOMTOMs). This

applied to New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, and French Polynesia in the Pacific; Reunion and Mayotte in the Indian Ocean; St Pierre et Miquelon in the Atlantic, and Martinique and Guadeloupe in the Caribbean. These became integral parts of France, each with a substantial degree of local autonomy to run local government but all formally subordinated to a central government department in Paris.

Table 3: French Overseas Territories and Departments that are islands

Overseas Departments		Other history
	Since	
Guadeloupe	1946	
Martinique	1946	
Reunion	1946	
Mayotte	2011	TOM 1976-2003
Overseas Collectivities		
French Polynesia	2003	TOM 1946-2003
Saint-Pierre et Miquelon	2003	TOM 1976-2003
Wallis and Futuna	2003	TOM 1961-2003
St Martin	2003	Formerly part of Guadeloupe
St Barthelemy	2003	Formerly part of Guadeloupe
Special Collectivity		
New Caledonia	1999	TOM 1946-1998

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overseas_departments_and_territories_of_France (1.8.2011)

The formal integration route was adopted also by the United States for Hawaii (statehood in 1959) and partially for the Northern Marianas (commonwealth status 1975) in the Pacific, and for Puerto Rico (commonwealth status 1952) in the Caribbean (see Table 2 above).

Constructing an island sample for the decolonisation period

To see how political status has related to the material welfare of small-island populations over time it is necessary to identify a sample of economies that were all non-self-governing before the great decolonisation boom in the second half of the twentieth century and which followed different political

trajectories thereafter. These divergent decolonisation histories provide a natural experiment in the economic effects of alternative trajectories. Similar work to this, with a substantial data set for the most recent decades, is in McElroy and Parry (2012). Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter contains a 'Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories', within which Article 73 requires the administering powers of non-self-governing territories to "*transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible…*"

This placed a reporting requirement on administering powers which put their performance under an international spotlight. Reporting obligations also applied to states administering UN mandates or trusts over non-self-governing territories captured during the two World Wars, under Chapter XII of the Charter. In 1946 the eight 'administering powers'[3] submitted a list of 74 territories under their control which were to be subject to Chapter XI[4]. In addition, under Chapter XII of the Charter eleven territories were listed as trust territories[5]. Subsequent additions to the UN's list of non-self-governing territories brought the total up to 97 entities[6], of which 36 are islands or groups of islands with populations under 5 million inhabitants. In terms of the current world political map these 36 entities comprise 61 individual islands or

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[3] Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Notably missing was Portugal, whose dependent territories were not included in the UN list until 1963.

[4] The list can be found in General Assembly Resolution 66(1) 'Transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter', 9 February 1946, online available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3443695.60480118.html (accessed 27 January 2014).

[5] These are described at www.un.org/en/decolonization/its.shtml and listed at www.un.org/en/decolonization/selfdet.shtml (both accessed 27 January 2014).

[6] Listed at http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml (accessed 27 January 2014).

closely-linked archipelagos, as shown in Table 4 (see pages 402-404), or 57 if the Netherlands Antilles except for Aruba are treated as an entity. These islands provide the sample for the statistical comparisons that follow.[7] The research programme, from which this chapter gives some early results, takes the small island countries in Table 4 as a representative sample of candidates for 'decolonisation' after the Second World War, divides them between those that (as of 2012) have moved to become sovereign states and those that have become *sub-national island jurisdictions* (SNIJs), and then compares the two groups over time on indicators such as population, income per head, life expectancy, early childhood mortality, and imports per head.

Decolonisation outcomes and economic trajectories

A preliminary question is whether, among the 61 islands in Table 4, it was the small ones that became sub-national and the large ones that became sovereign. Figure 2 on page 405 shows the pattern across the sample. A tendency for non-sovereign status to be more common among very small units is suggested, and possibly some tendency for sovereign status to be more common in the population range 500,000 – 1,000,000, but there is no statistically significant conclusion to be drawn. The average population of sovereigns in the sample is 437,500 and that of non-sovereigns is 243,300 but the standard deviations in both cases are bigger than the means.

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[7] Sources: Islands list compiled from http://www.un.org/en/decolonization/nonselfgov.shtml, plus the 1946 list at http://www.statehoodhawaii.org/hist/nsgt.html and UN Resolution 66(1) 9 February 1946 at http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/3443695.60480118.html (all accessed January 2014). Population from United Nations Demographic Yearbook 2012 Table 5 at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2012.htm, accessed January 2014, with gaps filled using Wikipedia entries for individual islands. WDI income data from World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/1.1#, accessed 29 January 2014. UN income data from http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/resQuery.asp, accessed 29 January 2014. CIA income data from https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/ 2004rank.html accessed 29 January 2014.

Table 4: Islands that were listed as 'non-self-governing territories' or 'trust territories' by the UN at some time since 1946

Island territory at 1946	Component islands	Metropolitan power	Political Status at 2012	Population 2010	Per capita income at 2012 according to three databases		
					WDI 2012	UN Statistical Division	CIA World Factbook
American Samoa	American Samoa	USA	SNIJ[8]	66,000			8,000
Bahamas	Bahamas	UK	Sovereign	346,900	20,600	21,102	31,300
Barbados	Barbados	UK	Sovereign	276,302	15,080	14,739	25,000
Bermuda	Bermuda	UK	SNIJ	64,566	104,590	105,171	86,000
Cape Verde	Cape Verde	Portugal	Sovereign	517,831	3,830	3,731	4,400
Cocos (Keeling) Islands	Cocos (Keeling) Islands	Australia	SNIJ	600			
Cook Islands	Cook Islands	New Zealand	SNIJ	23,600		14,918	9,100
	Niue	New Zealand	SNIJ	1,496			5,800
Cyprus	Cyprus	UK	Sovereign	827,697	26,110	25,580	26,800
Fiji	Fiji	UK	Sovereign	857,000	4,110	4,507	4,700
French Establishments in Oceania	French Polynesia	France	SNIJ	268,500		26,113	22,000
	Wallis and Futuna	France	SNIJ	15,000			3,800
Greenland	Greenland	Denmark	SNIJ	56,534		40,303	37,400
Guadeloupe	Guadeloupe	France	SNIJ	401,784			
Hawaii	Hawaii	USA	SNIJ	1,360,301			
High Commission Territories of the Western Pacific	Kiribati	UK	Sovereign	100,000	2,520	2,077	6,200
	Tuvalu	UK	Sovereign	10,924	5,650	7,051	3,400
	Solomon Islands	UK	Sovereign	530,669	1,130	1,543	3,300
	Pitcairn	UK	SNIJ	58			
Jamaica	Jamaica	UK	Sovereign	2,702,310	5,120	5,187	8,900
	Cayman Islands	UK	SNIJ	54,878		53,393	

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[8]   SNIJ = sub-national island jurisdictions.

Island territory at 1946	Component islands	Metropolitan power	Political Status at 2012	Population 2010	Per capita income at 2012 according to three databases		
					WDI 2012	UN Statistical Division	CIA World Factbook
Leeward Islands	Antigua and Barbuda	UK	Sovereign	90,801	12,480	12,740	17,800
	British Virgin Islands	UK	SNIJ	21,689		29,436	42,300
	Montserrat	UK	SNIJ	5,020		12,049	8,500
	St Kitts & Nevis	UK	Sovereign	51,970	13,610	13,777	16,100
	Anguilla	UK	SNIJ	16,373		19,895	12,200
Madagascar and dependencies	Mayotte	France	SNIJ	212,645			
	Comoros	France	Sovereign	798,000	840	830	1,300
Malta	Malta	UK	Sovereign	415,275	19,760	19,265	26,900
Martinique	Martinique	France	SNIJ	396,308			
Mauritius	Mauritius	UK	Sovereign	1,280,924	8,570	9,337	15,400
Nauru	Nauru	Australia	Sovereign	9,378		12,577	5,000
New Caledonia and dependencies	New Caledonia	France	SNIJ	250,040		38,869	37,700
New Hebrides	Vanuatu	France & UK	Sovereign	221,417	3,000	2,869	4,800
Netherlands Antilles	Aruba	Netherlands	SNIJ	101,860		23,367	25,300
	Bonaire	Netherlands	SNIJ	14,006		18,168	
	Curacao						15,000
	Sint Maarten	Netherlands	SNIJ	917		18,168	15.400
	Saba	Netherlands	SNIJ	1,991		18,168	
	Sint Eustacius	Netherlands	SNIJ	3,543		18,168	
Puerto Rico	Puerto Rico	USA	SNIJ	3,721,208	18,000	18,634	16,300
Pacific Islands Trust Territories	Marshall Islands	USA	SNIJ	54,305	4,040	4,748	8,600
	Federated States of Micronesia	USA	Sovereign	107,839	3,230	3,317	7,100
	Palau	USA	Sovereign	21,388	9,860	8,853	10,500
	Northern Marianas	USA	SNIJ	48,317			13,600

Island territory at 1946	Component islands	Metropolitan power	Political Status at 2012	Population 2010	Per capita income at 2012 according to three databases		
					WDI 2012	UN Statistical Division	CIA World Factbook
Reunion	Reunion	France	SNIJ	828,054			
Samoa	Samoa	New Zealand	Sovereign	184,032	3,260	3,436	6,200
Sao Tome and Principe	Sao Tome and Principe	Portugal	Sovereign	163,783		1,397	2,100
Seychelles	Seychelles	UK	Sovereign	89,770	12,260	10,198	25,000
St. Pierre and Miquelon	St. Pierre and Miquelon	France	SNIJ	6,080			34,900
St Helena and dependencies	St Helena	UK	SNIJ	4,250			7,800
	Tristan da Cunha	UK	SNIJ	263			7,800
	Ascension	UK	SNIJ	702			7,800
Tokelau Islands	Tokelau	New Zealand	SNIJ	1,400			1,000
Trinidad and Tobago	Trinidad and Tobago	UK	Sovereign	1,317,714	14,710	18,067	19,800
US Virgin Islands	US Virgin Islands	USA	SNIJ	110,000			14,500
Windward Islands	Dominica	UK	Sovereign	69,017	6,440	6,710	14,000
	Grenada	UK	Sovereign	110,821	7,220	6,989	13,500
	St Lucia	UK	Sovereign	172,370	6,890	7,204	13,000
	St Vincent and the Grenadines	UK	Sovereign	100,892	6,400	6,314	11,800

In fact the key conclusion to be drawn from Figure 2 is that the choice of political status has been wide open across the size range of the sample. A second point to emerge from the detail of Figure 2 is that the UK has been far less amenable than France and the USA to conceding non-sovereign status for its larger territories. The largest non-sovereign with the UK as its metropole is Bermuda, with a population of 65,000; above this level all the islands that were under UK rule in 1946 have moved through to sovereign independence.

Figure 2: Political status and population size of small islands

The next question to ask is how income per capita compares today after half a century of divergent political evolution in the two sets of islands. A major problem is data: the big international agencies which prepare consistent national accounting measures across economies commonly do not collect and publish figures for very small territories, especially if those territories are non-sovereign (hence not members of the UN or the World Bank). Of the 61 island economies in Table 4, only 27 have their Gross National Income per capita reported in the World Bank's 'World Development Indicators' and these are all sovereigns with the sole exception of Bermuda. The Penn World Tables 6.3 covers none of the non-sovereign islands in the sample. The UN Statistical Agency's national accounts database has better coverage: 42 of the 61 islands in the sample, of which 26 are sovereigns and 16 are non-sovereigns. The CIA World Factbook covers 50 of the 61 islands, comprising 26 sovereigns and 24 non-sovereigns, but is less methodologically rigorous than the other international organisations. The reliability of the sources, in fact, is inversely related to their coverage of non-sovereign territories, but data availability prevails, for the moment, over strict rigour. Table 4 shows the UN and CIA figures, and Figures 3 and 4 plot the data.

The impression given by both these charts (in common with the previous literature reviewed above, which generally analyses data for territorial units without adjusting for population size) - that non-sovereigns among the sample tend to exhibit higher income levels than sovereigns today – could be misleading if the charts have been biased by giving undue weight to a large number of very small economies. Table 5 and Figure 5 show the comparison of aggregated income per capita across all the sovereign island populations and across the non-sovereigns. This population-weighted calculation confirms the proposition that non-sovereigns have an advantage.

Figure 3: Political status and income per head at 2012 according to the UN Statistical Agency

Figure 4: Political status and income per head at 2012 according to the CIA World Factbook

Table 5: Population-weighted per capita income 2012 compared between sovereign and non-sovereign islands

	UN data		CIA data	
	Number of islands	Population-weighted average income	Number of is-lands	Population-weighted average income
Sovereigns	26	9.316	26	12.740
Non-sovereigns	16	21.991	23	19.163

Source: Derived from data in Table 4.

Figure 5: Population-weighted comparisons of income per head using two datasets

Source: Derived from data in Table 4.

To this point, the statistical information on islands sample used here simply confirms previous work showing a positive cross-section relationship between non-sovereignty and income (McElroy/Parry 2012). The obvious question that follows is whether this disparity emerged during and after the

decolonisation process, or existed prior to decolonisation. For this, we require either time series data going back to 1946, or at least a data set showing income across the islands at 1946 or 1950, that would enable us to see whether the modern income disparity was present or absent at the beginning of decolonisation. Such income data is not at this stage available on a worldwide basis.

As a first step I have used the UN Statistical Division's macroeconomic database to trace per capita income over the 40-year period 1970-2010 for 26 of the sovereign islands in the sample and 13 of the non-sovereigns. For each economy covered I take Gross National Income per capita in US dollars and deflate to 2012 US dollars using the US GDP deflator. I then calculate the population-weighted average per capita real GNI for the sovereigns and non-sovereigns and plot the results at five-yearly intervals. The results of this exercise are shown in Figures 6 and 7. In Figure 6, the 1970 distribution of per capita income is plotted on the same basis as the 2012 distribution in Figure 3 above, showing that the shape of the distribution hardly changed over the 40 years, although the detailed ranking of individual economies has changed, and the leading 1970 sovereign cases Bahamas and Nauru clearly fell behind relative to the leading 2012 non-sovereigns Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.

Figure 6: Political status and income per head at 1970 according to the UN Statistical Agency

Figure 7 traces the population-weighted per capita real income of the sovereign and non-sovereign groups over the 40-year period and shows that the higher incomes of non-sovereigns goes back at least to 1970, and that since 1970 the two groups of economies have exhibited virtually identical aggregated rates of growth – strong confirmation for Sampson's (2005) finding that recent growth rates are not statistically related to political status. (There are signs in the chart that the early-1980s global downturn hit the sovereigns harder than the non-sovereigns, but this followed a period when the former's growth had been outpacing the latter's.) This suggests that the difference

Figure 7: Trajectories of real per capita GNI in 26 sovereign versus 13 non-sovereign island economies 1970-2010, population-weighted averages (Source: as for Figure 4)

in material welfare between the two types of political status was established already at 1970, which means that either something happened very early in the decolonisation era to separate the two groups of islands, or the hypothesis of a causal relation running from political status to income differentials (advanced, e.g., by Bertram 2004) loses ground to the competing hypothesis that wealthier territories were more successful in avoiding independence.

Another way to measure convergence or divergence over time between the two groups of island economies is the ratio of per capita income. This is shown in Figure 8 over the four decades 1970-2010. The pattern that shows

Figure 8: Ratio of population-weighted GNI per capita between 26 sovereign and 13 non-sovereign island economies, 1970-2010 (Source: as for Figure 4)

up is of non-sovereigns falling behind relative to sovereigns during the 1970s, but pulling away again in the 1980s before dropping back again in the 2000s. Over the forty-year period there is no clear secular trend, but the steep drop in

the early 1970s makes it all the more important to push the analysis further back to see whether the 1970 data may be an anomaly.

For one region it is possible to carry income comparisons back a further decade. A long-run study of the Caribbean islands has been published with a database going back to the early nineteenth century, which offers GDP estimates for the period 1960-1998 (Bulmer-Thomas 2001: Table 10). Figure 9 compares the time paths of individual islands over that 1960-1998 period,

Figure 9: GDP per capita of 12 sovereign and 11 non-sovereign Caribbean island economies, 1960-1998

Source: Bulmer-Thomas 2001: Table 10.

with those that became sovereign during the period shown with dashed lines and those that remained non-sovereign shown as solid lines. Island economies that have remained non-sovereigns tended to converge at the upper end of the distribution over time, whereas islands that became sovereigns grew more slowly overall and without apparent convergence. Figure 10 compares the path of population-weighted GDP per capita between the two Caribbean

Figure 10: Population-weighted real GDP per capita 12 sovereign and 11 non-sovereign Caribbean island economies, 1960-98 (Source: ibid. Tables 2 & 10)

groups, indicating both that the islands heading for non-sovereign status were collectively ahead at 1960 and that thereafter they diverged from the sovereign island states. This leaves the issue of causality still wide open, but could indicate two-way causality: both that the more prosperous islands avoided sovereignty, and that non-sovereignty may have boosted their economic performance. However, whether the Caribbean experience can be generalised to

islands in other regions remains to be explored. I turn now to two other measures that are more readily available for longer time periods: life expectancy, and imports.

The UN Demographic Yearbook and its historical supplements have information on life expectancy at birth for 22 of the 61 islands in Table 4 over six decades from 1950-55 to 2011. Figure 11 on the next page compares the distributions for these two periods, showing that across the two groups of islands for which long-run data is available, life expectancy rose substantially (by roughly a decade) and there was clear convergence as the laggards caught up. At the beginning and end of the period the two economies with highest life expectancy were, not surprisingly, the two (now-sovereign) European ones in the sample: Malta and Cyprus. Across the 22 economies, the visual impression is of a slight overall edge in favour of non-sovereigns, but there may well be bias in the samples, especially the non-sovereign sample, where higher living standards probably produced more statistical reporting.

The conclusion here appears to be that differences in life expectancy associated with eventual political status, which may have existed in the early 1950s, were increasingly eliminated over time as all island economies converged toward the 80-year level at which gains in life expectancy seem to level off. This potentially supports the possibility that today's non-sovereigns may have started out somewhat ahead of today's sovereigns among our island sample, but does not sustain the idea that non-sovereign status confers any clear advantage in relation to health outcomes. When average life expectancy across the two groups is tracked on a population-weighted basis, the outcome depends on the inclusion or exclusion of Puerto Rico – the largest of the non-sovereigns for which data was available, which already by 1950 had life

Figure 11: Total life expectancy at birth in 13 sovereign and nine non-sovereign island economies 1950-55 and 2011

expectancy of over 60 years after half a century of close connection to the USA. The calculation is crude, and prone to errors arising from gaps in the data and sample selection bias (only islands for which data was available are included). Data was located for 22 sovereigns and 14 non-sovereigns – a total of 36 of the 61 islands in Table 4. The results are in Figure 12, first with Puerto Rico included and then with it excluded. With Puerto Rico excluded, the remaining 13 non-sovereigns started out behind the sovereigns in 1950 but had caught up by 1970 and moved well ahead by 2010.

The life expectancy evidence, therefore, is inconclusive with respect to the key question of causality – whether relative wealth preceded political dependence, or vice versa. The second panel of Figure 12 is the best evidence at this point for the second position. We turn, therefore, to imports per head – probably the best proxy for consumption standards for which long-run data is available.

Figure 12: Population-weighted average life expectancy at birth, 22 sovereigns compared with 14 non-sovereigns including Puerto Rico

Figure 12 cont.

Trade data

Statistics of merchandise trade were collected and published for most small island territories throughout the colonial era, and have continued to appear for both sovereign and non-sovereign islands since decolonisation. The World Trade Organisation's online database begins in 1948, but is almost completely restricted to sovereign states, and for a number of the sovereign islands in the Table 4 sample only shorter runs of data for more recent dates are provided. Other sources fill some of the gaps, and provide figures for some non-sovereign islands. In this section a preliminary analysis is undertaken by assembling per capita import figures in US dollars for as many as possible of the islands in our sample at ten-yearly intervals from 1950 to 2010.

At this stage (early 2014) it has been possible to locate data on merchandise imports per capita in US dollars for only 22 sovereign small-island economies and eleven non-sovereigns – a total of 33, just over half the economies in the Table 4 sample. Future research will be directed to substantially

increasing the representation of non-sovereigns. Figure 13 plots the data, first with the Netherlands Antilles included and then with this outlier excluded. (Imports to the Netherlands Antilles at that time were dominated by oil passing through the refineries on Aruba and re-exported after processing – in other words, were mainly intermediate goods rather than destined for final consumption.)

No clear-cut general conclusions are possible from this exercise. Obviously two or three individual non-sovereigns (Bermuda, New Caledonia, Netherlands Antilles) stand out ahead of the bunch at 1950 but across the remainder of the islands covered there is no strong pattern. Provisionally Figure 13 on the following page could be consistent with the hypothesis that the gap between sovereign and non-sovereign groups opened up during or after decolonisation and was not pre-existing - but the fact that the three top cases in the import data at 1950 were all economies that later retained non-sovereign status keeps alive the alternative hypothesis that for at least part of the sample causality may have run from economic to political status.

Repeating the exercise for two post-decolonisation years, 1990 and 2010, produces the results in Figures 14 (for 1990) and 15 (for 2010) on the following pages for essentially the same sets of islands (American Samoa is added in 1990, Aruba appears separately from the rest of the Netherlands Antilles, and a couple of other non-sovereigns enter or leave the set as a result of data availability).

Figure 13: Imports per capita in US dollars in 1950: 22 sovereign and 11 non-sovereign small island economies

Figure 13 cont.

US dollars per head

Excluding Netherlands Antilles

Sovereign
Non-sovereign

Figure 14: Imports per capita in US dollars in 1990: 22 sovereign and 12 non-sovereign small island economies

Figure 15: Imports per capita in US dollars in 2010: 22 sovereign and 12 non-sovereign small island economies

Visually, comparing Figures 14 and 15 with Figure 13 might seem to support the hypothesis of non-sovereign political status driving stronger economic performance over time, but statistically significant results would still require systematic analysis that controlled for other factors, plus a bigger data set with wider coverage of non-sovereigns. This remains the object of future work. One corrective to the visual impression gained from Figures 13-15 is to calculate the population-weighted imports per head across the islands for which data was available. The result, in Figure 16, is remarkable. It appears to provide quite strong support for the idea that the islands that eventually became non-sovereign (a) started out ahead prior to decolonisation, and (b) retained basically the same lead sixty years after (c) experiencing a period during the late twentieth century when they pulled strongly ahead of the

Figure 16: Population-weighted imports per head, US dollars, sovereign versus non-sovereign island economies

sovereigns before falling back again at the beginning of the twenty-first cen-
tury. Thus analyses that emphasised the superior performance of non-
sovereigns up to the 1990s may have captured a phenomenon that was only
temporary and that may have been reversed in the past decade. The data are
not yet, however, strong enough to sustain any definite conclusion.

Conclusion

The research programme discussed in this chapter is still in progress and a
great deal remains to be done. The question of whether non-sovereign politi-
cal status confers economic advantage remains a fascinating one, which has
produced many research findings at the level of individual island case studies
while stimulating the search for statistically-valid generalisations. One central
proposition has stood the test of the work reported in this chapter: non-
sovereign economies at least have done no worse than sovereign ones in rais-
ing and sustaining the material living standards of their populations. The
choice of political status is therefore not one that can be founded on any ob-
vious superiority of sovereign independence. The opposite hypothesis - that
non-sovereign status wins out on economic performance - remains unproven
at the general level, however persuasively it can be argued for the histories of
particular cases. For non-sovereign island communities facing the possibility
of moving to sovereign independence – for example New Caledonia and
Bougainville – the economic evidence analysed here offers no clear positive
guidelines. Gains in per capita income should not be expected to flow from
independence; but neither is it clear that the change necessarily implies sacri-
ficing the material welfare of the population. This position is a considerable
shift from the argument in my previous work that gaining sovereign inde-
pendence has typically involved a trade-off: lower material welfare as the
price of gaining national identity and pride. But until more long-run data
spanning the entire decolonisation period is assembled and analysed, the

fundamental question of whether there is indeed any general relationship between sovereignty and material welfare in small islands will remain open.

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The MIRAB Model of Small Island Economies in the Pacific and their Security Issues

Clement A. Tisdell

Abstract: *The MIRAB model of Pacific island micro-economies was developed in the mid-1980s and dominated the literature on the economics of small island nations and economies until alternative models were proposed two decades later. Nevertheless, it is still an influential theory. MIRAB is an acronym for migration (MI), remittance (R) and foreign aid (A) and the public bureaucracy (B); the main components of the MIRAB model. The nature of this model is explained and the importance of distinguishing between the two processes involved in it (one based on foreign aid and the other on overseas remittance) is emphasised. Evidence is given of the importance of migration and overseas remittance for the functioning of some Pacific island microstates, such as Tonga. Yet, it is argued that no single model adequately typifies the economic situations of Pacific microstates and micro-economies because of their diversity. Even economies that have been classified as MIRAB economies can be very different. The newer TOURAB, SITE and PROFIT models have similar limitations. In order to understand adequately the economic situation of Pacific island microstates (including their economic vulnerability, their sustainability, and political merchantabilities), it is necessary to adopt a more holistic approach which takes account of historical, cultural and environmental factors.*

Introduction

The MIRAB model (which outlines the way in which several small island economies in the Pacific manage to remain sustainable, despite their comparative lack of domestic economic production) was developed by two New Zealand economists; Bertram and Watters (1985). It is based on the observation that these economies rely heavily on remittances from their emigrants and funds provided by foreign aid. As pointed out by Bertram (2006), this model has been widely accepted and applied not only in the Pacific but also to some small economies elsewhere. Bertram (2006:12) expresses the view that the MIRAB model is likely to continue to be applicable to many small island nations well into this century. Nevertheless, as is pointed out here, changes in the nature of the operation of the model are to be expected, and it is doubtful if it captures adequately the diverse way in which the economies of small island nations in the Pacific operate and have developed.

In this article, the basic structure of the MIRAB model is outlined and some studies providing support for it and examining its consequences are reviewed. The applicability of the model is then discussed and changes in the nature of its operation and future applicability are considered. This is followed by a brief discussion of security, sustainability and vulnerability issues involving small island nations in the Pacific. Before concluding, a brief note is added on the case of Nauru.

The MIRAB Model, Evidence Supporting it and its Consequences

MIRAB is an acronym for Migration (MI) Remittances (R), Foreign Aid (A) and the Public Bureaucracy (B); the essential components of the MIRAB model. It has been claimed that many small economies in the Pacific Islands rely on these four elements to sustain the economic welfare of their population (see, for example, Bertram/Watters 1985, 1986; Bertram 1986, 2006; see

also Bertram in this volume). There is convincing evidence that this is so for some, for instance, the Cook Islands, Samoa and Tonga.

It is helpful to decompose the MIRAB model into two distinct processes: (1) the aid process and (2) the emigration and remittance process. These operate as follows:

- Process I depends on the provision of foreign aid which in MIRAB economies is mainly used to fund the government bureaucracy. This aid provides income for public servants and a portion of this is remitted to their relatives, especially those who lack access to cash income. Expenditure by public servants (by those receiving their remittances) adds to additional employment and to cash incomes in MIRAB economies, for example, in retailing, via a multiplier effect. Nevertheless, typically, the import leakage from this expenditure is high. In cases where foreign aid is tied, this leakage is especially high.

- Process II involves the sending of remittances by emigrants from MIRAB economies to relatives (and to others) remaining at home. In turn, the spending of those remittances has a local multiplier effect on incomes and employment but this is damped by a high import leakage.

Figure 1 on the next page highlights these two processes. There is strong evidence that globally the total amount of international remittances to developing countries significantly exceeds the total value of their Official Development Assistance (Ratha/Silwal 2012), and this is probably so for most MIRAB economies in the Pacific. With foreign aid being reduced by countries such as Australia and the USA, many MIRAB economies are likely to become relatively more dependent on Process II, the flow of overseas

remittances from their emigrants, in order to maintain the economic welfare of their inhabitants.

Figure 1: Flow charts for two processes that sustain the functioning of MIRAB economies

Tonga's economy is heavily dependent on remittances from its overseas migrants. The nature and role of these remittances has been studied in depth by Richard P.C. Brown of The University of Queensland. Jimenez-Soto and Brown (2012:426) report that "*as many as 60 per cent of all households in Tonga have at least one overseas migrant, and 90 per cent of households receive remittances.*"

Brown, Connell and Jimenez-Soto (2013) find from studies of remittances by Tongans (and more recently by Fijians) that these are used mostly for consumptive rather than for investment. They argue, however, that this should not be deprecated because these remittances play an important role in poverty alleviation and in providing social protection. Jimenez-Soto and Brown

(2012) conclude from their detailed study of the role of migrants' remittances in Tonga that these remittances reduced the incidence of poverty by 31%. Furthermore, Brown, Leeves and Prayaga (2013) found that considerable social pressure is exerted on migrants (often through their church affiliations) to donate extra funds when natural disasters strike their Pacific homelands.

Why do some Pacific microstates rely heavily on continuing foreign aid and international remittances for their economic welfare? Why are remittances (and aid) used mainly for consumption ('unproductive' purposes) rather than for investment ('productive' purposes) in many Pacific microstates? One possibility is that the returns on investments in some of these economies are low or negative and the scope for investments giving positive returns at home are limited (Tisdell 2007). This is probably one reason why the governments of Tuvalu and Kiribati invest most of their capital funds abroad (namely the Tuvalu Trust Fund and the Reserve Equalisation Reserve Fund respectively) (Tisdell 2000a, 2000b). Bertram (2006:2) observed that there were limited opportunities for commercial economic investment in the MIRAB economies which he and Watters studied (Bertram/Watters 1985). However, Pacific microstates are diverse (Tisdell 1996, 2002, 2007, 2008a) and the extent to which commercial investment in them can yield positive returns varies. For example, the scope for productive investments is likely to be less in island nations consisting of atolls (for example, Kiribati and Tuvalu) than in those with islands that are mainly of volcanic origin (Fiji) or which are primarily of a continental type (New Caledonia).

If there is little scope for positive returns from investment in commercial production in Pacific microstates, then an alternative possible way to sustain their economies is by obtaining foreign aid and receiving international remittances. It also follows that there is little scope for aid to act as a catalyst for developing self-sustaining commercial production in these microstates.

Furthermore, the investment of remittances locally for productive purposes will be infrequent if negative returns are likely in most cases. An additional consideration is that a higher return may be obtained by investing in offspring (to increase their human capital) in order to facilitate their emigration and subsequently, their remittances. Poirine (1997) has studied this aspect in detail as far as investment in the education of children in MIRAB economies is concerned and stresses its importance.

It also follows too that many microstates in the Pacific are unable to develop by applying the liberal economic principles of the Washington Consensus. The smallest states (Nauru, Kiribati and Tuvalu for example) are severely restricted in their ability to profitably export goods, although some microstates are able to benefit from trade in services, such as tourism (Fiji) or by acting as a tax haven for banking and finance (Vanuatu).

How Widely Applicable is the MIRAB Model to Microstates?

The question has arisen of the extent to which the economies of Pacific island microstates satisfy the MIRAB model. First, it can be said that the model glosses over significant differences in factors sustaining the economies of microstates that have been classified as MIRAB economies. For example, Bertram (2006:7, Figure 1) classifies Samoa and Tonga, Kiribati and Tuvalu as MIRAB economies but in several ways, they are as different as 'chalk and cheese'. The economies of Samoa and Tonga differ substantially in their size and diversity and their physical geography compared to the much smaller states of Kiribati and Tuvalu. This incidentally raises the question of what criteria should be used to determine what is an island microstate or a micro-economy? How small must it be? 'Small' is a relative term and many dimensions can be used to determine its application. Consequently, judgment is involved in categorising an economy or a state as small. For example, Fiji has

a large economy compared to Tuvalu, but Fiji's economy is small compared to Australia's.

Secondly, while remittances make an important contribution to the economic functioning of many Pacific microstates, those received by Samoa and Tonga are largely a function of permanent overseas migration of family members. Both Tuvalu and Kirabati are much more dependent on remittances from family members able to obtain only short-term employment abroad, for example, the employment of merchant marines from these countries by German shipping lines and those on short-term employment contracts in Australia and New Zealand. Consequently, the sources of remittances of Kiribati and Tuvalu are much more vulnerable to changing economic conditions abroad than are those of Samoa and Tonga. For instance, there is intense competition from other nations, such as Pakistan, to supply crew for merchant ships. Furthermore, both Kiribati and Tuvalu are comparatively more dependent on rents from fishing rights within their Exclusive Economic Zones than are Samoa and Tonga. These rents are obtained from distant water fishing nations.

Thirdly, it has become quite clear that many small island economies cannot be classified as MIRAB economies. For instance, McElroy (2006) highlighted the fact that the economies of some island microstates depend heavily on inbound tourism. The acronym SITEs (Small Island Tourist Economies) was developed to describe these economies. A third category of island microstates has been developed by Baldacchino (2006) for which he coined the acronym, PROFIT. This somewhat abstruse acronym consists of the following components: P (people considerations); R (resource management); O (overseas engagement); IF (finance, insurance and taxation); and T (transportation). Baldacchino highlights the ability of small nations to make strategic political decisions in the global context which enhance their economic

welfare, for example, act as tax havens, provide flags of convenience for shipping, obtain rents from their natural resources and benefit from the presence of military installations. In some instances, these attributes are combined with tourism, foreign aid and remittances.

A fourth classification of the economies of some small island states also exists and was suggested by Guthunz and von Krosigk (1996) prior to the SITES and PROFIT models. It is the TOURAB aid and bureaucracy model. It typifies those economies that depend heavily on tourism and the distribution of aid via the public bureaucracy. It has received little coverage in the literature.

The TOURAB, SITEs and PROFIT models underline the diverse nature of small island economies. Bertram (2006) accepts the existence of this diversity and uses it to provide a global taxonomy of island microstates. He classifies economies according to the extent to which they satisfy MIRAB, SITE or PROFIT characteristics. Oberst and McElroy (2007:175) also provide a classification of small island nations according to whether they satisfy the MIRAB model or the combined PROFIT-SITE models. Note that not all the economies classified by Bertram (2006) and Oberst and McElroy (2007) are those of sovereign states: some are political dependencies and overseas territories of sovereign states. However, in neither of these publications are detailed reasons given for including particular island economies in one category rather than another. No quantification is provided. For instance, while Bertram (2006) classifies the Cook Islands as being predominantly a MIRAB economy, Oberst and McElroy (2007) place it in the PROFIT-SITE category. Both Bertram (2006) and Oberst and McElroy (2007) identify Tuvalu and Kiribati as having a MIRAB economy, but this fails to take account of their significant rents obtained from distant water fishing nations for access to fish (mainly tuna) in their very large Exclusive Economic Zones. Furthermore, as

mentioned above, there is failure to highlight adequately the extent to which these nations depend on overseas remittances based on relatively short-term employment contracts.

Each of these models is intended to identify theoretical ('ideal') types but the PROFIT model is rather elastic or 'hazy'. Oberst and McElroy (2007:165) claim that "*the three aspects that distinguish PROFIT from MIRAB models are: the dynamism of the private sector, the active role of domestic policy, and the strategic orientation towards diversification. PROFIT examples would include tax and insurance havens, offshore banking centres and duty-free manufacturing exporters*". The way in which the various dimensions of the PROFIT model can be measured are unclear. In fact, many of its dimensions do not seem to be quantifiable. On the other hand, the components of the MIRAB models can be measured, even though official statistics on remittances are inadequate because remittances are often made informally or directly by islanders and are, therefore, unrecorded.

Security, Sustainability and Vulnerability: Issues Involving Pacific Island Microstates

It is generally accepted that island microstates are economically more vulnerable than larger nations. Reasons for the economic vulnerability of island microstates have been outlined by Briguglio (1995). Factors which contribute to their economic vulnerability include:

- Their lack of economic diversification in exported commodities and their lack of scope for such diversification given their limited resources;

- Many are prone to natural disasters (such as cyclones and tsunamis) and, unlike large nations, they have limited resources to respond to such disasters which often impact on a large proportion of their population; and

- Land-based subsistence crops (which in some PIC provide a buffer against commercial economic instability) may be destroyed or severely damaged.

The economic vulnerability hypothesis has, however, not been accepted without dissent. According to Bertram (2006:2): "*In a globalizing world, inhabitants of small island economies have open to them a myriad of evolutionary responses to external forces that potentially enable them to seize niches of opportunity, and thereby insulate themselves from global economic shocks*" (see Bertram in this volume). This is a similar theme to that expressed by Baldacchino (2006). However, I believe it to be too sweeping a view. For example, while Brown et al. (2013) accept that island microstates in the Pacific are economically vulnerable, they also point out that some, such as Samoa and Tonga, are significantly insulated by their access to and dependence on overseas remittances. Despite this, many Pacific island economies do not have access to significant remittances, for example, that of the Solomon Islands. However, the Solomon Islands did receive a major cash injection as a result of RAMSI (the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands; see Dinnen in this volume) which resulted in the stationing of a sizeable security contingent there led by Australia (Anon 2014). The last of this contingent left in August, 2013 and so this source of cash inflow stopped. There are also worrying signs that the incidence of poverty is rising in Pacific microstates for example, in Tonga, despite its being able to access a high level of overseas remittances (Jimenez-Soto/Brown 2012). Furthermore, aid donors are liable to cut their level of aid when they experience economic difficulties at home, demand for the exports of those island economies that have significant exports are liable to drop, and the inflow of overseas tourists to island economies is likely to be curtailed by difficult economic conditions abroad.

Sustainability

The question is often posed of whether the MIRAB model of economic dependence can be sustained. In particular, for how long will those who have migrated from MIRAB economies and their progeny continue to send

remittances to their kin in island economies? Some reduction in the willingness to send remittances can be expected with the passage of time. In order to ensure the long-term sustainability of the remittance system, continuous emigration is required. This however, is only possible if countries receiving Pacific Islanders as migrants continue to be willing to receive them. This is by no means assured (see, for example, Friberg et al. 2006).

As far as I am aware, there are no available comprehensive statistics of population and labour movements between Pacific islands and from and to Pacific island microstates and territories. It would be useful to have such information.

In a few cases, the sustainability of the economies of some microstates have depended on the mining of non-renewable resources, such as phosphate in the case of Nauru; an unsustainable economic activity. Several states also rely on income from renewable but depletable resources, such as tuna. There is always a risk of these resources being exploited in a sub-optimal way, and even being exhausted, problems not unknown in the Pacific (McDaniel/Gowdy 2000).

A serious problem for Pacific island microstates consisting of low-lying islands (such as coral atolls) is the likelihood of sea level rise as a result of global warming (Tisdell 2008b). Eventually these nations will become uninhabitable, and their inhabitants will become environmental refugees. For example, Kiribati and Tuvalu are at particular risk of this. In many cases, defensive actions (mitigation) of sea level rise can be expected to be ineffective and uneconomic. No doubt such small microstates will look to other nations, such as Australia, to accept their environmental refugees.

Political vulnerability

Despite the hypothesis of Baldocchino (2006) that island microstates have considerable ability to manipulate larger nations to their advantage, it seems

more likely that larger higher income countries have the upper hand in this regard. For example, both Nauru and Papua New Guinea were probably more willing to accept boat people (refugees) for offshore processing from Australia because of their considerable dependence on Australian foreign aid. Australia also wants to have friendly relations with Indonesia and both sides of Australian politics recognise Indonesian sovereignty of West Papua (Chauvel 2012). The Australian Government does not support the Free West Papua Movement (ibid.), and in turn may expect Papua New Guinea to do likewise. In that regard, Australia has leverage via the considerable amount of aid it provides to Papua New Guinea. There are also doubts about whether Timor Leste has received an equitable deal in relation to Australian access to its offshore oil and gas, especially since it has been alleged that Australia spied on East Timor at the time an agreement was being negotiated with East Timor for Australian access to these resources (Lamb 2014; see also Schmitz in this volume). This matter has been referred by the Government of Timor Leste to the International Court for Justice in the Hague.

An interesting question is why does Australia not make it easier for individuals from Pacific microstates to migrate to Australia permanently? The populations of some of these states (for example, Nauru and Tuvalu) are so small that the migration of their residents to Australia would have a miniscule impact on Australia's total population. It may also be less costly than providing aid (Tisdell 1990: Ch. 10). Is it because pressures might emerge from larger Pacific Island states for a similar deal? Or is it a matter of strategic military concern? For example, if some microstates were to become depopulated, would they be taken over by potentially hostile foreign nations?

There are also other unresolved questions: What would happen to the sovereignty of a nation state if all of its population migrated to another state (see Blitza and Bertram in this volume)? If all the land mass of a sovereign

state (for example, Tuvalu) should be submerged by sea level rise, would it lose all of its existing territorial rights? If one of more of the islands of a sovereign state (for instance, Kiribati) should be submerged by sea level rise, would its exclusive economic (maritime) zone be correspondingly reduced?

Some Pacific islands provide important strategic military bases, such as Guam for the United States, and may become more important as tensions escalate on territorial claims by Northeast Asian countries to areas in the Pacific Ocean. However, Australia's military bases are on its mainland with its forward bases being in its far north. Nevertheless, one understands the concerns of the United States and Australia about securing defensive outposts in the Pacific. On the other hand one wonders why France maintains a significant military presence in French Polynesia when it no longer has possessions in Asia, such as in Indo-China. Is it merely to provide a politically acceptable form of aid to French Polynesia? Or is it to bolster the appearance of France as a global political power? It might be thought that because French Polynesia is a French overseas territory (and therefore, not a sovereign state) it ought not be classified as a MIRAB, TOURAB or similar economy. However, the boundaries of an economy do not have to coincide with that of a sovereign state. Depending on the purpose, and subject to some judgment, the economies of regions and other geographical areas can be analysed (including the economy of French Polynesia) even when they do not constitute sovereign states.

Brief Notes on the Case of Nauru

To some extent, every Pacific island microstate is unique. This is highlighted by the case of Nauru. It is not an archipelago (unlike most Pacific island microstates) but consists of a small single island formed by a raised coral bed. In 1888, Nauru became a German Protectorate and in 1906 (as a result of a British initiative) a German and British consortium was formed to mine its

phosphate deposits which was in particular demand for fertilizer in Australia. Although Germany lost its possessions in the Pacific as a result of World War I (Nauru was placed in 1919 under the trusteeship of the UK, Australia and New Zealand), phosphate mining on Nauru continued. It was occupied by the Japanese in World War II and reoccupied by Australian troops in 1945. Nauru was again placed under the trusteeship of Australia, New Zealand and the UK in 1947 and administered by Australia. It became a totally independent nation on 31 January 1968. McDaniel and Gowdy (2000) state that between 1909 and 1966, Nauruans received little or no economic benefit from phosphate mining on their island. Furthermore, they point out that "mining under occupation and then trusteeship had left more than a third of the island in a state of complete destruction" (McDaniel/Gowdy 2000:45). A later source (Anon 2013:6) claims: "*the phosphate reserves on Nauru are almost entirely depleted. Phosphate mining in the central plateau has left a barren terrain of jagged limestone pinnacles up to 15 metres (40 ft) high. Mining has devastated about 80 per cent of Nauru's land area [and a considerable amount of marine life surrounding the island has been killed by silt and phosphate runoff]*".

As a result of pressure from Nauruans and UN bodies, more generous phosphate royalties were paid to Nauru in the two years preceding its independence (McDaniel/Gowdy 2000:45), and a portion of these was placed in the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust. By the time of its independence, Nauru's phosphate deposits were virtually exhausted. Returns from investments by the Nauru Phosphate Royalties Trust were intended to provide a continuing source of income for Nauru but due to unwise investments and use of these funds by the government to cover budget deficits, they were almost exhausted by the beginning of this century (Anon 2013), thereby leaving Nauru in a dire economic state because it had few alternative ways to earn income. It therefore, became highly dependent on foreign aid provided

mainly by Australia, New Zealand and Taiwan. In addition, Australia agreed in 1993 as a result of an out of court settlement to pay Nauru $107 million (Australian) to rehabilitate the mined areas of the island (McDaniel/Gowdy 2000:46). However, I could not find evidence of any significant rehabilitation having been done.

Given its difficult economic situation, Nauru has had to consider every possibility for earning income from external sources. In the 1990s, it became a tax haven and a base for money laundering but under pressure from the inter-governmental Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, it changed its policy in 2003. It has also welcomed the opportunity to house those seeking asylum in Australia and arriving 'irregularly' by boat in return for extra Australian aid. This is a part of Australia's *Pacific Solution* to stem the arrival of boat people arriving via Indonesia. The Nauruan detention centre operated from 2001- 2007 then close but was reopened again in August 2012. Presumably, this centre will not provide Nauru with a secure long-term source of income.

Nauru has some other sources of income such as royalties from fishing rights, but these are quite limited. Furthermore, by world standards, its net migration rate is low. The *Central Intelligence Agency* (CIA) (2013) reports that the estimated net migration rate of Nauru in 2013 was 14.63 migrants per 1,000 of its population which suggests that (unlike Samoa, Tonga and several other microstates in the Pacific) it cannot rely on international remittances for its economic sustainability. The CIA also reports that Nauru has no defence forces and that Australia is responsible for its defence.

While there is some evidence that Nauru has used its jurisdictional power for manipulative purposes (for example, in changing its recognition of the People's Republic of China and Taiwan), its global manipulative power appears to be limited and in acting as a haven for money laundering, it did not

escape international attention (Drezner 2001). Baldacchino (2006) claims that microstates are so small that their support of economic activities regarded internationally as dubious, undesirable or illegal are not noticed and do not result in any international retaliatory action. Thus, Nauru does not fully comply with Baldacchino's PROFIT model although it is true that several sovereign microstates in the Pacific trade their votes in international fora in return for extra aid and other economic benefits from larger nations and do support international economic activities of 'borderline' nature. However, many of these activities are not sustainable and depend on sporadic opportunities. In addition, Nauru is not a magnet for tourism and therefore, does not fit the SITE of the TOURAB model either. Nor does it appear to comply with the MIRAB model. Bertram (2006:7) does not include it in his taxonomy of microstates based on this model but Oberst and McElroy (2007:175) classify it as being a MIRAB economy. Despite this, it is an economy which depends much more on foreign aid than on overseas remittances. This is not clear if it is classified as a MIRAB economy. In fact, like most Pacific island microstates, Nauru has special characteristics which can only be appreciated by considering its historical background and its special circumstances. It is only by taking into account these aspects that one can understand the challenging economic situation it now faces.

Concluding Comments

It is doubtful if any of the simple models for describing the economies of island microstates and dependencies (the MIRAB, TOURAB, SITE and PROFIT models) adequately explain the economic situations that Pacific island economies now face because they do not take enough account of historical and cultural factors as well as matters of location. These models do not seem to explain (for example) why the economies of Singapore, Hong Kong, Malta, Nauru, Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Federated States of Micronesia are so

different. The historical association of the Pacific island microstates with Australia, France, New Zealand and the USA are of considerable importance for their economic functioning but the way in which these relationships have come about requires delving into the historical background of their development. This is underlined by the case of Nauru. Today, China has also taken a greater interest in many of these Pacific microstates as part of its growing global influence. This could become a concern for those nations (such as Australia, New Zealand and USA) that have had the greatest external influence on these microstates in recent decades.

The possibility that the populations of some of these microstates (for example, Nauru and the Solomon Islands) could sink into abject poverty is another concern, and the problem of how several of these microstates will cope with predicted sea-level rises is unresolved. Apart from this, serious health problems exist in several Pacific states close to Australia. For example, the incidence of malaria is high in the Solomon Islands and in Papua New Guinea and in the latter country, tuberculosis (including a strain resistant to antibiotics) is relatively common. These problems are occurring virtually on Australia's doorstep. However, it seems likely that Australia will do even less in the future to help address these issues because with the election of Tony Abbot as Prime Minister in the latter part of 2013, the Australian government is in the process of substantially reducing the amount of its foreign aid. The United States is also reducing aid to the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands (Friberg et al. 2006) but these states may be able to sustain their economies as a result of remittances. However, not all Pacific island states are able to do this, because of external obstacles to the migration of their citizens. Furthermore, the US may add obstacles to migration from Micronesia and the Marshall Islands as indicated by Friberg et al. (2006:130-131). This would undoubtedly result in great economic hardship for residents of these nations,

especially if they experience major adverse consequences from climate change.

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The Economic Relations between the Pacific and the EU: Negotiations for an Economic Partnership Agreement exemplified by the Fisheries Sector

Klaus Schilder

"*The old colonial mentality hasn't changed. European powers are clothing their self-interest in the rhetoric of development, backed with the lure of aid.*"
(Jane Kelsey, University of Auckland 2005)

Abstract: *Negotiations for a regional free trade agreement between the European Union and the Pacific Island Countries have been ongoing since 2004. While the economic significance of trade between the regions is comparatively small, regional political and economic integration is a priority for the Pacific. The EU has negotiated for comprehensive trade agreements with the Pacific, the so-called Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). While interregional negotiations are subject to controversy, both Fiji and Papua New Guinea have signed bilateral Interim Agreements with the EU. In the negotiations, Pacific Island Countries are aiming to preserve their policy space, also in light of other geopolitical interests in the region. As most countries in the region depend on fisheries, the sector provides valuable insights into the potential effects of trade liberalization towards the EU. In the future, EU-Pacific relations will need to be built on a truly joint cooperation strategy that takes into account existing power asymmetries between the regions.*

Introduction

The Pacific region is currently experiencing a hitherto unprecedented growing global geostrategic attention. Both the traditional trade partners the USA, Japan and the European Union (EU) as well as the emerging economies are showing an increasing interest in and attention for the region. In addition to the - geostrategically as well as commercially- traditionally influential countries Australia and New Zealand (Schilder 2004), especially the influence of China – in the light of the immense demand for resources of the largest global economy - in the region is growing significantly. These are joined by India and Brazil with their own economic interests as well as South Korea and Indonesia. Traditionally Russia, the US and Japan are already pursuing their geo-strategic interests, partly through the development and security political presence in several island countries.

The economic importance of trade between the Pacific Island Countries and the EU is not particularly high compared to that with the neighboring Pacific countries. The top trading partners include the United States, China, Russia and Switzerland. The region transacts only about 0.06% of its foreign trade with the EU. Exports are dominated by only a few commodities including palm oil, coffee, coconut, fish and caviar. EU imports to the region are dominated by machines and technical equipment.

Against the backdrop of the growing multipolarization in the region, in 2012 the EU issued a notice that describes the growing foreign policy importance of the Pacific (European Commission, High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy of the EU 2012). In it the action fields trade, environment, fisheries, climate change as well as democratization and human rights are described as key tasks for a more coherent EU-Pacific policy. Under the 10th European Development Fund, the EU has assured the region development cooperation in the amount of 750 million €. But the partnership

Annual trade flows between the EU and the Pacific (2003-2012).

Source: European Commission, DG Trade (2013)
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/january/tradoc_147358.pdf)

Pacific Trade Data by Country 2004-2013

	Trade tariffs (as share of government revenues)	Main export products (share of total exports)
Cook Islands	19.6%	Pearls, fish (76%)
Fiji	26%	Sugar, textile, fish (32%)
Kiribati	19.7%	copra, seaweed, fish (41.6%)
Marschall Islands	21.1%	fish, coconut oil (68%)
Micronesia	15.8%	fish (94%)
Palau	20.8%	n/a
Papua New Guinea	7.3%	gold, crude oil, copper (78%)
Samoa	13.3%	fish, cocnut pulp, beer (70%)
Solomon Islands	23.9%	timber (65%)
Timor Leste	n/a	crude oil (> 90%), coffee (7%)
Tonga	54%	vegetable, fish (44%)
Tuvalu	15.1%	n/a
Vanuatu	36.5%	copra, beef, timber, cocoa (32%)

Source: Oxfam Australia (2010)
(www.oxfam.org.nz/sites/default/files/reports/GEC%20in%20the%20Pacific%20Final%20Oxfam.pdf)

with the EU is not always favourable received. Already in 2006, the former Pacific strategy of the EU was criticised, in particular with regard to its considerable conceptual and structural weaknesses (Schilder 2006). While great importance is attached to the cooperation with the EU in many countries of the region, such as the development cooperation, climate protection, ecotourism and renewable energies, there is however a prevailing perception of a very unequal partnership in other policy areas. This seems to be especially the case in view of the year-long and toughly running trade negotiations. Here the EU's ambitious trade and investment policy strategy is not working out, if not even likely to fail (Laporte/Piñol Puig 2013).

The status of negotiations

The negotiations between the EU and the 14 Pacific ACP countries (PACP) about an interregional Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) began on 10 September 2004. These aim for a classical free trade area for agricultural and industrial goods, but also for a reciprocal market opening of trade in services, investment, competition rules, government procurement, data collection and protection of intellectual property rights. Originally, the conclusion of the EPA has already been planned for the end of 2007, but the negotiations dragged on due to a lacking agreement on the common objectives for such a contract (Schilder 2005). In 2007, Papua New Guinea and Fiji initialed a so-called Interim EPA and signed this in 2009 in order to avoid the interruption of preferential market access of canned tuna and sugar to the EU. Papua New Guinea and the EU ratified the Interim Agreement in 2011, yet the ratification by Fiji is still outstanding to date due to its unstable political situation, but also because of reservations towards the content (see below).

Since 2008, the negotiations for a regional EPA between the EU and the Pacific Island Countries have also continued. However, no formal negotiations took place between September 2009 and September 2012. Only in May

2013 did the PACP trade ministers meet to verify the progress of negotia-tions[1]. When end of 2013 Papua New Guinea withdrew from the talks due to a dispute over future fisheries rules, the EU suspended negotiations in Octo-ber 2013. The new working meeting of negotiators on both sides scheduled for March 2014 has not yet taken place. In April 2014, the Ministers for Trade and Fisheries stated once again that the negotiations with the EU be completed by June of that year[2], but in view of the year-long dragging talks, these date announcements appear non-binding even within the time con-straints applied by the EU Commission[3].

The negotiations became also controversial, when the EU Commission during the current negotiations on 30 September 2001 and much to the sur-prise of the Pacific States, presented to the EU Council of Ministers a pro-posal, whereby the duty- and quota-free access to the European market should end by 1 January 2014. By the end of 2007, the EU had issued the Ministerial Decision No. 1528/2007, by which the to date granted preferential market access conditions of the ACP countries were to be continued for the duration of the EPA negotiations disregarding the expiry date of 1 January 2008 as laid down in the Cotonou Agreement. With the threat of a new deadline for the completion of duty- and quota-free access for non-LDCs belonging to the group of Pacific Island Countries, the EU further strengthened the pressure which had been kept up during the entire negotiation phase.

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[1]   see Pacific Islands Forum Trade Ministers' Meeting, Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 27 May 2014 (online: www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/in-news/2014/pacific-islands-forum-trade-ministers-meeting.html, read on 20 June 2014).

[2]   see Sisilo: Let's go for the Best Possible Deal, Solomon Star 18 May 2014 (online: www.solomonstarnews.com/news/regional/518-sisilo-let-s-go-for-the-best-possible-deal, read on 14 June 2014).

[3]   see No Deadline to Finalise EPA Negotiations, Fiji Sun 28 May 2014 (www.fijisun.com.fj/2014/04/28/no-deadline-to-finalise-epa-negotiations-eu/, read on 20 June 2014).

Interim Agreement with PNG and Fiji

Even if the end of preferential market access has intermittently been post-
poned to 1 October 2014, the EU leaves Fiji with a difficult choice whilst
excluding them from the poorest countries (Least developed countries - in
short LDCs) in the region: 1. Significant damage to the sugar exporting econ-
omy when preferred EU market access is ended or 2. the ratification of the
negotiated Interim EPA, whereby the nationally available political manouver-
ing space for the diversification of local economic and industrial structure
becomes clearly limited. Yet just two of the non-LDC Pacific island countries
have signed an interim agreement with the EU: Papua New Guinea (signed on
30 Juli 2009) and Fiji (signed on 11 December 2009). The other non-LDCs in
the region (Cook Islands, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Niue, Palau, Nauru,
Samoa and Tonga) have since 1 January 2008 benefited from the easier mar-
ket access under the EU's Generalised System of Preferences.

The Interim Agreements are classic free trade agreements for goods.
They provide duty- and quota-free market access for all exports from the two
countries, yet with transition periods for rice (expired 2010) and sugar (up to
2015). In addition, the agreements provide for the gradual opening of local
markets to European imports. In the case of Papua New Guinea, the country
has committed to import 88%, in relation to their value, free of customs duty
from the EU. Exceptions apply for economically important products such as
meat, fish, vegetables, furniture and jewelry. Fiji has undertaken to let 87% of
all European imports duty-free into the country within a 15-year transition
period. The liberalization commitments are staggered: 14% at entry into force
of the agreement, an additional 2.5% after five years, another 60% after 10
years and finally 11% by the end of the 15th year. Exceptions apply to meat,
fish, fruit and vegetables, alcohol and iron goods. Other sections of the
agreement are dealing with security clauses that permit the temporary

reintroduction of tariffs or quotas in case of a potential damage to the economy, with support measures for the compliance with the strict European Sanitary and Phytosanitary health standards as well as trade facilitation measures mainly in the area of cooperation of the authorities to simplify customs formalities. Missing, however, are more specific development policies aimed at the establishment and strengthening of regional markets. These include measures such as the protection of sensitive competitive industries, the support of reforms in the tax and fiscal policy aiming at the offsetting of losses or the strengthening of intra-regional trade. The German Federal Government and the leading *Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development* (BMZ) welcomed the agreement and listed as positive aspects of the Interim Agreement – in addition to the substantial improvement of market access to the EU – the adaptation of liberalization to the needs of a weaker partner, the protection of sensitive sectors, the partial relaxation of rules of origin (RoO), the compliance with social and environmental standards as well as measures for certification and quality assurance. In view of the food security in rural areas but also the preservation of particularly sensitive sectors or industries, the BMZ also considers it important to further defer the liberalization process. During the negotiations, the BMZ advocated to shape the WPAs compatible with development, however only in December 2013 the Federal Government supported an initiative by other EU member states for a greater flexibility of the negotiating mandate of the European Commission, which was pushing for a market opening[4]. Yet this did little to change the underlying philosophy of liberalization and mutual opening of markets within the Federal Government either.

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[4]   Joint letter to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and Vice President of the European Commission and the European Commissioners for Development and Trade, Dec. 5th 2013 (online: http://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/ j4nvgs5kjg27kof_j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vjg0k5ved1vs/f=/blg274173.pdf, read on 16.09.2014).

The negotiations have been criticized and rejected by numerous political and civil society groups in the region and in the EU since their beginning. Given the strong fragmentation of the already small markets, a strong regional competition from a similar range of exports, low purchasing power and deficits in communication and transportation infrastructure, the possible economic benefit for the Island Countries appears particularly questionable. In addition, expected revenue losses due to the elimination of import tariffs will tighten the financial problems of state budgets. The *Pacific Network on Globalisation (PANG)*, one of the most prominent civil society voices in the region, critically followed the negotiations from the beginning (PANG 2008) and recommended their own governments to put an end to them.[5] Besides the negotiation's own lack of transparency, here also the potential loss of an independent and sovereign trade control and industrial policy - the so-called policy space – is particularly criticized. The following recommendations have been especially formulated to increase the EPAs' compatibility to development and to avoid any potential damage (European Parliament 2014):

- Independent, ex ante human rights impact assessments combined with a human rights clause, which regularly examines the impact of EPAs on the human rights situation in the PACP states and possibly allows for an adaptation of the treaty (Bartels 2014).

- A maximum flexibility in the design of the reciprocal liberalization obligations between the parties as well as the adoption of best results from other negotiating configurations.

- Abandonment of negotiations on new issues such as services, investments, competition, public procurement policy, intellectual property rights as well

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[5]   Free Trade Warning, The Fiji Times Online, 20 October 2008 (online: www.fijitimes.com/story.aspx?id=103832, read on 20 July 2014).

as tax and fiscal policy, to avoid precedents on a multilateral level in bilateral negotiations.

- No restrictions on the use of export taxes, among others on commodity exports.

- No most-favoured nation clause[6], that can automatically forward commercial advantages granted by the EPA to other trade parties.

- Existing or negotiated rendezvous clauses [7] should not include topics, that are not yet negotiated at multilateral level in the WTO or where there is no consensus.

- Combining of the planned liberalization measures with the realisation of concrete so-called *Development Benchmarks*, which make a progressive liberalization subject to the reduction of economic vulnerabilities of each country or region (European Parliament 2014)

The ACP Civil Society Forum had particularly criticized the weakening of the regional integrity through the signing of the Interim Agreement with Papua New Guinea. It is feared that in the coming regional negotiations, the agreement could set new standards for not yet negotiated issues such as services or investment liberalization. Thus there is the risk that Papua New Guinea could try to immediately bilaterally negotiate services, investment or other issues, for which the other 13 PACP states had demanded a rendezvous clause and with that a postponement. Unfortunately, the position of PNG is heavily influenced by a very powerful business lobby, especially the fishery and mining sector. Bilateral negotiations of PNG with the EU would therefore possibly result in a collapse of negotiations on a regional agreement. In fact, bilateral negotiations with individual members of a federation of states generally

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[6] The most-favoured-nation clause states, that all trade concessions granted to a trade party should be awarded to all other WTO member states immediately and unconditionally.

[7] Rendezvous clauses ensure that agreements be reviewed after a first stage of implementation and, if necessary negotiations on other topics such as services and investments follow.

decrease rather than increase regional integration efforts of the group, since they place the excluded members in a less favourable position than the contracting parties. Also, individual states have a lot less resistance against the EU's negotiating material than a regional entity whose political bargaining power is limited anyway. The WWF also critically noted that the exemption could feed into the export of potentially unsustainable fished tuna into the EU. Therefore, additional measures for the licensing of industrial enterprises, for example, according to the criteria of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) are necessary (ACP Civil Society Forum 2011).

Fiji's dilemma

The EU continues to exert pressure in the EPA negotiations with its decision to definitively terminate the unilaterally granted trade preferences by 1 October 2014. Fiji was able to avoid the negative consequences of the EU decision only by ratification or provisional application of the Interim Agreement already signed. On 17 July 2014, Fiji informed the EU that the country would implement the Interim Agreement as of the end of July 2014[8]. Fiji exports more than 90% of its sugar to the EU, especially to the United Kingdom. In 2012, exports were at EUR 37.8 million, a decrease of 39% compared to the previous year. For years, the sugar industry – on which directly and indirectly depend more than 200,000 jobs in the country – has struggled with substantial structural challenges (Weber 2007). Yet in the opinion of the Suva government, any possible benefits of the trade agreement with the EU would be eaten up by the significant costs of a terminated preferential access of sugar exports in the EU. Therefore Fiji vigorously searches for economic alternatives to open up new markets for its ailing sugar industry. The government is

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[8]   The EU and Fiji implement the Pacific Interim Economic Partnership Agreement, press release by European Commission (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-852_en.htm, read on 20 July 2014).

currently negotiating intensively with countries such as Egypt, Bangladesh, Japan and countries in the Middle East about new export contracts[9]. Also Chinese investors have recently shown interest in buying sugar, should Fiji not to bring into force the Interim Agreement[10].

Criticism of the Fiji government has also been growing towards other sections of the Interim Agreement. In particular, the PACP states are calling for an approach of variable geometry, whereby a differentiated negotiating approach is applied according to the different economic strengths and regional conditions, and not treat all countries the same way in a regional free trade agreement. The Interim Agreement is also heavily criticized because of its controversial individual provisions, including the issue of development cooperation, the protection of emerging industries from premature market opening, no prohibition of imposed export duties, of the most favoured nation clause nor the arbitration clause[11]. In this respect, the chief negotiator of the PACP states, Robert Sisilo, commented: "*No wonder the EC is pushing us towards the IEPA, which will not be a 'stepping stone' but a dead end road. [...] So by signing IEPA as the Trade Commissioner was suggesting, PACPs will by definition agree to these issues hands down and lose their leverage in negotiating a comprehensive EPA, if this is still going to be negotiated at all.*"[12]

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[9] Red Alert on Fiji's Fish, Sugar, Island Business, December 2012 (online: www.islandsbusiness.com/2012/12/fiji/red-alert-on-fijis-fish-sugar/, read on 14 June 2014).

[10] Chinese Investors interested in Fiji's Sugar, The Fiji Government, 1.3.2014 (online: www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Press-Releases/CHINESE-INVESTORS-INTERESTED-IN-FIJI%E2%80%99S-SUGAR.aspx?feed=news, read on 20 June 2014).

[11] Arbitration clauses serve the substantive enforcement of protective interests of contracting parties (States or investors) of trade and investment agreements. These are quite controversial, particularly when being used for enforcement of private investors' interests and not for the protection of common good.

[12] PACPs firm on 'variable geometry' stand, Island Business, January 2014 (online: www.islandsbusiness.com/2014/1/business/pacps-firm-on-variable-geometry-stand/, read on 21 June 2014).

European Interests

As already shown, the importance of economic exchange between the EU and the Pacific Island States is in absolute terms not particularly large. Yet relatively speaking, the EU pursues quite offensive economic interests in the negotiations. Given that currently about half of the tuna consumed in the EU originates from the Pacific Ocean, the access to the regional fishery resources is of overriding economic interest for the EU, especially in the southern European fishing nations. There are also other geopolitical considerations that make a closer economic connection of the Pacific to Europe interesting. First, the EU Member States want to ensure access to the strategic reserves of raw materials in the region. This becomes particularly evident in the European investments in deep sea mining initiatives. Secondly comes the support of European diplomacy in international negotiating processes. Lastly, the Pacific has 12 votes in the negotiations that the EU would like to use (especially in the context of the UN) for its benefit.

Fishing interests in the Pacific

The South Pacific, particularly the fishing grounds around the so-called Coral Triangle between the Philippines, Indonesia and Papua New Guinea is considered as being of great global importance. About a quarter of the global tuna catches, including the high priced Skipjack, comes from this region. The certified Skipjack catch in 2009 was at 267,087 tons. The EU receives about half of its tuna imports from these waters. The tuna is mainly exported canned packed, it is mainly used in salads, sandwiches or as a pizza topping. The EU is particularly for Papua New Guinea a major export market: Nearly 28% of the total tuna exports go to the EU, mainly to Germany and the UK - an increase of 3% within three years (2009-2011). PNG is already the fourth largest supplier of canned tuna in Germany. About 5% of the precooked tuna

halves processed in the EU and 4% of canned tuna originate from this country.

In 1982, eight island countries under the umbrella of the so-called *Nauru Agreement (Parties to the Nauru Agreement, short PNA)*[13] joined forces to monitor fish stocks in their exclusive sovereign base areas and adjacent waters. The purse seine fishery for free swarming Skipjack stocks on the fishing boats of Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu without the use of fish aggregating devices (fish aggregating devices, short FADs) was certified in 2011 in accordance with the sustainability criteria of the Marine Stewardship Council[14] (MSC). This certification provides requirements for improving the environmental performance and fisheries management, also effective measures to control fishing such as the definition of permitted fishing days or the reduction of bycatch as well as the adaptation of existing limits to scientific findings[15]. As a result of the certification, 30% of the Skipjack catches from the Western part of the Coral Triangle may carry the blue MSC ecolabel for sustainable fishing.

According to numbers of the *Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission* (WCPFC) founded in 2004, stocks of Skipjack tuna have currently not yet been overfished in contrast to the Bigeye and Blue tuna. According to scientific findings of the WCPFC, the catch of Skipjack tuna in the region can be made sustainable, provided that the catch of other tuna species is excluded (*Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission* 2010). However, given the generally low levels, there is an urgent need for a closer

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[13] www.pnatuna.com/
[14] www.msc.org/de
[15] Skipjack fishing of PNA countries now MSC certified in Western and Central Pacific, Marine Stewardship Council, 9.1.2012 (online: www.msc.org/presseraum/pressemitteilungen /the-pna-western-central-pacific-skipjack-tuna-fishery2019s-2018free-school2019-set-operat ions-gain-msc-certification, read on 24 June 2014).

monitoring of hygiene standards in the tuna industry of Papua New Guinea. This requires the creation of additional capacity for quality assurance, monitoring of tuna fishing and for certification programs. Without strict monitoring and control instruments and in view of an increased trade, the sustainable use of Stockfish tuna stocks is threatened.

Fishery as a point of contention

In the eyes of the Pacific, the EU has not managed to respond to the complexity of the political and socio-cultural conditions during the EPA negotiations. In the current EPA negotiations with the EU, the fishing industry is one of the biggest points of contention, since fishery as one of the most important economic sectors for the Pacific is of major importance for sustainable growth and development.

In the EPA negotiations, the members of the PACP-group demand particularly a more flexibility configuration of the global rules of origin ('*global sourcing rules*') for fresh, frozen, chilled, smoked and dried fish products. Extended global sourcing rules[16] would allow Pacific Island States, that do not have their own fishing fleets or sufficient fish stocks, to obtain catches from third states, to process these in their own country and then to export them into the EU labelled with their own certificate of origin. Historically speaking, the main reason that prevented the development of the fish processing industry in the region was the insufficient catch combined with a too small and outdated fleet. Currently however, the EU only grants exceptions from the global rules of origin under the Interim Agreement to the states of Papua New Guinea and Fiji, and this only for fresh or frozen tuna, which is then further processed and canned in the country. With this so-called "change

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[16]   Preferential rules of origin determine from or in which countries certain products or its intermediates may after presentation of a proof of preference be exported or imported free of or at reduced rates of duty. By extending the rules of origin, also the value added by processing in their own country can be increased.

in tariff heading" method, both countries were able to assert their main demands. Yet Shaheen Ali, Industry and Trade Minister of Fiji, made it quite clear that Fiji expected from the EU a concrete proposal for a greater flexibility in the global rules of origin ('*global sourcing*') also for the export of fresh and frozen fish in return for further concessions regarding fisheries protection and management rules required by them[17]. The PACP States raised a similar request for a regional EPA[18]. The EU has not yet responded to this, but the Interim Agreement provides for a review of the efficiency and sustainability implications of preferential rules of origin for tuna stocks, followed by a possible renegotiation (ICTSD 2008).

Yet it appeared that the EU tried to instrumentalize the EPA negotiations to raise the pressure on the Pacific countries and the *Western Central Pacific Fisheries Commission* to enforce their own offensive economic interests in fisheries. Moreover, the conclusion of the bilateral Interim Agreement, which was clearly advantageous for Papua New Guinea, took the neighbouring Pacific countries by surprise and indicated to them that the extent of the benefits ultimately depends only on the bargaining power of each country. In this context, Tonga's Trade Minister and spokesman for the EPA negotiating group, Viliami Uasike Latu, declared unmistakenly: "*As a member country we think we have been mistreated by EC especially when it comes to fisheries issues*".[19] Yet the European commission considered its concession in the negotiations "*as a specific relaxation for the PACP and 'cannot be taken as a precedent in other negotiations.*'"(European Commission, DG Trade 2007).

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[17]   No Deadline to Finalize EPA Negotiations: EU, The Fiji Sun, 28 April 2014 (online: www.fijisun.com.fj/2014/04/28/no-deadline-to-finalise-epa-negotiations-eu, read on 16 June 2014).

[18]   Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (2013) Update on the Pacific ACP-EU negotiations, 10/2013.

[19]   Europe hits back in War of Words with the Pacific over Trade, Radio Australia, 18 June 2014 (www.radioaustralia.net.au/international/radio/program/pacific-beat/europe-hits-back-in-war-of-words-with-the-pacific-over-trade/1147312, read on 14 July 2014).

The then EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson valued the conclusion of negotiations in a letter to Wilkie Rasmussen, the Foreign Minister of the Cook Islands, as a special concession of the EU towards a central claim classified by the PACP States (ibid.). In fact, the concern of not getting to a negotiating conclusion unless concessions on the global sourcing rules were made combined with the analysis that the granted preferences should under existing regional capacity constraints not lead to an economic disadvantage of European fish processing industries for the foreseeable future, has probably created a broad consensus within the EU Commission.

The EU, however, was consequently not willing to let other Pacific Island countries benefit from this preferential treatment. In the regional negotiations, it demanded from the PACP states a narrower interpretation of the rules of origin for fish than was already granted in the two Interim Agreements. Andrew Jacobs, EU ambassador in the Pacific, explicitly warned the PACP states against believing that similar generous arrangements would be transferred to a regional free trade agreement (European Parliament 2014). The Pacific understood this as a clear sign for double standards in the EU's negotiating strategy. Background of the EU position had been a heated debate with the Southern European fishing nations in the European Parliament on the development of the rules of origin during the ratification of the Interim Agreement with Papua New Guinea and Fiji. Especially Carmen Fraga Estévez, Spanish MEP in the fisheries committee had descibed the preferences as completely exaggerated and warned of a potential significant impact on the European fishing industry. In her view, Papua New Guinea could become a "real "hub" for the processing of huge amounts of tuna from all origins from neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, China, the United States or Australia" (European Parliament 2010). Indeed, the increased competition by PNG on the global market could mean that in future, particularly

the Latin American tuna industry would come under pressure. Here mainly Spanish tuna producers (Jealsa, Calvo and Garavilla) had in recent years largely invested in processing plants, because most states could under the GSP import low-cost produced tuna fillets duty free into the EU. While in 2010 the tuna fishing in Galicia decreased by 40%, it is however unclear how imports from Papua New Guinea might have contributed to this. Scientific studies also show that in the medium term, the EU suppliers could even benefit from cheaper tuna imports from PNG, while producers in Southeast Asian and West African would lose out (European Parliament 2012). This radical opposition against generous global rules of origins in the EU – regardless of its actual relevance – is likely to have resulted in a much narrower product range (for which the EU would grant such flexibility) in the proposal for a regional free trade agreement than in the Interim Agreements, and the insurance of the commission not to grant other bilateral trade partners any similar concessions.

PNG has in recent years- not least because of the joint venture with Thailand and the Philippines - expanded its processing capacity for Skipjack and related Bigeye tuna with a total investment of 38 million US dollars (as of December 2012). The EU is thus in the absurd situation, in which Papua New Guinea on the one hand becomes a serious competitor on the canned tuna market, on the other hand and due to the rising export of cooked tuna halves at competitive cost prices establishes as a major supplier to the European tuna industry. Whilst the responsible EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht in May 2012 still assumed that the exemptions in the Interim Agreement would stilmulate the creation of up to 53,000 jobs by 2016[20] and lead to revenues around 21-70 million US $ and thus significant welfare gains for the country,

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[20]   Speech of EU Trade Commissioner Karel de Gucht of 29 May 2012 (online: http://europa.eu /rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-397_en.htm, read on 20 July 2014).

the European Commission found in a study commissioned by the European Parliament that the employment effects were considerably overestimated. The study concludes that the number of jobs could increase to a maximum of 20,000 by 2018, that between 40 and 85% of the jobs would exist less than a

Development of of tuna production capacity before and after the exemption of RoO in PNG (2007-2011)

	Capacity [t/day]	Estimated actual production capacity [t/day]				
Factory		Before exemtion		After exemption		
		2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
RD Tuna Canners Madang	200	120	60	100	100	100
Frabelle (PNG) Ltd. Lae	100	40	60	60	70	60
South Seas Tuna Wewak	200	100	90	80	80	75
Total	500	260	210	240	250	235
Raw fishing consumption [t/year]		63,700	51,450	58,800	61,250	57,575
Total production [t/year]		33,565	27,011	31,054	32,830	31,054

Source: Europaen Commission, DG Internal Politics (2012) (http://www.europarl.europa-.eu/document/activities/cont/201210/20121010ATT53391/20121010ATT53391EN.pdf)

Estimated impact of the exemption on the European tuna industry until 2018 (Econometric analysis)

Scenario	Profitable for the EU	Unprofitable for the EU
PNG exports in EU	10% increase	20% increase
Consumption of canned tuna	Higher	lower
Production development	- 1%	- 7%
Development of value-added	- 5.2 millions	- 43 millionss
Employment development	- 180 jobs	- 1,500 jobs

Source: European Commission, DG Internal Politics (2012) (online available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/papua_new_guinea/documents/press_corner/20121011_european_parliament_study_on_the_derogation_en.pdf)

year and that also the working conditions for the predominantly female work-force were a cause for criticism (Linpico 2011).

The same study concludes that the direct negative economic consequences for the European fishing industry had so far been practically non-measurable, unless the example was repeated for other countries in the region. However, it is assumed by the estimates that Papua New Guinea will substantially increase its tuna exports in the coming years through new investments, which could lead to significant adverse effects on the European industry. Here a clear development policy benefit is opposed to protectionist interests of some EU Member states.

Estimated Tuna production after growing investment in the sector in Papua New Guinea (2013-18)

Tuna production	Tuna consumption [t/day]					
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Total actual production	275	290	305	320	340	360
Total production of new factories	90	225	351	436	533	624

Source: European Commission, DG Internal Politics (2012) (www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201210/20121010ATT53391/20121010ATT53391EN.pdf)

Fiji had for a long time shown little interest in the enactment of the negotiated agreement with the EU. Besides the general political instability another reason for this might have been the fact that the only fish factory in the country – the majority state-owned *Pacific Fishing Company Limited* (PAFCO) produced in Levuka – mainly produced for the British and Canadian market (ibid.). Recently PAFCO also completed a contract with the US Bumble Bee cannery for the export of Albacore tuna fillets, which are economically not interesting for the EU. Parts of the processed tuna come from the Solomon Islands, Tonga and Kiribati, which do not have a processing industry of their own. Currently, there are also negotiating to build its own cannery on Fiji. Yet in mid-July 2014 – under supposed political pressure from the EU

negotiating team and facing the threat of termination of the trade preferences on 1 October 2014 – Fiji made an unexpected political change of course with the announcement of the early enactment and subsequent parliamentary ratification of the signed Interim Agreement. [21]

Likewise, the EU wants to make possible concessions in the EPA negotiations subject to bilateral fisheries agreements. In particular, the EU questioned the effectiveness of protective measures implemented for the stocks by the regional Fisheries Commission (*Western and Central Pacific Fischeries Commission* - WCPFC). From the perspective of the Pacific, bilateral agreements in turn would facilitate the EU's economic access to the regional maritime resources and further restrict the room for manoeuvre on the part of the PACP group. Thus in 2013, Kiribati signed a bilateral fisheries agreement with the EU, according to which the EU may fish with four trawlers and six purse seines longliners in the waters of Kiribati. The PNA sharply criticizes the Agreement, and accuses the EU of neither complying with the restrictions on deep-sea fishing days nor on those for the use of fish aggregating devices[22]. Already in the year 2004, Pacific Heads of State and Government committed themselves in the so-called Auckland Declaration to the sustainable conservation of natural resources in the region. The PACP states are now ready to discuss with the EU further improvements in their regional fishery protection policy, but expect in return from the EU not to present facts unilaterally[23].

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[21]   Fiji will ratify the Interim Agreement with the European Union, Pacific Islands News Association, 15 July 2014 (online: www.pina.com.fj/index.php?p=pacnews&m=read&o=93207 309153c4a127c5de12cafcb9b, read on 20 July 2014)

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Conclusion

The limited economic ties between the EU and the Pacific Island Countries contribute to a subordinate political importance of the region in the European foreign policy. This cannot be obscured by the close development relations under the Lomé and Cotonou agreements, which had been growing for decades. In the past, the EU has set important, but also selectively limited development impulses in the region. Despite this or perhaps because of the massive and aggressive political pressure by the EU and the assessment of the Pacific partner countries of the possible negative consequences of a regional EPA, there is a major scepticism throughout the negotiations and a more or less distinct lack of interest in signing a regional free trade agreement. The negotiations have now dragged on for more than 10 years, with no agreement in sight, that would be beneficial for the foreign or development policy for the Pacific Island Countries. Only Papua New Guinea has –apart from the recent announcement of Fiji – as part of the negotiations on a bilateral Interim Agreement of the EU managed to receive substantial concessions in the fisheries that could along with a rightly chosen framework lead to a deepening and diversification of the national fishing industry.

Throughout the negotiations, the EU was not willing to consider possible trade alternatives according to the Cotonou Article 37 (6). In addition to expanding the '*Everything-but-Arms* (EBA)' - preferences, which grants the least developed countries duty and quota-free access to the European market, for the entire Pacific by providing a 'EBA region', which together would meet the criteria of the EU market access initiative, also the conclusion of a regional free trade agreement would be possible, which would give the EU only selective and gradual market access concessions. Against the backdrop of the EU's unwillingness to seriously consider such alternatives and, if necessary, to defend against challenges within the WTO, the EU's rhethoric

clothed in development policy is but a half-hearted attempt to conceal its own offensive economic interests. This impression is not least underlined by the complex architecture of European development aid machinery, which follows complex allocation criteria, has insufficient administrative capacity and does not take apparent absorption bottlenecks within implementation on the part of its partner countries serious enough. The partnership between the EU and the Pacific Island Countries appears mostly donor driven with a focus on the EPA negotiations. The positive development objectives of the Cotonou Agreement, including the strengthening of regional integration and the development of supply capacities of local production structures, could eventually be promoted without entering into bilateral or regional free trade agreements. This points in the perspective beyond the year 2020 – the year of the expiry of the previous Cotonou Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries (Nickel 2012). A new European development policy in the region would on the one hand build on a new Pacific Strategy at eye level, taking into account both the shortcomings of the past as well as the existing power asymmetries. On the other hand, a commercial cooperation could be established, leaving the EU interests behind the legitimate regional development priorities, and would offer the region credible and regionally specific alternatives for an aggressive liberalization dogma of the past.

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Mining in the Pacific Island Countries:
Opportunities and Risks

Matthias Kowasch

Abstract: *In a world where mineral resources are being depleted, the supply and control of raw materials is an important strategic issue. Economic powers like the United States, France and Australia are interested in mineral resources discovered in the Pacific Islands region, especially in Melanesia. The chapter links political and economic interests in Melanesia's mineral resources, using examples from West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia. The three cases studies have indigenous independence movements, and a strong economic interest by external powers. While enormous gold reserves were found in West Papua, Bougainville has large copper reserves, and New Caledonia possesses around 25% of the world's nickel deposits. The political conflicts around the control of these resources have a long history and are unresolved. External actors have geostrategic interests. While France still maintains a territorial presence in the Pacific Islands region, Australian and American companies are participating in the exploitation of mineral resources in PNG and West-Papua. Resource conflicts often take place in very complex social situations where different actors pursue multiple interests. The author analyses the social arena where landowners, local governments, multinational mining companies and state governments defend different interests and hold different perceptions.*

Keywords: Resource control, governance, resource conflicts, mineral deposits, independence movements, Pacific Islands, Melanesia

Introduction

The search for natural resources to feed economies is a globalised problem. All national economies, but especially the resource-poor countries and the growing economies of emerging countries like China and India need a secure supply. However, some mineral recources are becoming increasingly scarce. Krysler (2012:11) notes: "*In recent months, the reports of the imminent shortage of raw materials in Germany have significantly increased. The* Federal Association of German Industry [BDI, 'Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie'] *even falls in apocalyptic mood. The commodity expert and future president of the BDI, Ulrich Grillo, gloomy predicts that the next cold war will be a resource war. The BDI assumes among other things that we can not afford the energy transition, because the necessary raw materials such as copper, cobalt, rare earths or germanium are simply too expensive*."

The raw material supply has economic and political significance, both for the commodity importers as well as for the export states. Bebbington (2012:5) highlights how extractive industries produce "both incredible wealth and destruction at one and the same time" in the export states. The worldwide hunger for resources attracts mining companies to invest in more remote, dangerous and previously unexploited regions of the world. The Pacific Island countries, notably in Melanesia, are increasingly affected. Investment in the resource sector by foreign companies is mostly appreciated by local governments, because the companies bring foreign currency into the country, pay some tax revenue, and because they create jobs.

The present chapter is not primarily concerned with the socio-economic impacts or resource exploitation in the local context, resulting from huge mining projects, but provides three examples, on the macro- economic scale, of a connection between global demand for raw materials, resource exploitation in the Pacific Island countries and broader international strategic interests

in the region. The study specifically addresses questions of resource control and supply. The different interests of the actors involved are analyzed. Interests may overlap and lead to conflicts among the actors, thus the discussion about the causes of conflicts is a key element of this chapter. The author questions the interlinking between the abundance of resources and independence movements.

Methods and frameworks

The present study analyses scientific papers, book chapters, press releases and newspaper articles. It is based on several years of fieldwork in the French overseas territory of New Caledonia, where the author wrote his PhD entitled *Les populations kanak face au développement de l'industrie du en Nouvelle-Calédonie nickel* (Kowasch 2010). The fieldwork consisted of empirical studies in four Kanak villages in the vicinity of the Koniambo project that envisaged the construction of a processing plant next to the exploitation of a profitable nickel mine. The Koniambo projet is located in the Northern Province of the country that is governed by the independence party PALIKA (*Party of Kanak Liberation*). In the villages of Netchaot, Baco, Oundjo and Gatope 239 persons aged between 16 and 70 years were questioned about school qualification, career aspirations, and their hopes and fears over the nickel project. In addition, the author conducted informal interviews with representatives of the mining company, the provincial government, the local municipality and the different landowners. After his PhD, the author dealt with issues of governance, socio-economic impacts of mining projects and territoriality within two CNRT (*National Centre for Technolocial Research*) funded research projects ('Mining Governance' and 'Value of Place'). The results and experiences from the different research projects serve as a basis for the present chapter.

   In this chapter I compare three mining sites: West-Papua (Grasberg project), Bougainville (Panguna project) and New Caledonia (Koniambo

project). In all three cases, the mining sector is interwoven with independence struggles. Bougainville and the government of the Northern Province in New Caledonia both want to use the mining sector for economic emancipation and later for political independence.

Spatial distribution of mineral ressources in the Pacific Island Countries

Considering all Pacific Island countries, only Papua New Guinea (PNG), the French overseas territory New Caledonia and to a lesser extent, the Solomon Islands and Fiji have significant mineral resource deposits. West Papua is – after annexation by Indonesia – politically a part of Southeast Asia, but culturally a Melanesian country, possesses important mineral resources, especially gold and copper.

While New Caledonia mines almost exclusively nickel and owns about 25% of worldwide reserves, the independent state of Papua New Guinea possesses a large number of valuable ores such as gold, silver, copper, nickel and cobalt. PNG also has rich deposits of oil, natural gas and manganese. Despite this PNG is ranked 153 of 182 nations on the Human Development Index. The largest mining projects are currently Ok Tedi (copper and gold), Porgera (gold), Hidden Valley/Hamata (silver and gold), Simberi (silver and gold) and Lihir (gold). Other projects are Tolukuma, Sinivit and Edie Creek (all gold) (Figure 1 on the next page). In addition, more projects are planned, for example Ramu Nickel and the deepwater seafloor mining project Solwara where the company Nautilus Minerals intends to commercially explore copper, gold, silver and zinc-rich seafloor massive sulphide deposits in 1,600 m depth (see also Imbun 2013:312).

Figure 1: Mining Projects in Papua New Guinea (Cartography: M. Kowasch 2014, Source: Imbun 2013)

In New Caledonia, three smelters process nickel ores from over 20 deposits: Doniambo, Goro Nickel and Koniambo (Figure 5). In addition, virgin ores are exported to Asia, Australia and Europe.

Although the Solomon Islands are barely larger than the German *'Bundesland'* (federal state) of Hesse, the country owns rich mineral deposits. Gold, copper, bauxite, zinc, lead, cobalt and phosphate are exploited.

The Fiji Islands mainly produce gold, but also silver and cement. The most important mining project is the Vatukoula Gold Mine, which is operated by *Emperor Gold Mines*. The Waisoi project is a second gold mine where copper should also be mined. The project is located in the Namosi and Naitasiri provinces, approximately 30 km west of Suva. The Namosi joint-venture where the American company *Newcrest* has the controlling interest is currently conducting exploratory drilling. Other gold deposits in the Fiji

Islands are Mt. Kasi, Tuvatu and Cirianui and Dakunimba (for an overview, see http://www.domegoldmines.com.au).

In the small island nation of Nauru, with its nearly 10,000 inhabitants, phosphate was mined on a large scale over 90 years. When the phosphate reserves became exhausted at the end of the 20th century, the small 21.8 km^2 island resembled a lunar landscape over much of the surface. Once one of the richest per capita countries in the world, Nauru now has to ask for development aid. The power supply in the hospital is no longer continuously secured, wrecked cars are lying on the roadside, and the apartment buildings of the foreign mine workers are now empty. The airline Air Nauru had to stop operations (Folliet 2011). Only a small coastal strip is still usable for agriculture. There are few jobs since the decline of the phosphate industry, according to the CIA World Factbook 90% of the population of Nauru are unemployed (www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook). Other resource-rich countries in the Pacific Islands region try to avoid this worst case, however, the situation is not comparable to PNG or New Caledonia due to the territorial smallness of Nauru.

Interlinking of Policy and Resource Extraction

The worlwide growth of communication technologies and the aerospace and chemical sectors feed the hunger for resources. Several metals are classified by governments as 'strategic'. 'Strategic raw materials' refer to energy sources (e.g. oil, gas, coal and uranium) or industrially used resources that are necessary for the functioning of contemporary economies (e.g. copper, nickel, cobalt, lithium, coltan, etc.), but can also be profitable minerals like diamonds, precious stones or gold. In particular, rapidly growing economies such as China and the Southeast Asian countries are characterized by a high demand. States with an extremely high and or increasing energy consumption (e.g. USA or China) need energy sources such as oil and natural gas. Copper

for example is needed for the production of electric motors, mobile phones are manufactured with coltan, lithium is essential for the production of re-chargeable batteries, and platinum is used in the construction of fuel cells. The world desires increasingly scarce resources, and governments have polit-ical and strategic interests in a secure importation of raw materials.

Although Australia is and remains by far the largest inward investor in the Pacific Island countries, Chinese investment is growing rapidly (Ko-wasch/Lindemann 2014). Hayward-Jones (2013:8) notes: "*Chinese compa-nies and investors in the Pacific Islands, mostly from provincial centres in China, have expanded beyond their traditional small retail business focus to the domain of infrastructure and mining*." Chinese investment is the most visible in Papua New Guinea, where "it has been driven in large part by a desire to secure access to that country's vast natural resources." The Chinese state-owned *Metallurgical Construction Group Corporation* (MCC) will start the exploitation of nickel and cobalt in the Madang province in PNG. With US$ 2.1 billion, the Ramu Nickel project represents the largest Chinese in-vestment in Oceania (http://www.highlandspacific.com; Smith 2013:178; Kowasch/Lindemann 2014). The US oil giant *Exxon Mobil* has invested about 19 billion US$ in a liquefied gas project in the Southern and Western High-lands of Papua New Guinea, in order to secure valuable gas reserves (http://pnglng.com/project/about). The Papua New Guinea liquefied natural gas project is due to start in 2014 and has a lifespan of about 30 years.

West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia have mines that have great geopolitical significance. The American mining company *Freeport* runs the large Grasberg mine in West Papua; it's known as the largest gold mine in the world and represents economic interests of the United States in Indonesia. In New Caledonia the independence movement of the FLNKS (*Kanak and So-cialist National Liberation Front*) uses the nickel sector, in particular the

Koniambo project in the north of the main island, for economic and political emancipation from France. And in Bougainville the reopening of the Panguna gold and copper mine is currently a source of controversy. The mine could be an economic support leg for political independence and secssion of Bougainville from PNG.

The Example of West Papua

In West Papua (or Irian Jaya, as the region is known of Indonesia), resource exploitation and political interests are particularly linked. In 1667 the western part of New Guinea came under Dutch influence by a treaty with the Sultan of Tidore (Mückler 2013:193). Both British and Dutch tried several times to annex the territory, the Dutch succeeded in 1816. In 1936 the Dutch geologist Jean Jacques Dozy discovered significant gold and copper deposits in the Maoke Mountains on behalf of NNGPM (*Nederlandsche Nieuw Guinea Petroleum Maatschappij*). NNGPM was officially a Dutch company, but in fact 60% of the shares belonged to the *US Standard Oil* group (40% to *Standard Vacuum Oil Co.* and 20% to *Far Pacific Investments Standard Oil of California*) (ibid.). Thus, there was an early interest by the US in the lucrative mineral resources in West Papua, which later had a decisive impact on the political future of the region in the 1950s and 60s.

In 1942, the Japanese army occupied large parts of Dutch New Guinea. The Japanese propagated a policy of a 'Greater Asian Prosperity Sphere' and thus supported the ideology of 'Asia for the Asians'. Anti-colonial resentments and pan-Asian sentiments were encouraged. Due to the high Japanese military presence, especially on the north coast, the landing and retaking of the island by Allied forces in 1944 was broadly welcomed by local people. After the defeat of the Japanese, Achmed Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta proclaimed the Republic of Indonesia on 17 August 1945. On 27 December 1949, the Dutch Parliament recognized the independence of Indonesia,

whether West Papua was part of Indonesia was initially unclear, and the Netherlands supported the self-determination of the indigenous Papuan people, as envisaged in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter. The negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the future status of West Papua, in which the UN also intervened since 1954, ended without a result, because Indonesia refused to recognize the self-determination of the indigenous Papuans. President Sukarno equipped the Indonesian military with Soviet, American and British weapons to step up Indonesia's military presence to meet the rising number of Papuan rebellions staged by the pro-independence *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM), or Free Papua Movement (O'Brien 2010). Sukarno already wanted to provide the conditions for a military solution in West Papua. After the independence supporters gained the majority in the 1961 elections, the official independence of West Papua was proclaimed on 1 December 1961, and the national flag was hoisted. Sukarno saw the danger of the new nationalism in West Papua and in December 1961 gave the order to occupy the region. The Netherlands replied with military counterattacks, and West Papua was prepared for a long-time conflict. In a region characterized by lush tropical rainforest and long transport routes, a rapid military success seemed difficult. But Sukarno used the two superpowers against each other – the Soviet Union and the United States. Both states supplied Indonesia with arms, supporting different camps. The United States therefore exerted pressure on the Netherlands to accept the annexation of West Papua by Indonesia. US President J.F. Kennedy was supposed to have said on the subject of West Papua: "What importance have half a million cannibals, when it is the matter to take 200 million Indonesians away from the Eastern bloc?" (Quoted in Zöllner 2008:9; Mückler 2013:203).

Since 1967, the US company *Freeport Sulphur* based in New Orleans (now Phoenix) obtained from Sukarno's successor Suharto a 30-year contract

to mine copper in West Papua. *Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc's subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia* ran the largest gold mine and the most cost-effective copper mine in the world with Ertsberg and later Grasberg (Mückler 2013:206). Freeport – and indirectly the United States – has therefore become an important ally of Jakarta. The Australian company *Rio Tinto PLC* has a joint venture with *Freeport* for a 40% share of production above specific levels until 2021, and 40% of all production after 2021 (www.riotinto.com). Furthermore, the Indonesian government maintains 9.36% of the shares in *PT Freeport Indonesia* (Nakagawa 2008:76). The company became the largest taxpayer in Indonesia, the largest foreign investor and one of the largest employers. According to Couasnon et al. (2013:9) the mine contributes 1-2% to the Indonesian GDP and generated receipts of US$ 1 billion in 2009. After the takeover of the US mining company *Phelps Dodge*, *Freeport* became the largest copper producer in the world, with deposits in Indonesia, Europe, North and South America. Production at Ertsberg started in July 1973. The Ertsberg mine is located at an altitude of 3,500 m above sea level, and the high-grade ores are directly under the surface and up to 350 m in depth (Mückler 2013:206). The deposits are considered as the world's largest gold and the third-largest copper deposits (see Mealey 1996). But in the mid-1980s, the reserves (33 million tons of copper) were exhausted. *Freeport* was looking for new deposits, and discovered gold and copper deposits at Grasberg in 1988, only about three kilometers away from Ertsberg (see figure 2 on the next page).

The mining operator *PT Freeport Indonesia* was often exposed to massive criticism, due to serious environmental pollution and repeated human rights violations. Relying on good relations with the Indonesian government, the company largely ignored Indonesian environmental laws. Up to 238,000 tons of toxic waste were transported daily via the rivers Aghawagon and

Otomona into the Ajkwa river and later discharged into the Arafura Sea, next to the Lorentz National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1999 (Mückler 2013:207; http://www.earthworksaction.org). The consulting company *Parametrix* published an impact study of the Grasberg mine in 2002, and explained that the water quality of rivers in the vicinity of the mine do not longer allow aquatic life (New York Times, 27 December 2005, in Nakagawa 2008). Nakagawa (2008:77) stated that sulfur-containing wastewater infiltrated into the groundwater. A second problem is the large amounts of sediments that make the water murky and difficult for aquatic life, especially the coral reefs in the Arafura Sea. According to a report by the Indonesian Ministry of Environment in 2004, the rivers into which the wastewater from *Freeport* were discharged contained 37,500 milligrams of suspended solids, although the Indonesian law allows only 400. A representative of the indigenous Amungme people spoke of "Eco-Terrorism" in this context (Banks 2002:59).

Figure 2: The Grasberg mine in West Papua

Human rights have been and are regularly violated in West Papua. Amnesty International and other human rights groups have accused the Indonesian police and army of kidnapping, torture and killing independence activists. In October 1966 for example, Indonesian military murdered 88 men, women and children in the village of Gulum in the Baliem area. In 1967 the Indonesian air force bombed villages in the area of Ajamaru (see Sharp 1977; Korber 1998). In 1984 Indonesian elite units killed independence fighters in operation *Clean up* (Brundige et al. 2004). In March 2013, 17 men from East Nusa Tenggara were tortured for 12 days in a police prison. They were accused of being responsible for the death of a police officer. In June 2013, Mako Tabuni, a Papuan activist, was shot dead by the Indonesian military near the West Papuan capital of Jayapura. A criminal prosecution of the offenders did not happen (http://www.amnesty.org). As a result of Tabuni's death Papua activists burned shops and cars. This list of incidents could be continued.

The oppression of the indigenous Papuans is accompanied by an active settlement policy by the Indonesian government. In 1971 the indigenous Papuans represent 96% of the total population in West Papua, in 2010 their part was only 49%. The number of non-Papuans rose from 36,000 in 1971 to 708,425 in 2000. Until 2020, the proportion of Papuans is projected to decrease to only 29% of the total population of the province (Elmslie 2000:4-5). According to Butt et al. (2002), by 2002 over 20% of the Papuans were infected with the HIV virus, compared to 0.4% in the rest of Indonesia. A West Papuan activist speaks in this context of a "slow motion genocide" (ibid:9). With respect to the United States, the George W. Bush administration (2001-09) restarted training and support of the Indonesian military, after previous US administrations had stopped it due to ongoing human rights violations in West Papua. In addition, the US mining company *Freeport* has paid the Indonesian military for decades to provide security for the mine. Schilder (2005:

63) notes that in 2002, US\$ 5.6 billion were paid to Indonesian military. Thus, *Freeport* paid Indonesian officers that were responsible for killings and torture in the context of mining and independence struggles. Payments to foreign officials are prohibited under US law. *Freeport* has avoided a public statement concerning the accusations.

On the other hand, in 2002 the company presented an 'Environmental Risk Assessment' to improve wastewater management. Promises to respect human rights were also given. Voluntary trust funds for the support of the indigenous peoples (Amungme and Kamoro communities) in the neighbourhood of the mine were established. *Freeport* paid US\$ 8.5 million into the funds until 2006 and wants to continue to promote them with US\$ 1 million per year (Nakagawa 2008:82). With the money, Papuan people can purchase shares and become "partners" of the mining project. *Freeport* has also made some effort to favour and increase local employment. In 1996 only 600 Papua workers were employed at Grasberg. By 2006 their number had risen to 2,650; 320 of them in the management of the company (Nakagawa 2008:83). In 2003, *Freeport* established the '*Nemangkaw Mining Institute'*, to instruct and train local workers. In summary, it must be noted that *Freeport* has made progress in environmental management and the involvement of the local population. Nevertheless, the measures are insufficient, considering that the company has a total of approximately 17,000 employees.

On the political scene, law no. 21 on the Special Autonomy of Papua granted a greater autonomy to the Papuan Province in 2001, but the Indonesian-run development has not benefitted to the indigenous population. In the end, there is little hope that Papuans will obtain independence from Indonesia in the next few years. O'Brien (2010:53) notes: "Papua's situation has attracted international attention due to its conspicuous humanitarian dimensions, although perhaps not as much as it deserves." In fact, the international

community makes little effort to support and defend the Papuan independence movement. US-President Obama has renewed the binational relationship with Indonesia, making the state a strategic partner in South-East Asia. US Congressman Eni Faleomavaega of American Samoa continues to champion the Papuan cause, but he has incurred criticism when he required the US State Department to report human rights abuses in West Papua (O'Brien 2010:53). For Australia, the Papuan cause remains sensitive. Jakarta distrusts Canberra since the Australian support for the East Timorese independence movement. The murder of the Australian native Drew Grant on the Grasberg mine road in July 2009 has forced the Australian government to re-engage with West Papua. The *Melanesian Spearhead Group* (MSG), that comprises Fiji, Vanuatu, PNG, Solomon Islands and the Kanak FLNKS from New Caledonia, supports the independence movement, but still refuses a full membership to West Papua (Pazifik Infostelle 9/2014:24; see Ratuva in this volume).

Indonesia still prevents foreign journalists from entering West Papua, fearing they will inform the international community about the political situation there. The Grasberg mine is a no-go area for journalists. Recently, in August 2014, two French journalists, Valentine Bourrat and Thomas Dandois from the TV channel ARTE, were arrested by the Indonesian military, because they were arrived with a tourist visa and wanted to film a doumentary about the independence movement. They were sentenced to 2.5 months of imprisonment and were released on 27 October of the same year (Pazifik Infostelle 12/2014:20). This illustrates the continued sensitivity of Indonesia about West Papua. Concerning the future of the Grasberg mine, *Freeport* has a contract for exploitation until 2021. Indonesia's government is actually thinking about an acquisition of the mine in order to exploit the copper and gold deposits themselves. If this happens, *Freeport* will lose the third largest, and one of the most lucrative mines in the world.

The Example of Bougainville

Figure 3: Mining on Bougainville

The island of Bougainville was the scene of a major mining conflict with strong geopolitical dimensions, in which conflict, where more than 15,000 peoples lost their lives between 1988 and 1998 (Banks 2008:27). The conflict took place after the civil war in West Papua and it was the second largest, longest, most brutal and costly conflict in Oceania since the end of World War II (see Böge in this volume). The ten-year-long civil war in Bougainville shows once more the interlinking of resource wealth and political power. The superficial starting point for the escalation of the conflict were the events concerning the Panguna copper mine, that was the largest open pit copper mine in the world at its time of operation from 1972 to 1989.

Bougainville and Buka, a small island in the North of Bougainville (see Figure 3), are geographically part of the Solomon Islands, but belong politically to the independent state of Papua New Guinea. Bougainville is the most

peripheral of all provinces in PNG, and the distance between the state capital Port Moresby and the provincial capital Arawa is over 1,000 km. At the end of the 19th century, Bougainville and two other islands (Choiseul and Isabel) were part of the German colonial possessions in the Pacific. In 1899, Choiseul and Isabel were ceded to Britain in order to resolve a dispute over the Samoa islands. The arbitrarily drawn boundary line between Bougainville and Choiseul remained even after the defeat of the Germans in World War I. Australia received the former German New Guinea including Bougainville from the *League of Nations* to administrate it as a Trust Territory. The northern Solomon Islands, however, remained to the *British Solomon Islands Protectorate* (BSIP). Australia was interested in the exploitation of natural resources discovered in Bougainville, particularly gold. Because of these economic interests Australia ignored the local desire for political independence or joining the Solomon Islands. Instead, Australia established its own administrative capacity in Bougainville. In the early 1960s the Australian company *Conzinc Rio Tinto* discovered large deposits of low-grade copper in Bougainville. With the increasing demand for copper on the world market and new production technologies, which also made profitable the extraction of minerals with low ore grades, *Bougainville Copper Limited* (BCL), the local subsidiary of *Conzinc Rio Tinto*, put the Panguna mine into operation in 1972, before PNG's independence declaration. The ore reserves were assessed at 900 million metric tons and seemed to secure the long-term exploitation of the mine. During 17 years the Panguna mine was the most profitable mining project in PNG and generated approximately 44% of the export earnings and 17% of the internally generated revenue the government (Regan 1999:17). The government of PNG held 19% of the shares of BCL. According to Regan (1999:17), the operator paid a total of more than US$ 1 billion in taxes and dividends to the state. Around US$ 33 million were disbursed to

the landowners, US$ 28.5 million as compensation and US$ 4.5 million as rent. Some US$ 83 million were paid to the provincial government of Bougainville. A high tax revenue is one explanation why PNG's government never wanted to give independence to the island of Bougainville. So, the largest part of royalty payments was disbursed to the state government in Port Moresby. Imbun (2013:314) explains that the landowners were unsatisfied with the payments: "*The landowners of mining and hydrocarbon projects had viewed the 'traditional' compensable tenets such as land and water use and royalties that characterised the Bougainville mine regime as inadequate and successfully added equity, trust funds, preferential employment and business spin-offs into the agreements. The payments for these resources were not significant and often failed to reflect changes in economic and social lives of the people.*"

The main consumers of the copper from Bougainville were Japan, Germany, Spain and the South-East Asian countries. Arawa, the capital of Bougainville, became PNG's third largest urban centre, because of the infrastructure development associated with the Panguna mine. The population of Arawa rose from 5,000 to 15,000 inhabitants from 1972-88 (Mückler 2013:166).

The ethnic groups that lived near the mine (Nasioi, Rorovana, Uruwan, Nagovesi and Banoni) suffered under resettlement and land loss. Many landowners refused the compensation payments offered by BCL because they feared that this meant the sale of their land. The long colonial history with arrivals from Germany, Australia, Japan and New Guinea made the landowners additionally suspicious towards an Australian mining company. Land has a profound identity value for Bougainvillian people, as is the case with the Kanak in New Caledonia and other Melanesian peoples. It is the land of the ancestors, and the clan history is written in the territory (Kowasch 2012a:203). Since BCL had to negotiate directly with landowners, the

company supported them in establishing the *Panguna Landowners Association* (PLA). But the PLA was rapidly exposed to accusations of being a stooge of the mining company and insufficiently defending the interests of the landowners (Mückler 2013:167). Compensation payments led to internal tensions and could not satisfy the local opposition to the mine, especially because the environmental and socio-economic impacts (e.g. water disturbance and landslides) were considerable. The rapid transition from a subsistence towards monetary economy catapulted the region around the mine into a new era, what Oliver (1991:177) described as follows: "[...] these urbanized Bougainvillians had chosen to live European lifestyles as completely as their incomes permitted, in housing, food, clothing, recreation, etc. [...]". The capitalist lifestyle caught on with increasing incomes and the demand for "western" consumer goods. The ecological damage included the deforestation of tropical rain forests and the pollution of the Jaba and Kavarong rivers with heavy metals, especially cyanide and nitrates. Due to the massive slag of the mine about 3,000 ha became unusable for agriculture (http://www.unpo.org). Because of dissatisfaction with the PLA in 1987 the Bougainvillian politicians P. Serero and F. Ona established a 'new' PLA, the *New Panguna Landowners Association*, which was not recognized by the BCL. Opponents of the Paguna project now claimed not only higher compensation payments and greater involvement of the local people, but a political independence of the island from PNG. Fears that the BCL, as a multinational company, could manipulate PNG's government, fueled opposition to the project. Finally, the conflict escalated when a *Peace Package* offered by the state government was rejected by the militants on Bougainville. In 1989 Ona founded the *Bougainville Revolutionary Army* (BRA) that began an armed struggle for the complete independence of the island. The government reacted by sending soldiers of the PNGDF (*Papua New Guinea Defence Force*) to expel the activists

from the area of the mine. The conflict escalated into a civil war. The Panguna mine gradually ceased operations from May 1989, because the safety of the workers could no longer be guaranteed (Mückler 2013:169).

The reasons for the Bougainville conflict have been identified by several authors (Connell 1991; Banks 2008; Regan 2010, 2014; Böge 2010; Braithwaite et al. 2010; Mückler 2013). The geographer Glenn Banks (2008) distinguishes three lines of argument. The strict Marxist-oriented line of interpretation, that sees the cause of the civil war in hostile opposing groups or classes, seems to find little support in the scientific community. The anthropologist Colin Filer traced the conflict to the unequal distribution of compensation payments, and to the serious environmental impacts under which the local population suffered. Filer (1990:88) puts forward a 'social disintegration' thesis that is also supported by Bainton (2010). Griffin (1990) stressed the desire of Bougainvillians for political independence as the main driving factor. Mückler (2013) concurs that the independence movement was older than the resource conflict over the mine. The demands of the project opponents were in addition to previously existing claims for independence after the beginning of the conflicts around the Panguna mine.

Griffin (1990) mentions the ethnic differences between Bougainville and the rest of PNG as a decisive argument for opposing the Panguna project. In the course of this debate Braithwaite et al. (2010) noted that the fight against the mine was primarily initiated by young clan members, partly against the resistance of the elders and women (Kent/Barnett 2012). Regan (1999:13; see also McMillan 1988) also argues that the independence movement was crucial, and suggests the mine was a catalyst for the conflict: "However, the mine was a catalyst for the conflict rather than the direct cause." He explains: "*In the complex political, economic and cultural situation of Bougainville, it is naive and misleading to attempt to analyse the origins of the conflict in*

terms of single causes. [...] Each factor tended to reinforce the importance of other factors at different times." (Regan 1999:14).

In 2013 Bougainville proceeds to a state-building process (Böge 2010). The island actually has an autonomous status that will eventually lead to full independence or to a large degree of autonomy within PNG. Both options require the creation of new political institutions. Currently, the reopening of the Panguna mine is vigourously debated (Regan at the conference '*Mining and mining policy in the Pacific*', November 2011, Noumea). The question is whether the mine should start production before an eventual political independence, or afterwards? The Australian company *Rio Tinto* is interested, and consultants have appeared on the island to assess the situation. The mining project could, if carefully managed, promote autonomous economic development, similar to the situation in New Caledonia where that process is already underway.

The Example of New Caledonia

New Caledonia, a French overseas territory to the South-East of Vanuatu, possesses around 25% of global nickel reserves. This 'green gold' was discovered in 1864 by the French engineer Jules Garnier on Grande-Terre, the main island of the archipelago. The French colonial administration began exploitation of the valuable ores quite rapidly. Nickel is used in the production of stainless steel, in the aerospace industry and in the making of coins. It is considered as a 'strategic' mineral. The country produces under 5% of globally consumed nickel metal despite its large reserves, because a single smelter processed all the nickel ores in New Caledonia until 2010 ('Doniambo' in Noumea). Figure 4 also shows that the Asian countries, especially China, Indonesia and the Philippines, have started to invest more funds in the nickel industry since 2000.

Figure 4: Evolution of the global nickel ore exploitation and nickel metal production (2000-2009), in % of the global exploitation/production, Source: US Geological Survey 2014

Built in 1910, the 'Doniambo' plant is operated by the SLN (*Société Le Nickel*), a subsidiary of the French group *Eramet* (see Figure 5). But high commodity prices at the beginning of the 21st century induced international mining companies to contemplate the immense nickel deposits and to invest in

this overseas territory of France. Henceforth, two new metal processing plants have been built: once in the Southern Province (Goro Nickel project), the other in the Northern Province of the country (Koniambo project) (see Figure 5). While the Goro Nickel project operated by the Brazilian company Vale was completed in 2010, the first smelter in the North (called *'usine du Nord'*), run by the Caledonian-Swiss consortium *SMSP-Xstrata*, started pilot production in April 2013. When these new smelters run at full production capacity, New Caledonia will triple its nickel metal production (from 60,000 to 180,000 tonnes).

Figure 5: Nickel mining and processing in New Caledonia

The Goro Nickel project includes the construction of a port in Prony bay, a coal-fired power station and a processing plant that uses a hydrometallurgical process. The smelter has a production capacity of 60,000 tonnes of nickel metal (as ferronickel) and 4,500 tonnes of cobalt (see Kowasch 2010; Bonvallot/Lardy 2012). The hydrometallurgical process means a discharge of acidic

wastewaters into the New Caledonian fringing lagoon via a 24 km long pipeline. A total of 36,000 m^3 of wastewater per day will be pumped through the pipeline, which is located in the Havannah channel and lying on the sea floor at a depth of 35 m. The project attracted violent protests by local Kanak clans during its construction phase, but the protests diminished with the signing of an agreement with the mining company, called a *'Pacte pour un développement durable du Grand Sud'* (Agreement for sustainable development of the Great South). Nevertheless, several local Kanak clans still opposed the project. While some of them were employed by the company or subcontractors, others continued to fight against it. After several accidents and technical problems, nickel production has been suspended since November 2013 for an indefinite period.

In contrast to the Goro Nickel project, the construction of a nickel smelter in the North, where the majority of the population is Kanak, should be understood as a political project that provides economic and political emancipation from France. The majority shareholder (51%) of the project is the local company SMSP (*Société Minière du Sud Pacifique*), which is an investment vehicle of the government of the Northern Province. The Swiss company *Xstrata* holds the other 49% of the shares. Since the Northern Province is governed by the independence party *Palika* (Kanak Liberation Party), the Kanak independence movement is directly involved in the nickel industry for the first time (Kowasch 2010; Pitoiset/Wéry 2008). After a civil war in New Caledonia in the 1980s, sparked by Kanak resistance to continued French rule, the independence movement imposed conditions on new negotiations about the political status of New Caledonia. The Kanak leaders required an active participation in the nickel sector, and access to adequate deposits to permit construction of a nickel smelter in the North. In return, they accepted an adjournment of a referendum about political independence. Nevertheless, the

long-term goal was to create the economic conditions for future political independence. After their purchase of SMSP (formerly a small company belonging to the Lafleur group) in 1990, the Nothern Province, a vanguard of the independence movement, became the owner of a mining company, but still lacked enough ore deposits to supply a processing plant. For that reason, the independence movement asked the French government to support their demand to exchange mining titles with the SLN. In 1996 the *Bercy Agreement* enabled the final exchange of the mining titles of Poum and Koniambo. While the SLN got the Poum massif nickel deposits in the North, and an additional compensation payment, the SMSP obtained the rich Koniambo deposits. For a long time the French parent company of the SLN, *Eramet*, resisted the exchange of the mining titles, because they did not want to lose their monopoly on smelting in New Caledonia. Under pressure from the state government, they finally succumbed. The government did not want to jeopardize the negotiations with the independence movement on a new autonomy status and was trying to avoid a possible flare-up of ethnic unrest in a politically unstable situation. At last, the negotiations resulted in 1998 in the treaty of Noumea, that provided for partial devolution from the French state; the transfer of all jurisdictions to the New Caledonian government, except sovereign powers (foreign policy, defense, police, justice, currency) (Maclellan 2013; Kowasch/Lindenmann 2014; see also Lindenmann in this volume).

The SMSP, which did not have the necessary funds or the know-how to build a nickel smelter, need a srong mining partner to realise the Koniambo project. Finally, the government of the Northern Province and the SMSP convinced the Canadian group *Falconbridge*, at the time the third largest nickel producer in the world, to invest in the project and to agree with the 51-49% model. The SMSP, the majority shareholder, would contribute a secure supply of ore, and had majority support of the local population for the

Koniambo project. Falconbridge would be responsible for the construction of the smelter. In 2005, the Swiss mining company *Xstrata* acquired the Canadian company, and started in 2008 with the construction of the largest industrial project ever in the predominantly rural Northern Province (Grenon 2012). The Koniambo project comprises a smelter, a coal-fired power plant, a port on the Vavouto peninsula and the broader economic development of the Voh-Koné-Pouembout (VKP) region where the new smelter is located (Kowasch 2012b, 2010).

Since the processsing plant was built in a rural area, new infrastructure was necessary. Consequently, the government of the Northern Province and the three districts making up the VKP region have planned the construction of shopping centers, industrial zones, filling stations, and improved socio-cultural activities for the existing and the new population. New rental properties are shooting up like mushrooms. However, new apartements cannot satisfy the rising demand, resulting in exorbitant rents and land values. Kanak customary land has not been exempt from this growth pressure, and indeed some clans have profited from it. For example, a shopping centre, new housing, a filling station, a cinema and a Lapita museum will be built on the customary land of the Bako clan, only a few kilometres from the provincial capital Koné (Kowasch 2012a, 2012b). The number of construction sites increased, and the hotels of the region now live to the rhythm of the mine workers and managers. The money flows, and life in the Kanak villages in the neighbourhood of the mine is changing rapidly from a largely subsistence to a consumer society. But not all people find work and benefit from the new revenues. The socio-economic disparities are growing in the Kanak communities formerly and still in part characterized by great solidarity. The environmental impacts of the mining project are considered by the majority of Kanak clans as the 'price to pay' for economic development and political

emancipation. In 2008/09, surveys in four neighbouring Kanak villages (Oundjo, Gatope, Baco and Netchaot) showed that only 24% of 239 Kanak people interviewed were opposed to the project (Kowasch 2010:372, 2014:255). This percentage has declined as jobs and income have come on stream.

On the macro-economic level, the Northern Province and the SMSP have pursued a strategy of further exploitation of other nickel mines, all to create the preconditions for economic emancipation from France. The 51-49% model has also been applied to projects in South Korea and China (Kowasch/Lindenmann 2014). Together with the South Korean partner *Posco*, the SMSP has built a nickel smelter in Gwangyang (South Korea) to repay the loans for the co-financing of the Koniambo project more quickly. And by exporting to the Gwangyang smelter, in operation since 2008, the SMSP also hopes to prolong the life of the mines on the East coast of the island that have low-grade ores. The same 51-40% model is envisaged with the Chinese partner Jinchuan. A joint-venture agreement has already been signed; the future plant 50 km north of the Vietnamese border should become operational in 2017. Similar to Bougainville, the government of the Northern Province wants to use the mining sector as an 'instrument' for political emancipation. But in contrast to Bougainville, the Kanak independence movement wants to be the 'master' of resource exploitation and will not delegate exploitation to foreign companies.

Resource Control, Conflicts, and International and National Interests

The competition for the exploitation and control of mining resources is characterized by complex situations and relationships between the different actors. They pursue different interests and objectives. In small-scale island contexts with small populations such as New Caledonia, some actors hold several offices and perform different functions. They can be a landowner, sit

in the local parliament and be an entrepreneur in the mining sector at the same time. Depending on the situation, they represent the interests of one or other group. The representation of interests can change during a conversation, and the same person no longer represents the position of the landowner, but those of the entrepreneur with very different interests. But all interest groups share the goal of a certain control of mining resources. Except for environmentalists and opponents to the mine, the actors want to benefit in any way from the mining project. If actors are marginalized, the desire for participation can change into rejection and organisation of countermeasures. The following graphic (Figure 6) illustrates the different interests of actors involved in mining projects.

Figure 6: Interests in the mining sector of the different involved actors

Government of resource exporting state
Main interests: Economic development, particpation in the project, taxes and incomes

International mining company
Main interests: Profit maximization, subordimate also CSR (Corporate Social Responsability)

Local government
Main interests: Economic development, particpation in the project, taxes and incomes, representation of local interests (i.a. of landowners), job creation

Resource importing state
Main interests: Resource acces, secure the supply of resources for economic development, strategic interests
Representation of interests in the exporting state: ambassy, companies

Mining project

Landowners
Main interests: Compensation payments, participation in the project: employment and creation of subcontracting companies, reduction of environmental impacts

International companies seek profit, but have recently engaged in *corporate social responsibility* (CSR), because doing a project against the will of the local population is more and more expensive and demands extensive security

measures. Roadblocks and court proceedings can only be cushioned by high profit margins. Therefore, an agreement with the landowners in the vicinity of the mine is financially reasonable and in the interest of the mining operator. Consequently, the mining companies strengthen their CSR profile. There are a lot of companies venturing into rural areas that have tried to establish viable relationships with local communities (see Imbun 2010). On the other hand, it is not necessarily the case that the companies have long-lasting good relations with landowners. Imbun (2013:310) emphasizes: *"[...] it is not 'business as usual' for mining companies as they must, on an everyday basis, maintain viable relationships with landowners particularly, and local communities generally, to operate projects successfully"*. The local population in turn hopes for jobs and broader economic development in their region. The smaller the capacity to take an active role in the project, for example as a result of religious or ethnic marginalization, the greater their efforts to seek compensation payments. In northern New Caledonia for example, the local government refused royalties, because they pursue an active project participation (shareholding, employment and creation of subcontracting companies). In West Papua, most of the local Papuans are socially marginalized; consequently they do not support the Grasberg project. An active participation in the form of employment and subcontracting becomes more improbable due to their marginalization.

The main interests of local (regional or provincial) governments are broader economic development, higher taxes and the creation of jobs for the local population. Because governments have to think of the next elections, they support highly visible development projects, as for example the construction of roads and cultural or industrial facilities.

State governements also pursue political goals. The establishment of an international mining company brings foreign currencies into the state's

budget. With foreign currencies and tax revenues the government has a greater financial capacity for investment in other economic projects, social issues, etc. A government can also show a higher state GDP and job creation. Environmental pollution and social upheavals are not in the interest of the government, which does not need negative headlines for its own re-election. Consequently, they are often played down, while economic development and revenues are promoted.

Mineral exporters have an interest in a secure and reliable raw material supply. Therefore, security, control and low prices for coveted raw materials have a high priority. In order to ensure the continuity of supply, many importing countries rely on companies that they control or which are domiciled in their countries. For this reason, China's state-owned company *Metallurgical Construction Group Corporation* (MCC) have invested in a mining project in PNG (Ramu Nickel). In a similar way, *FreeportMcMoRan*, the parent company of *PT Freeport Indonesia*, represents American interests in Indonesia. On state visists, presidents or prime ministers are often accompanied by economic representatives and managers who want to develop markets and negotiate favorable conditions for economic projects. In addition to the securization of resource imports and the development of national economies is vital. The opening of new markets and favorable conditions for economic projects promises new revenue streams and high profit margins for the company, boosting the economy of the commodity-importing country.

Countries with important mineral resources such as Papua New Guinea and New Caledonia benefit from the rising demand and the high world market prices for raw materials. However, the long-term investment in other economic sectors is a prerequisite for a sustainable socio-economic development. Papua New Guinea proves this, because despite a growing GDP, the majority of the local population do not benefit from mining. The gap between

rich and poor is growing constantly. This analysis is supported by representatives of the resource curse thesis (Auty 1993; Langton 2010; Langton/Mazel 2008; Robinson et al. 2006). Langton (2012:6) explains: "*Despite modernity's promise of progress and wealth for all, and the enormous revenue flowing from resource extraction projects to governments, many indigenous and local peoples living in the shadow of those projects are still disadvantaged, marginalized and poor.*" While the mining company retains the majority of the benefits, the local population generally consumes an important part of 'its' revenues with the purchase of imported goods such as cars, electronic equipment, cell phones and computers, as well as food and beverages. Sustainable development through the investment in other economic sectors does not occur. The phenomenon is also called '*Dutch Disease*'. The term was coined in 1977 and describes the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959. The concentration of the Dutch economy on the export of the natural gas resulted in a stronger currency. Other exports grew and imports became less expensive, making the manufacturing industry less competitive. So, the resource curse as well as Dutch Disease leads to a general decrease in economic development.

In many places, mining projects are a source of conflict between the local population, and the mining company and the state government. In West Papua, the safety of the mine workers can only be guaranteed by a massive military presence, which in turn exacerbates the conflict. In Bougainville the conflict around the Panguna mine has caused international sensation, because the resistance against the mining project led to the flare of independence struggles. The following 10-year civil war was terminated by an international police intervention under the direction of New Zealand and Australia.

International interest in strategic and other raw materials, such as coltan or nickel have an influence on the domestic political situation and may also

improve or weaken bi-national relationships. In the so-called 'New Great Game' in the Pacific region, mineral resources play an important role (Kowasch/Lindenmann 2014; Hayward-Jones 2013, Garnaut 2013). A safe raw material transport route through the Strait of Malacca and the military control of the South China Sea are current issues, as well as accessing resources in Papua New Guinea and West Papua. Chinese investment is increasing in the Pacific Island countries, although Australia is by far the largest donor and most important strategic partner.

Because of its particular political status as a French overseas territory with a large autonomy, New Caledonia is 'better defended' against foreign influence, although even France is considered as "foreign country" by the Kanak Independence movement. A subsidiary of *Eramet* controls the majority of the nickel deposits by possessing mining titles. Land rights are an important issue in mining projects and represent a high potential for conflict.

In post-colonial contexts land rights are often ambiguous, different land legitimacies are overlapping, also because indigenous people were displaced as a result of colonization (Kowasch 2012a; Sikor/Lund 2009). In addition, customary tenure systems result in several clans and families claiming the same place. After a clan has given a name and thus an identity to a certain place, the clan holds land rights and can use the place for agriculture or housing. But the clan also can 'lease' the place to another as usufruct (for agriculture or housing). The transfer of land is not a transfer of property rights. However, both clans have rights to the place: the first as 'first owner', the second as 'land user' (Kowasch 2012a). Overlapping legitimacies are characterized as a 'game of power and influence' (Kowasch et al. 2015, forthcoming), and clans keep alive the history of these places that defines social relationships. In most cases, patrilineal land rights exist. Mining companies that negotiating with landowners about compensation payments have to identify

which of the clans have land rights and also if the community is patrilineal or matrilineal. Identification of the various groups can cause problems, because knowledge about the clan history has been lost over centuries, especially in regions where people have a regular employment and where traditions are not so preserved. Imbun (2013:313) describes the complexity of land rights and the misinformation that can lead to conflicts: "*While in many cases it is the ability of people, particularly male elders, to remember and encode genealogies to assert their rights in areas of commercial interest, faulty memories in oral history and overlapping rights across groups may cause difficulties for developers and landowners themselves.*" The Mount Kare, Kutubu, Porgera and Misima projects in PNG show the complexity of land rights and the difficulties in finding an amicable solution for the distribution of royalties (see Imbun 2013). Banks (1996:231) notes that most conflicts in Melanesia are linked to the issue of land legitimacy or the distribution of compensation payments: *"[...] the most common disputes are either over ownership of particular pieces of land, or over the distribution of the money between occupiers and landowners"*.

Conclusion

The mining projects in West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia underline the importance of the resource exploitation for the involved actors and emphasize the interlinking between geopolitics and economic interests. The interlinking can be a source of conflict, because trade in raw materials promises large benefits, because some resources have a strategic importance, and because the various actors defend different interests. Resource control, the security of supply, and benefits are at the center of disputes. In the Pacific Islands region, especially Melanesia possesses large mineral resources. Different nations and mining companies seek gold, copper and nickel. In particular, China's investment in the PICs is increasing.

In Melanesia, large parts of the land are classified as '*customary land*'. Land is considered as intellectual property by the indigenous people who claim compensation payments for the destruction or loss of land. Strathern (2009) highlights that land is vital for social relationships between clans and families. CSR that includes negotiation over compensation payments has a significant influence on developing countries like PNG (see Imbun 2013). So, royalties are subject to negotiations, but are also source of conflict between local peoples and mining companies, and between different clans and families. West Papua, Bougainville and New Caledonia are examples. But the three regions have another common aspect: mining projects are in the center of independence movements. While West Papuans fight for political independence and against the exploitation of their natural resources, Bougainville and the Northern Province of New Caledonia use the mining sector for economic and political emanciaption. In Bougainville and Kanaky (how the indigenous Kanak call their country), the mining sector is seen as an 'instrument' for the economic development of a future independent state. But in contrast to Bougainville where *Rio Tinto* is ready to reinvest in the copper industry, the independence Kanak movement wants to be the 'master' of resource exploitation.

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Case Studies

Mining, War and Peacebuilding on Bougainville

Volker Böge

Abstract: *This chapter explores the causes of violent conflict and successful post-conflict peacebuilding on the South Pacific island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea. It investigates the role of mining in the causation of the conflict and in the peacebuilding process. It will become clear that mining, which was to bring economic development in the context of a globalised economy, resulted in extreme environmental degradation and social disintegration, finally leading to the longest and bloodiest war in the South Pacific since the end of the Second World War. While post-conflict peacebuilding and state formation on Bougainville have been successful so far, the sustainability of peace and political order depends to a large extent on how the problem of the Panguna mine, and of mining in general, is resolved. This issue had been deliberately shelved during the first stages of the peace process because of its divisiveness. In recent years, however, it has re-emerged, and a broad variety of stakeholders is working hard to get it right this time. Although Bougainvilleans have demonstrated extraordinary ingenuity and skilfulness in building peace and political community, the danger of relapse into conflict cannot be ruled out, because the mining issue has to be dealt with in the context of a globalised economy and an international state system both of which have so far not proven conducive to the aspirations, needs and wellbeing of the people of Bougainville.*

Keywords: Bougainville, Panguna mine, mining, environmental degradation, violent conflict, peacebuilding, state formation

Introduction

For almost ten years (1989 to 1998), the island of Bougainville in the South Pacific was the theatre of a large-scale violent conflict. Over the last decade and a half Bougainville has gone through a comprehensive process of post-conflict peacebuilding. The primary catalyst for the violent conflict in Bougainville was a giant mining project, the Panguna mine in the mountains of Central Bougainville, and the sustainable success of current peacebuilding endeavours very much depends on the solution of the Panguna mine problem.

This chapter explores the contribution of mining to the outbreak of violent conflict on Bougainville and its role for peacebuilding, focusing on the links between natural resource extraction and localized violent conflict, and building a case for conflict-sensitive approaches to mining in the interest of peace and security.

Economic exploitation, environmental degradation and social disintegration as causes of violent conflict

The island of Bougainville has an area of about 9,000 square kilometers (approximately the size of Cyprus) and 250,000 inhabitants. Geographically it belongs to the Solomon Islands archipelago. Politically, however, it is part of the state of Papua New Guinea (PNG), which became independent in 1975, after decades under Australian colonial rule. During the time of Australian administration, *Conzinc Riotinto of Australia* (CRA), one of the world's largest mining companies (which became *Rio Tinto* in 1995), successfully carried out exploration on Bougainville in search of copper. In 1967 it established *Bougainville Copper Limited* (BCL), with CRA as the majority shareholder. Construction of BCL's Panguna copper and gold mine in the Crown Prince Range in central Bougainville started in 1969, and in 1972 production commenced. In the 1970s and 1980s Panguna was one of the largest open-pit

mines in the world; most of the copper ore was exported to the *Norddeutsche Affinerie*, a copper refinery in Hamburg, Germany.

Figure 1: Bougainville in PNG

For CRA the Panguna project brought enormous profits, and after independence it brought considerable revenues for the central government of PNG in the far-away capital city of Port Moresby on mainland New Guinea. The mine was the largest single source of income for the government and the backbone of PNG's economy, providing about 16% of PNG's internally generated income and 44% of its exports (Connell 1990). It enjoyed massive support from the former colonial power Australia; the Australian government perceived Panguna as decisive for sustaining the young nation state of PNG economically[1].

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[1]   A comprehensive account of the construction, operation, legal context and impact of the Panguna mine is given by Wesley-Smith 1988, see also Regan 2003. The view of the mining company BCL is given by Quodling 1991 and Quodling 1992. For a brief overview of the

For the local people on the ground, however, the mining operation had major negative environmental, social and cultural effects. Land was taken from the local communities on a large scale as BCL was granted leases for mining, tailings disposal, building roads, mining towns and port facilities. Mining caused enormous environmental degradation. No environmental impact studies were conducted before mining started (we are talking about the late 1960s), and BCL initially provided hardly any environmental safety measures (there was no environmental legislation in place at the time mining began). Mining replaced agricultural land on a large scale. Loss of land also meant loss of sources of drinking water and timber. Tailings were directly disposed into the local river system. In the 1970s, 150,000 tons of rock waste and tailings were discharged into the rivers every day from the mine (Brown 1974:19). This method of riverine tailings disposal (which in the meantime has been banned worldwide – apart from PNG) resulted in sedimentation, erosion, flooding, loss of fish and freshwater. Rivers were polluted, particularly by heavy metals such as zinc, copper, cadmium and mercury. Sediment loads in rivers became extremely high. As a consequence, particularly fertile land at the river banks was lost and the rivers became completely devoid of fish. Forest depletion impacted on traditional hunting and gathering activities. Wildlife declined drastically or even disappeared completely. The ever increasing spread of tailings threatened ever more villages and deprived villagers of agricultural land. In short: the environmental degradation threatened the lifestyle of the local population which is closely linked to the land. Land to the local communities is not only important as the basis for their subsistence and smallholder economy, but also as the core dimension of their whole

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mine's operation and associated problems see Vernon 2005. For the environmental degradation caused by the mine see the early assessment of Brown 1974, see also Wesley-Smith 1988 and Connell 1991.

social, cultural and spiritual life[2]. Loss of land therefore is not only economically detrimental, but has far-reaching effects on the social fabric and the psycho-social well-being of communities and individuals. The social and cultural significance of land was widely ignored by the management of the mining company and state authorities.

Environmental degradation was accompanied by social disintegration. The establishment of the Panguna mine led to population growth and urbanisation at an unprecedented scale. The majority of the overall urban population was young male non-Bougainvillean mine workers, mostly from other parts of PNG (only a small minority of mine workers were locals). An upsurge of law and order problems ensued: rape, assault, gang violence, prostitution, alcohol abuse etc. Indigenous Bougainvilleans blamed the mine and the subsequent increase in the number of outsiders for this rise in crime and social problems – all the more so as these outsiders were considerably different from the Bougainvilleans and had different customs. Bougainvilleans, who are very black-skinned people, referred to those outsiders from other parts of PNG as '*redskins*' because of their lighter skin colour, whereas Bougainvilleans often are called '*blackskins*' by other PNG citizens. Often redskin workers brought in their *wantoks* (relatives) and squatted on land without asking. Squatter settlements became a widespread phenomenon. The blackskin-redskin difference contributed to rising tensions. Local people blamed outsiders – workers, expatriate company management and the agents of the central government – for not respecting indigenous culture and their status and customary rights as the original owners of the land[3].

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[2]   For an overview of the various aspects of social, economic, cultural and political conditions in Bougainville before the mine-induced violent conflict see Regan/Griffin 2005.
[3]   On the disintegrative social effects of the Panguna mine in particular and of mining in a Melanesian context in general see Filer 1990, Filer 1992 and Wesley-Smith and Ogan 1992.

Moreover, the mining project also led to the development of social inequality within the up to then rather egalitarian local communities, e.g. between those (few) with a job at the mine and those without, between those receiving compensation and those who were left out, between the older generation whose representatives had struck a deal with the mine operators and the younger generation who had not been included, between men and women etc. This led to unrest and infighting within and among communities. In other words: *Development* brought by the mining project put pressure on the traditional social fabric from outside and at the same time caused frictions within the local communities (Boege 1999).

Finally, the distribution of revenues from mining was highly unbalanced, with 62% of BCL gross revenue going to the central government of PNG, 33% to foreign shareholders (mainly CRA), 4% to the Bougainville provincial government and 1% to local landowners (Quodling 1992).

Hence the benefits and costs of mine-induced development were perceived by many on Bougainville as extremely unevenly divided, with the bulk of the mining revenues flowing to outsiders, and the local communities left with the negative environmental and social effects. The people on the ground demanded meaningful environmental protection measures, compensation for environmental damage and a larger share of the revenues generated. The mining company and the PNG government disregarded the concerns of the Bougainvilleans and rejected their demands, and this triggered the longest and bloodiest war in the South Pacific since the end of World War Two. Natural resource extraction, the environmental degradation and social disintegration it caused as well as the unequal distribution of mining revenues were critical causal factors for this large-scale violent conflict.

The violent conflict

The violent conflict started when young members of the local clans in the mine area brought the mine to a standstill by acts of sabotage in late 1988. As the PNG police riot squads were unable to cope with the activities of the protestors, the central government sent its military (the *Papua New Guinea Defence Force* – PNGDF) to the island in March 1989 and declared a state of emergency on Bougainville in June 1989. Members of the clans in the mine area established the *Bougainville Revolutionary Army* (BRA) and began fighting the government forces. Fighting that started in central Bougainville soon spread across the whole island. The BRA adopted a secessionist stance and called for self-determination and political independence for Bougainville, pointing to ethnic differences between the Bougainvilleans and the rest of Papua New Guineans and stressing historical, kinship and cultural ties with the neighboring islands of the Western Province in Solomon Islands[4].

Because of the fighting, the Panguna mine was forced to stop mining operations in May 1989, and soon after the BRA managed to over-run and shut down the mine for good, and it has remained closed ever since; even today it is in the hands of a faction of the secessionists (see below).

In its war against the BRA the PNGDF were supported by local Bougainvillean auxiliary units, the so-called *Resistance Forces*. In fact, over time it was the *Resistance* that bore the brunt of the fighting on the government side. This changed the character of the conflict. From being a war of Bougainvilleans against 'foreign' government troops, it became a war among Bougainvilleans themselves. From then on traditional conflicts between different groups

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[4] For the sake of completeness, it must be mentioned that there had been secessionist movements on Bougainville before, beginning already in the 1960s; and before PNG became independent in mid-September 1975 Bougainville had declared its own independence on 1 September 1975. Bougainvilleans only revoked this step and joined PNG after a provincial system of government was introduced for PNG which gave Bougainville far-reaching self-government competencies.

and clans were also fought under the umbrella of the 'great' war of secession. Parties entangled in local conflicts either joined the BRA or the *Resistance*. At times *Resistance* units would wage their own 'private' wars against BRA units over merely local issues, especially land disputes. On the other hand, it was not unusual for individual BRA or *Resistance* units to change sides, or for BRA to fight other BRA or *Resistance* to fight other *Resistance*. It would be misleading to think of the BRA or the *Resistance* as unitary actors. Rather, those entities were made up of largely independent units. There were no clear and efficient lines of command and control. The leadership had only rather limited influence on the activities of the local fighting units on the ground. This also applied to the security forces of the PNG government. They also often operated independently from their political and military leadership, fighting their own 'private' smaller wars that followed the logic of 'pay back' more consistently than instructions from the government in far away Port Moresby.

Over time the war became more and more complex, and the frontiers blurred. There were no two clear-cut sides fighting each other over one single distinctive issue as in conventional wars. It was not only *the* state (of PNG) against *the* secessionists (of *the* BRA). Rather there was a host of parties entangled in various overlapping conflicts. Coherence of the fighting parties was mainly based on traditional social ties – of kinship, clan and village. What took place on Bougainville was not a war in the conventional sense of the term. It was neither war between states, nor was it merely an internal war between the central government and its security forces on the one hand and a unitary armed opposition on the other.

Rather, one has to comprehend the Bougainville violent conflict as a hybrid social-political exchange, shaped by a patchwork of actors and interests from the local and the modern political and economic sphere. The overlap of

these spheres with regard to the causes of conflict, the issues at stake, the perceptions, values and motives of the conflict actors as well as the forms of their (violent) behaviour and activities gave the war its specific features, which made it neither a "classical" (inter-state or intra-state) nor a 'new' war[5].

The main victims of the violent conflict were the civilians. They suffered from the collapse of basic services such as health and education and the breakdown of infrastructure and public administration. In 1990 the central government ordered a total air and sea blockade on the supply of goods and services to Bougainville (and later the BRA-controlled areas) which included a blockade of medical supplies. This blockade led to the death of thousands of islanders in the following years, mainly as a result of the collapse of the medical care system. Out of the number of almost 20,000 Bougainvilleans who lost their lives during the war and only a small minority were combatants killed in action (approximately 10%), the vast majority were civilians.

Large numbers of the populace were forced to flee their homes or were forcibly resettled during the war. The PNGDF forcibly transferred huge portions of the population into so-called care centres (internment camps under the supervision of the military). At times almost 67,000 people lived in these care centres under very difficult conditions and were subject to grave human rights abuses committed by the PNGDF. Thousands more fled their villages to hide in the bush from the PNGDF. Around 2,000 Bougainvilleans became refugees in neighbouring Solomon Islands[6].

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5   On 'new wars' see Kaldor 1999; Duffield 2001. Given the complex mixture of issues and actors involved in the Bougainville violence it is tempting to use the 'new wars' terminology to comprehend what happened, and in fact, the Bougainville conflict is exhibiting several features of so-called 'new wars'. However the Bougainville story also comprises dimensions that cannot be grasped by the concept of 'new wars', see Boege 2006.

6   The Bougainville conflict had a major impact on the Solomon Islands and relations between PNG and Solomon Islands. Based on kinship ties, many Bougainvilleans found refuge with

The security forces of PNG and its local auxiliaries continuously and systematically attacked the civilian Bougainville population, burning down houses and villages, destroying gardens that people depend on for their subsistence agriculture, indiscriminately killing civilians and making people 'disappear'. Members of the BRA and the *Resistance* also committed war crimes such as rape, torture, murder, wilful killings of suspected 'traitors', taking hostages, destruction of property and pillage. Continuous and systematic mass rapes were a particularly terrible feature of the conflict. Thousands of Bougainville women were raped, mostly by PNG security forces (Braithwaite et al. 2010).

In the course of the conflict the non-Bougainville civilian population had to leave the island (approximately 20,000 people) (ibid.). These were mainly mine and plantation workers and public servants from other parts of PNG and their families, but also Chinese shop-owners and white technical experts. Non-Bougainvilleans were deliberately attacked, killed and terrorised by the BRA with the aim to force them off the island. It can be argued that this was a form of ethnic cleansing along the blackskin-redskin divide (ibid.; Regan 2007).

Peacebuilding and state formation

By the late 1990s, a stalemate had developed on Bougainville in which neither side believed there was anything to be gained by continuing the war, and a stable process of post-conflict peacebuilding ensued, with the *Bougainville Peace Agreement* (BPA) of August 2001 as its cornerstone[7]. Its two core

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their extended families on Solomon Islands close to Bougainville. Others had to move to refugee camps, supported by the Red Cross and the Solomon Island government. Many Solomon Islanders had sympathy for the fight of the BRA, and the BRA used transboundary links in support of its struggle, in particular to circumvent the PNG-imposed blockade. On several occasions, PNG navy patrol boats violated Solomon Islands sovereignty in pursuit of BRA units, and there were stand-offs between the PNG navy and the Solomon Islands navy. Hence the Bougainville crisis led to tensions between the two neighboring Melanesian countries.

[7]   The text of the BPA in Carl/Garasu 2002:67-85.

political provisions are, firstly, autonomy for Bougainville in the framework of the state of PNG and its constitution, and, secondly, a referendum on the future political status of Bougainville, that is, independence or autonomy within PNG, ten to fifteen years after the establishment of an autonomous government for Bougainville (which took place in 2005)[8].

The history of the successive steps and stages of the political process that led to a comprehensive peace arrangement for Bougainville shall not be recounted here. Instead, some of the main characteristics of post-conflict peacebuilding shall be briefly recalled[9].

Of utmost importance for building peace, for rebuilding communities and re-establishing order was the utilisation of customary forms and institutions. As has been said, the conflict was not just a war of secession, but rather a complex mixture of such a political war and inter-communal customary sub- or mini-wars between local societal entities. Hence the termination of the war had to address the 'higher' political level as well as the 'lower' level of (inter) communal conflicts. In the first place this meant that negotiations and agreements between political and military leaders at the top level were not sufficient. Agreements and reconciliation at the grassroots level were of at least similar importance, and this inter-communal peacebuilding was largely based on customary approaches.

Many customary peace processes and peace ceremonies have taken place at the local level between enemy villages and clans all over the island since the end of the war (some of which have not been concluded yet, and more are still to come). During the war elders and chiefs had become responsible for regulating conflicts and organising community life due to the absence of

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[8] The outcome of the referendum will have to be ratified by the PNG parliament. So, in theory at least, PNG could sabotage a pro-independence vote.
[9] For more details on peacebuilding in Bougainville see Boege 2006, 2008, 2012; Boege/Garasu 2004, 2011.

functioning state institutions. They were also entrusted with an important role
when violent conflicts had to be settled in the transition phase from war to
peace at the local level. In doing so, they utilised customary methods of con-
flict resolution. On this basis, the negotiations at the 'higher' political level
finally also led to a comprehensive peace settlement. It was this combination
of bottom-up and top-down approaches to peacebuilding as well as the inter-
action of state-based institutions and instruments, non-state customary institu-
tions and also civil society institutions (womens' peace organisations, media-
tion trainings etc.) that made Bougainville a success story of post-conflict
peacebuilding.

   As customary institutions have proven to be effective in peacebuilding,
there is a case for their utilisation in the current process of state formation as
well. The people and the political elite in Bougainville today are confronted
with the task of building new state institutions. State-building will provide for
either a completely independent state in the future (with autonomy as a transi-
tional phase to independence) or for a widely autonomous political entity
within PNG[10].

   Many Bougainvilleans – out of bitter negative experience – nurture a
deep distrust of western-style centralised government structures and processes

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[10] Moreover, Bougainvilleans are challenged with the task of developing some kind of a coher-
ent 'national' identity as a foundation of a sustainable political community; this might be
called 'nation-building'. To a certain extent, such a specific 'Bougainvillean' identity devel-
oped during the times of war and peacebuilding. Given that the notion of 'nationhood' has
no roots in traditional Melanesian societies, this was a big leap forward. War and peacebuild-
ing served a unifying function. Nevertheless, dividing lines among the Bougainvillean popu-
lation remain even today. Efforts to build a Bougainville 'nation' have to acknowledge that
there are "sometimes tensions between local identity and our Bougainville identity" (BCC
2004:56).The *Bougainville Constitutional Commission* (BCC) therefore talks about the ne-
cessity to "preserve, foster and develop both our local identities and our Bougainville identi-
ty" simultaneously (ibid.). Whether this can actually be achieved remains to be seen. It
would be negligent to ignore the frictions that exist between customary identity as a member
of a local community (extended family, lineage, clan) on the one hand and identity as a 'citi-
zen' of a 'nation state' on the other. – For a very detailed and sensitive account of multi-
layered Bougainville identities see Regan 2005.

(see Hassall in this volume). They prefer a system of governance based on their own indigenous norms. A strong desire to 'marry' local customary and introduced liberal-democratic institutions and processes for the purposes of state-formation can be felt in all quarters of the Bougainvillean populace. This desire is clearly reflected in the Bougainville Constitution, which makes comprehensive reference to customary ways and *kastom* (a Pidgin derivative of 'custom') (BCC 2004).

In fact, political order on Bougainville today comprises of elements of the Western model of statehood (a constitution, a president and a parliament, free and fair elections, a public service etc.) and elements of customary governance (chiefs and elders, village assemblies, councils of chiefs, councils of elders, customary law). To a certain degree these domains merely co-exist, with complementarities and synergies, but also frictions and incompatibilities; and to a certain degree there are efforts towards deliberate combination and integration (the above-mentioned 'marriage'). So far, governance and the containment and resolution of conflicts in this context of hybrid political order have been functioning relatively well[11].

The hybrid governance situation is complicated even further due to the fact that the *Autonomous Bougainville Government* (ABG) which was formed after elections in 2005 is not the only actor that lays claim to legitimate authority at the state level in Bougainville. There is also the *Meekamui* movement[12]. *Meekamui* is a faction of the former BRA that has not yet joined the peace process officially (although it never disturbed or undermined that process either). Meekamui has declared the territory under its control in Central Bougainville around the Panguna mine a 'no-go zone' for outsiders. It has its

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[11]   On the concept of hybrid political orders see Boege et al. 2009, on hybrid political order on Bougainville see Boege 2010.

[12]   Meekamui means 'holy land' in one of the local Bougainville languages.

own structures of governance and its own military wing, the *Meekamui Defence Force* (MDF). The 'border' between the no-go zone and the rest of Bougainville is rather porous, and there is considerable exchange. A very particular state of fragmented shared sovereignty has developed in the *Meekamui* region. While it is covered by the general provisions of the peacebuilding and statebuilding processes (the PNG and ABG authorities claim that those provisions apply for the whole of Bougainville), these provisions are only partially implemented. On the other hand *Meekamui* is a 'state' – or rather a very specific political entity – of its own. In August 2007, meetings between the ABG and the *Meekamui* Movement yielded the *Panguna Communiqué*, which has provided the basis for a rapprochement between the two entities (with some collaboration, especially with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the delivery of basic social services). Since then a complicated process of exchange between ABG and *Meekamui* has been underway which might lead to some kind of formal 'reunification' of political entities on Bougainville in the future. At present, however, some sections of the population do not acknowledge the ABG as the (only) legitimate government. *Meekamui* (which itself is not a unitary actor, but consists of several factions) is in a relatively strong position as it controls the Panguna mine and the access roads to Panguna. Any solution to the Panguna mine issue will have to take *Meekamui* into account.

Mining for independence?

The Panguna mine problem had been deliberately put aside during the first stages of the peace process because of its divisiveness. Over the last years, however, it has come to the fore again as all stakeholders are aware that sustainable peace on Bougainville can only be achieved if the Panguna problem is solved. Today a broad debate about re-opening the mine (and about the future of mining on Bougainville in general) is underway. Based on the BPA,

the ABG has comprehensive governing competencies 'short of independence'. Most importantly, the highly sensitive issues of land and natural resources, mining, environment, oil and gas, and trade, commerce and industry are in principle under the sole control of the ABG. The current ABG is a strong advocate of re-opening the Panguna mine, its main argument being that only the revenues from the mine can sustain an independent Bougainville in the long term. The ABG also wants to lift the current moratorium on new explorations for mining on Bougainville outside BCL's lease area. It has established a mining division, which is assisted by the World Bank in capacity-building and training of staff, and is working on a Bougainville mining legislation[13].

Mining is seen as the most promising option for a substantial increase in government revenue and as the main means of economic growth and development for an autonomous – and perhaps later on an independent - Bougainville. Hence, if Bougainvilleans want independence – and currently it very much looks like the vast majority of them would opt for independence in a referendum[14] – then they will have to accept mining. An independent Bougainville – so the argument goes – can only survive in a globalized economy and in the current international economic and political system if it generates value from its mineral wealth. Many Bougainvilleans are convinced by this economical-political line of argument, but by far not all of them. For some time now talks at different levels and in different contexts have been going on about the possibilities of re-opening the Panguna mine and about the development of new additional mining projects on the mineral-rich island. There is

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[13]   At the time of writing (February 2014) the draft new Bougainville mining law is under discussion in the Bougainville parliament and public; it seems to be highly controversial.

[14]   "Many observers suggest that a majority of Bougainvilleans would currently opt for independence but that a considerable minority would vote to stay with PNG, with PNG exercising its prerogative under the peace agreement not to ratify the result" (Jennings/Claxton 2013:7).

general agreement that comprehensive discussions with local communities, in particular the landowners in the areas directly affected by mining, will be necessary before the commencement of planning to resume mining. There are divergent views regarding the willingness of the people in the mining area to allow mining to take place again.

As has been said, the mine site and adjacent areas are still controlled by a 'hard-core' faction of the secessionists, the *Meekamui* movement and its MDF. The ABG is in continuous dialogue with the *Meekamui* movement. Without *Meekamui* consent (or some form of dissolution of the *Meekamui* movement altogether) re-opening of Panguna will be impossible. Within the ranks of *Meekamui* views on re-opening Panguna and developing new mining projects seem to differ, with some more open to the idea and others strongly against. This reflects the mood of the landowning communities in the mining area and mine-affected areas. The strongest resistance comes not from the area immediately surrounding Panguna but from more distant communities that suffered the greatest environmental damage from the mine – particularly those that are downstream, along the Jaba River.

Landowners from the mining area and mine-affected areas have established nine new landowner associations for the different areas (the mine site area, the access road area, the downstream area etc.) as well as an overarching umbrella organisation; in the process the different competing factions of the pre-war *Panguna Landowners Association* (PLA) have come together again in order to protect the rights and interests of the landowning communities. Regional public fora on the Panguna question have taken place in 2013 and 2014 for the different regions of Bougainville, organised by the ABG's mining division, to inform grassroots Bougainvilleans about the options and to collect their opinions. In the Panguna area a specific *Panguna Peacebuilding Dialogue* is underway, based on a *Panguna Peacebuilding Strategy* that was

launched in early 2013. Processes of reconciliation within and between communities in the Panguna mine area and adjacent areas had begun in earnest only in 2009. Some community leaders and politicians from these areas have put a lot of effort into initiating these processes; other leaders, however, remain skeptical and have not yet joined. Although reconciliation will take time, it is an essential foundation for meaningful dialogue about reopening the mine. There is general consensus that without completion of all outstanding reconciliation processes in the mine-affected areas, the mine could never be re-opened.

Although BCL is still the formal legal owner of the Panguna mine[15], BCL officials have not had access to the mine site since it was occupied by the BRA in 1989. BCL has declared its interest in reopening the mine and commissioned a prefeasibility study on the costs and technical requirements of redeveloping Panguna. The study, which was completed in November 2008, found that there is potential for a viable mining operation at Panguna, although the capital costs of redevelopment are likely to be high[16].

In the meantime, BCL and *Rio Tinto* keep a low profile in Bougainville. Company representatives are well aware of the profound distrust (and even hatred) still harbored in certain quarters of the populace. They acknowledge that reopening Panguna will depend on reestablishing trust and good relations with the communities on Bougainville – an immense effort that will take considerable time. Some Bougainville political leaders want BCL to come back, to clean up the environmental mess it left behind, and to take over

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[15] *Rio Tinto* owns 53,58 % of BCL; the government of PNG 19,06 %; and public shareholders 27,36 %.

[16] Redeveloping Panguna will cost about US$3.8 billion. Copper reserves are estimated at almost 3 million tons, and gold production in the range of 400,000 ounces per year. Panguna is potentially one of the world's largest copper and gold mines, with a processing rate of 50 million tons of ore per year and a mine life of at least seventeen years. Moreover, BCL holds seven exploration licenses in areas adjacent to the Panguna area, and it is widely believed that they also contain large deposits of copper and gold.

responsibility for mining again: "It is better to deal with the devil you know, and the devil that knows us, than a completely new devil"[17]. Other political figures are more open to alternatives to BCL.

Conclusion: a happy end in sight?

At this point in time it looks like a majority of Bougainvilleans are pro-mining, but there is also a relatively strong and determined minority against. Furthermore, among those in favour of re-opening, opinions on the preconditions differ widely; questions are, for example:

whether the old *Bougainville Copper Agreement* (BCA) is null and void and a new agreement should be negotiated from scratch or the old BCA should be renegotiated,

whether BCL/*Rio Tinto* should pay compensation first before negotiations about a new agreement or about adjustment of the old BCA can commence, or the compensation issue should be part of such negotiations[18],

whether only the landowners should decide about re-opening or the decision should rest with the ABG, or all people of Bougainville should decide, e.g. in another referendum,

whether the referendum on independence should come first and then the re-opening of the mine, or the other way round,

whether BCL/*Rio Tinto* has to clean up the environmental damage it left behind (the effects of which can still be felt today) first, or environmental clean-

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[17]   ABG President John Momis. A Ministerial Statement to the Bougainville House of Representatives, Tuesday 31.12.2013. *New Dawn on Bougainville* 31 December 2013 (http://bougainville.typepad.com/newdawn/page/2).

[18]   The Umbrella PLA, for example, says that for them compensation is a pre-condition for any negotiations about re-opening Panguna, whereas the ABG President Momis holds that only after the mine is operating again the compensation issue can be addressed in earnest. The *Meekamui* sticks to the initial BRA demand that *Rio Tinto* pay 10 bn Kina (~ 5 bn €) in compensation.

up and new substantial environmental protection measures have to come with the re-opened mine[19].

It can be envisaged that a rather protracted process of discussion still lies ahead. At least, however, there is consensus that the issue has to be resolved peacefully, and that Bougainvilleans have to come to a unified position first before commencing negotiations with external actors (the PNG government and the Australian mining company – or other foreign companies for that matter). Again, in order to prevent new violent conflict it is of utmost importance to reach a very broad consensus among Bougainvilleans. Only on such a basis, formal negotiations about re-opening the Panguna mine can lead to sustainable results and old mistakes and their fatal consequences can be avoided.

It remains to be seen how much the various stakeholders have learned, and how deep and sustainable the lessons were. The ABG is focused on the potential economic benefits of mining, but it also acknowledges the importance of a social license to operate; whether the central PNG government has an equally balanced view is unclear. Given the fragility of the sociopolitical context, it would be dangerous to give undue priority to economic considerations and to set aside social and cultural considerations as less important. Moreover, the question whether Bougainville is only economically viable as an independent state based on the revenues generated by a re-opened mine (as argued by the current ABG) or whether there are alternatives like agriculture, fisheries, (eco-)tourism etc. (as argued by some of the ABG's critics) should be discussed more thoroughly and more open-minded[20].

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[19]   Environmental clean-up is predicted to be a large-scale, very long and very expensive exercise. UNEP has agreed to assist Bougainville with the preparation of the clean-up.

[20]   If there will be a referendum on independence as planned between 2015 and 2020, it is highly unlikely that the mine will re-open before the referendum, and it will definitely be

So far, Bougainville has been one of the rare success stories of contemporary post-conflict peacebuilding (in comparison, for instance, to Irak, Afghanistan, Mali, Liberia, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegowina, Kosovo, Guatemala and several others). Whether the story will culminate in a peaceful future or not very much depends on how the mining issue is dealt with. At this point in time, Bougainville also has the potential to become another kind of success story, namely of conflict-sensitive and conflict-relevant redevelopment of mining in a post-conflict situation.

What is needed to achieve this is firstly, the creation of a stable political environment as a precondition for re-starting natural resource extraction; this means continuing and deepening the ongoing processes of peacebuilding and state formation, and secondly, a comprehensive process of dialogue and engagement that includes all stakeholders, company/ies, communities and their traditional leaders, state agencies, ex-combatants, community-based organisations and NGOs -, and that particularly addresses the concerns of the local population. Ideally, conversations would focus on:

the past: what went wrong with mining on Bougainville, and why. This is to achieve a common understanding of the history as the basis for reconciliation (and compensation) and for (re-)establishing trust;

the present: based on reconciliation and mutual trust, expectations and needs of communities, company/ies and other stakeholders can be discussed and current grievances and concerns can be addressed;

the future: identification of visions and ways forward, building of consent (within and among as well as between communities, companies and state agencies), collaborative planning, decision-making and implementation, and

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years before the mine could generate revenue for the ABG. So one will have to think about alternatives anyway, at least for a transition period.

establishment of procedures for addressing grievances and solving disputes in the future.

Such a dialogue process would have to be sequential. Without having sorted out the problems of the past and without reconciliation it will not be possible to plan for the future. This means in particular that the effects of mining and its contribution to violent conflict will have to be dealt with. This implies that BCL/*Rio Tinto* takes responsibility for the damage done and the wrongs committed in the past and demonstrates willingness to make reparations to communities. Furthermore, the distribution of revenues from resource extraction will have to be changed in favour of the landowning communities, the local population and the ABG. Finally, comprehensive environmental rehabilitation and protection measures as well as sustainable community development projects need to be implemented so as to avoid a repetition of the mistakes of the past which led to violent conflict in the first place.

Doubtless it is questionable whether all this could be achieved. The people of Bougainville and their political leaders find themselves in a difficult position regardless. They are determined to build sustainable peace and a functioning political community – both of which must be genuinely home-grown, not merely copies of alien ('Western') models. Such models have proven to be unworkable in the historical, social and cultural context of Bougainville. At the same time, however, the Bougainvilleans have to build peace and political community under conditions not of their choice, conditions that they cannot change. They have to position themselves and their 'holy land' within a globalised economy and an international state system which has proven so far to be not conducive to their aspirations, needs and wellbeing. Bougainville was incorporated into the global economy by way of a gigantic mining project, with the natural resources extracted from the land shipped overseas, along with the profits. Meanwhile the Bougainvilleans were left

behind with their land and communities destroyed, with an extremely bloody protracted violent conflict as the result; and they were incorporated into the international state system as part of a 'nation-state' to which they did not feel they belonged. It has taken them more than a decade of hard work in reconstruction, reconciliation and peacebuilding to lift themselves out of misery, and they have demonstrated their extraordinary ingenuity and skilfulness in doing so. Now, however, the danger of relapse into the old conflicts cannot be ruled out, precisely because the global economic and political environment has not changed: a global economy hungry for copper and gold, and a global society dominated by the international state system. Under these circumstances it is only 'natural' for the ABG to push for re-opening of the Panguna mine as the backbone of a future independent state of Bougainville. For the sake of the people of Bougainville one could wish there were other alternatives.

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# The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands – Achievements, Transitions and Prospects[1]

Sinclair Dinnen

Abstract: *The Solomon Islands experienced an internal conflict between 1998 and 2003 that resulted in the collapse of government structures and services, including the police force, and the closure of commercial enterprises. Unable to resolve the crisis on its own, the Solomon Islands government requested help from its regional neighbours, leading to the deployment of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) in 2003. Mobilised under the auspices of the Pacific Islands Forum, RAMSI was led and largely funded by Australia. It aimed to restore security and stability in the archipelago through a combination of policing and law enforcement, institutional strengthening with central government agencies and measures aimed at reviving the national economy. As the 10-year mission comes to an end, Solomon Islands remains fragile and faces major challenges as it contemplates the future. It is unlikely that economic growth will be able to match population growth and the rising popular expectations. Reliance on logging is likely to be progressively replaced by mining, with the potential for accentuating patterns of uneven and enclave development that contributed to the original conflict. These and related issues are examined in the context of Solomon Islands recent history.*

Keywords: Solomon Islands, regional intervention, security, statebuilding and development

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Figure 1: Solomon Islands

Introduction

RAMSI was mobilised in direct response to a request for assistance from the beleaguered Solomon Islands government (SIG) in 2003. Ethnic tensions (known locally as 'the tension') between the people of Guadalcanal and Malaita, the two largest islands, erupted in 1998. Around 35,000, mainly Malaitan, settlers were forcibly displaced from their homes in areas surrounding the national capital, Honiara, on Guadalcanal. Armed skirmishes occurred between rival militias representing the two island groups. The *Royal Solomon Islands Police Force* (RSIPF) fractured along ethnic lines, leading to a breakdown in government authority.[2] While the *Townsville Peace Agreement* (TPA) in October 2000 ended the spectre of an all-out ethnic war, the country remained militarised and ex-militants and rogue police engaged in collective

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[2] In the absence of a military force, the police constitute the principal coercive and enforcement agency of the Solomon Islands state.

and opportunistic violence in Honiara and parts of rural Guadalcanal and Malaita. Government revenues dropped drastically with the closure of major commercial enterprises, essential services ground to a halt in many areas, while the compensation process adopted as the principal instrument of peacemaking became rapidly corrupted (Fraenkel 2004). Confronted with national bankruptcy, lacking any effective enforcement capacity, and viewed as deeply compromised by many citizens, it became clear that SIG was incapable of resolving the crisis on its own.

The arrival of RAMSI in mid-2003 under the auspices of the *Pacific Islands Forum* (PIF) was welcomed by most Solomon Islanders. Although regional in character, the mission was led by Australia, which also supplied the bulk of funding (around $AUD 200-250 million per annum), personnel and other resources. Smaller but significant contributions have come from New Zealand and other Forum member states. The restoration of law and order was entrusted to the mission's police, the *Participating Police Force* (PPF), comprising around 330 police officers with back-up from 1,800 military personnel. RAMSI has evolved considerably over a ten year period in terms of its operational priorities, organisation manner of engagement. Consistent with liberal peace approaches, restoring security was linked to a more ambitious state-building exercise aimed at strengthening the central agencies of the Solomon Islands' state and encouraging investor-led growth (Allen/Dinnen 2010:299-327). Ten years later, and following an estimated investment of more than AUD$2 billion (Lake 2013), the mission has moved into a transitional phase. This has entailed a gradual reduction in the size of the mission, including the complete withdrawal of its remaining military in 2012. It has also involved the progressive absorption of RAMSI's development programs into more regular aid arrangements managed by bilateral and multilateral donors (Coppel 2010). While RAMSI's early successes in

restoring security attracted well-deserved praise, much remains to be done in order to fulfil the mission's prescriptions for a stable, secure and self-sufficient Solomon Islands. Outstanding questions include the sustainability of gains made over the last decade and the extent to which the island nation's own leaders and institutions can maintain and build on these. There are also concerns regarding Solomon Islands' capacity to manage the structural problems and conflict stresses that contributed to the original tension in the late 1990s. Many of these remain unaddressed, and some are likely to become accentuated in light of anticipated economic and demographic trends.

This paper examines these issues in the context of Solomon Islands' recent history. The first section examines the larger international strategic context that informed the initial decision to deploy RAMSI and that helped shape the character and priorities of the mission. This is followed by a section on the background to the tension and the myriad factors that contributed to the internal crisis. Section three looks at RAMSI's evolution since 2003 and its main achievements. The final section considers the island nation's prospects in the years ahead.

The Strategic Context of Intervention

Australia had declined several earlier requests for armed assistance.[3] An approach by SIG to the UN in September 2002 was abandoned after it became clear that any Security Council vote was likely to be vetoed by China owing to Solomon Islands' recognition of Taiwan (Ponzio 2005:173-188). The Australian government's decision to mobilise and lead the regional mission in 2003 resulted from a confluence of strategic considerations. Concerns with regional instability had been growing in Australian policy circles from the

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[3]   These included requests by Prime Minister Ulufa'alu and his successor Manasseh Sogavare, the first as early as 1999 and later during the *Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting* (CHOGM) in 2002 (Lineham 2006).

late 1990s following political upheavals in Indonesia, East Timor, Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Solomon Islands. Combined with the limited impact of traditional soft power approaches, these concerns underscored the need for more effective forms of engagement on the part of Australia as the leading regional power in the Southwest Pacific.

Australia's view of its own national interests and regional leadership responsibilities were also changing following the 9/11 2001 attacks in the U.S. and subsequent bombings in Bali in 2002 and Jakarta in 2003. The American-led 'war on terror' established a new lens for viewing the phenomenon of 'state failure', linking it directly to the generation of subnational and transnational threats to regional and global security.[4] This, in turn, provided a justification for a spate of international interventions in post-conflict and fragile states, and was adopted by the Australian government as the official rationale for its intervention in Solomon Islands.

The clearest exposition of this emergent framing was made by the *Australian Strategic Policy Institute* (ASPI) in an influential report on Solomon Islands. Identifying the archipelagic nation as the Pacific's first 'failing state', ASPI warned of it becoming a "petri dish in which transnational and non-state security threats can develop and breed" (ASPI 2003:13), and called for the Howard government "to reconsider the policy paradigm that has shaped Australia's approach to our Southwest Pacific neighbours ever since they became independent" (ibid.:7). A "sustained and comprehensive multinational effort" (ibid.:39) was proposed for Solomon Islands, with the restoration of law and order to be followed by a sustained state-building exercise to "build new political structures and security institutions and address underlying social and economic problems" (ibid.).

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[4]   See, for example, USA 2002:iv.

The timing and shape of the intervention owed as much to Australia's adoption of this model of liberal peace as it did to actual developments in Solomon Islands (Allen/Dinnen 2010). Consideration of the particularities of local context was to a large extent subordinated to the application of the larger strategic framework and its formulaic prescriptions. These entailed robust external interventions with a strong accent on security, state-building and neo-liberal economic reform. Each element is reflected in the three pillars around which RAMSI is organised: law and justice; the machinery of government; and economic governance. While beleaguered authorities in Honiara had been requesting some kind of intervention since 2000, what had changed by 2003 "was the Australian government's reading of the situation in Solomon Islands and its implications for Australia" (Hameiri 2012:412). This reading, in turn, represented a shift away "from a particularist and developmental lens to a global and security lens in viewing Pacific developments" (Fry/Kabutaulaka 2008:16).

Background to the Tension

The Solomon Islands has never had a 'strong' or 'effective' state as measured by its institutional capacities or ability to project authority throughout its territory. Although the tensions exacerbated the fragility of the state, the events that unfolded from the late 1990s were as much a consequence of this underlying fragility as they were a source of it. The centralised state inherited from Britain at independence in 1978 has struggled to consolidate in Solomon Islands' socially diverse and geographically fragmented environment. Around eighty languages are spoken among a population of just over half a million people dispersed across an archipelago comprising six main islands. Individual identities remain relentlessly localised, with little sense of 'nation' or shared political community. Former Prime Minister Solomon Mamaloni famously declared that Solomon Islands was "a nation conceived but never

born" (Mamaloni 1992:14). Contemporary forms of 'community' for the 85%
of Solomon Islanders living in rural areas revolve around complex interplays
of kinship and exchange relations, friendships, church membership and myri-
ad claims to customary land. Most people continue to live on the margins of
the modern state and formal economy, relying on local systems of informal or
customary governance for their welfare and security needs, and on a mix of
subsistence agriculture, fishing and cash cropping for everyday survival.

   The centralisation of political power continues to be contested in many
places, as it was during colonial times. Much of this contestation has revolved
around the allocation of scarce public resources, the unfulfilled promise and
uneven pattern of post-independence development, and the failure of succes-
sive governments to deliver essential services, such as education and health.
Solomon Islands' political culture shares important characteristics with its
Melanesian neighbours. The strong party system on which the Westminster
system is premised has failed to take root and a highly personalised style of
'big-man' politics prevails. Accessing and redistributing state funds through
patronage networks based on kinship is a key dynamic of political behaviour
and has contributed to instability and corruption, accentuated by a corrosive
nexus between elements of the political elite and the notoriously corrupt
Asian-dominated logging industry (Dinnen 2008:339-355). It has been argued
that the potential disruption to political patronage networks posed by the
declining demand for log exports during the Asian financial crisis in the late
1990s and the election of a reformist government resulted in deliberate acts of
destabilisation by vested political and business interests (Hameiri 2007:409-
441, 2008:357-371).

   The small formal economy – logging, fishing and, increasingly, mining –
has failed to match the needs and expectations of a rapidly growing and
youthful population. Spatial inequalities associated with longstanding patterns

of uneven development have encouraged internal migration from less developed regions to areas offering better employment and economic prospects, and improved access to services. Migration from the densely populated and undeveloped island of Malaita to Honiara and adjacent areas in rural Guadalcanal over many years has accentuated social and cultural differences between 'settlers' and 'indigenous' groups. Local resentments have been directed at the perceived monopolisation of employment and other development opportunities by Malaitans, and their involvement in land transactions viewed as contrary to Guadalcanal customs (Kabutaulaka 2001). This sense of grievance was experienced most acutely by the inhabitants of Guadalcanal's remote southern Weather Coast, where the rebellion that heralded the tension originated. More generally, extractive industries, such as logging and mining, can have seriously divisive social impacts at local levels and contribute to growing conflict stresses (Naitoro 2000; Dinnen et al. 2011). In addition, their enclave character is likely to fuel perceptions of relative deprivation.

Demands for greater political devolution and provincial autonomy have a long history in Solomon Islands. Perceptions of a progressive withdrawal of state from rural areas and a widening gap between Honiara – where political and economic power is concentrated – and the rest of the country are shared by many Solomon Islanders. The dissolution of Area Councils from the mid-1990s onwards saw the demise of an important mechanism for the delivery of government services and public works at local levels (Dinnen/Allen 2013). A related aspect of these popular grievances concerns the perceived failure of the formal sector of government to engage with the informal community governance systems and leadership structures that prevail throughout the archipelago. While under enormous stress in many places owing to the character and pace of change, these local systems based on a blending of custom, Christianity and tenuous linkages to bits of state, retain high levels of

legitimacy among rural Solomon Islanders. While dissatisfaction with the workings of the centralised state has resulted in disengagement in some localities, it has more usually led to strident calls for greater engagement with government, through a devolved system that can link with existing community governance structures, including traditional mechanisms as these have evolved (Allen et al. 2013).

The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

Australian leadership of the regional mission was contingent on securing the consent of Solomon Islands' authorities and member states of the *Pacific Islands Forum* (PIF). Forum Foreign Ministers endorsed Australia's plan of intervention, while the Solomon Islands Parliament unanimously passed the *Facilitation of International Assistance* (FIA) Act 2003, setting out the powers and immunities of mission personnel. Described as a form of "co-operative intervention" by the then Australian Foreign Minister Downer[5], RAMSI was to operate through Solomon Islands national laws and respect the island nation's sovereignty (Fullilove 2006:33). Under the FIA Act, the Solomon Islands Parliament was to review RAMSI annually and could, in theory, terminate the mission by revoking its consent. The wide-ranging mandate combined security and development objectives:

Ensure the safety and security of Solomon Islands;

- Repair and reform the machinery of government, improve government accountability and improve the delivery of services in urban and provincial areas;

- Improve economic governance and strengthen the government's financial systems;

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[5]   Alexander Downer, 'Our failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of the Solomon Islands'. Address at the launch of the ASPI Report, Sydney, 10 June 2003.

- Help rebuild the economy and encourage sustainable broad-based growth; and
- Build strong and peaceful communities.[6]

RAMSI's initial phase, led by the PPF, focused on the restoration of law and order. This was to be followed by a period of consolidation and institutional reform, and, finally, the building of sustainability and self-sufficiency among Solomon Islands' institutions. In addition to the highly visible police and military presence, civilians from a range of Australian government departments[7] were placed as advisers in various ministries and agencies. In this regard, RAMSI has been described as "the most comprehensive whole of government strategy towards a fragile state of any donor to date" (Patrick/Brown 2007:87). As well as Australia's substantial commitment of funds and personnel, no fixed exit date was specified. The mission was coordinated in Solomon Islands by a *Special Coordinator's Office*, headed by a senior Australian diplomat, while Australian-based agencies operated through an interdepartmental committee in Canberra.

Security was restored quickly and peacefully. Large numbers of firearms were handed over to mission personnel, while well-known militant leaders were apprehended to be processed subsequently through the criminal courts. This intensive period of law enforcement placed considerable pressure on other parts of the fragile criminal justice system, and the mission placed a number of international personnel in relevant agencies, including as magistrates, lawyers, clerks and prison officials. In addition to their executive policing role, the PPF also began the longer-term task of cleaning up and rebuilding the RSIPF. Over 400 officers resigned or were removed, amounting to

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[6]   As listed on the RAMSI website: http://www.ramsi.org/about/what-is-ramsi.html
[7]   Australian government departments participating in RAMSI included: the Departments of prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs and Trade, AusAID, Defence, Australian Federal Police, Attorney-General's, Customs, Treasury, and Finance and Administration.

more than one quarter of the total workforce. Other early achievements included restoring stability to government finances. Improvements in public financial management and tax collection saw government revenues increase by around 170% during RAMSI's first three years (Kukoc 2007). Legislative and policy provisions were enacted to support private sector investment, while measures were taken to strengthen Solomon Islands' accountability mechanisms, including the Office of the Auditor-General, the Ombudsman, and the Leadership Code.

Inevitably, there were also set-backs. Serious public disturbances occurred in Honiara in April 2006 following national elections (Dinnen 2008b:1-38). Two days of rioting and opportunistic looting destroyed much of the capital's Chinatown and served to highlight the underlying fragility of the peace. Manasseh Sogavare's subsequent election as Prime Minister heralded a dramatic deterioration in bilateral relations between the Solomon Islands' and Australian governments. A staunch nationalist and critic of the mission, Sogavare sought to reassert his government's control over RAMSI and curb what he viewed as Australia's dominant influence. This, in turn, provoked strong resistance from political leaders in Canberra (ibid.:17-26). Although these differences were fought out at the highest levels of the two governments and did not necessarily affect operational relationships, they inevitably cast a shadow over the future of the mission. In doing so, they also exposed the inherent vulnerability of the 'co-operative intervention' model to the vagaries of shifting local political allegiances.

Changes of government in each country in late 2007 provided a much-needed circuit breaker. Improved relations with the Melanesian countries – Solomon Islands and PNG in particular – were a high priority for the new Australian government led by Kevin Rudd. Although there was no radical change in substantive policy, there was a distinct change in tone with

Australian pronouncements now couched in the more constructive language of 'partnership', 'mutual respect' and 'mutual responsibility'.[8] RAMSI's evolution and capacity for learning were most apparent in this later period (Braithwaite et al. 2010). A recurring criticism raised by local and regional observers during the first phase of the mission related to Australia's dominance of key decision-making and the perceived marginalisation of Solomon Islands' and regional stakeholders. While to a large extent an inevitable consequence of the asymmetry in resources and capabilities between the different stakeholders, as well as the initial prioritisation of RAMSI's security agenda, the period since 2007 saw the creation of more space for Solomon Islands' and regional voices to actively participate in the shaping and implementation of the mission.

New consultative arrangements included the 2009 Solomon Islands-Australia Partnership for Development that sought closer collaboration between the two governments in meeting agreed development goals. A *Forum Ministerial Standing Committee* (FMSC) was established,[9] as was a 'triumvirate group' comprising senior officials from SIG, PIF and RAMSI,[10] while a *Partnership Framework* was designed to increase alignment between the mission's work and the priorities of SIG.[11] These mechanisms reflected a growing sensibility to local concerns and priorities that had previously been overlooked. The earlier emphasis on law enforcement was broadened through support to locally-led reconciliation processes, including the establishment of

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[8]   This change in tone was expressed most clearly in the Australian and Papua New Guinean Governments' *Port Moresby Declaration* of 6 March 2008.

[9]   The FMSC comprises past, present and future *Foreign Ministers of Forum Chair* countries, as well as the Foreign Ministers of Solomon Islands, Australia, and, since 2009, PNG.

[10]   The 'triumvirate group' comprises the Solomon Islands Government Permanent Secretary to RAMSI, the Honiara-based *PIF Representative to Solomon Islands*, and the *RAMSI Special Coordinator*.

[11]   Progress under the Framework is monitored by a *Joint Performance Oversight Group* co-chaired by the *Special Coordinator* and Solomon Islands Prime Minister.

a *Truth and Reconciliation Commission* (TRC) in 2009. There was also a lessening of the mission's initial reluctance to facilitate national dialogue around issues of political decentralisation.

Transition and beyond – Solomon Islands' future prospects

As it marked its tenth anniversary in July 2013, the mission still enjoyed high levels of popular support. The *People's Survey 2013* revealed that that 86% of Solomon Islanders surveyed continued to support RAMSI's presence.[12] This is unusual for a prolonged international intervention and an indication of the strengths of local perceptions about the critical role of the mission. Although uneven across sectors, there is evidence of improvements in government service delivery. A substantial amount of public debt has been retired, while the formal economy has been growing consistently, with GDP growth averaging around 7% since 2004 (Allen 2011:6). Rumours of renewed ethnic tensions in Guadalcanal in early 2012 were dismissed unequivocally by spokespersons for the two former rival militias (Marau 2012). The RSIPF successfully managed protests associated with latest change of government in November 2011, while reported incidents of serious crime remain low by regional and international standards.

Although an indicator of the success of the mission, high levels of popular support also suggests a continuing lack of confidence by Solomon Islanders in their own institutions and anxiety about a possible return to conflict without the presence of RAMSI. For example, according to the 2011 People's Survey, 65% of respondents believed that the country was not yet ready for RAMSI to scale back its activities, while only 19% said it was. Ironically, the success of the mission in restoring security and administrative functionality

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[12]   The *Peoples Surveys*, commissioned by RAMSI and undertaken by the *Australian National University*, have been gauging local views across the Solomon Islands since 2006 on a range of social, economic and development issues. They can accessed on the RAMSI website: http://www.ramsi.org/

may have inadvertently induced high levels of dependency among many Solomon Islanders, rendering RAMSI indispensable for their country's continuing stability. This dependency has been evident in varying degrees across different sectors of government, as well as extending from the highest levels of political leadership to citizens in rural localities. This in turn raises questions about the effectiveness of RAMSI's efforts to rebuild local capacities and empower Solomon Islanders to resume control over their own destiny.

The mission's extensive police-building engagement illustrates some of these dilemmas,[13] many of which are common to all large interventions (see, for example, Ignatieff 2003:162). Despite signs of improvement, the People's Surveys reveal that Solomon Islanders still have limited confidence in the capabilities of their own police force. While in part a legacy of the earlier tension, there is evidence that Solomon Islanders are now evaluating the local police in relation to the much better resourced and highly professional mission police. The RSIPF inevitably come off worse in such comparisons. An irony here is that the continuing presence of the PPF, whose primary task for some time has been to rebuild the RSIPF, may actually be accentuating this lack of confidence on the part of many citizens. Likewise RAMSI's substantial financial and other support to the RSIPF – around two-thirds of the total costs of policing– may have reduced the pressure on SIG to adequately resource the RSIPF.

With much of RAMSI's development work focused on central government agencies in Honiara, many rural Solomon Islanders still face major problems of access to state services. This includes access to the RSIPF and the state justice system. Beyond the national capital, the RSIPF has some 28 police stations and posts located in the provinces. The former are usually

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[13]   The following discussion draws on Dinnen/Allen 2013.

based in provincial capitals, leaving a scattering of smaller police posts in selected rural areas. Significant disparities exist in the distribution of police personnel and other assets in different parts of the country. For example, just over half the total number of RSIPF officers are stationed in Honiara which is home to less than 20% of the total Solomon Islands population. By contrast, only 7.5% of the police are located in Malaita province with around 30.3% of the national population. It is only recently that more attention has been given to the development of a model of community policing that will be able to extend the reach of the RSIPF across the archipelago and that will be sustainable in light of the fiscal constraints facing SIG.

In addition to the findings of successive People's Surveys, recent research by the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs and the World Bank's Justice for the Poor Program demonstrates the extent to which rural Solomon Islanders continue to rely on their own village-based mechanisms for managing everyday disputes and ensuring community safety (Allen et al. 2013). Different configurations of three overlapping justice systems – *kastom*,[14] church and state systems – are found in different areas, with the former being most commonly used to resolve local disputes. Rather than being archaic remnants of a pre-modern past, these local systems are highly dynamic and manifestly capable of adaptation. Although weakening in many places under the weight of rapid change, and while they may suffer from lack of accountability and inconsistency with human rights standards, they retain a high level of legitimacy among most Solomon Islanders. RAMSI's singular focus on the state policing and justice systems has largely neglected the role of these non-state actors and processes. The World Bank research provides a strong case

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[14] The term '*kastom* system' is used here to refer to local rule systems whose authority lies in appeals to locally-specific bodies of *kastom* (custom) or tradition, and that are typically administered by local 'chiefs'.

for engaging with the realities of legal pluralism in Solomon Islands by fostering linkages between different security and justice providers. This would potentially enable greater alignment between the diverse sources and forms of regulation at local levels. In the long term, it could lead to the development of more socially attuned and fiscally sustainable approaches to managing disputes, as well as helping to prevent the kind of conflict escalation that occurred in the late 1990s.

A broader lesson from recent international state-building interventions is the importance of nation-building as a related but distinct process to state-building. In its literal sense, nation-building is about the development of a sense of shared political community among the citizens of a particular state. Although loyalties to kin and family groups are likely to remain a strong foundation for individual identities in such a socially diverse country, the importance of extending the loyalty of Solomon Islanders to the idea of Solomon Islands as a nation-state is increasingly recognised. While there are clearly limits to the role of external actors in such complex historical processes, state-building clearly needs to be embedded in the larger project of nation making. Among other things, this requires a significant broadening of the narrow technical state-building perspective that dominated in earlier phases of the mission.

RAMSI has been sensitive to local concerns about the potentially destabilising effects of its drawdown and eventual departure. The current Partnership Framework provides the master transitional strategy of graduated withdrawal and the mission's drawdown is calibrated according to the completion of agreed objectives in relation to different activities rather than being bound by strict timelines. It is clear that some form of external security guarantee will be required for the foreseeable future. The next phase in RAMSI's transition will cover the period 2013-17. Since 1.7. 2013, RAMSI's three development

pillars (law and justice, machinery of government and economic governance) have shifted across to development programs managed out of the *Australian* and *New Zealand High Commissions*. During the next four years, it is anticipated that RAMSI's main role will be to work with the RSIPF. A small contingent of the PPF, now based almost entirely in Honiara, will continue to support the RSIPF. A switch in the modality of external assistance is taking place, reflecting the transition from post-conflict stabilisation to a more regular development assistance approach.

The need for long-term international support is premised on an appreciation of the structural challenges facing the island nation, including its relatively poor economic prospects and the conflict stresses these are likely to induce. Many of the underlying factors that contributed to the original tension remain unaddressed. A recurrence of conflict remains a real risk with international evidence confirming the cyclical character of conflicts in fragile states (World Bank 2011). Analysis by the *World Bank* (2010) demonstrates how economic growth in Solomon Islands since 2003 (average *per capita* growth of 3.6 *per annum*) has been largely driven by the influx of aid flows (38% of GDP on average since 2003) and unsustainable levels of logging. Set against an annual population growth rate of around 2.6%, even these growth rates have been unable to bring incomes back to pre-tension levels. According to recent forecasts, commercial logging stocks are expected to be exhausted by 2015, leading to a dramatic anticipated drop in government revenues. Planned new projects in fisheries, mining, tourism and agriculture, even if successful, are unlikely to make up for the shortfall that will result from such a development. As well as the impact on revenue and jobs, the demise of the notoriously corrupt logging industry "is likely to place pressure on local patronage networks and exacerbate socioeconomic grievances, thereby partly recreating

conditions that contributed to the original outbreak of violence in the late 1990s" (Allen 2011:2).

Despite the mission's considerable accomplishments, Solomon Islands remains vulnerable to future instability. Projections indicate that likely medium-term economic growth will increasingly be concentrated around Honiara or around enclave resource development, especially mining. This is likely to accentuate historical patterns of uneven development and associated grievances over relative deprivation. Rapid and unplanned urban growth, typically involving informal settlements on customary or state land, has considerable potential for generating conflict over land use, as well as entrenching real and perceived inequalities in the distribution of incomes and services. Likewise, experience in Papua New Guinea and the neighbouring island of Bougainville attests to the links between mining projects and new patterns of rent-seeking and local-level conflict.

RAMSI has undoubtedly succeeded in its initial task of restoring security and stability to Solomon Islands but the outstanding challenge will be in sustaining these achievements in the longer-term. This is now well understood among senior mission officials, as it has been understood by Solomon Islanders for many years. It is also reflected in the acknowledgement that while RAMSI will disappear, substantial international support will be needed for many years to come, albeit in the form of bilateral and multilateral aid programs provided by Australia and other international partners.

The implications for Australia's engagement in Solomon Islands of the recent change of government in Canberra remain unclear at this stage. On assuming office, the new conservative administration led by Tony Abbott announced its intention to re-absorb the Australian aid agency – *AusAID* – back into the *Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade* (DFAT). This announcement came as shock to many observers of aid politics in Australia and

raised concerns that the relative autonomy of the aid program would become a casualty as Australian aid becomes more closely aligned to the strategic and trade interests that animate foreign policy. Other observers have been more sanguine, pointing to similar organisational changes in other bilateral donors that have not dramatically affected the character of their aid programs. The relatively few public statements from the new government on its new foreign policy directions indicate that Australia's near neighbours, including Solomon Islands, will remain a focus for engagement. While it is unlikely that the new government will do anything to jeopardise the very substantial Australian investment in Solomon Islands over the past decade, it seems likely that its strong ideological commitment to development through trade will have some impact. Time will tell.

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Australian Military Interventions in East Timor: Real- or Moralpolitik at work?

Manuel Schmitz

Abstract: *Australia intervened in 1999 and 2006 militarily in East Timor. In both cases, Australia's actions were important to end violence and destruction in the former Portuguese colony. Considering the considerable costs of both interventions, the question arises why Australian governments decided to employ military forces. Were the decisions driven by moral concerns, the desire to help a neighbour in need? Or were cold-hearted interest-calculations behind the decisions to intervene? In other words: Were the interventions an example of Moral- or of Realpolitik? The essay discusses the various arguments for each perspective and concludes that it was neither a clear case of Moralpolitik (as the Australian governments likes to portray it) nor just an exercise in Realpolitik (as many civil society actors paint it). Indeed, judged by the motivations, the two Australian military interventions in East Timor were a mixture of Real- and Moralpolitik, norms and interests were of importance.*

Figure 1: Timor-Leste

Introduction

Big is beautiful, at least in international relations. Small states normally do not receive much attention, neither from decision-makers nor from academics. In the international arena the big players, which command over people, territory, resources and possess military, might and economic leverage, take centre stage. East Timor, Timor-Leste or Timor Loro Sae in the two official languages – Tetum and Portuguese – of the country, is not big: Its territory covers 14,870 km² (global rank 160 of UN member states) and is home to 1.2 million people (global rank 158). Certainly, there are smaller states. Countries like Singapore and Qatar have less territory; Luxembourg and Cyprus have less people. But East Timor is not only small; it is not even rich, unlike the other mentioned small states. According to data from the World Bank its GDP in 2012 stood at $1.293 billion, resulting in a GNI per capita of $ 3,620 and is therefore considered to be a "lower middle income country" (World

Bank 2014). It should be noted, however, that East Timor achieved this status only recently. When the country gained its official independence in 2002 it was considered to be the poorest country in Asia. Responsible for the remarkable improvement is the exploitation of East Timor's oil and gas reserves, the only driver of economic development in the country. But while its oil and gas reserves make all the difference for East Timor, for the global market the reserves are not of importance: In 2012 its total oil production placed it only on rank 51 of the world's producing countries (EIA 2013).[1] Because East Timor is neither big nor rich it should get not much attention in the international arena.

Surprisingly, East Timor became an international issue, especially in Australia. In the fall of 1999 Canberra took the lead in the *International Force for East Timor Mission* (INTERFET), a multinational armed peacekeeping mission, which was authorized by the United Nations to restore peace and order in East Timor after a referendum on independence had led to a security and humanitarian crisis in the then Indonesian province. Some years later, Australia again headed a military mission in East Timor, the *International Stabilization Force* (ISF). The *Operation Astute*, as it was known in Australia, was charged with the task to return order to the country after a dispute between elements of the security apparatus threatened to result in a bloody civil war.

Sending the troops abroad is always a risky decision for governments, especially in democratic systems. In the worst case, a country finds itself entangled in a long-lasting conflict, in which it loses its soldiers for reasons that are difficult to communicate to a critical domestic audience. Even in the best case – the conflict is ended quickly and without much bloodshed – governments

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[1]   The gas reserves are not yet exploited.

are faced with a considerable financial bill, since military interventions do not come cheap. The question arises, why Australian governments did decide, nevertheless, to intervene with military forces in small East Timor. Were the decisions driven by moral concerns, the desire to help a neighbour in need? Or were more sinister motives behind the decisions to intervene? In other words: Were the interventions an example of *Moral-* or of *Realpolitik*?

The answer to this question is important for several reasons. East Timor is small, weak and close to Australia, as are many Pacific Island States. Seen from Canberra, Timor-Leste is part of an "arc of instability". Therefore, the two episodes provide lessons about Australia's behaviour towards smaller states in its neighbourhood. (Besides, Australian military planners and foreign-policy makers, certainly, have drawn their lessons from the engagements.) Furthermore, the decision to send soldiers abroad is a very serious one: the life of Australian citizens is risked in the endeavour. Its severity makes it a particularly good case to reveal the drivers of Australian foreign policy in general. Finally, the discussion of Australia's motives may be a small contribution on the wider debate about normative vs. interest motives in foreign policy making.

I begin by discussing the central terms of the essay – Realpolitik and Moralpolitik – in the context of Australia's foreign policy. This is followed by an analysis of the INTERFET mission that examines the main reasons for Australia to intervene. The next section answers the same question about motives for the ISF mission. In the final section I will summarize the findings.

Real- and Moralpolitik in Australia's foreign policy

The term Realpolitik was coined by a German political thinker (Ludwig August von Rochau) of the mid-nineteenth century, but its essential features can be traced back to Machiavelli, if not Thucydides. At the core of the concept is

the belief that in the international arena states should act according to their interests, mainly defined in gaining and defending power vis-à-vis other states. To ensure survival in a hostile international environment, states must pursue a cold-hearted policy based on rational calculations of the possible. What is possible is determined by the power structures of the international systems, not by domestically defined limits such as the respect for human rights and the rule of law (Waltz 1979:117; Carlsnaes 2002:334).

The opposite of Realpolitik is Moralpolitik. A state's behaviour should follow moral concerns about what is wrong and right, and not simply declare might over right. Norms that are central to a state's domestic politics should not be forgotten on the international stage. Thus, values and principles should guide action, not interests. Foreign policy becomes less focused on achieving particular gains for the state, but should be more oriented towards universal principles. A truly normative actor does not ask "What is good for me?" but "What is good for the wider community?" (for a good discussion of normative actors see Tocci 2008).

Australia, as most states, likes to see itself as a force for good international relations. The Australian Foreign Minister (1988-1996) Gareth Evans, of the Australian Labour Party, argued in the 1990s that Australia should act as a "good international citizen". In a book co-authored with Bruce Grant he explains: "*The rules of international behaviour should not be different from those governing every other kind of human behaviour. [...] We are idealistic because it is the nature of men and women who live by the precepts of democracy to believe that they can change the world for the better*" (Evans/Grant 1995:42). Non-Labour politicians may be a little less enthusiastic about morality in international affairs and putting more emphasis on interests, but are nevertheless reluctant to paint Australia's foreign policy as being driven by amoral 'realistic' concerns. Australia's Prime Minister (1996-2007) John

Howard projects his own vision of the country's international prestige on the outside world when he stated: "*We are seen as a fair-minded and generous country. We are seen as a country that stands up for what it believes in. [...] Australia is a liberal democracy with global political and economic interests and a proud history of defending freedom against its enemies.*" (Howard 2006a) And his Foreign Minister Alexander Downer proclaimed: "*At the core of foreign policy are Australian values, which guide our approach to the world.*" (Downer 2006a)

It is fair to say that there is a bipartisan consensus that Australia should not deny its democratic nature on the global stage. But there is also a bipartisan tendency to deny a conflict between interests and values. Most often Australian politicians, like politicians in general, like to blur the lines between Real- and Moralpolitik in order to foster support for actions abroad. Alexander Downer, Foreign Minister from 1996 to 2007, states for example: "*It is interesting that what is morally right so often makes practical good sense.*" (Downer 2001) But pursuing one's own interests and be true to one's own moral values at the same time may be less often possible than decision-makers like us to believe. Therefore, it may be a good idea to ask the following questions to distinguish between Real- and Moralpolitik in the case of Australia's military missions in East Timor: Was Australian military personnel sent to East Timor first and foremost to advance Australia's interests? Or was the well-being of the East Timorese at the forefront of Australian considerations?

INTERFET 1999-2000

For centuries Portugal did not pay much attention to its colony in East Timor, nor did Australia (except for a short time during World War II). The eastern part of the island of Timor, located only around 650 km to the north of Australia, only became an issue to Australia after the end of the authoritarian

regime in Lisbon in April 1974 had led to a political awakening in East Timor. But a country even more concerned was Indonesia. When during the course of 1975 it became clear that Fretilin, a left-leaning independence party, gained the upper hand in the political struggle in East Timor, the authoritarian and strongly anti-communist New Order regime in Jakarta became alarmed. Fearing an "Asian Cuba" at its doorstep, Indonesia invaded East Timor in December 1975, only a few days after Fretilin's declaration of independence. The Indonesian annexation (since 1976 East Timor was regarded as an Indonesian province by Jakarta) was resisted by the majority of East Timorese and for the next quarter of a century the country witnessed tremendous violence. (For an overview see Nevins 2005). It is estimated that at least 100,000 Timorese died during the Indonesian occupation (CAVR 2006). Many critics characterized the events in East Timor even as genocide (Kohen/Taylor 1979; Jardine 1999).

Australia's reaction to Indonesia's aggression, human rights violations and breach of international law must be described as Realpolitik. Right from the beginning the decision-makers in Canberra were aware of the unfolding drama at Australia's doorsteps but did not take a stance against Jakarta. Military options were never even discussed; diplomatic support for the East Timorese plight was refused. In fact, Canberra became a key backer of Indonesia's annexation and one of the few countries that accepted the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia not only de facto but also de jure: Good relations with the big neighbour Indonesia were not to be jeopardized by taking a stance for small East Timor. (For a detailed account of Australia's East Timor policy between 1974 and 1998 see Schmitz 2010:132-211; Leaver 2001.)

Only in December 1998 Canberra indicated that its position towards the East Timor may have changed: In a letter to Indonesian President Habibie the

Australian Prime Minister Howard argued for an independence referendum in East Timor, while at the same time indicating that continued Indonesian sovereignty may be the best option. Indeed, such a referendum on East Timor's future status was held in August 1999. 78.5% of the voters rejected the offer of special autonomy within in Indonesia and voted for independence (the voter turnout stood at 98.6%). The campaign had seen widespread violence, but after the declaration of the results on September 4, the situation escalated even further. Pro-Indonesian militia with the support of Indonesian military circles went on rampage and plunged East Timor into chaos and violence (Kingsbury 2000). It is estimated that during the crisis more than 1,400 people were killed and around 250,000 fled their homes. Around 75% of East Timor's infrastructure (schools, hospitals etc.) was destroyed within weeks (Schmitz 2006:36). Although these numbers were not known at the time, it was clear to outside observers that a humanitarian catastrophe was taking place in East Timor.

Unlike in 1975, Canberra took the initiative, diplomatically and militarily. In the diplomatic arena it pushed for a UN authorized peacekeeping mission, lobbying Washington and other Western powers to support such an intervention. Furthermore, it campaigned the Indonesian government to invite such a peacekeeping force to East Timor. When Jakarta finally agreed on this (pressured by Washington) Australia took the military lead in INTERFET, as the mission was called. The mission was headed by Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove, who commanded, at the peak, over more than 11,000 personnel coming from 23 countries (among them 191 troops from Fiji). Australia provided the largest contingent with 5,700 soldiers. Within weeks after the first arrival on 20 September 1999 order was restored and on 23 February 2000 the mission officially ended. However, Australian troops stayed on as

part of *United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor*, UNTAET (Australian Army 2012).

For Australia INTERFET was the largest military deployment since the Vietnam War. Furthermore, it was the first time Canberra took the command over a multinational force. Before the deployment many voices warned that INTERFET would face fierce resistance from the pro-Indonesian militias. The decision to send troops was thus risky.[2] It was also costly: A report by the Australian Auditor General estimated the costs of Australia's military deployments at 1.4 billion Australian Dollars (Australian Auditor General 2002:24).[3] The Howard government even had to introduce a temporary tax levy in order to finance INTERFET (Australian Politics 1999).

Australia's INTERFET engagement is clearly a reversal of its former East Timor policy. But does a change in policy mean a change in motives? A critical view of Canberra's policy holds that Australia still did practice Real-politik and pursued its security and economic interests above all. How convincing is this?

Looking at security interests first, it could be argued that Australia was driven by the wish to weaken the big neighbour Indonesia, a view very often heard in Indonesia (Soesastro 2000:129). Indeed, if the international system resembles a dog-eat-dog environment, as is the underlying assumption of Realpolitik, the weaker the neighbour the more secure a state becomes. In the case of Australia, it is fair to argue that Australia's public mind showed a certain apprehension towards Asia in general and Indonesia in particular at the end of the nineteen-nineties, as has been the case for decades. Many Australians looked at its giant neighbour (Indonesia's population stood at 205 million in the year 2000 compared to Australia's 19 million) with fear and

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[2]   Fortunately only one Australian soldier lost her life during the deployment, due to illness.
[3]   During 1999 and 2000 the Australian Dollar stood at around 0.40 of the US Dollar.

suspicion (Philpott 2001; Sherlock 1999:28). The purpose of INTERFET then would have been to secure the separation of Indonesian territory: A final step to secure a quasi-colony for Australia and a signal to other troublesome territories like Aceh and Irian Jaya that their separatist cause is not lost, weakening Indonesia even further.

There are a couple of counterarguments to this. First, it is doubtful to what extent the secession of East Timor could have resulted in a weakening of Indonesia. Holding on to the province was financially costly to Jakarta. In order to justify its occupation, the Indonesian regime invested heavily in East Timor's development since the beginning of the nineteen-eighties, but the province remained one of the poorest in Indonesia, straining the central budget (Sherlock 1996). Furthermore, the unlawful occupation tarnished Jakarta's international reputation. According to Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik, East Timor was a "pebble in the shoe" of Indonesia on the international stage. It is known that Indonesian President Habibie and his advisors could see the merits of letting East Timor go. To their minds, Indonesia without East Timor would not be weaker but stronger. In this respect, they were right, as the last decade has shown.

Second, while it is true that segments of Australia's society looked fearful towards Indonesia, this anxiety should not be overstated. At the time of INTERFET more and more Australians saw Asia not only as a threat but also as an opportunity. No longer could Australia just be described as the "misplaced continent", a Western country located in the South and suffering the "tyranny of distance" from its former European mother countries (Bell 2000). In the security domain Canberra and Indonesia were even tied through a Security Agreement (Crowhurst 1998). What most Australians feared was not a strong Indonesia, but a weak one. A disintegrating Indonesia going through a process of balkanization, a scenario not considered unlikely by most Western

observers at the time, was in fact one of Australia's biggest security concerns in 1999. Foreign Minister Downer stated for example in April 1999: "*Our political and strategic interests are obvious. Take a glance at any map – it doesn't take an expert in strategic policy to understand that what happens in our own neighbourhood will affect us more deeply and more quickly than events that occur in most other areas of the world.*" (Downer 1999) Indonesia as a failing state at Australia's doorsteps was not in the interest of Australia, because it would have been impossible for Canberra to shield itself from the repercussions. 'Waves' of migrants heading in boats to Australia's affluent shores were a nightmare for most voters in 1999 as they are in today's Australia. To see Australia's intervention as a plot to weaken Indonesia is therefore not very convincing.

What about Australia's economic interests? As mentioned in the introduction East Timor possesses oil and gas reserves. Was it at the end simply about oil? Interestingly, many East Timorese suspect that this was Australia`s hidden agenda. Certainly, there can be no denial that Canberra tried to take advantage of the power asymmetry between Australia and East Timor when it negotiated the exploration of oil resources in the Timor Sea with the newly independent state. The Australian government played hard to gain as much concessions from the Timorese as possible. But follows from this that INTERFET was driven mainly by the thirst for oil?

Again, various arguments can be made against such an interpretation. First, Australia's economic interest cannot be reduced to oil alone. Australian companies had widespread business interests in Indonesia at the time, among other sectors in the mining industry. Taking a confrontational stance against Jakarta could have jeopardized Australian commercial interests. The smooth relationship between Australia and Indonesia in the past, despite the ongoing human rights violations in the province, indicated that economic concerns

could only tilt the balance against a pro-Timor stance (Aubrey 2000:139). And an independent East Timor was not even necessary for Australia to gain from Timor's oil wealth. Already in 1989 the Australian government had signed a treaty with the Suharto regime that allowed for Australian oil exploitations in the Timor Sea. The terms of the agreement were favourable to Canberra, because Jakarta was more interested in diplomatic than economic gains. Thus, profits were already made under the current arrangement (for a critical account see Aditjondro 1999). Pressing for a change, which would certainly endanger business interests, did not make economic sense.

Can it therefore be conclude that INTERFET was indeed a case of Moralpolitik? A caveat is necessary here: It may not have been in the national interests of Australia to intervene in East Timor, but it was in the interest of the Australian government. Australia's Realpolitik towards the East Timor issue, pursued by all governments from 1974 to 1998, had in recent years become more and more unpopular with the Australian public. A heterogeneous East Timor lobby, which consisted of the Timorese diaspora, human rights groups, solidarity organizations, church groups, and even veteran organizations, had been successful in portraying the conflict in East Timor as a David vs. Goliath-story. When the situation escalated in Sep-tember 1999 it became the top story in Australian media and the public de-manded from its government to take a stance. Faced with the choice between an unpopular Realpolitik-approach, which would not have endangered the relationship with Jakarta, and a very popular Moralpolitik-strategy, the government reluctantly decided to do the popular (Chalk 2001:237). Australia became East Timor's "reluctant saviour" (Fernandes 2004).

Operation Astute

After INTERFET Australian troops remained in East Timor: Canberra pro-vided military personnel to UNTAET, the UN-mission that administrated

East Timor until the country became officially independent on 20 May 2002 to UNMISET (*United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor*), the follow up peacekeeping mission between May 2002 and May 2005, and to UNOTIL (*United Nations Office in Timor-Leste*), a small mission charged with supporting the institutions of the new state. UNOTIL was supposed to end in May 2006. After all, East Timor was considered to be a case of successful nation-building by the international community. But this perception was to change rapidly in the spring of 2006. East Timor went from showcase of nation-building to failing state status. What had happened?

Between April and May 2006 a conflict within the national security apparatus spilled over into wider sections of the society, resulting in communal violence between civilians. Within weeks the country stumbled into chaos and disorder: at least 37 people were killed, over 150,000 Timorese fled their homes, and thousands of buildings were looted and burned. Public life came to a standstill, state institutions failed, government lost control (Schmitz 2006, 2007). On May 24 the Timorese government requested military assistance from the governments of Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Portugal. The first Australian troops arrived one day later. Together with its international partners, Australia managed to stop a further deterioration, but it took the young nation years to achieve a sense of normality again. The mission was finally ended in March 2013.

As in 1999, Australia did take the lead in the *International Stabilization Force* (ISF). The Australian deployment, called *Operation Astute*, consisted at the peak in June 2006 of around 2,650 soldiers and about 200 police (UNSC 2006). Again, it was a rather costly exercise in peace-keeping: The total costs add up to 1 Billion Australian Dollar. But fortunately only two Australian soldiers lost their live during *Operation Astute*, both in accidents. In comparison, in Afghanistan 40 Australian servicemen died between

February 2002 and June 2013. While *Operation Astute* may not have been a high risk mission it nevertheless meant a serious commitment by Australia (for an overview see Blaxland 2014:198-208).

What were the Australian motives to intervene? First, it should be pointed out that the East Timor crisis of 2006 did not raise as much interest in Australia's public and media as the crisis of 1999. The events in Timor did not go unnoticed, but there was no public outcry to act. East Timor was one issue of many in Australian politics at the time. Thus, unlike in 1999, the Howard government did not need to pay too much attention to domestic concerns. Nevertheless, the Australian government presented itself as fighting for a good cause. Prime Minister Howard on June 9, 2006: "*We're doing that [sending troops to East Timor] because it's the right thing to do, it's the right thing to help a country like East Timor, a tiny country of a million people.*" (Howard 2006b) And his Foreign Minister Downer talking about Australia's contribution to nation-building in its neighbourhood stated in July 2006: "*You cannot create stable societies in a matter of a few years – we've always said that. These are 20 and 30 year projects we're pursuing. But we'll continue to pursue them, continue to make progress. Not for our own sakes – we're not there for treasure, despite the wacky conspiracy theories. We're there because we've been asked and because we can make a difference.*" (Downer 2006b)

Such a benign perspective is supported by the simple fact that Australia did respond to a formal request by the Timorese government. Australia was invited and it is indeed doubtful that Timorese authorities could have ended the crisis by themselves. On the other hand many Timorese questioned the impartiality of the Australian government. The Howard government had been critical of the governing Fretilin part under Mari Alkatiri in the past years. Furthermore, Canberra had demonstrated in diplomatic disputes with Dili

over oil issues, fishing rights and refugees problems that it was just too will-
ing to pursue its interests above all (Balint 2005). On the diplomatic stage,
Canberra's action between 2002 and 2006 had reminded many of bullying.
And, many Timorese had not forgotten Australia's Realpolitik attitude during
the Suharto years. For these reasons, it might be a good idea to ask for Aus-
tralia's interests behind *Operation Astute*.

To start with, it should be pointed out that the Australian government had
less to lose with *Operation Astute* than in case of INTERFET, because East
Timor was no longer part of Indonesia. There was neither the risk of weaken-
ing the big neighbour nor of damaging the diplomatic relations with Jakarta.
In fact, the Indonesian government even supported Australia's intervention
(Nason 2006). Furthermore, because with *Operation Astute* Canberra fol-
lowed an invitation by the Timorese government, diplomatic objections by
other actors (such as China) were not to be feared.

Instead, Australia could gain reputation, not as a champion of human
rights (that are not of concern in a Realpolitik strategy), but as a middle pow-
er, which is able to project its power overseas. It is telling that a text on the
official website of the Australian Navy described *Operation Astute* as a "text
book example of littoral maritime power projection" (Stevens 2006). Certain-
ly, it was a show of Australian capabilities, and as such it served two purpos-
es with regard to Australia's power.

First, the Australian engagement portrayed East Timor as Australia's
backyard. This perspective is neither fair nor flattering to the Timorese, but
for Australia to have a backyard can be seen as adding to its prestige. Only
powerful states have backyards. Already in 1997 a foreign policy White Pa-
per called 'In the National Interest' stated: "*Australia's international stand-
ing, especially in East Asia and North America and Europe, is influenced by
perceptions of how well Australia fulfils a leadership role in the islands*

region." (Australian DFAT 1997:69) In line with this thinking and in his famous outspoken way, Australian Prime Minister Howard remarked during a State Visit to Washington in May 2006 on current problems in the Pacific region: "*I've always taken the view, and the Government's always taken the view, that this is primarily an Australian responsibility. The Pacific is our backyard and we are the country that has the prime responsibility for looking after the security exigencies as they arise.*" (Howard 2006c) Not surprisingly, Australia's refusal to put its troops under UN-Command was interpreted by some commentators as an attempt to assure that Canberra not only bears the risks but also wins the laurels (Dodd 2006).

Second, the successful demonstration of military might has a deterring effect. It demonstrates future adversaries that a country is able to defend itself or its interests. Surely, there is no immediate threat to Australia to the extent that outside powers aim to invade Australia. But all defence policy is an insurance against dangers, which lurk in the future.

Maybe such an interpretation of *Operation Astute* as an exercise in power maximizing is too critical. But there is no denial that security concerns were a main driver for Australia's reaction to the East Timor crisis of 2006 (Firth 2012:149; White 2007:126). It all comes down to the Australian fear that East Timor could become a failing state. Indeed, during the course of May and June 2006 the Australian government repeated the assessment that the crisis in East Timor resulted from poor governance. The Australian Prime Minister stated for example on 29 May: "*The fundamental problem in East Timor is that the country is not being governed...*" (Howard 2006d) And on 9 June Howard remarked: "*...this has certainly been a reminder of the fragility of many of these small island states [...] There was a view a generation ago that no matter how small the country might be it should have its independence without a lot of thought being given at the time to whether some of those*

countries were viable." (Howard 2006e) Australian diplomacy made it clear that Australia as a neighbour had a "vital interest in ensuring that Timor-Leste developed as a stable democracy", as the Australian Representative to the United Nations put it (United Nations Security Council 2006b).

The notion of failing states as a security liability was well established in Australia in 2006. For some years, Australian security thinking had followed the international trend to see weak states as dangerous (Smith et al. 2001:122; Nguyen 2005). According to this view, fragile states invite transnational terror groups and international organized crime to set up camp in a state that is unable to exercise control over its territory. Poverty, misery and chaos may lead to civil unrest and humanitarian disaster, forcing people to leave their failed countries and become refugees. Not to mention the dangers of pandemic diseases, environmental degradation, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These so-called 'non-traditional security threats' were high on the security agenda of Western states, at the latest since 9/11. In Australia more specifically there has been talk about an 'arc of instability', consisting of the small island states to the North, including East Timor (Firth 2005:181). Indeed, East Timor was not the only island state witnessing political turmoil: the Solomon Islands faced a similar crisis (see Dinnen in this volume). The Australian intervention of 2006 must be seen in the context of this debate on failing states and an arc of instability. Australia sent its troops to prevent a state from failing and becoming a security threat to Australia.

It is striking, how powerful the ideas about failing states were in the minds of Australian decision-makers. In fact, even if East Timor would have become a failed state, the security consequences for Australia would have been minimal. The threat of terrorism? East Timor is neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan. The idea that radical Islamistic groups – and these are the terror groups feared most by Australia – would set up camp in the predominantly

Catholic nation (98% of the population) is rather ridiculous. Organized crime? East Timor is not Somalia or Colombia. The communication and transportation lines connecting East Timor to the international community are so weak that it would be folly for international (!) crime syndicates to use East Timor as a base. And piracy would not be profitable enough, since there are no major sea lanes passing the island. Pandemic diseases? Again, East Timor's isolation would make an outbreak of a pandemic – and there has been none so far reported – less threatening than an a comparable event in, say, Indonesia, a country considered to be a hotspot for Avian influenza by the World Health Organization. Environmental degradation? East Timor is too small to produce significant environmental costs to its neighbours. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? Of course, there are none in East Timor. Refugees? Historically, the East Timorese have fled to the mountains in case of crisis and they did so in 2006. Furthermore, most Timorese were too poor to ever pay human traffickers. In fact, Timorese boat people have never been a major problem for Australia, not even during the bloodiest years of the Indonesian occupation. To sum it up: A failed East Timor would not have been a major security threat to Australia. Therefore, *Operation Astute* might to be considered a textbook case of misperception in international relations.

Conclusion

The two cases have shown that moral concerns did play a role in Australia's decisions to intervene in East Timor in 1999 and 2006. The statements made by Australian politicians painting the engagements as humanitarian interventions were not merely window-dressing to assure a sceptical domestic audience. In both cases, Australia did take political, military and financial risks to help the East Timorese. While East Timor became independent first and foremost because the Timorese fought for it for decades, Australia nevertheless

played a constructive role, at least at the very end in the years 1998 and 1999: Canberra acted as a midwife in the birth of the new nation. It took on this role, because an active civil society pressured its government to take humanitarian concerns seriously. To this extent Australia's democratic nature did make a difference. During the crisis of 2006 domestic considerations were less prominent in Australian decision-making. Nevertheless, the Australian government decided to answer the Timorese call for help. It is fair to say that on this occasion Australia acted less as a bully than as big brother (a role that included the right to make patronizing comments). But without Australia's intervention, East Timor could have faced a civil war.

However, it would be naive to see only moral considerations behind the Australian decisions. In 1999, the Australian government was as much concerned about its political fate as about the suffering of the Timorese. The Howard government was indeed a reluctant saviour. And in 2006, the fear of a failed state in its neighbourhood and the wish to show Australia`s power did make it certainly easier for Canberra to commit to a military mission. Interestingly, there was not as much to lose as was feared by Australia, because a failed state East Timor would not have resulted in serious security threats for Australia. But the misperception did make a stable East Timor a more valuable goal for the Howard government. In both cases, therefore, interests were part of the calculations. To sum it up: Judged by the motivations, the two Australian military interventions in East Timor were a mixture of Real- and Moralpolitik, norms and interests were of importance. It should not be forgotten, however, that the deployment of military force very often indicates a failure of diplomacy beforehand. Seen from this perspective, Canberra still has a lot to learn in its dealings with its surrounding states. After all, a true Australian Moralpolitik would mean the commitment to turn a backyard into a neighbourhood.

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Shifting Sands: Fiji's Foreign Policy and Geopolitical Reconfiguration of the Pacific

Steven Ratuva

Abstract: *Since the 2006 coup, Fiji's foreign policy went through a significant shift, primarily as a result of sanctions by Australia, New Zealand, United States and European Union and its suspension from the Pacific Island Forum and Commonwealth. As a consequence Fiji enlarged its circle of international support and building up its regional and global status by engaging more intensively with alternative friends such as China, forging new diplomatic ties with numerous countries, becoming chair of G77, strengthening its foothold within the Melanesian Spearhead Group and setting up its own Pacific Island Development Forum. This has reconfigured the regional geopolitical dynamics in a significant way and to some extent shifted the centre of political gravity away from Australia and New Zealand, whose reaction has been to reclaim their regional dominance. This chapter examines some of these dynamics and the implications on Fiji's regional position as well the impact on the broader regional geopolitics.*

Keywords: foreign policy, sanctions, reconfiguration, geopolitics, diplomacy

Figure 1: Fiji Islands

Introduction

Shifts in Fiji's foreign policy in recent years have been shaped by a syncretic mixture of internal, geo-political and strategic factors. Fiji's new-found power in the new geopolitical reconfiguration of the Pacific is a result of how it has been able to strategically leverage its position amongst the small island states, against Australia and New Zealand, after its suspension from the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific's premier gathering of leaders, after the 2006 coup. The rise of Fiji's influence is at the cost of the dominance of Australia and New Zealand, the undisputed post-cold war neo-colonial hegemonic forces in Pacific geopolitics. Fiji's attempt to cement its sub-regional hegemony and the concurrent demise of the Australian and New Zealand influence must be contextualized in the larger geopolitical scenario, especially the increase in China's influence in the Pacific and the US reaction to this and how Fiji positions itself in relation to posturing by the two powers.

Within this broad framework, this chapter focuses on Fiji's new foreign poli-cy initiatives and how these have been shaped by, and in turn, shape regional geopolitics and discusses some of the implications on Fiji and the region generally.

Shifts in Fiji's foreign policy

Fiji's foreign policy since independence can be understood at three levels—the international, regional and sub-regional levels. While each has its own specific characteristics and dynamics, they are linked in complex and dynam-ic ways. Let us look at each in detail.

Firstly, in the international domain Fiji has always had a pro-Western stance in relation to ideological alliance and UN votes. As a former British colony, it naturally gravitated towards the Anglophone global camp, in par-ticular, US, Britain, New Zealand and Australia. Because of Australia's and New Zealand's geographical closeness, Fiji's economy, education and cultur-al ties have been strongly linked to these two countries. However, normal diplomatic relations between these three countries have often been thwarted by the coups in Fiji which have often provoked the wrath of the two countries which readily imposed sanctions on Fiji. The major condition for the lifting of the sanctions was often Fiji returning to electoral democracy. This has led to a very temperamental and fragile relationship since the first coup in May 1987 and the latest after the 2006 coup. Normal relation was recently restored after the 17 September 2014 Fiji general election.

The sanctions against Fiji after the 1987 coup motivated Fiji to seek al-ternative international friends, a strategy which led to the *look north policy*, a general reference to Asia and more specifically, China. Asian countries such as Malaysia were very supportive of Fiji after its suspension from the Com-monwealth and sanctions following the 1987 coup. Malaysia has had a long historical association with Fiji, even before independence, in the areas of

political relations and economic development including Fiji's emulation of Malaysia's affirmative action program (Ratuva 2013). The fact that Malaysia and other Asian countries had authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states or had gone through military coups, meant that their positions on Fiji's military coups and post-coup military governments were more accommodating than those of western liberal democracies such as US, UK, Australia and New Zealand (Ratuva 2011).

Following Fiji's isolation after the 1987 coups, Fiji embraced China in its look north policy primarily because of its vast resources, growing world stature and historical-cultural links between Fiji and China. About 3% of Fiji's population are of Chinese ancestry and the post-1987 coup minister for finance, Mr Jim Ah Koy, a prominent Fijian businessman, who aggressively pushed for Chinese investment in Fiji, had Fijian-Chinese ancestry. Part of the deal was that Chinese businessmen were able to enter Fiji without the usual visa requirements if they were able to provide FJ$100,000 investment money upfront. This led to a wave of Chinese immigrants entering Fiji, amongst them transnational criminals involved in drug trade (Tarte 2010). There was also an upsurge in Korean investment and immigrants as the look north policy extended to other Asian countries.

During the period of the cold war, Fiji's foreign policies were very much aligned with the US bloc and under US pressure, Soviet ships which used to frequent Fijian ports, were banned from entering Fiji in the early 1980s (Robie 1992). Things began to take a dramatic turn as a result of the signing of the *South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty* (SPNFZT) or *Rarotonga Treaty* in 1985 which effectively banned nuclear weapon and powered ships from entering ports in the signatory countries, including Fiji (Pacific Island Forum 1985). Despite this, US nuclear-powered ships still entered Fiji ports and this led to the formation of the *Fiji Anti-Nuclear Group* (FANG), which spent the

next decade protesting not only against French nuclear testing in the Pacific, also nuclear waste dumping by Japan in the northern Pacific and US nuclear-powered vessels in the Pacific (Robie 1992).

The post-cold war regional politics was largely driven by Australia's security interests, manifested in its "cooperative intervention" doctrine, inspired by the obsessive paranoia that the Pacific "arc of instability" poses a terrorist threat to Australia's security (Fry/Kabutaulaka 2008). Although based on flimsy logic, this fear-mongering strategy largely shaped Australia's attitude towards the Pacific and while it may have worked in relation to the *Regional Mission Assistance to the Solomon Islands* (RAMSI, see Dinnen in this volume), it did not work for Fiji after the 2006 coup (Hayward-Jones 2014). RAMSI was possible through the Biketawa Declaration, a regional security agreement which enabled members of the PIF to "intervene" in any member country provided they were invited (Pacific Islands Forum 2000; see Holtz and Blatt in this volume). While the Biketawa Declaration worked in the Solomon Islands, it failed in Fiji after the PIF could not ensure that Fiji carried out its election in 2009 as Frank Bainimarama the coup leader promised them. Despite this, through Australia's and New Zealand's insistence, Fiji was suspended from the PIF and instead of submerging Fiji in economic and political disaster as intended, Fiji was able to leverage itself towards greater global significance by becoming Chair of the G77 (a loose association of 132 member developing countries set up to promote the collective economic interests of its members as well as enhance their capacity for negotiation in the United Nations), Chair of UNDP and more than doubled its diplomatic relations worldwide (Swami 2012; see Hasenkamp in this volume). In addition, Fiji intensified its international peacekeeping operations for the UN, in Afghanistan and Syria, a continuation of its global peacekeeping involvement since 1978 (Ratuva 2011).

Secondly, Fiji's relationship with the other small island states has a different type of configuration and of intensity compared to Fiji's relationship with New Zealand and Australia. While Australia and New Zealand look at Fiji as a delinquent juvenile state which needs to be disciplined and kept under control, the small island states see Fiji as a model 'big brother' who provides the political shield against the hegemonic accesses of New Zealand and Australia. However, over the years, Fiji's behaviour as a mini hegemon has angered some small states who felt that Fiji had selfishly acquired to itself most of the benefits of regionalism (Crocombe 2001). Amongst these were its control and conversion of *Air Pacific*, originally a regional airline, into a national carrier and recently renamed it *Fiji Airways* and hosting of and acquiring direct benefits from regional organizations such as the PIF and *University of the South Pacific*. It is for this reason that Fiji's attempts in the past to host the *Secretariat of the Pacific Community* (SPC) had been met with fierce resistance, although at the moment it already hosts more than half of the SPC staff in the Suva headquarters. The main headquarters is located in Noumea, New Caledonia, an overseas *collectivité* of France

Fiji has had its own share of disputes with island neighbours such as the dispute over the Minerva Reef with Tonga, Fiji's nearest neighbour. This almost flared up into a full-fledged military confrontation as the navies of the two countries engaged in threatening posturing. Fiji also has differences with Vanuatu over its maritime boundary, in particular, Fiji's claim to Conway Reef, located South West of Fiji and Fiji's refusal to recognize Vanuatu's claim to Hunters and Mathews Islands, now claimed by France (via New Caledonia). Fiji signed an agreement with France where Fiji would recognize France's claim to Hunters and Mathews Islands while France would recognize Fiji's claim to Conway Reef. These sorts of boundary disputes are bound to increase as a result of the growing interest in deep sea mining.

There are other areas where Fiji's regional ambitions have undermined the interests of its neighbours. In early 2014, Fiji banned Solomon Airlines planes from landing in Nadi, Fiji's largest airport, as a result of disputes over landing rights. This followed Fiji's termination of Nauru's national carrier, Our Airline, from landing in Fiji as Air Kiribati because of disputes over landing rights. In both cases, both airlines posed a threat to Fiji Airway's monopoly in the region.

After Fiji's suspension from the PIF, it set up its an alternative regional organization called the *Pacific Island Development Forum* (PIDF) which consists of government leaders, civil society and the private sector in the region. The structure of the PIDF is in contrast to the PIF which consists largely of political leaders and attempts for engagement by Pacific civil society organizations in the past have been denied. The PIDF poses a direct threat to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the PIF and Fiji has positioned itself to leverage both to further its regional geopolitical ambitions. One way of doing this is to stay outside the PIF despite the fact that the suspension has been lifted and there is now an open invitation for Fiji to re-join the forum. Fiji's precondition for re-joining is the reform of the PIF structure to ensure that development partners such as Australia and New Zealand are not to be full members of the organization. In other words, Fiji would only to re-join the PIF on the condition that New Zealand and Australia are excluded from the organization.

Naturally, Fiji's demand for Australia's and New Zealand's expulsion from the PIF has been met with trepidation by the two countries which fear that their only means of exerting their dominance in the region is through multilateral engagement via the PIF. For Fiji, re-joining the PIF will weaken its newfound regional power immensely given Australia's and New Zealand's dominance in the organization. It will also mean compromising on the power

and legitimacy of the PIDF which Fiji has used effectively so far as leverage against regional dominance by Australia and New Zealand. By hosting the Pacific leaders in a summit with India's prime minister in Fiji on 19 November and with China's president on 21 November 2014, Fiji used the opportunity to showpiece its status as a Pacific hub and conduit between the Pacific region and major global powers (Rounds 2014).

At the sub-regional level, Fiji's membership of the *Melanesian Spearhead Group* (MSG) is probably Fiji's most economically lucrative foreign policy engagement within the region, outside New Zealand and Australia, Fiji's two largest tourism markets. More than 80% of all the Pacific wealth is in the MSG region. Papua New Guinean (PNG) in particular is a large market for Fijian investors and at the same time Fiji has provided investment opportunities for PNG capital in Fiji's booming tourism industry. Fiji's political forays within the MSG has also created division and instability especially as some of Fiji's policies impinge on the sovereign interests of countries like Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and PNG. Fiji was chair of the MSG in 2012 until the baton was handed over to the FLNKS, the Kanak political movement in New Caledonia.

The Fiji-China-relations

The three-day visit to Fiji by the president of China from 21 to 23 November 2014 cemented a longstanding diplomatic relationship which started in 1975 when China first established its embassy in Fiji (Rounds 2014). Although China, unlike the Americans, has no substantive base in the Pacific, it has consolidated a foothold in Fiji through its strategic manoeuvrings in the form of increased aid and intensified military relationship and high level diplomatic links with Fiji, a country which has been regarded by Australia and New Zealand as a 'pariah' Pacific state since the military takeover in 2006. Fiji has taken advantage of its antagonistic relationship with the two sub-regional

powers to facilitate China's forays into the central Pacific and use it as a leverage to reciprocate to the hostile posturing of its two larger neighbours.

The demise of Australia's and New Zealand's power in the Pacific and the concurrent increase in Chinese influence in Fiji and the Pacific has been cause for anxiety for the US. As an anti-Chinese gesture, it lifted sanctions on Fiji as well as normalized diplomatic links and urged Australia and New Zealand to do the same. However, there was concern by the two countries that to engage with Fiji before the election would be seen as succumbing to the whims of the military regime which they vehemently detested and a slur on their own hard-line stand on democracy in Fiji. The solution they sought has been to engage with Fiji in an incremental manner through a series of initiatives such as restoration of diplomatic ties, resumption of aid, support for the constitutional reform and election process while maintaining travel sanctions for regime supporters until after the election in September 2014. Bob Carr, Australia's Minister for Foreign Affairs justified these progressive engagements on the grounds that the "democratic reform (in Fiji) was encouraging and irreversible" (Parry 2012). Full diplomatic relations were eventually restored after the election.

By intensifying engagement initiatives with Fiji, the US hopes to lessen Fiji's growing support for China, a reversal of the post-cold war stance when the US turned its back on Fiji and the Pacific islands generally as symbolized by the closure of the USAID office in Suva. During the cold war, aid was a crucial tool of anti-Soviet containment as part of the broader strategic denial doctrine of ANZUS (Australian, New Zealand, United States) alliance. The renewed interest of the US in the Pacific as shown by the reopening its USAID office in Port Moresby has rekindled a new surge of geo-political tension. Because of its central location as the economic and political hub of the South Pacific, it has been argued that Suva may become a centre of

contestation for US-China geo-political rivalry which will reverberate around the Pacific (Winiera 2012).

Visits by Chinese surveillance ships and senior Chinese officials have become a common occurrence. The Chinese president first visited Fiji as vice-president in 2009. According to cables from the New Zealand Embassy released by Wikileaks, New Zealand and Australia attempted unsuccessfully to stop Jinping's visit to Fiji because it would "send the wrong message in light of international efforts to urge the government in Suva to carry out democratic reforms" (Field 2011). The cable went on to say that "Fiji remained strategically important for China and Beijing was privately candid about linking development assistance and economic engagement with guaranteed political support on issues of interest to China" (ibid.).

One of the most politically significant Chinese projects in Fiji is the setting up of a *Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy* (CISD) in collaboration with the *Shanghai Institute of International Studies* (SIIS) one of the leading foreign policy research institutes and think tank for the Chinese government. The SIIS has been tasked with training Fijian diplomats and other civil servants along the lines of the Chinese intellectual and ideological lenses. Creating a cadre of Chinese trained Fijian intelligentsia will be a powerful tool to shape policies which are sympathetic to China's global interests.

Even more worrying to the US is the speculation that China may set up a military establishment of sorts in Fiji and this suspicion is continuously fuelled by the increasing military ties between the two countries in terms of training and provision of equipment. In January 2013 Major General Quian Lihua, Chief of Foreign Affairs Office in China's Ministry of Defence visited Fiji as part of "annual defence co-operation briefing"(*Pacnews* 22 January 2013:6). Being the highest ranking Chinese military official to be welcome into Fiji, Lihua's visit was both symbolic and strategic, more so after he

discussed delivery of military hardware in the form of Chinese-made naval boats and other equipment to strengthen Fiji's military capability. The two sides made an agreement that the *People's Liberation Army* (PLA) "would help and support the Fiji Military Forces (FMF)" in the areas of "co-operation, training and development" (ibid.).

The dilemma for the US is that while its Asia-Pacific pivot is meant to contain these sorts of Chinese influence, especially military overtures, the challenge is to devise a diplomatic strategy to win back Fiji's loyalty. The US's military links with Fiji goes back to Second World War when Fiji was a base for the US military during the Pacific war (Lowry 2006) and military links continued over the years through training for Fiji military officers in the US. During the cold war Fiji was ideologically aligned with the US and Fiji, like many other Pacific island states has always been part of the US voting bloc in the United Nations.

After the lessening of US presence in the South Pacific after the cold war, Australia became the proxy hegemon whose role as 'deputy sheriff' was to keep Pacific island nations within US-Australian orbit through aid and diplomacy. This was articulated in the form of a series of policy initiatives such as "pre-emptive intervention," "cooperative intervention" and "partnership for development and security" which came into being after 9/11 to ensure that the Pacific "failed states" which made up the "arc of instability" did not pose any threat of terrorism and international crime to Australia (Wainwright, 2003). The expectation for Australia's role as a US lapdog to keep the Pacific states within its sphere of loyalty failed. Some of the reasons for this included Australia's patronising foreign policy and bullying tactics which generated negative images of Australia amongst Pacific island states, lack of substantive impact of 'boomerang' aid programs (most of the aid goes back to Australia through Australian consultants) and lack of sensitivity to Pacific island views

(Kelsey 2004). Paradoxically, Australia's weaknesses turned out to serve China's interests and encouraged Chinese forays into what was once a US sphere of influence.

Buoyed up by the success of its regional manoeuvres and increased regional and international attention, Fiji may not be in a hurry to be readmitted into the PIF as it enjoys its new-found power. However, Fiji's increasingly bloated ego risks fizzling out prematurely as it begins to seriously fathom the realities of geo-political brinkmanship. While playing the China card gives it political and psychological advantage in the geo-political manoeuvring game, economic and technical reliance on China can become a liability. Some of the problems Fiji is facing include poor quality of infrastructure built by Chinese companies, failure of some Chinese companies to pay for workers' provident fund, failure of Chinese companies to follow building codes and increase in illegal activities such as human trafficking associated with the Chinese underworld. On the basis of these unsavoury experiences, the Fiji government has reassessed its technical preference by contracting three New Zealand companies to build and repair Fiji roads instead of the once preferred Chinese companies such as China Railway. Beneath the veneer of public political showmanship is latent anxiety about the appropriateness of Chinese technology and development ethics.

The extent of Chinese influence in Fiji will be ultimately determined by the internal political dynamics in Fiji as well as the changing regional response to these internal realities. If Fiji re-joins the PIF, it will lose some of its autonomy and power over Australia and New Zealand. This could potentially weaken China's links with Fiji and undermine China's power ambitions in Oceania generally. This may not necessarily imply that China would retreat from Fiji, but rather, China may be forced into a situation of long term

cooperation with the US (and by extension, Australia and New Zealand) in their engagement with Fiji.

The second scenario is that Fiji's re-admittance into the PIF and lifting of the sanctions by Australia and New Zealand could provide Fiji with the opportunity to use the China leverage as a tool of vengeance against Australia and New Zealand. Because of China's long term investment in Fiji through development aid, Fiji is unlikely to ditch China so easily even after Fiji has normalized relations with Australia and New Zealand. For Fiji, China has been a trusted friend at a time when it was isolated and humiliated. Prior to his visit to Fiji on 21 November 2014, China's President Xi Jinping said: "*I hope my visit will help strengthen political mutual trust, enhance cooperation in areas such as economy, trade, agriculture, forestry, fishery and tourism, expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges, deepen multilateral co-ordination and co-operation, and take China-Fiji traditional friendship to a new height.*" (Chaudhry 2014:1).

This scenario will probably provide Fiji with the opportunity to engage more proactively and aggressively with the two contending sides (China and US) to extract maximum advantage in terms of economic benefits and political mileage. While the two powers find Fiji an important ally in the South Pacific, it is doubtful if they would expand too much energy competing over its control because there are other more serious issues of conflict to deal with in South East Asia. Instead of a cold war type battle over Fiji, they would most likely agree to allow each other space to deal with Fiji while keeping a close eye on what the other is doing.

New powers and Fiji's relations

China and the US are not the only two global powers interested in Fiji and generally the Pacific. There are other global players such as Taiwan, Russia, Georgia, Israel and the Arab League which have been active lobbyists to win

the hearts and minds of the small Pacific states primarily for the purpose of soliciting recognition and mobilizing UN votes. Economically challenged small Pacific islands states are deliberately targeted because of their perceived susceptibility to accepting financial reward in exchange for political favour. Fiji in particular has been targeted because of its influential position within the region.

Two countries who were pioneers of this patronage strategy are Taiwan and China whose *Tom and Jerry* chequebook diplomacy game has left behind a legacy of instability and corruption in the region (Crocombe 2007). Six Pacific countries (Nauru, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Palau and Marshall Islands) recognize Taiwan and seven (Fiji, Tonga, Samoa, Vanuatu, Papua New Guinea, Niue and Federated States of Micronesia) recognize China. Australia and New Zealand aside, most, if not all, of the island states receive aid from both countries rather than just from the country they recognize. Fiji plays a rather 'balanced' approach by officially recognizing China, while at the same time hosting a Taiwanese embassy under the guise of the Taiwan Trade Mission.

Russian has been campaigning through provision of aid for recognition of the two breakaway Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while Georgia has been doing the reverse. Buoyed by Russian patronage, Abkhazia itself has been directly involved in giving aid to specifically targeted countries. Tuvalu established diplomatic ties with Russia in September 2011 as well as received aid in the form of water from Abkhazia during the serious drought in 2011. Just a year earlier Tuvalu received US$12,000 from Georgia. Russia provided US$50 million aid to Nauru after Nauru recognized South Ossetia (Brooks 2012). Vanuatu's recognition of Abkhazia in May 2011 caused some confusion amongst its leaders and differences amongst leading Vanuatu government officials but nevertheless it became the fifth

state to recognize Abkhazia's independence after Russia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru. However, this recognition was retracted a month later in June 2011 after a change in government. The big catch for the two countries was Fiji given its strategic importance and influence in the Pacific. Georgia donated 200 netbook computers for Fiji schools in October 2011 following the visit by Georgian Foreign Minister, Grigol Vashadze.

Russia, it appears, has an even grander scheme reminiscent of its cold war ambitions. It too wanted to send out a message, at least in some symbolic form, that Ms Clinton's "Pacific century" rhetoric should not be seen purely as a Chinese-American affair. It appears that Russia still wants to be seen as a strong regional power whose significance has not dissipated even after the cold war. One of Russia's major symbolic acts as a regional power was to invite Pacific islands foreign ministers to Fiji in February 2012 for "top-level meeting" with Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov (Malo 2012). The Pacific islands foreign ministers who attended showed their support for Russia in return for possible aid. The Russian foreign minister's visit also gave Fiji the opportunity to reassert its central position in the Pacific and regional conduit for major power politics between Russia, China and US.

However, unlike the Chinese and Americans, Russia has virtually no presence and real influence in the Pacific and the US pivot does not really consider the former cold war warrior as a potent adversary as threatening as the Chinese. However, it may be in a position to take advantage of the US-China tension to make probing inroads and even exert influence. For instance, Fiji's Minister for Defence and National Security, Joketani Cokanasiga announced that the Fiji Government was to enter into "an agreement with Russia's Federal Service for military and technical cooperation" (Naikaso 2013). Russia's involvement in the Pacific is significant because as a traditional

Pacific power it no doubt contributes to a situation of multi-polar geo-politics in the Pacific which may dissipate some intensity from the US-China tension.

Israel and the Arab League have also been active antagonists in the clamour to mobilize support on the vote to upgrade Palestine's status in the UN to non-member observer state similar to the Vatican. Fiji has traditionally been a strong supporter of Israel in terms of UN votes, diplomatic relations through a Suva-based honorary consul and Christian-linked connections. By and large, Israel's approach has been silent and executed largely through US influence with the belief that 14 Pacific island states would continue to support Israel at the UN. The Arab League was more forthright in using what Callick (2010:1) referred to as "generous charm offensive" through the launching of a US$54 million development fund and the formation of a new Arab-Pacific Cooperation Forum sponsored by United Arab Emirates (UAE). This followed a visit to the Pacific by UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and a trip to Abu Dhabi by heads of government and foreign ministers of all 14 Pacific island states. In Abu Dhabi, the Pacific island states expressed "the concern of Arab states regarding the conflict in the Middle East, in particular in Palestine" and "agreed on the need to settle all outstanding disputes and issues based on relevant Security Council resolutions and the principles of the Road Map recognising that the views of the Arab states were crucial to a just, comprehensive and permanent peace" (quoted in Callick, 2010:1). Again Fiji became the operational point for UAE in the Pacific because Fiji is the only Pacific state with an embassy in UAE.

Although the much anticipated UN General Assembly vote overwhelmingly favoured the Palestinians as expected, three Pacific island states (out of 9 Pacific islands UN members), Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia and Palau, who are recipients of the US funding under the *Compact of Free Association* with the US, together with Nauru, a near bankrupt country,

voted 'No' with the US. Of the 41 abstentions five, namely Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga, and Vanuatu together with Australia were from the Pacific and of the 138 which voted 'Yes', Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Kiribati together with New Zealand, were from the Pacific (see Hasenkamp in this volume). The 'No' votes indicated the US economic and strategic stranglehold on the countries concerned and the abstentions showed a shift away from direct Israeli support to a 'neutral' position presumably to please both the US and Arab League. Nauru and FSM were rewarded for their 'No' vote through a "lavish" invitation of the leaders of the two countries to Israel to meet the Israeli president, prime minister and minister for foreign affairs with promise of aid (Sofer 2010; Madsen 2012). By abstaining, Fiji was aware of its commitment both to the non-aligned movement as well as to the US bloc which it had traditionally supported. It also showed its growing independence in terms of foreign policy objectives and approaches.

Another case of UN vote mobilization involved Australia, Luxemburg and Finland who were all vying for non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council, for the Western European and Others group. Both Luxemburg and Finland sent representatives to attend the PIF meetings to lobby for support. While this was going on, Fiji was actively campaigning against Australia's bid to counter Australia's campaign against Fiji's participation in the UN peace keeping operations. Sensing Fiji's intentions, Australia eventually withdrew its UN campaign against Fiji and later went on to win one of the two seats with Luxemburg winning the other.

Japan, a traditional Pacific aid donor and strong ally of the US is also wary of China's growing influence in Fiji and the Pacific but its main interest is in fishing and its strategic priority is closer to home where it is involved in sovereignty disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the South China Sea. The Japanese Embassy in Fiji looks after Fiji, Kiribati,

Nauru, Tuvalu and Vanuatu and this enhances Fiji's regional profile in a significant way.

Fiji's relationship with India was further cemented as a result of the visit by the Indian prime minister on 19 November 2014. Amongst other things, India promised more aid in the area of medicine, IT, rural development and small industries as well as lifting of visa requirements for Fiji citizens visiting India.

Perhaps one of the most interesting developments is Indonesia's close links with Fiji and the MSG. While this may be seen by some as an attempt to pre-empt and possibly undermine any support for West Papuan independence amongst the MSG members, it can also be seen as an opportunity to discuss the difficult West Papua issue face to face with Indonesia. Although Fiji has been supportive of the West Papuan issue in the recent past by hosting the West Papuan independence leaders in Fiji in 2011, strong Indonesian lobbying and influence has changed this stance. As a sign of this closeness, the Indonesian president was invited to the PIDF summit in Fiji in 2014 and pledged $20 million to help in climate change programs.

Perhaps the least known foreign link to the Pacific is Cuba, which has increased training programs for Pacific medical doctors. About 8 medical students from Fiji are now studying in Cuba. Although a long-time adversary of the US, its presence in the Pacific does not pose any threat whatsoever to US interests in the region.

Fiji's dominant role as a regional power was further consolidated as a result of the visit to Fiji by the Indian prime minister on November 19 and the Chinese president on 21November 2014. Fiji invited the Pacific islands leaders to attend summits with the two leaders. In doing so, Fiji had reinforced its claim as a regional hegemon, a claim which does not go down well with PNG which sees itself as the largest and most powerful island state in the region.

The competition for Pacific leadership between the two states has been around since the 1970s.

Fiji plays a vital role in the multi-layered geo-political dynamics in the Pacific and the multiplicity of players, driven by different interests, makes the Pacific geo-political scene fluid and unpredictable. Fiji has taken advantage of this to further its own geopolitical interests by not only raising its own regional and global profile, also drawing the other small Pacific island states to its orbit. Like other small states, Fiji has strategically taken advantage of the opportunity to maximize the benefits for itself by playing the game of multipronged political gamesmanship. While the big powers may see the small states like Fiji as potentially controllable chess pawns, the small states have used their 'smallness' as an opportunity to pit the main powers against each other as a pragmatic and economically rational way of extracting monetary and development benefits, some of which are useful for national development and some of which merely end up in the pockets of the elites (Crocombe 2007).

To Fiji's advantage, perhaps one of the most interesting developments in all these is Australia's 'demotion' as America's 'deputy sheriff' in the Pacific as the US moves in to take direct control engagement with Pacific states. This can been as a consequence of Australia's neglect of the Pacific as an Australian strategic studies expert warns: "*We (Australians) need to be careful to avoid looking like the South Pacific is an afterthought to Australia's broader strategy. While Canberra continues to talk of the 'Asian Century', the Pacific Islanders are certain that it is an 'Asia Pacific Century.' Our Pacific Island neighbours know that their place in evolving global geo-politics depends on effective relationship with Asia. That's why they're extending and expanding these relationships while strengthening compatible traditional arrangements*" (Herr 2012:1).

In response to Australia's decline in influence, Herr adds, "*Whether anyone in Canberra wants to admit it, Australia has suffered a retreat from influence within our region and its institutions; a decline of support from our neighbors in the United Nations; and diminished respect from key allies in the South Pacific on regional affairs*" (ibid.).

This may indeed be the case at one level, but the reality is more complex. While Australia may have lost political prestige, its cultural and economic influence is still very strong and it is still the destination of choice for most Pacific migrants as well as largest aid donor, largest exporter and largest tourism market in the region (Chand 2012). While Fiji enthusiastically manoeuvres its political leverage against Australia, Australia still remains Fiji's largest source of tourism and trade and the cultural and sporting links between the two countries have a long history.

This paradox coupled with the influence of multiple players testifies to the fact that Fiji's geopolitical interests are often shifty and contradictory and sometimes involves a syncretic mixture of long term strategic goals and short term pragmatic interests. It is for these reasons that it is not possible, by any stretch of the imagination, to generalize about Fiji being neatly categorized as singularly loyal to either side of the US-China divide.

Conclusion: The paradoxes of exclusion

Fiji's suspension from the PIF and anti-coup sanctions by Australia and New Zealand paradoxically worked in Fiji's favour because it transformed its isolation into a powerful fulcrum for geo-political leveraging. One of Fiji's major policy directions was to bolster its pro-China 'look north' policy as an alternative to the traditional Australia-New Zealand links. Fiji also used its 'free' status outside the PIF to mobilize the economically and politically powerful MSG sub-regional bloc to harness its leveraging power, isolate

Australia and New Zealand from the MSG as well as weaken the regional legitimacy of the PIF.

Fiji's initiative to form the PIDS as a UN voting and lobbying bloc for small Pacific states independent of Australia and New Zealand within the UN further strengthened its position in the eyes of the island states. Fiji's growing self-confidence was given a major boost after it was elected chair of the G77. Perhaps the most daring tactical manoeuvre by Fiji was to mobilize the Pacific island leaders for an annual solidarity meeting prior to the annual PIF leaders' conferences since 2010. Seen by some as an alternative to the leaders' forum, it is now accepted as an established regional event which was later formalized as the PIDF from 2013 to give it more development focus as well as institutional permanence.

Although Australia and New Zealand are not part of the PIDF, by and large they still wield enough hegemonic presence to influence the decision-making consensus within the PIF leaders meeting and thus nullify the possibility of any pro-Fiji bloc swaying decisions within the PIF. Although Pacific island leaders would support Fiji's readmission into the PIF during the PIDF meeting in Fiji, they would suddenly reverse their tune or merely remain mute when facing Australia and New Zealand across the table during the PIF leaders meeting. PIF protocol dictates that decisions should be arrived through consensus and voting is avoided at all cost to project an image of unity rather than division. This type of manufactured consensus, patronizingly justified under the ideological rubric of *Pacific Way*, has often undermined the views of the smaller island states in favour the powerful countries like New Zealand and Australia.

The challenge for Fiji is how it is able to balance both its own geopolitical interests with its regional obligation. Fiji has often acted unilaterally at the cost of other regional neighbours and in the process undermined its own

respectability as a regional leader. On the other hand, it can be argued that being tied down by regional obligations could overshadow Fiji's ambitions to become a significant player in the world stage. It appears that Fiji's chosen approach is to use a multi-pronged tactical manoeuvre; firstly by rallying loyal the Pacific states through the PIDF and secondly by using its position as a regional hub to further its international ambitions as we saw in hosting of regional summits with the leaders of India and China.

The danger, however, is whether Fiji's continued rise as a regional power is driven by real economic and political muscle or is it merely an exercise in ego projection. If the former is the case then Fiji is destined to become the 'Singapore of the Pacific', a model it is now pursuing in earnest. If the latter is the case then a bloated ego could be precondition for illusive notions of self-grandeur, a psychological condition which may be unsustainable, if not self-harming.

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Perceptions and Preconditions for Democratic Development in Fiji[1]

Manfred Ernst

Abstract: *The article examines one of the key dilemmas in the democracy discourse – how can democracy 'work' realistically in countries of the Global South? Historically, democracy has developed quite differently in various contexts and across time. As such, political, cultural, social and economic forces, rooted in the Euro-American context, have stimulated and transplanted the concept of democracy worldwide. It is argued that the dynamic process of democratic development is inherently interwoven with the development of 'capitalism' in the economic sphere, with 'liberalism' as the overarching political ideology. The development of democracy in the West, especially since the end of WWII, is contrasted with the development of democracy in the Global South, which took place under different conditions. The view that new democratic states everywhere must imitate the Euro-American model is questioned through recommending a theoretical and practical re-conceptualisation of views along the lines of* hybrid political orders or hybridity of governance. *These arguments are substantiated by a summary of views of a representative sample of people concerning their perspectives for democratic development in Fiji. The article concludes with recommendations for the development of a framework for 'deepening democracy'.*

Keywords: Democracy, Colonialism, hybrid political orders, development

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[1]   This article is based on the author's chapter on 'Democracy' in *Voices of the People – Perceptions and Preconditions for Democratic Development in Fiji* (Boege et al. 2013).

Introduction

Since gaining its independence in 1970, Fiji has been dealing with the conse-
quences of nearly a century of racially-divisive British colonial rule. It has
experienced four coups in the last twenty-seven years, the first two of which
occurred after the election of Fiji's first multi-ethnic government in 1987. The
coup leader - a senior military officer - claimed to be acting to save the
iTaukei from subjugation to other ethnic groups. Five years of military rule
ensued, during which the country was expelled from the Commonwealth,
became a republic and adopted a new constitution which was heavily
weighted in favour of the *iTaukei* (the 1990 Constitution). By the mid-1990s,
moderate politics returned to prominence, and a more balanced constitution
was passed into law (the 1997 Constitution). Fiji's third coup, in 2000, fol-
lowed the first general election under the 1997 Constitution, which produced
another multi-ethnic government and the country's first Indo-Fijian Prime
Minister. Fiji's fourth coup took place in December 2006; the reasons given
for carrying out this coup were the need to establish universal suffrage for all
Fijian citizens; to ensure that electoral reforms enabled that universal suf-
frage; to rid the country of corruption; and to establish a truly multi-ethnic
society in which racial issues would no longer be the determining factors in
policy formulation, nor the basis for, nor the driving force in, politics
(NCBBF 2008). The government has announced that there will be general
elections by September 2014. Prime Minister Bainimarama stepped down as
commander of the *Republic of Fiji Military Forces* and is leading a new polit-
ical party named 'Fiji First'. Whether the new party, that has the full backing
of the military, will accept the verdict of the ballot box and have their soldiers
retreat to the barracks if their party loses the elections, is a question that oc-
cupies the imagination of many people in the build-up campaign (Lal
2013:15).

While the causes for each coup, it is claimed, differ, public discourse has increasingly raised questions about the most appropriate governance system for Fiji. There have been competing claims that, on the one hand, democracy is a 'foreign flower' which does not work well with traditional systems of governance, and, on the other hand, that democracy is the only viable political governance system. Moreover, public discussions about both Fiji's present and future are marked by discontent and divisions along ideological, religious and ethnic lines, and economic interests. What has not been sufficiently articulated is the option of developing a form of democratic governance that is most suited to a context laced with a multiplicity of cultures and religious traditions, as well as philosophical thought. It is for these reasons that it was felt that an extensive and impartial inquiry that includes the views of all sections of society was needed in order to formulate feasible and durable solutions to Fiji's deep-seated governance problems. This, and the desire to assist Fiji in its search for a more appropriate and suitable form of governance, are the motivations for this study, and subsequently, this report. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that democracy in its various forms is far from the cure for all governance problems around the world. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that democracy in its various forms is far from the cure it has been touted as being for governance ills around the world, especially after the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall. Nevertheless, the 20th century was marked by the worldwide spread of democracy.

This paper provides an analytical framework based on the understanding that liberal modern democracy – as promoted by OECD countries over the past two decades – is an inherently Euro-American understanding of democracy.[2] It will be shown that this understanding developed in a historical

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[2]   The *Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD) is an international economic organization consisting of 34 countries, 26 of which are European countries, as

context that is completely different from the historical experiences and cultural practices of countries in the Global South.[3] The view that the Western liberal model of democracy forms the basis for economic development and wealth for the benefit of all, and should therefore be adopted by the rest of the world, is not only a-historical but flawed, based as it is on the unsustainable exploitation of resources, combined with massive, irreversible environmental destruction, and a deepening global economic crisis that affects the majority of people all over the world today (Held et al. 1999; Randers 2012).[4]

In contemporary research into political culture and comparative politics, a central question is: 'What determines the emergence, survival, and development of democracy?' (Geddes 2007:317-339; see also Welzel/Inglehart 2007:297). The following brief historical overview serves to show how democracy developed in Europe and in the British settler colonies, namely the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in specific historical, cultural, social and political contexts (Stephens 2005; Spruyt 2007:212). Moreover, it will be shown how the development and spread of democracy is inherently inter-woven with the development of capitalism in the economic sphere, and the political ideology of liberalism. Following that, the development of democracy in the West will be contrasted with the development of democracy in the Global South, which took place under very different conditions, especially since the end of WWII. Here the view that new democratic

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well as the United States and Canada, Chile and Mexico, South Korea and Japan, Australia and New Zealand. It was founded in 1961 with the common aim of stimulating economic development and world trade, and promoting democracy and the free market economy.

[3]   The term 'Global South' refers to those post-colonial countries that are either still developing or remain under-developed, and are marked by conflict, high levels of poverty and inequality. The other term often used by developed states, especially OECD states, to describe such countries is the 'Third World'.

[4]   See especially Held et al. 1999, chapters 3 – 5 and 8. In *2052,* Jorgen Randers draws on his experiences in the sustainability arena and the use of global forecasting tools; this book also includes the predictions of more than 30 leading scientists, economists and other thinkers regarding global development for the next 40 years.

states everywhere must imitate and follow the Euro-American model will be questioned, by referring to a re-conceptualization of views along the lines of *hybrid political orders* or *hybridity of governance*, which provides a more useful theoretical and practical approach. This general overview will be followed by a summary of the views and responses of both focus group participants and interviewees in Fiji, regarding their perspectives for democratic development. This paper concludes with recommendations that incorporate some key elements for a framework for 'deepening democracy'.

The limits of measuring democratic development

In recent years, considerable efforts have been made to measure and classify democracy by institutions such as *Freedom House*, based in the United States, and the *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance* (International IDEA), which is based in Sweden, and has 24 states as members. In addition, the Intelligence Unit of a leading conservative international financial magazine – *The Economist* – publishes a detailed report annually; this is known as *The Democracy Index*, which attempts to measure democracy, and to classify and rank the nations of the world accordingly. The *Index* is based on the ratings of 60 indicators, which are grouped into five categories, namely (1) electoral processes and pluralism, (2) civil liberties, (3) the functioning of government, (4) political participation, and (5) political culture (Democracy Index 2011:12). Each country is rated on a scale of zero to ten in each category, with their overall democracy index indicated by averaging out these five scores. These index values are then used to categorise countries as one of four types of regimes, namely; 'Full Democracies', 'Flawed Democracies', 'Hybrid Regimes', and 'Authoritarian Regimes':

Table 1: Democracy Index 2011

	No. of countries	% of countries	% of world population
Full democracies	25	15.0	11.3
Flawed democracies	53	31.7	37.1
Hybrid regimes	37	22.2	14.0
Authoritarian regimes	52	31.1	37.6
	167	100	100

Note: 'World' population refers to the total population of the 167 countries included in the Index. Because this Table only excludes micro-States, this constitutes nearly the entire world population. (Source: Democracy Index 2011:2.)

In the 2011 report, Fiji appears in the 'authoritarian regimes' category, ranked 123rd out of 167 countries, with a score of 3.67. Fiji is grouped together with countries such as Haiti, Russia, Egypt and China. The only other Pacific Island nation included in the *Index* is Papua New Guinea, which is listed as a 'flawed democracy', and ranks 67th with a score of 6.32 (Democracy Index 2011:12). Five years ago, in the *Index* of 2007, Fiji was classified as a 'hybrid regime', and ranked 91st with an overall score of 5.66 (Democracy Index 2007:4). The top-ranked country in the *Democracy Index* is Norway, with an overall score of 9.80 (Democracy Index 2011:11). In view of measurements such as these, there has been great interest in building democratic institutions worldwide, especially in the post-colonial societies of the Global South. This has become of major concern to both political scientists and political practitioners from OECD donor countries. Building democratic state institutions is presented as *the* way forward for providing a solid and sustainable framework

for development, security and peace.[5] This approach is informed by the discourse on so-called 'fragile states', which has become fashionable in mainstream Western political thought[6] - because fragility of statehood is perceived as a threat to security and development, building stable states is seen as a political necessity of primary importance (see Holtz and Dinnen in this volume).

At the same time, democracy, as promoted by Western governments' aid agencies and international NGOs, not only focuses on state-building, but also on building democratic states using the Western (or Euro-American) model employed by developed OECD countries. These countries are presented as being the most advanced democracies, and against this backdrop, post-colonial countries in the Global South, such as Fiji, are seen as more or less deficient democracies. As noted above, conventional indices are used to measure the stability of states and/or their level of democracy, and to rank states accordingly.[7] These rankings are presented by their proponents as culturally and politically neutral; however, in doing so, they neglect the epistemological and political bias of the ranking system, and overlook the political-ideological climate in which they were conceived.[8] At the same time, they serve obvious political purposes. For example, rankings, such as those of Freedom House, generate "a profound impact on international relations,

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[5] For this line of thought in the donor community, see e.g. AusAID 2006; OECD-DAC 2007, 2008, 2010, 2011; UK DFID 2005 and USAID 2004 and 2005. For full references, see the end of this chapter.

[6] Overviews of the fragile states discourse are provided by the edited volumes by Debiel and Klein 2002, Milliken 2003, Rotberg 2004, Schlichte 2005, Jones et al. 2007, Debiel/Lambach/Reinhardt 2007 and John 2008. For full references, see the end of this chapter.

[7] Apart from their political-ideological bias, the indices also have their methodological weaknesses; see e.g. the critique of the Freedom House Index by Giannone (2010). A more contextually sensitive approach is pursued by International IDEA, which seeks to avoid bias against non-Western forms of governance, and views democracy as being a permanent work in progress (International IDEA 2001 and 2008; for full references, see the end of this chapter).

[8] For a critique of the political-ideological (neo-liberal and neo-conservative) partiality of the Freedom House Index, see Giannone 2010.

humanitarian policies, development aid, and foreign policy of governments"
(Giannone 2010:91). On the other hand, to "establish democracy rankings
based entirely on Euro American understandings of what democracy should
be is to rule out the possibility and necessity of generating inflicted forms of
democratic governance consistent with different circumstances" (Koelble and
LiPuma 2008:7).

Furthermore, the mainstream approach utilized by the Western model of
democratization legitimizes and propagates the (neo-) liberal democratic
model in a pseudo-neutral 'scientific' manner; it lacks a self-reflexive ques-
tioning of one's own judgments about governance and democracy. Critics
argue that the underlying assumptions are highly a-historical and a-cultural,
that promoters of state-building along Western lines ignore context and cul-
ture, promote a narrow understanding of democracy, and present a highly
idealised picture of Western liberal democracies (see ibid). At the same time,
they expose a limited understanding of the actual structures and processes of
governance in countries that are labelled fragile states and/or deficient democ-
racies.

In fact, the current Western mainstream discourse on so-called fragile
states and deficient democracies, as well as its corollary (the promotion of
conventional democratic state-building along the lines of the Western OECD
model state), is of little use in understanding the realities of governance in
post-colonial states in the Global South, and for supporting home-grown
democratic development. In these post-colonial states, including Pacific Is-
land countries, state institutions are not the only institutions which fulfill
functions that, in the model Western state, are clearly state obligations. Local-
ly-rooted social entities (e.g. extended families, clans, tribes and village
communities) and traditional authorities (e.g. village elders, chiefs, healers,

'big men' and religious leaders), determine the everyday social reality of large parts of the population.

Moreover, as seen in Fiji and the Pacific, state institutions are to a certain extent 'infiltrated' and overwhelmed by local, customary non-state 'informal' institutions and social forces, which operate according to their own logic and rules within state structures. This leads to the departure of state institutions from the Western ideal in post-colonial societies. On the other hand, the intrusion of state agencies impacts on non-state local orders as well. Local customary institutions, as well as modern non-state institutions (for example churches and trades unions), are subject to deconstruction and re-formation as they engage with, and are incorporated into, state structures and processes. They do not remain unchanged; rather, they respond to and are influenced by the institutions of the state apparatus. They adopt an ambiguous position in relation to the state, appropriating state functions and 'state talk', whilst simultaneously continuing to pursue their own agenda.

Hybridized governance

In the course of these interactions, governance is hybridized; that is, the interface of introduced (liberal democratic) state institutions and local customary non-state institutions constitutes what can be called a 'hybrid political order'.[9] In hybrid political orders, diverse and competing authority structures, sets of rules, logics of order, and claims to power co-exist, overlap, interact and intertwine, combining elements both from introduced Western models of governance, as well as those stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and politics, with further influences exerted by the forces of globalization and associated societal fragmentation. The terms 'hybrid' and 'hybridization' are used to characterise these processes and political orders,

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[9]   On the concept of hybrid political orders, see Boege 2008, 2009 and Boege et al. 2009.

because they focus on a combination of elements that stem from genuinely different societal spheres which follow different logics, and because they affirm that these spheres do not exist in isolation from each other, but permeate each other, and, consequently, give rise to specific political orders that are characterized by the closely interwoven texture of their separate sources of origin.

In hybrid political orders, different types of legitimate authority, beyond the rational-legal authority legitimized by liberal democratic procedures, can be found; traditional and charismatic types of legitimacy co-exist, compete and interact with rational-legal legitimacy, leading to the hybridization of legitimate authority.[10] There continues to be a limited understanding of this diversity of co-existing and interacting types of legitimacy in mainstream Western political and academic discourse. Local understandings of legitimate authority stemming from indigenous customs and cultures may clash with liberal Western understandings of legitimate democratic governance (Lattas/Rio 2011:17).

The liberal democratic model focuses very much on the institutions and procedures of democracy, and, in particular, competitive (multi-party) electoral processes. It is conventional wisdom in Western political thought that elections are central to establishing legitimate democratic governance; however, this is not necessarily true in non-Western societal-cultural contexts

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[10] Max Weber distinguishes three ideal types of legitimate authority, namely legitimacy based on (1) Rational grounds – "resting on a belief in the 'legality' of patterns of normative rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands (legal authority); (2) Traditional grounds – resting on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of the status of those exercising authority under them (traditional authority); or finally (3) Charismatic grounds – resting on devotion to the specific and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him (charismatic authority)" (Weber 1968:46, see also Weber 1978:215). In the formally democratic states of the Pacific, hybridized forms of legitimacy prevail today, combining rational-legal, traditional and/or charismatic sources, see e.g. Boege 2009.

such as the Pacific Islands. Rather, the competitive dimension of liberal democratic elections, as well as the notion of a formal political opposition, is alien to customary practices in Pacific communities, and those assuming positions of power on the basis of such competitions are not necessarily seen as legitimate authorities.

In hybrid political orders, government and administrative office bearers do not enjoy authority primarily by virtue of being democratically elected representatives, nor as appointed servants of the citizenry. Rather, their legitimacy stems from sources beyond the rational-legal realm of the state and its procedures. For example, these leaders obtain their positions of power through being selected to stand for elections in the formal liberal democratic process due to their status in kin groups, such as their extended families, clans or tribes. Accordingly, their points of reference are not 'citizen voters in constituencies', but members of their kin groups. They enjoy legitimacy not because of the belief of citizens in the democratic process as a means to endow authority, but because of the belief of members of communities in their customary right to lead; they are not legitimate authorities as a result of being elected according to liberal democratic procedures, but rather because they can refer to other sources of legitimacy, usually rooted in custom and culture. Moreover, elected leaders themselves "do not necessarily understand, follow, adopt or even necessarily believe in the legitimacy of the formal institutions associated with the so-called OECD institutions which are being advocated and pursued by the international community" (Hogg/Leftwich 2008:1).

Rise and Development of Democracy after WW II

Since the end of World War II, the worldwide spread of democracy has intensified. Many political leaders who hold very diverse views profess to be democrats, and political regimes of all kinds use the term 'democratic' to describe themselves, regardless of the fact that what these regimes say and do is often

considerably different (Held 2006:1). It is hard to find any government in the contemporary world that does not either call itself democratic, or promise to restore democracy (Dahl 1989:313). Various attempts to quantify the development of democracy in the world conclude that more than 60% of all countries today have in place at least some minimal forms of democratic institutions and procedures (Beetham et al. 2008:5; see also Democracy Index 2011:2). Given this background, the vast majority of contemporary political and social scientists agree that democracy is the predominant form of government in the world today. It appears that nowadays governmental and non-governmental organisations alike consider democracy as an end unto itself because of the widespread conviction that democracy initiates economic development, contributes to poverty reduction and peace-building, and leads to greater protection of human rights (Beetham et al. 2008:5).

Nonetheless, there is still no universally accepted definition of democracy. However, there does seem to be a common understanding that, at a minimum, the fundamental features of democracy include:

- Majority rule, and the protection of minority rights;
- Regular, free and fair elections of representatives on the basis of universal suffrage;
- Citizen's rights and responsibilities;
- Protection of human rights including:
    - Freedom of speech and religion;
    - The right to equal protection under the law;
    - The opportunity to participate fully in the political, economic, and cultural life of society; and,
- Commitment to the values of tolerance, co-operation, and compromise (Lindsay 1951, Dahl 1956, Beetham et al. 2008).

Origins and Development of Democracy in the Western World

It is a widely held view amongst scholars that democratization initially took place in the emerging capitalist economies of Europe, in which small groups of rich elites usually held political power. Stephens, for example, sees the relationship between capitalist development and democracy as occurring in the shifts of balance of class power, in a process that weakened the power of the rich (landlords and large capitalists), and strengthened the lower classes (2005:2). Urbanization, industrialization, and new forms of communication and transportation contributed to the rapid gain of the capacity for self-organization, in the form of an emerging trade union movement, co-operatives, and all sorts of social clubs. It has also been argued that capitalism is positively linked with democracy because it "shares values and culture, and facilitates its development" (Almond 1991:468). This view is partly built on Schumpeter's classic publication *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, in which he stated that "historically the modern democracy rose along with capitalism, and in causal connection with it (…) modern democracy is a product of the capitalist process" (1966:296-297). Following this argument, Dahl concludes that, "it is an historical fact that modern democratic institutions (…) have existed only in countries with predominantly privately owned, market oriented economies, or capitalism if you prefer that name" (1990:143).

The argument that democracy promotes and supports capitalism appears valid when considering the historical experiences of 14 advanced capitalist democracies today.[11] With the exception of Italy and France, all these

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[11] Stephens subdivided these countries into five categories: (1) *early democratizers,* such as Switzerland, France, and Norway; (2) *countries with social democratic dominance,* such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden; (3) an *exceptional case* - that of Great Britain; (4) the *breakdown cases* of Germany and Italy; and (5) the *British settler colonies* of

countries are part of the exclusive group of 25 countries with the premium label 'full democracies' (Democracy Index 2011:11). To varying degrees, these countries have in common the existence of social security policies for low-income earners and unemployed people (such as housing supplements, child and child-raising benefits), social welfare assistance in the form of money or food vouchers, health insurance and pension insurance, all of which are characteristic of so-called 'welfare states'. As stated by Almond, these policies have been developed in order to reduce or eliminate the negative impacts of capitalism (1991:472). Other authors point out that the acceptance of institutions such as trades unions and political parties with socialist tendencies, were 'strategic decisions' by leaders of the ruling upper and middle classes on realizing that the cost of oppression would by far exceed the costs of concessions in the form of the above-mentioned welfare measures (Flora/Heidenheimer 1981).

According to Cammack, at the heart of the development of democracy in Western countries was the establishment of stable capitalist regimes, which found a balance between maintaining the authority of the traditional elites, and granting a degree of political participation to the masses without losing control (1997:13).

Democracy, Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism

In essence, liberalism can be defined as a political ideology that began in the 18th century in England, and which promoted social development by introducing laws and reforms in order to prevent revolutions (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992:80-81). Central to the idea of liberalism is a focus on the individual and self-determination. As a political movement, it supports liberal democracy, human rights, constitutionalism, fair and free elections, freedom of religion,

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Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the USA (Stephens 1979:115). See also Rueschemeyer et al. 1992:121-154.

and free trade. During the 19th century, liberalism became increasingly identi-
fied with democracy. In the 20th century, liberalism became more and more
associated with the economy, as democracy helped to provide an ideological
justification for the defence and protection of private property by force, if
necessary (Held 1997:9-12). This has contributed to the development of a
model of democracy that is based on debate, voting and decision-making by
majority rule. One of the fundamental problems for democratic development
in the Global South is the huge difference between this Western notion and
the prevalent values and practices of societies like Fiji, which are based on
dialogue, consensus-seeking and common rule (Galtung 2000:145).

During the second half of the 20th century, in particular since the 1970s,
Milton Friedman played a leading role in a new school of thinking that fierce-
ly opposed any welfare state tendencies by promoting so-called 'free market
programmes', in an attempt to radically transform capitalist economies, as
summarized in the classic statement of Friedman's economic philosophy in
Capitalism and Freedom (Friedman 1982). Due to Friedman's position at the
School of Economics at the University of Chicago, this new approach became
known as the '*Chicago School*' approach. The common term for the ortho-
doxy of such economic policies is 'neo-liberalism'. The term '*Washington
Consensus*'[12] is also widely used to refer to a neo-liberal or market fundamen-
talism. At the core of the neo-liberal agenda are: the elimination of the public
sphere, total liberation for corporations, and minimal social spending. "In
every country where Chicago school policies had been applied over the past
three decades, what has emerged is a powerful ruling alliance between a few

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[12]   The term '*Washington Consensus*' was coined in 1989 by the economist John Williamson. It
describes a set of specific economic policy descriptions that have been used as standard re-
form packages, promoted by institutions such IMF and the World Bank, for use in develop-
ing countries in crisis (on the regional impacts in Pacific see Schilder and Holtz in this vol-
ume).

large corporations and a class of mostly wealthy politicians" (Klein 2007 15). Another term for a newly emerging system that removes the boundaries between big government and big business is 'corporatism'[13]. The main consequences of economic liberalism for states, communities, the economy, and finally democracy, are "'huge transfers of public wealth to private hands, often accompanied by exploding debt, an ever-widening chasm between the dazzling rich and the disposable poor and an aggressive nationalism that justifies bottomless spending on security" (ibid.). The medicine prescribed by the Chicago school 'spin doctors'[14] usually includes tax cuts, free trade, privatized services in all areas of public life, cuts to social spending, and deregulation. Today, the key concepts of economic liberalism are promoted by, for example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (commonly known as the World Bank), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Neo-liberal policies and strategies are, to varying degrees, used by governments all over the world (e.g. USA, the European Union, Australia, and New Zealand).

The Development of Democracy in the Global South

There is a general consensus that state formation and democratization outside the Western experience took place in very different environments, and under different circumstances (Spruyt 2007:229). Like many other states in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, Fiji gained independence after the former colonial power (Britain) withdrew. Decolonized countries had a much shorter period of time to gain experience in state formation, and to build a democracy based on their own history, cultures, and value systems, than Western states. As one

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[13] 'Corporatism' describes the system of running a state using the power of organizations such as businesses, which claim to act in the best interests of the majority of people.

[14] The term 'spin doctors' describes so-called experts whose job it is to present the policies, actions, or words of a person or organization to the public in their best possible light.

author bluntly put it "for better or worse, it is the European state system which has been superimposed on the rest of the world" (ibid:231).

If the optimum pre-conditions for the development of democracy are material prosperity, urbanization, and the existence of a political culture that encourages tolerance and participation, how could developing countries lacking most of these pre-conditions establish, develop and sustain democracy? How can the emergence and survival of democracy under quite different social, economic, political and cultural conditions take place? How can countries that have been colonized and exploited for hundreds of years build democracy on social and economic structures changed and shaped by the colonizers?

Legum reports that, at a meeting in Washington, a World Bank expert asked the former President of Tanzania the question: 'Why have you failed?' Nyerere replied: "The British Empire left us a country with 85% illiterates, two engineers and 12 doctors. When I left office in 1985, we had 9% illiterates and thousands of engineers and doctors. At that point our income per capita was twice what it is today after the Structural Adjustment programme. We now have one third less children in our schools, and public health and social services are in ruin. During those years, Tanzania has done everything that the World Bank and the IMF have demanded" (Nyerere quoted by Legum 2012:32).

Legum commented that the fact that after independence the standard of living rose for more than a decade is usually forgotten. Nyerere was referring to the overlooked fact that, after independence, African standards of living rose for more than a decade. It was the debt crisis and the collapse of many export prices that forced African states such as Tanzania to seek help (ibid.).[15]

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15   The roots of the debt crisis lie in the 1970s and 1980s, at a time when Western banks were desperately seeking outlets for the huge liquid reserves placed with them by oil producing

Given this background, democratic development in the context of the de-colonization of Third World countries constituted a much more drastic step into unknown territory than for Western countries. Transferring the letter and spirit of the 'Westminster model' to, for example, Australia, where the level of economic development was relatively high, education almost universal, and where most people shared a common language and culture, was a very different matter from transferring this model to newly-independent, develop-ing countries with their economic under-development, mass illiteracy, and cultural heterogeneity (Pinkney 2003:43).[16]

If there is any lesson that can be learned from the European experience with democracy, it is that the building of democracy and the consolidation of democratic institutions are long and complex processes. Democracy does not happen quickly, or because elections are held; the histories of Western de-mocracies show that it takes substantial periods of time, as it often involves lengthy struggles for freedom from authoritarian governments.

Democracy and the New Global Order

This brief historical overview serves to illustrate that the development of democracy and the development of welfare states are interwoven but distinct processes. With focus on Fiji, it should be noted that the development of welfare states took place under favourable, special conditions that existed in only a limited number of countries. It should also be noted that, when the Cold War ended (as symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall), capitalism

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countries, the pace of whose profits far out-stripped their ability to spend this money. 'Those banks persuaded poor countries to take loans at the then prevailing low interest rates. It seemed to be a wonderful opportunity for all concerned. With time, the loans were mostly rolled-over, and of course, interest rose at compound rates, as global mobile capital became apparently scarcer. Hence the debt trap' (Legum 2012:32-33).

[16] In Fiji, cultural heterogeneity had resulted from the indenture system introduced by Great Britain, which resulted, at independence, in the people of Indian descent forming about 40% of the population. Those of Indian descent had completely different cultures, languages and religions (Hinduism, Islam and Sikhism) to those of the fairly homogenous existing *iTaukei* population.

became the dominant system in the world economy. In this context, it is important to be aware that democracy is a political philosophy; in the same way capitalism dominates the world economy, it has been suggested that democracy as a system of governance, together with free market capitalism, is without alternative, and is the likely "end point of mankind's ideological evolution' and the 'final form of human government" (Fukuyama 1992:2).

This view has been challenged by other authors, who rightly argue that democracy is a form of organization of social power in the public arena that cannot be separated from the economic and social structure on which that power rests (Boron 2005:31). The triumph of liberal democracy within the globalized capitalist economy (as held by Fukuyama) goes together with the erosion and decay of the international state system (Held 1995:27). There is little – if any – material basis for expecting significant improvements in these economic and political relationships; on the contrary, material development in the world economy is likely to worsen in the foreseeable future. It is hardly the case that the free market economy and democracy, or economic and political freedom, work together for the benefit of all people. The assumption that there is such a thing as a sovereign democracy in the capitalist world economy is actually an illusion, because the prevailing system of ownership and control results in substantial inequalities in wealth and income (Frank 1993:12; Dahl 1991:333). In the globalized capitalist economy, it also becomes increasingly difficult to determine and control economic policies at national level.

Just how serious a threat neo-liberal policy married to corporatism is for democracy is well-summarized in the following quote: "*Until the fall of the Berlin Wall (...) the global system was run by politicians. Since then it has been run by economists and financiers, rather like a macrocosm of the corporate world (...) Corporates are not working for a broad range of stakeholders*

and economies are not working for the populace (...) For the past thirty years or more, the agenda (of the corporate world) has focused entirely on shareholders return. This inevitably results in an obsession with share prices (...) The best way to protect the share price is to protect the earnings, and the easiest and fastest way to do that is to cut costs (...) Companies are gutted beyond recognition and millions of employees sacrificed for a short-term share price boost. This share market monster must be fed regularly. So mergers and acquisitions become an essential part of the corporate repertoire (...) The notion that the stock price is the be-all and end-all of corporate performance is so ingrained that it seems to have been handed down on stone tablets. In reality it is an outgrowth of the go-go 1980s and '90s. The related notion that shareholders are the only stakeholders with a legitimate claim on the corporation is just as ingrained and just as new" (Legum 2012:39).

This means that the wishes of the people forming the electorate in a democracy become secondary to those of the owners of foreign as well as local capital. It also explains why a change of government does usually not lead to a change of policies, because "[t]he global market has given the invisible hand of the market a carte blanche to pick up democratically elected governments by the scruff of their necks and slap it around if it attempts to put the needs of its electorate above the interests of international capital" (ibid:40).

An Alternative Approach

In Pacific Island countries in particular, state institutions are not the only institutions that fulfill functions which, in the model Western state, are clearly a state's obligations. 'The state' often has little relevance to many people in rural areas. Rather, local non-state customary institutions, which have their roots in their pre-colonial past, still play an important role in the everyday life of the majority of people and communities.

In fact, "whether the democratic institutions that emerged from northern experience indeed are appropriate to the historic conditions of the South" (Gaventa 2006:9) is certainly an appropriate question, all the more so as the flaws and shortcomings of the liberal representative model of democracy become more and more obvious. There is a gulf between the promise and the practice of democracy, which leads to disenchantment with democracy, not only in the Pacific Islands, but also in the Western heartlands of liberal democracy.

The liberal democratic model focuses very much on institutions and procedures of democracy, particularly competitive (multi-party) electoral processes. In this model, people are mainly voters, private economic actors, and consumers of rights and services, which are provided by state institutions that are democratically legitimized by means of elections. This is in essence democratic elitism: the people have the right to choose the elites by whom they are governed by means of a democratic process – namely elections.

The win-lose logic of elections contradicts the consensus-oriented mentality of Pacific Islanders who strive, whenever possible, for outcomes that allow everybody to 'save face' and maintain good relationships (that is, not to 'lose' an election contest, and be forced into 'opposition'). The Westminster model, which relies on confrontation between government and opposition, 'clashes with the Pacific ideal of consensus decision making. The government/opposition split is considered to be divisive and wasteful of scarce financial and human resources' (Henderson 2003:229). For example, with regard to Fiji, Ravuvu explains that villagers did not understand the need for a formal opposition: 'It made no sense to them to actually pay people to work against the government and against their chosen leaders in Parliament' (Ravuvu 1991). Accordingly, competition between political parties, also seen as a vital ingredient of liberal representative democracy, is not necessarily

perceived as a positive democratic feature by people in the Pacific. Rather, 'parties have proved to be a particularly divisive factor in the Pacific context' (Henderson 2003:230). Usually, parties are not built around distinctive political programmes and along clear ideological lines; instead, they are rather loose unions of individual candidates that temporarily join forces for election purposes. Commitment to any specific party is very weak, with 'party hopping' a frequent phenomenon. Governments are often built on rather shaky and shifting party coalitions, and changes of government are frequent due to splits in such coalitions (Larmour 2005:235). Multi-party systems are weak, and political parties and their members do not enjoy much prestige as constituent elements of democratic governance.

In conclusion, then, mainstream Western political science thinking still follows a modernist path, the assumption being that there will be development from an undemocratic or pre-democratic tradition to democratic modernity, using Euro-American states and societies as a yardstick for such development. This thinking leads to the presupposition that all democratic states must emulate the Euro-American template, and if they don't, they are 'incomplete', that is, democracies 'with adjectives' ('illiberal', 'deficient', 'virtual', and 'defective') (see Collier/Levitsky 1997). This line of thought promotes "a very specific and idealised notion of democracy (…) [It] tends to support a one-size-fits-all approach and pays little attention to local context and pre-conditions" (Gaventa 2006:15). A change of analytical perspective would acknowledge the different modernity/ies of the societies of the Global South, and, accordingly, the existence of different forms of democracy/ies as works in progress, adapting to the historical and cultural conditions in those societies. People must be free to define democracy on their own terms, instead of imposing a universal (that is to say Euro-American) definition of

democratic governance on them. "Attempts to force a country to be 'democratic' make a nonsense of the term" (Henderson 2003:239).

Voices of the People – A Summary

To conclude, a summary of the findings on democracy of the research project on 'Perceptions and Preconditions for Democratic Development in Fiji' (Boege et al. 2013:34-50) that was carried out between 2011 and 2013 will be presented.[17]

The majority of focus group participants appeared to know little about the origins, history and development of democracy, although a few participants in each group demonstrated familiarity with some of the key elements of democracy, such as equality, human rights, the rule of law, and participation in decision-making through elections. Focus group participants clearly view the current system in Fiji as undemocratic by virtue of the lawfully elected government being ousted through a coup in 2006, the Constitution abolished, and Fiji ruled since then by a military government, through the issuance of decrees. In addition, human rights have been violated and there were (and still are) restrictions in place with regard to the freedom of expression. Given a choice of governance systems, the vast majority of participants prefer democracy for Fiji, and a substantial number of participants are – for a variety of reasons – opposed to or critical of the current government. It should be noted, however, that a small majority of participants expressed their appreciation for

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[17] Convinced of the importance of recognizing the views and wisdom of the people of Fiji in devising a form of governance that is appropriate and suited to Fiji's historical cultural context, specific local political conditions, and aspirations of her people, the research report is based on a systematic exploration and analysis of views of Fijians from all sectors of society. This was achieved by means of holding 41 focus group discussions involving 330 participants, and conducting 83 in-depth interviews with individuals representing government, civil service, judiciary, academics, church leaders, civil society organisations, civil servants, leaders of political parties and business. In determining the sample for both focus groups and interviews, great care was taken to accurately reflect the composition of Fijian society in terms of gender, religion, ethnicity, age, education, status, living conditions and geographical distribution. The full report is available on the website of the *Pacific Theological College* www.ptc.ac.fj

certain programmes, projects and policies introduced by the military govern-ment. Nevertheless, there is agreement between supporters and opponents alike that there is a need for reform of the electoral system, and the introduc-tion of regulations for political parties and aspiring politicians.

A comparison between responses of participants in focus group discus-sions and interviewees shows some striking similarities, but also some differ-ences. The major differences between responses from participants and inter-viewees can mostly be ascribed to the different levels of formal education and status of the two groupings. Most focus group participants are representative of the majority of Fijians, who have low to moderate incomes, being in in-formal or formal employment, living in villages, towns and settlements. The vast majority of participants have had at least some sort of formal education: most have completed primary school, although very few have undergone secondary school or studies at tertiary level. In contrast, the interviewees represent a much smaller section of the social strata of Fiji, having medium to higher incomes, the majority having degrees from tertiary institutions, and being in leading positions at different levels of government, religious organi-zations, civil society, business, and political parties, or being traditional lead-ers. Because of these differences, interviewees naturally exercise a much greater influence on the public discourse on democracy, and provide more differentiated and reflective opinions on democracy and other related areas.

Similar to focus group participants, the vast majority of interviewees ex-pressed their support for democracy as their preferred model of governance, rejected in principle the idea of bringing about change through coups, and also rejected any sort of racially-based politics. Similarly, the majority of interviewees support reforms of the electoral system. Because some inter-viewees are politicians, or have been involved in politics in the past, there was less criticism of the role and function of political parties and politicians.

It also became clear that the interviewees' responses were often based on their personal backgrounds, or personal experiences; this is especially true for those who either suffered or benefitted from the last coup. In broad terms, those interviewees who suffered as a result of the last coup are mainly traditional leaders and representatives of NGOs who have expressed criticism of the military, as well as trades union leaders and people who lost their jobs because they were dismissed by the current government. On the other hand, the majority of interviewees who are part of the government, such as civil servants and ministers, as well as many of the business representatives, expressed their support for the current government in different ways.

Turning to the broader picture, having a liberal democracy in a 'sovereign' country may be better than having no democracy at all, but it is still far from the ideal of democracy, which is, by definition, the government of the whole people by the people equally represented. Looking at the economic fundamentalism which underlies the globalized capitalist economy, one lesson that can be learnt is that relying purely on voting every four or five years is inadequate for controlling economic policy. Representation may be a necessary precondition for democracy, but it can only be genuinely democratic when reinforced by the enhanced participation of citizens at all levels of decision-making in all spheres of public life. This increased participation would need to be complemented by the insertion of democratic principles into economic life, which in turn would require the introduction of new clauses into the ground rules or basic laws of the free-market and trade system at global, regional and national levels. Eventually, this would require a fundamental rethinking of the relationship between democracy and the economy.

As has been outlined in the first part of this paper, conventional democratic state-building aims at replicating the liberal representative model, by applying a standard recipe of support for elections and state institutions, with

some additional assistance for civil society (Carothers 1999). Civil society in this context, however, is also understood along Western lines, with NGOs, community-based organizations, business associations, and trades unions etc. constituting elements of 'civil society'; at the same time, the Western approach ignores actors and institutions which do not fit into its understanding of civil society, such as chiefs, elders, healers, charismatic religious leaders etc., thus missing the realities on the ground in the countries of the Global South.

This liberal representative model of democracy is challenged by approaches that aim at deepening democracy: "*In this view, democracy is not only a set of rules, procedures and institutional design, and cannot be reduced to only a way of competition amongst parties (...) Rather, it is a process through which citizens exercise ever deepening control over decisions which affect their lives, and as such it is also constantly under construction (...) Full democratic citizenship is attained not only through the exercise of political and civic rights, but also through social rights, which in turn may be gained through participatory processes and struggles*" (Gaventa 2006:11).

In other words, this 'deepening democracy' approach transcends conventional understandings of liberal representative democracy, through creating and expanding more participatory and socially inclusive forms of democracy.[18] The focus of 'deepening democracy' is on new democratic arenas and spaces (Cornwall/Coelho 2004), and on participatory governance at the local level in particular. This approach is close to deliberative understandings of democracy (Habermas 1996; Dryzek 2000), which shifts the focus from a 'voting-centric' democracy to a 'talk-centric' democracy (Chambers 2003),

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[18] Famous examples are the Porto Alegre experiment (Manor 2004), and what became known as 'forum politics', which preceded the new activist-based innovative movements of Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. This approach is fully explained and further developed in the final chapter of this report with regard to its applicability in Fiji (see Boege et al 2013:187-190).

and to concepts of empowered participatory governance (Fung/Wright 2003). In this context it can be argued, for example, that contestation among combative political parties is not the only possible democratic model; consensus-seeking in village or town meetings is another real option.

After eight years of military rule on the 14th of September 2014 the Fijian people will elect a new government. Whatever the outcome will be it is hoped that the newly elected government will realize that the country needs a more robust and engaged civic life than the one it has been accustomed to since independence.

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Contributors

Notes on Contributors

Dr. Geoff Bertram, Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
Contact: geoff.bertram@vuw.ac.nz,

Dr. Henning Blatt, Lawyer in Essen, Germany.
Contact: blatt@raehp.de

Eike Blitza, Research associate at the Chair for Public Law, particularly International and European Law at the University of Trier.
Contact: eike.blitza@web.de

Dr. Volker Böge, Peace researcher and historian. Research Fellow at the School of Political Science and International Studies (POLSIS) at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia. Fields of work: post-conflict peace-building and state formation; non-Western approaches to conflict transformation; natural resources, environmental degradation and conflict. Regional areas of expertise: the South Pacific, Southeast Asia and West Africa.
Contact: v.boege@uq.edu.au

Dr. Sinclair Dinnen, Associate Professor at the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia (SSGM) Program in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia.
Contact: sinclair.dinnen@anu.edu.au

Dr. Manfred Ernst, Manfred Ernst is the Director of the Institute for Research and Social Analysis (IRSA) of the Pacific Theological College (PTC) in Suva, Fiji. He has studied political science, sociology and modern history, and has a PhD in Philosophy from the University of Hamburg, Germany. He has been living and working in Fiji for 18 years.
Contact: irsa.director@ptc.ac.fj

Oliver Hasenkamp, M.A., Oliver Hasenkamp is Chairman of the German Pacific Network (Pazifik-Netzwerk e.V.). He holds a B.A. and M.A. in Political Science from the Free University of Berlin and the University of Potsdam as well as Certificates in *Climate Change Diplomacy* and *Diplomacy of Small States* from DiploFoundation. Since January 2016, he is working as an officer at the United Nations Association of Germany (DGVN).
Contact: oliver.hasenkamp@pazifik-netzwerk.org

Dr. Graham Hassall, Graham Hassall is an Associate Professor in the School of Government, Victoria University of Wellington. He has held previous academic positions in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Switzerland, and Fiji Islands, and specialises in government and public policy in the Pacific Islands. He also has an interest in global governance and is currently President of the United Nations Association of New Zealand.
Contact: graham.hassall@vuw.ac.nz

Dr. Andreas Holtz, political scientist, Technical University Kaiserslautern. His main interests are the interface between culture and power, theories of international relations and research about small states.
Contact: holtz@verw.uni-kl.de

Dr. Matthias Kowasch, Matthias Kowasch is currently a lecturer at the Department of Geography at University of Bremen. He holds a PhD in human geography about the participation of the indigenous Kanak in the development of the nickel sector in New Caledonia, including extensive fieldwork in Kanak villages. He specialises in resource exploitation, governance, indigenous people and textbook research. Before arriving in Bremen, he worked at the University of New Caledonia and the Institute of Research for Development (IRD) in Noumea.

Contact: kowasch@uni-bremen.de

Dr. Peter Lindenmann, Peter Lindenmann studied social anthropology, biology and environmental studies at the Universities of Basel and Zurich. He holds a PhD in Social Anthropology from University of Basel where he has also been teaching for numerous years. His research in political anthropology is based on several prolonged stays in New Caledonia. For his thesis he received the price of the THESE-PAC association in 2012. He currently works as a programme officer at the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation.

Contact: peter.lindenmann@bluewin.ch

Dr. Derek McDougall, Principal Fellow (Associate Professor), School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Melbourne, Victoria 3010, Australia.

Contact: d.mcdougall@unimelb.edu.au

Dr. Hermann Mückler

Hermann Mückler is Professor of Cultural & Social anthropology and ethno-history at the University of Vienna. His regional focuses are the Pacific Islands as well as Australia. He specialises in peace and conflict studies, colonialism and post-colonialism, geopolitics, history, visual anthropology and material culture.

Contact: hermann.mueckler@univie.ac.at

Dr. Christoph Müller

Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in Australia with aditional accreditation for Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

Contact: info@canb.diplo.de

Dr. Steven Ratuva

Director of the Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies and Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand. He has worked in a number of universities including the University of Auckland, Australian National University and University of the South Pacific and has published widely in the areas of peace and conflict, affirmative action, civil-military relations, development and political change.

Contact: s.ratuva@auckland.ac.nz

Dr. Klaus Schilder

Development policy officer at MISEREOR, German Catholic Bishops Development Organisation, Berlin.

Contact: klaus.schilder@misereor.de

Dr. Anne-Marie Schleich

Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany in New Zealand with aditional accreditation for the Cook Islands, Fiji, Samoa, Kiribati, Tonga and Tuvalu.

Contact: info@well.diplo.de

Dr. Manuel Schmitz

Manuel is teaching in the master programme "European Studies: Transnational and Global Perspectives" at the K.U. Leuven, Belgium. He was a lecturer at Trier University, Visiting Fellow at Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta (Indonesia) and Vice-Chairman of the German East Timor Society. In his PhD thesis he analysed the international campaign for East Timor's independence.

Contact: manuel.schmitz@chello.be

Dr. Clement A. Tisdell

Australian economist and Emeritus Professor at the University of Queensland. He is best known for his work in environmental and ecological economics. Research interests: Environmental and Resource Economics, Agricultural Economics, Economic Development and Growth, Industry Economics and Industrial Organisation, Microeconomic Theory.

Contact: c.tisdell@uq.edu.au

Dr. Joanne Wallis

Lecturer and Convener, Asia-Pacific Security program, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University, Canberra.

Contact: joanne.wallis@anu.edu.au

Around one third of the Earth's surface is covered by the Pacific Ocean. When looking at "the" Pacific, public and scientific discourse – especially in Europe - is mostly centered on the periphery of this ocean, which includes important actors like Australia, the USA, Russia, China, Japan as well as the booming Asian and Latin-American states.

This ignores that the Pacific itself is not only covered by water, but is also a political space in the sense of different political units summarized in the term of Pacific Island Countries (PICs). In fact, the Pacific Islands Region has been one of the politically most dynamic regions of the world in the last decade and even more so today. There are ongoing transformations to regionalism and the regional system of cooperation, in national politics and in the relationships to larger actors as well as the international activities of the Pacific Island States. This book brings together renowned international experts on politics in Oceania as well as researchers and scholars from Germany to provide a comprehensive overview of many of these current developments and issues in the Pacific Islands Region. It offers a theoretical framework as well as contributions analysing actors, institutions and structures in Oceania, substantiated by case studies from various island states.